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ABSTRACT
The world was shaken by the June Fourth Massacre which erupted in China in 1989. 
It is abundantly clear that the cause of the pro-democracy movement with widespread 
support from different walks of life lies primarily in the despotic rule of state socialism. The 
present study observes that most people who supported the student demonstrations in 1989 
did so because they considered what the students demanded was consistent with their wishes. 
Feeling discontented with the intense social problems in China, many people thus offered 
their support to the student movement. Despite the tragic nature of the massacre, the 
significance of the incident is a deeper "awakening" among Chinese intellectuals. After the 
massacre, many Chinese intellectuals have become more conscious of their independence, 
considering professional autonomy as fundamental right to intellectual life. Rethinking their 
social role, they strove to restructure a new relationship with the state. Some of them go 
along the path of working outside the state apparatus and some even step on the way of "anti­
establishment".
The present study first establishes a framework for examining sociologically how 
ideas are formed with particular reference to the examination of Chinese intellectuals' 
conceptualization of democracy. The basis for this framework is K. Mannheim's sociology 
of knowledge, together with A. Gramsci's sociology of intellectuals and P. Bourdieu's notion 
of intellectual field. Deriving the insights from these scholars we hope to establish a more 
coherent conceptual framework for the analysis of intellectual production.
With this framework in hand, the next step was to determine a reasonable approach to 
the examination of the ideological formation of Chinese intellectuals. The source of 
information for the study came from the first-hand intensive interviews with the selected 
intellectuals. Besides, the present study also scrutinizes the works of these intellectuals 
whose works have spanned the years especially from the May Fourth Movement (1919) to 
the June Fourth Incident (1989). Their perceptions of democracy, freedom and human rights 
provide vital clues for determining the complete picture of the evolution on the idea of 
democracy in contemporary China. No one intellectual has managed to suggest what 
democracy is, but using the theoretical framework and examining the interviews, writings 
and speeches of these intellectuals over a period of several years have allowed this researcher 
to develop a systematic and a more integrated view of democracy as formulated by Chinese 
intellectuals.
In the process of analyzing the ideological production of Chinese intellectuals, this 
writer has also discovered the emergence of new and different relationships which have 
developed between Chinese intellectuals and the state. At the same time as they have 
become more independent, the nature of their critique has changed. In the past Chinese 
intellectuals criticized only the corruption of government and never the system of 
government itself. But post-Mao intellectuals have thrown off the fetters of their 
predecessors and turned their attacks on the system of their repressive Communist regime. 
Those who, in an earlier era, were fiercely loyal to the Communist ideals now speak only of 
the myth of a Communist utopia. Their criticism of the crises in China and their critique of 
state socialism reveal not only their scepticism of socialist praxis but also their wishes to 
make China more democratic. One point which deserves special attention is that the present
research finds that the sixth generation of intellectuals has become more conscious about 
their independent role, rethinking a new relationship with the state and they have 
distinguished themselves from the establishment.
The most significant finding of the present research is the fact that the ideological 
formation is greatly affected by the social location, the educational orientation and 
generational location of intellectuals. More importantly, a deeper understanding of how 
Chinese intellectuals conceive the ideas of democracy is significantly determined by the 
particular socio-historical and socio-cultural contexts in which the ideas are formed. The 
present study also observes that intellectual radicalism is greatly constrained by the socio­
economic and political opportunities that intellectuals have access. With different social 
locations and socio-economic-political opportunities to which intellectuals access, they may 
adopt different strategies in coping with the state. After the June Fourth massacre, many 
Chinese intellectuals with critical thinking were forced to exile overseas. The writer also 
finds that these exiled intellectuals have deeper reflection of democracy and also their 
relationship with the state especially when their socio-political circumstances have changed. 
Adding these observations together, it is highly indicative to us that Chinese intellectuals 
have struggled for a more autonomous social position and endeavored to have a new 
relationship with the state.
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LIST OF INTERVIEWS
In the present research, the author has visited different places to interview some 
prominent Chinese intellectuals. It is suggested by Cheek (1986) that most Chinese 
intellectuals are "establishment intellectuals", working either directly under state 
administration or closely associated with the establishment. In addition, it is a well-known 
fact that Chinese intellectuals have not really distinguished themselves from the 
establishment especially when they were restricted by their dependent social location. Thus, 
we too regard most Chinese intellectuals as "establishment intellectuals" working for the state 
and they a part of the state apparatus no matter what forms they took.
After the June Fourth Movement of 1989 many intellectuals, particularly those with 
critical and dissident views, went abroad. The present study examines this group of Chinese 
intellectuals with particular reference to the relationship between their changing socio­
economic and political situations and social location and their ideological formation. The 
researcher is based on a series of interviews in Princeton and Arizona in the United States of 
America; Holland; London and Paris. The interviews were conducted in July 1992 and June 
to July 1993.
One word concerning these interviews that should be stated here is the author 
conducted the following interviews in Mandarin and Cantonese and which materials were 
recorded in Chinese. In the present study, the author translates these interviews and reports 
them in English. When citing or using the interview materials, the author shall state clearly 
where and when the interviews took place. A list of the interviews conducted follows.
Interviews conducted in 1992
1. Yan Jiaqi, Paris
2. Ran Runnan, Paris
3. Linda Lui, Paris
4. Sun Xiaobin, Holland
5. Chinese scholars, London
Interviews conducted in 1993
1. Su Xiaokang, Princeton
2. Chen Yizhi, Princeton
3. Fang Lizhi, Arizona
4. Liu Binyan, Princeton
5. Su Wei, Princeton
6. Kong Jisheng, Princeton
NOTES ON TRANSLATIONS
In this thesis, I do all the translations of materials from original Chinese into English, 
except the quotations adopted from the English source. The present study uses Pinying 
System to translate names of provinces, cities, and places, except Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Most of the names of people are translated according to Pinying System, except some names 
which are adopted from Taiwan source remain in its original system. For example, Chow 
Tse-tsung, Chang Hao and Chaing Chen-chiang are still cited according to the original 
system.
INTRODUCTION
In the modem world, intellectuals have become more powerful and significant, 
influencing the politics and formation of society/ Intellectuals, nowadays, have to come 
to grips with the questions of to which class (if any) they belong and to which political 
current they adhere. The sociology of intellectuals is concerned primarily with the 
intellectuals and their roles in society, especially the examination of the social, political 
and economic factors which affect their social location and relationship with the state.^ 
Central questions in the sociology of intellectuals, simply stated, are: (1) What is the 
relationship between their social location and their ideological formation? (2) Have the 
intellectuals formed a special class, or an independent stratum, or rather, do they just 
belong to different classes? (3) Do their ideas represent their own class interests, or the 
interests of other classes separately, or rather, a reflection of complex interests of 
different classes? Answers to these questions have aroused waves of debate in different 
settings, among different schools of thought, and in different socio-historical and socio­
political contexts.
Another controversial issue is the definition of intellectuals. Traditionally, 
intellectuals have been defined in terms of their particular function or role in society, 
considering them as a group of people who earn their living with their minds (Coser, 
1965). In addition, many American sociologists define intellectuals as "producers of 
culture" (see, for example, Lipset & Dobson, 1972). Marxist-inspired analysts have 
interpreted intellectuals as bound by the "relations of production", regarding them as 
carriers of "cultural capital", and have argued that intellectuals have become more 
dominant in modem society (see, Bourdieu, 1984, 1988; Gouldner, 1979). In discussions 
of social movements, intellectuals have been considered an important part for they are
'For the discussion on the increasing influence o f intellectuals in the modem world, see, for example, Konard and Szelenyi (1979; 
1991); Bell (1974); Gouldner (1979); Habermas (1971) and Bourdieu (1971).
^The discussion o f the development o f sociology o f intellectuals as a sub-field in sociology is clearly presented in Gella (1976). 
This book gives a detailed discussion on the formation of the sociology of intellectuals and its scope of studies &om an international 
view. See also Bourdieu (1969 & 1985: 11-24).
professionally engaged in the production of ideas or manipulation of symbols, 
contributing to the development of the collective identity of social movements (see, 
Eyerman & Jamison, 1991). Some scholars go far beyond such discussions, suggesting 
that intellectuals have become a new class to further their own interests (see, Konrad and 
Szelenyi, 1979 & 1991). Gouldner (1979) also argues in a similar fashion that 
intellectuals are to be united by "newer forms of new class' ideology", characterized by a 
"multi-science character" as ideological framework. Other analysts have just put 
emphasis on the experts and scientific practitioners but ignored the critical or "public 
intellectual" (Jacoby, 1987) in their discussions of intellectuals (see, for example, Ben- 
David, 1971). In most of the foregoing accounts, from whichever vantage points they 
chose, one dimension consistently has been ignored, that is, the relations between the 
particular context of social movements and formative influences on intellectual life.^
Paraphrasing Gramsci, we can argue that while all activists are intellectuals, all 
activists do not serve the function of intellectuals in social movements."* In this light, we 
believe all intellectuals emerge in aome particular context, implying that no one is bom 
an intellectual. Rather, intellectuals are formed during the process of interaction, 
especially when they carry out intellectual activities in particular social settings.^ 
Following Eyerman & Jamison (1991), we consider social movements primarily as 
processes through which meaning/knowledge is constituted. Apart from analyzing 
instrumental and strategic actions of movement praxis, we attempt to study the cognitive 
side of these movements, that is, the interaction between the formation of collective 
identity and the social, political, economic and historical contexts in which ideology is
^This line o f reasoning is adopted from Eyerman and Jamison (1991). For discussion on the different definitions o f intellectuals, 
see, for example, Huszar (1960); Pipes (1982); Eisenstadt & Graubard (1973).
^Gramsci (1971: 121) writes that "[a]ll men are intellectuals, one could therefore say; but all men do not have the function of 
intellectuals in society".
’This line o f thought is influenced by the work of Eyerman & Jamison (1991) on social movement. They propose to study social 
movements from a cognitive approach, that is, examining the formation o f ideology or collective identity of social movements. In 
particular, they suggest investigating the ideological creators (movement intellectuals) of social movements with special reference to 
the interaction between ideological formation and the particular socio-historical context.
formed. Against such an intellectual background, the principal goal of this study is to 
examine the relationship between the ideological formation of intellectuals and the socio- 
historical as well as socio-political contexts of social movements supporting democracy 
and human rights in contemporary China.
In order to explore ideology/knowledge of these movements, the vertical line of 
the present research will concentrate on scmtinizing how "movement intellectuals" 
conceptualize ideology/collective identity for the movements. Horizontally, the 
particular socio-historical and socio-political contexts of different social movements will 
be examined. Putting the observations on the interaction between both vertical and 
horizontal lines we hope to depict a contextual and sociological framework for 
understanding the ideological production of Chinese intellectuals.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
Early in the May Fourth Movement,^ the Chinese intellectuals began to look into 
what they pictured as a cultural enigma. Confronted with a total disintegration of the 
socio-political and the socio-cultural as well as socio-moral orders in their time, the May 
Fourth scholars were forced to find an alternate path to fill the "vacuum" set in this 
particular historical stage (see, Lin Yusheng, 1979). Having internalized the role of 
intellectuals, as the gatekeepers and sources of legitimacy and interpreters of cultural 
values (Cheng, 1990: 68-70), the May Fourth scholars began to look into the Western 
ideas of "democracy" and "science", trying to find another set of ideas to restore the
^In the May Fourth Movement, the intellectuals not only fought against the unequal treaties imposed by Japan and other Western 
countries but also sought democracy and science to save the nation from bankruptcy. Concerning the definition of the May Fourth 
Movement, scholars have divergent interpretations. Some identify the entire movement with the new culture movement, considering 
it as a phenomenon o f the intellectuals; and even some o f them regard the movement as "Chinese Renaissance" or an "intellectual 
revolution in modem China". In contrast, some scholars, especially the communist writers, interpret the movement as directly caused 
and directed by the Russian Revolution. J. Chen (1971) suggests that the focus on purely cultural or political aspects of the movement 
only falls into over-generalization and distorts the nature o f the movement Having such a belief, Chen proposes to interpret the 
movement in light o f its social and historical settings. He therefore suggests that the May Fourth Movement (MFM) and the New 
Culture Movement (NCM) should not be seen as the same. For Chen, the MFM is primarily a patriotic movement for direct political 
action, and its "collaboration" with the NCM rendered an invaluable service to the final dissolution o f Chinese tradition and the quest 
for modernity. Contrary to Chen, Chow (1960) defines the MFM in a far broader sense, considering both cultural and political aspects 
o f the m ovement In this research, 1 adopt the definition from Chow (1960) to analyze the movement in light o f a broader scope. For 
details o f the definitional issues regarding the MFM, see, Chow (1960); J. Chen (1971) and Chang Hao (1989).
cultural order (see, for example, Fairbank, 1983: 374-450; Cheng, 1990: 71-76). The 
challenge of modernity began to confront the Chinese people in general and the 
intellectuals in particular. They were forced to disentangle the unresolved dilemma 
between tradition on the one hand and modernity on the other (see, for example, Lin, 
1979 and Li Zehou, 1990a). Both the intellectuals and the students have been engaging 
in various social and intellectual movements, struggling for freedom, human rights and 
emancipation of individuals since 1919 (see, Fairbank, 1983; Cheng, 1990; Nathan,
1990). 'Democracy' was the central theme and 'catchword' constituting the core ideology 
of the 1919 May Fourth Movement, the democracy movement in late 1970's , the 1986- 
87 student demonstrations and the 1989 Tiananmen pro-democracy movement (see, for 
example, Nathan, 1985, 1990; Ferdinand, 1991; Womack, 1991; Wasserstrom, 1992). It 
is therefore necessary to examine how the movement intellectuals conceptualize 
democracy in response to different historical contexts.
In addition, it has been observed that post-Mao Chinese intellectuals have become 
more conscious of intellectual independence, becoming more critical and more willing to 
assert their rights. In particular, the post-Mao intellectuals have become more critical 
and bold enough to confront the state (see, for example. Cheek, 1986; Goldman et al. 
1987 & 1993). Their critique and dissidence are not confined only to private meetings 
but have been expressed in the public arena. Discussion groups and salons were popular 
in the late 80's, indicating an emergence of a relatively free public sphere (Gold, 1990 
and Rosen, 1992). In addition to these observations, my previous research also confirms 
that Chinese intellectuals are rethinking their role in Chinese society with particular 
attention to considering their relationship with the state (Mok, 1991). From this vantage 
point, it is intellectually stimulating to further study their conceptions of democracy, their 
relationship with the state, and their role and function in society.
OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
Recent studies have suggested that there is a continuity in the concept of 
democracy between the May Fourth scholars and the contemporary intellectuals, 
(Wasserstrom, 1990: 3-24; Yu Yingshih, 1991: 243-257; Cheng, 1990: 71-76; Israel, 
1992; Schwarcz, 1992) while some researchers argue that the interpretations of 
democracy have been varied in respect of different socio-historical settings (Duke, 1989: 
48-68; Calhoun, 1989: 116-119; Krauss, 1989: 294-315; C.P. Chang, 1989: 3-4; Lin 
Yusheng, 1989: 62-81, 214-240; Israel, 1992). In this research, I confine my study to 
examining the group of movement intellectuals and the student demonstrators who have 
become more open to Western thought and liberal thinking. I hope to scrutinize how 
they interpret and develop the ideas of democracy at different points of time.
One point which deserves emphasis here is that this study is not a work on history 
of ideas but a sociological study of ideological formation. To be more specific, particular 
attention is given to a contextual examination of how Chinese intellectuals conceptualize 
democracy in different social movements. In order to grasp a sociological understanding 
of their ideas, the present study is going to investigate how their social locations or social 
origins have influenced their diagnosis and conceptualizations of democracy. In addition, 
this research also investigates the interaction between intellectuals' political ideas and 
their educational orientations. To sharpen our analysis, the present study also examines 
the influence of different generational locations on their intellectual lives, that is, the 
relation between their upbringing, spirit, virtues and limitations and their thought 
processes. Equally important, intellectual radicalism is suggested to be facilitated and 
constrained by the economic and political opportunities to which intellectuals have access 
(Brym, 1980, 1987). In other words, this study will explore how the political opportunity 
structure to which intellectuals have access has influenced their radicalism and political 
strategies.
Another objective of this study is to examine the relationship between the state
and the Chinese intellectuals in the post-Mao era, whether the undertaking of socio­
political changes in the present regime have enhanced the growth of intellectuals in 
relation to their social and political positions. It is my hypothesis that the contemporary 
Chinese intellectuals have immense power in the cultural domain, exerting their influence 
in the cultural and political hegemony. In this regard, I hope the present study can 
elucidate whether or not the contemporary Chinese intellectuals have become a more 
critical and independent social group, occupying a more strategic position in Chinese 
politics with more influence upon the civil society than in previous periods.
Such examination may make significant contributions to understanding the social 
transformation of Communist China in general and the roles and social positions of 
intellectuals in particular. The present research would have far-reaching significance for 
the political sociology of intellectuals and sociology of knowledge with particular 
reference to the development of democracy in modem China. After this general 
introduction, I am going to discuss the specific research questions, the conceptual 
framework of the study and the methodology of the present research.
SPECIFIC RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To deal with the first objective, I am going to investigate the following questions: 
How do the intellectuals interpret and conceptualize the ideas of democracy? How do 
their peculiar social locations and educational orientations influence their thinking about 
democracy? Are there any particular characteristics of the concept "democracy" at 
different points of time since the May Fourth Movement? How do the generational 
locations influence their political thoughts? To what extent does their access to economic 
and political opportunities affect their political orientations? What is the relation 
between their concept of democracy and their particular socio-historical, socio-cultural 
and socio-political contexts? How significant is the concept of democracy in 
understanding the Chinese state and intellectuals? How is the idea 'democracy' 
developed in, and what are its implications for, modem China? Is there any continuity of
the concept 'democracy' from the May Fourth scholars to the intellectuals in post-Mao 
China?
My hypothesis here is that there is a continuity in the concept of democracy 
between the May Fourth scholars and the post-Mao intellectuals. I am convinced that the 
prominent intellectuals, but not the student demonstrators in the post-Mao era, developed 
a clear notion of democracy than that of the May Fourth scholars (see, for example, 
Calhoun, 1989; Wasserstrom, 1992; Unger, 1991). It is thus my main interest to validate 
the foregoing stated hypothesis.
Under the second objective, I would investigate such questions as: Do the ideas of 
the intellectuals express their own interests or represent the interests of others? How do 
they perceive their role, function and social position? Are there any changes taking place 
in their social origins as compared with those of their forerunners, the traditional literati? 
It is my hypothesis that the contemporary Chinese intellectuals have become more 
dissident and critical and independent in thinking. Unlike their forerunners, the 
traditional literati, they not only complain about maladministration within the emperor's 
"approved boundary" but also attack the political system and even the official ideology. 
Their critical outlook is reflected in their level of critique and intensity of dissidence. I 
hypothesize that the Chinese intellectuals in the post-Mao era have emerged as a 
relatively independent social group rather than only relying on their political patrons as 
the establishment intellectuals did in the Mao era. I hope the present study will validate 
the hypothesis of a changing relationship between the post-Mao intellectuals and the 
state.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY
In order to understand contextually the ideas of democracy as perceived by the 
intellectuals, the present research will examine the works of Mannheim, Gramsci and 
Bourdieu to establish an original analytical framework in light of their ideas on 
knowledge and intellectuals. These scholars have suggested different ways to study
ideas. The present study attempts to compare and contrast their works in order to 
develop my own perspective in viewing ideological formation.
The central notion of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge deals with the 
interpretation of ideas and nature of meaning, in a more specific sense, the interpretation 
of thought. What Mannheim has proposed is not a causal relationship between the ideas 
and social environment, or a kind of socially determined knowledge. In another words, 
the notion of relatedness between the socio-historical context and ideas can be adequate 
both to the historicity and to the autonomy of thought (Mannheim, 1936, 1952). 
Mannheim believes that the deeper understanding of ideas can only be a kind of 
reflective self-awareness at which the sociology of knowledge is aimed. He has 
highlighted the importance of the social location and group affiliation of intellectuals in 
shaping their ideas. I hope that the conceptual tool borrowed from Mannheim can 
provide a contextual understanding of man's ideas and give a concise picture of the social 
origin of democracy in China.
In order to have a contextual understanding of democratic thoughts of Chinese 
intellectuals, the present research will follow Gramsci's sociology of intellectuals. I am 
going to examine, first, the social origins of intellectuals; and second, the group character 
of the education that they have received and the political socialization of intellectuals, 
especially their political and occupational ties to a variety of social groups. In essence, 
the present research will look into the complex process of social affiliation and 
disaffiliation (Gramsci, 1971). Aside from their social origins, the present research also 
examines the relationship between their socio-economic and socio-political opportunities 
and their intellectual radicalism (Brym, 1987). It is also suggested that the political 
environment in general (Eisinger, 1973) and political opportunity structure in particular 
(Tarrow, 1989; McAdam, 1988) have significant impact on ideological formation. This 
study is going to integrate this literature to sharpen our analysis.
In addition, the study of ideas is related to the field of intellectual history. The
contemporary discussion of the "intellectual field" has enhanced our understanding of 
intellectual thought (Ringer, 1991; Bourdieu, 1969). This research will deal with the 
sociology and history of intellectuals as a field concerning a configuration or a network 
of relationships (Ringer, 1990: 269-278). The main focus lies in the relationship between 
the intellectuals and their social connections in the field (Bourdieu, 1969: 89-119, 1985:
11-24). It is believed that the intellectual field is influenced by the concerns and conflicts 
of the larger society, but its logic is its own. According to Ringer and Bourdieu, ideas 
are never totally separable from their ground in institutions, practices and social relations 
but intimately relate to a broader academic background. Following this reasoning, I have 
to see belief systems as mixtures of good reasons with inherited conventions and the 
orientations perpetuated by institutions, practices and social relations; and with intricate 
aggregates of rational, traditional and ideological elements. In this view, ideas or beliefs 
are so complicated that the examination of them is by no means simple and straight­
forward. The analysis of intellectual thought then becomes multi-dimensional, involving 
investigation from different perspectives and upon different levels.
The sociology of knowledge, the sociology of intellectuals and the intellectual 
field provide three intellectual paths for this research. They are not isolated but 
complementary to one other. An analytic framework built from these three intellectual 
standpoints may result in a more coherent and comprehensive understanding of Chinese 
democracy. In brief, the present research is going to examine, first, the particular socio- 
historical, socio-political and socio-cultural contexts in contemporary China; second, the 
social origins of the intellectuals; third, the institutional factors, their social networks and 
educational orientations; fourth, the effects of their generational location on their 
ideological formation; and last, the relationship between intellectual radicalism and the 
economic and political opportunities of the intellectuals. This study will attempt to 
examine how these variables interact with one another producing their peculiar 
interpretations and meanings of democracy.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Although there are different opinions regarding the extent of the May Fourth 
period, I shall adapt the view of Professor Chow Tse-tsung; namely, that the May Fourth 
period extended from 1919 to 1921/ Contemporary China is the period 1978-1989, in 
which various pro-democracy movements took place. The present study will focus on 
how the intellectuals have conceptualized the ideas of democracy throughout these 
movements.
Based on the criteria of typicality and representativeness, I have selected as our 
targets for study, particular intellectuals who are more open to liberal thought from the 
West. They have been prominent and influential in their fields. Most important of all, 
the selected intellectuals for study are "movement intellectuals" who have contributed to 
the intellectual development of collective identity/ideology in different movements. 
Even though they may not play an active role in organizing the movements, their spiritual 
and intellectual leadership deserves emphasis. They have distinctive ideas and lines of 
argument on China’s current situation, revealing also their orientations and representing 
their own intellectual realms. The most prominent intellectuals in the May Fourth 
scholars, Chen Duxiu and his closely associated magazine Qing Man (Youth), Hu Shi 
and Lu Xun.* Their ideas on democracy and emancipation of individuality are worth 
examining.
Among the post-Mao intellectuals, various typologies can be identified. To start 
with, borrowing typical Chinese categories, there are (1) the natural scientists and 
technical workers; (2) the social scientists, advisers to government and party reformers; 
and (3) the literary intellectuals including journalists and writers. Aside from these
’Different scholars may have different notions of the May Fourth era. I adopt Professor Chow Tse-tsung's definition, since his work 
is the most representative one in the field and most people agree with i t
®For most of the studies relating to the May Fourth Movement the attention is given to the ideas and works o f Chen Duxiu, Lu Xun 
and Hu Shi. Therefore, the present research also follows this 'tradition'. See, for example Chow Tse-tsung (I960); Lin Yusheng 
(1979, 1989); Zhou Y. S. (1989) & Tu Weiming (1987).
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categories, the present study will add one more type of intellectuals, namely, the cultural 
critics who have become more prominent in the intellectual discourse of post-Mao China. 
Each of these groups has its distinctive social and institutional base. The natural 
scientists have their audiences at Beijing University, the Chinese University of Science 
and Technology and other universities while their basis is firmly rooted in these same 
universities. The social scientists are based especially at the Chinese Academy of Social 
Science, though some are also scattered through Party and quasi-private think tanks. The 
literary intellectuals and the cultural critics are sometimes on the faculties of universities 
or housed in institutions like the Academy for Chinese Culture, but they are most 
distinctively writers for increasingly open newspapers and magazines, including a host of 
new, substantially independent publications and book series. They also engage in an 
effort to develop a sort of coffeehouse and salons culture outside of the official 
institutions of Beijing. Each of these groups also has its own distinctive ideas and lines 
of argument on China’s current situation, though sometimes these discourses overlap. 
The categorization of these intellectuals, simply put, is solely based on their different sets 
of ideas and their different orientations.
Personal Interviews
This research is based partly on some intensive interviews with the most 
representative intellectuals from different fields. I went to Paris, Holland, London, 
mainland China and the United States to meet different Chinese intellectuals, discussing 
their recent views of their social roles and their relationship with the state. These are 
other questions that I asked them during the interviews: Do they think that the 
intellectuals have become more independent in the post-Mao era? Do they believe the 
Communist Party (CCP) can reform itself from within? What are their views on 
democratization in Chinese politics? What do they think about the U.S. and U.K. models 
of democracy? Are they applicable to China? Which kind of model of democracy do 
they adhere to? What are the elements in their conception of democracy? Do they think
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that their notion of democracy is a continuity of that of the May Fourth Movement? 
Why? In what aspects are their ideals of democracy more progressive than those of the 
May Fourth intellectuals? How do they conceive the traditional mentality of the literati? 
Do they adhere to this mentality? and why? How do they see the future of intellectuals in 
terms of their social positions and roles in China? I think the foregoing stated questions 
can sharpen our analysis on the evolution of democracy in China and the roles and 
positions of Chinese intellectuals. Hopefully, intensive interviews explore their ideas 
from various angles and clarify their ideas. Additional insights come from analyzing 
their written works.
1) Scientists/Technologists
I identified key intellectuals and scholars for the interviews: In the group of 
natural scientists, I selected the most prominent Astrophysicist and democrat. Fang Lizhi, 
who was the former vice-president of the Keda in China until his purge in 1987 after the 
1986-87 anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign. Fang has been most outspoken, 
criticizing the government and advocating total westernization. He also declared the 
death of socialism in China (Brugger and Kelly, 1990). His writings and works have 
tremendous influence especially on the 1989 pro-democracy movement in China. Fang 
has been regarded as the most representative democrat, the spiritual and ideological 
leader, the spokesman for democracy; and he has been called the Chinese Sakharov {The 
Nineties, Aug. 1990; Calhoun, 1991).
2) Social Scientists
Among the social scientists, Yan Jiaqi is the most representative one for he 
headed the Institute of Political Science at the Chinese Academy of Social Science 
(CASS). Yan was closely associated with the former Party general secretary, Zhao 
Ziyang, having been a member of Zhao’s think tank. Yan had been enthusiastic in 
advocating the political structural reforms and democratization in China. His ideas of 
democracy are influential in intellectual circles (Calhoun, 1991; Wasserstrom, 1992).
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Yan was the leader of the pro-democracy movement in Paris (1990-1991), fighting for 
democratization in China. I chose Yan Jiaqi because I believe he can reflect the general 
conception of democracy among the social scientists.
3) Literary Intellectuals/Journalists
For the literaiy intellectuals, the most influential one is Liu Binyan since his 
reportage literature has been well received by the general public. He has revealed the 
way the people live, deeply touching the hearts of the people in mainland China. Liu 
Binyan has been regarded as the 'mouth of the people', playing the role as 'doctor of 
socialism' and ' social conscience' (Goldman, 1987; Schell, 1988). Liu, consciously 
harking back to the Confucian self-definition of intellectuals and playing the role as a 
censor, produces writings which always maintain the value of the people. Having been a 
member of the CCP since the 1920's, Liu experienced the anti-rightist campaign and the 
Cultural Revolution, being attacked and purged several times; but still he maintained his 
faith in the CCP until the mid-80's. His relationship with the CCP can be a good 
illustration of the relationship between the state and the intellectuals under the present 
regime. His recent attack on the present regime and his support of democracy can 
enhance our grasp of the thoughts of those people who had been close and loyal followers 
of the CCP but finally abandoned their trust in the Party {The Nineties, July, 1991; 
Goldman, 1987; Cheek, 1992). The magazine The Nineties claimed that the changes of 
Liu's thoughts are also shared by many literary intellectuals in China {The Nineties, April
1991).9
4) Cultural Critics
^In the 50's, many Chinese intellectuals followed Mao Zedong faithfully, seeing Mao as always correct, the only faults were rooted in 
themselves. Having the dreadful experiences in the Cultural Revolution, many of these intellectuals recognized the fact that the major 
causes of China's social and politick problems lied with the dictatorial rule and distorted socialist praxis. In the post-Mao era, many 
Chinese intellectuals began to reconceptualize their role and restructure their relationship with the state. Many of them have become 
conscious of intellectual independence and academic autonomy. In the 4th meeting of the National Writers' Association held in 1985, most 
participants generally agreed that freedom in creative writing as fundamental to literary intellectuals. Along this line, Chinese journalists 
have been proposefully breaking the "restricted zone" of press and publication. It is observed that many writers and journalists have 
attempted many times to exert their autonomy and independence from state control. Baihua's Unquited Love, the discussion of socialist 
alienation and the publication of Economics Herald in Shanghai are some examples to demonstrate how Chinese intellectuals have strived 
to develop a new relationship with the state. It is against such a socio-cultural and socio-political contexts that we argue that Liu Binyan's 
deep reflection of his role as writer and journalist as well as his changing relationship with the state is also shared by other literary 
intellectuals and journalists. For details, see, for example, Goldman, et al. 1993 and 1994) and my discussion in chapter 7.
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In the literary and cultural realm, Liu Xiaobo is one of the most critical and 
radical critics. His cultural iconoclasm not only attacks Chinese tradition but also 
criticizes the political structure and the people. His call for repentance and self- 
examination is indicative of the intellectual foundation necessary for us to understand the 
newly emerged and younger intellectuals in the post-Mao era. Unlike other cultural 
critics, Liu adopts a direct way to attack tradition and the existing socialist regime. His 
criticism is not confined only to corrupt bureaucrats, autocratic rulers and authoritarian 
political structure but extends also to the national character of the Chinese people. His 
vehement attack and sharp criticism also go to himself. The deep repentance and 
reflection makes him conscious of the social responsibility of the people for causing 
despotic rule in China. His rejection of socialist regime and his role detached from the 
establishment indicate his consciousness of intellectual autonomy. Putting all these 
factors into account, I believe the examination of Liu’s political ideas can illuminate the 
new relationship between the state and intellectuals in the late 80s. In addition, the 
selected intellectuals come from different generational locations. The present study 
examines how influential of their different generational locations on the ideological 
production of intellectuals. Apart from that, the present research will discuss different 
groups of intellectuals whether they are categorized as "establishment intellectuals", 
"non-establishment intellectuals" or even "anti-establishment intellectuals" in order to 
develop a fuller picture of the political thought of Chinese intellectual circles.
In addition, I have also contacted some scholars who have been either participants 
or witnesses in the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 or researchers of the Chinese democracy. 
In England, Holland, Hong Kong, and the United States, I have interviewed some 
scholars who have been doing the research on the Chinese pro-democracy movement of 
1989. The discussion with these scholars from different countries has sharpened my 
analysis and offered me various perspectives in examining the ideas of the Chinese 
intellectuals. Additional interviews of some student leaders and participants in the 1989
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Tiananmen Square Incident were also conducted, which renders us with views on the 
movement and different notions of democracy.
Library Research
The present study relies not only on interviews of the selected intellectuals and 
scholars but also on the writings and speeches of these prominent intellectuals. Much of 
this material comes from Chinese periodicals, Party and non-Party newspapers and the 
books written by them; and different journals and magazines published in Hong Kong 
and the U.S.A. closely associated with the pro-democracy intellectuals. The main focus 
of this study will be the speeches and writings of these selected intellectuals particularly 
as they refer to the concept of democracy. In addition, by investigating their personal 
histories such as their letters, life histories and diaries, I hope to have a deeper 
understanding of their ideas. The library research has provided me with good sources of 
materials covering Chinese democracy, such as Minzhu Zhongguo, a journal to which 
many pro-democracy intellectuals contribute their articles, expounding their thoughts on 
democracy; World Economic Herald, a relatively independent newspaper run and 
supported by a private organization in mainland China, which highlights the issues 
concerning the political reforms and democracy; Dushu and Zhishifensi, two journals in 
which many articles reflect the current thoughts on democracy in China. I also have 
reviewed some journals such as Research on Political Science, published by the CASS; 
The Nineties, and Zhengming, current journals published in Hong Kong discussing the 
development of Chinese democratic thoughts. Finally, other materials employed in the 
present study include the social science frameworks for the study of intellectuals and 
ideology, especially in relation to the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of 
intellectuals and intellectual history. Combining the published books, articles and the 
speeches of the intellectuals, I think the material is adequate to develop a clear 
understanding of the evolution of democracy in contemporary China.
In the next chapter, I am going to discuss the theoretical framework of the
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research. Chapter two will concentrate on the May Fourth Movement, especially a 
contextual analysis of the democratic thoughts of the May Fourth scholars. Chapter three 
will be a brief history of various pro-democracy movements in contemporary China. The 
main task of chapter four is to analyze contextually the reasons for the uprising of the 
1989 pro-democracy movement. Chapters five to eight contain the discussion of the 
selected intellectuals and their democratic thoughts. Chapter nine will be devoted to the 
discussion of the changing relationship between the intellectuals and the state. The last 
chapter is the conclusion of the research summarizing whether there is continuity in the 
concept of democracy from the 1919 May Fourth Movement up to the 1989 June Fourth 
Incident.
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY
The principal goal of this chapter is to propose an analytic framework for the 
examination of ideological formation of intellectuals. A better understanding of political 
ideas of intellectuals is closely related to the realms of sociology of knowledge, sociology 
of intellectuals and the intellectual field. What I suggest here is a contextual analysis of 
ideas and thoughts. Thus, the spotlight is put on the relationship between ideas and the 
socio-historical and socio-political-cultural contexts where intellectuals live.
The ideas of Mannheim, Gramsci and Bourdieu have tremendous influence on the 
analysis of ideological formation. I am going to draw light from their works to develop 
an analytical framework for the present study. It is the objective of this chapter to 
contrast and compare the ideas of these scholars with particular reference to their 
conceptions on ideological production of intellectuals. There is the intention neither to 
prove nor disprove their theories. I hope, by comparison of their works, to develop a 
more coherent and comprehensive framework for the present research.
Mannheim, Gramsci and Bourdieu have proposed different ways to analyze the 
formation of political ideas of intellectuals, but they have some common points in the 
interpretation of ideological production. They consider not only the social locations or 
social origins of intellectuals to have influenced their political ideas but also the 
educational orientations and the institutional networks to have significant impact on the 
formation of intellectual ideas. In addition, they have also emphasized the importance of 
a contextual analysis of ideas. Their proposed ways to study ideas rest not only on the 
structural, cultural and historical constraints to the construction of ideas but also on the 
relational and positional attributes of ideas.
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SOCIAL LOCATION OF INTELLECTUALS AND IDEOLOGICAL 
FORMATION
Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge
Mannheim has recognized that there are many factors influencing the ideas of 
people, suggesting that it is necessary to analyze the concrete social situations in which 
thought takes place and intellectual life is carried on (Mannheim, 1936: xxix). 
Mannheim highlights the significant impact of the social location of intellectuals on 
ideological formation. To Mannheim, there is plurality of groups developing different 
sets of knowledge, which make up the structure of the "social". In Mannheim's mind, 
ideas can be seen as a collective experience. Mannheim adds,
"[the sociology of knowledge] as a discipline explores the functional dependence of 
each intellectual standpoint on the differentiated group reality standing behind it, and 
which sets itself the task of retracing the evolution of the various standpoints". 
(Mannheim, 1953: 190)
In addition, Mannheim has sought to point out that ideas of people are not merely 
based on personal experience but rather shaped by social group and social-historical 
situations (Mannheim, 1936: 2-4). The normal method or approach to intellectual history 
is to study isolated individuals or groups based on the assumption that they are in some 
way "typical" or "representative" of the whole society. But such a method results in little 
more than impressionistic evidence.* To Mannheim, individuals are members of a social 
group in which the ideas of individuals are shaped especially when they share a common 
social location. The personal experience of Mannheim further confirms his brief of the 
relationship between the social location of intellectuals and the production of ideas.
In the 1920's, Mannheim discovered that different political groups with various 
positions in Europe had produced corresponding orientations, which expressed the social 
and political situations of particular social groups and also shaped their political and 
social values. Having such an observation, Mannheim begins to hypothesize that the
‘I draw this line of argument from Ringer (1990). For details o f intellectual history, see, for example. Ringer (1990), Shils (1972) 
and Scheler (1992).
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understanding of people’s ideas should trace back to their social locations. Mannheim 
thus concludes that the social structure has put different individuals into various social 
locations, which in turn, generates common modes of thought and shared experience 
(Longhurst, 1989: 27-28). Recognizing the influence of class upon ideas, Mannheim 
suggests a more inclusive concept "commitment", to replace Marx’s concept of 'class’, 
thereby defining social groups by their commitment to world aspiration. Highlighting the 
conflicts inherent in the social relation, Mannheim points out different social locations 
which imply a particular potential for experience and action. Central to Mannheim’s 
ideas of social location, competition constitutes the structure of the "social". He argues 
that the emergence of social locations and classes is an historically contingent 
phenomenon, in which the relationship between these groups is structured by the 
competitive nature of social life (Longhurst, 1989: 27-28).
In his essay on "Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon", Mannheim makes it 
amply clear that there is competition among different groups. To him, group competition 
is fundamentally a political phenomenon. As Mannheim states,
"Every historical, ideological, sociological piece of knowledge (even should it prove to 
be absolute truth itself), is clearly rooted in and carried by the desire for power and 
recognition of particular social groups who want to make their interpretation of the 
universal one." (Mannheim, 1952: 191)
Thus, Mannheim has indicated the centrality of the competitive nature in the 
interpretation of the world. To take his position a step further, Mannheim argues that 
competition is the base of the human associative life, for he believes that competition has
greatly determined the production and structuring of ideas. Mannheim adds,
"The point I want to make is that process of change in the deepest strata of world 
interpretation, modification of the categorical apparatus itself, can to a large extent be 
explained in terms of competition." (Mannheim, 1952: 211)
The inherent existence of competition and struggle in social life has set the stage 
for the emergence of antagonism among different social groups, producing different 
patterns of thoughts or systems of ideas and reflecting the interests of various social
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groups. Following the competitive nature in the heart of human associative life, it is 
analytically logical to argue that different groups draw upon and create forms of 
knowledge to defend their positions in society's hierarchy (Mannheim, 1936; Longhurst, 
1989: 33). Hence, we inevitably confront conflicting views in the conceptualization of 
the world by the intellectuals. The idea of competition is not only central to Mannheim's 
sociology of knowledge but also parallel to Gramsci's notion of cultural hegemony. In 
short, the conception of the social, to Mannheim, is a fundamentally competitive sphere 
made up of different social groups.
Having these lines of reasoning in mind, Mannheim has sought to trace the 
specific connection between actual interest groups in society and the ideas and modes of 
thought which they espoused. Louis Wirth makes it clear that the sociology of 
knowledge seeks to throw light on the question of how the purposes and interests of 
different social groups come to find expression in certain theories, doctrines, and 
intellectual movements (Mannheim, 1936: xxx). Therefore, in order to have a more 
coherent conception of ideas, the analysis of the shifts in social relationships and social 
institutions where the intellectual activities have taken place becomes significant.
On this view, we should draw out the relations that exist between knowledge and 
the social groups or system that apprehend that knowledge. In a word, Mannheim 
proposes that ideas can be understood sociologically. Sociology of knowledge is thus a 
perspective to examine the various 'world-views' or value orientations as contingent on 
the experience of particular social groups.
Mannheim's Free-floating Intellectuals
Mannheim's analysis of intellectual ideas inevitably links with his conception of 
intellectuals. According to Mannheim, sociology of knowledge is mainly concerned with 
those persons in society who are the bearers of intellectual activity, namely, the 
intellectuals. He holds that the composition of this group, their social and class 
background, the method by which they are recruited, their organization, the rewards and
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prestige they receive, and their participation in other spheres of social life, all constitute 
some of the more crucial issues in the sociology of knowledge (Mannheim, 1936).
Despite the fact that Mannheim recognizes the significant position of intellectuals 
in the realm of sociology of knowledge and his suggestion of a link between the social 
location of intellectuals and their ideas (Mannheim, 1952), he postulates the existence of 
objective criteria for integrating and synthesizing the different intellectual views by 
arguing that the intellectuals are classless and "socially unattached" (Mannheim, 1956). 
He maintains that intellectuals belong to a social stratum which is to a large degree 
unattached to any social class (Mannheim, 1979: 139).
Or, put differently, it is
"a stratum with no roots, or at least few roots, to which no position of class or rank can 
be precisely imputed". (Mannheim, 1953: 127)
In his various writings, he consistently regards intellectuals as socially classless, 
and characterizes them as "free-floating intelligentsia" (freischwebende Intelligenz) 
(Mannheim, 1982: 269; 1979: 137; 1956: 106). With the classless aggregates, according 
to Mannheim, intellectuals are able to synthesize the conflicting historical situations and 
provide an interpretation of the world in which they live (Mannheim, 1956). Mannheim's 
argument that the political ideas of intellectuals are independent of their social position to 
me is contradictory to his argument that ideas are the result of a collective experience 
(Mannheim, 1936: 2-4).
In Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim conceives that the contemporary intellectuals 
are neither a class nor part of a class but a "relatively classless stratum which is not too 
firmly situated in the social order" (Mannheim, 1955: 154). This group of intellectuals, 
in this sense, may be and generally are recruited from various social classes. In 
Mannheim's eyes, unlike the workers and entrepreneurs whose ideas may be determined 
by the class positions of their adherents, the intellectuals are immune to such a 
determination since they have participated in a common educational milieu in which their
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class differences and the variations in outlook tend to be suppressed (Mannheim, 1955: 
157). He believes then that intellectuals are capable of breaking out of the constraints 
imposed on their thinking by their class origins. He also claims that intellectuals 
themselves do not form a class since "they [the intellectuals] are too differentiated" 
(Mannheim, 1955: 155) or heterogeneous in their political views to be regarded as such 
(see Brym, 1980: 56).
Under this rubric of thought, a question is thus raised concerning how the political 
attitudes of intellectuals are simultaneously heterogeneous and homogeneous. How can 
intellectuals be relatively classless and socially rootless when their ideas are embedded in 
their social positions. If we carefully look into Mannheim’s line of thought, we can see 
that Mannheim has suggested clearly that the ideas of intellectuals are in some way and to 
some degree shaped by their social locations. It is therefore ironic to argue that 
intellectuals are classless and socially rootless. As Brym (1980: 56-57) concisely asks, 
"For if the intellectual is situated in no particular position in the social order, and 
therefore has no socially derived interests, how can his ideas be socially determined?" It 
is at this point that we can see the self-contradiction inherent in Mannheim’s argument.
Brym explains Mannheim’s faults as the products of the "hunger for wholeness" 
which prevailed in Weimar Germany, in Mannheim’s time. Under this particular socio- 
historical context, Mannheim wished the intellectuals especially the elites could establish 
a total orientation and synthesis. With compassion toward the political synthesis, 
Mannheim thus romantically envisaged the intellectuals as politically homogeneous 
persons, whose coherence and cohesiveness could contribute to the formation of "social 
wholeness" (Brym, 1980:56-58). It is against such a background that the thesis of "free- 
floating intellectuals" was postulated.
If we empirically test Mannheim’s argument, we can accept only the relative 
classlessness of intellectuals, that is, their ideas are less class-determined than the ideas of 
others (House, 1977). But it is absolutely clear that intellectuals are socially-bound and
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class-bound. Even Mannheim himself is also aware of the problem regarding his "free- 
floating intellectuals" in his later works. A few years after the publication of Ideology 
and Utopia, Mannheim tried to modify his free-floating intellectuals thesis after seeing 
other scholars' exaggeration of his notion of classless intellectuals (see, for example, 
Caute, 1964 and Avineri, 1957). He began to tone down his argument, suggesting a more 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between intellectuals' social mobility patterns 
and their ideological orientations (Mannheim, 1956: 142).^
The foregoing discussion has indicated that the intellectuals are not simply 
socially detached and classless. Bottomore makes it plain that "the intellectual elite, in 
most countries and at most times, is one of the least homogeneous or cohesive of elites, 
and displays a considerable variety of opinion on cultural and political questions" (T. B. 
Bottomore, 1966: 75). There followed a series of scholarly debates on whether the 
intellectuals have formed a distinct social class (see, for example, A. Gouldner, 1979; 
Djilas, 1957; and Konrad & Szelenyi, \919)? The main thrust of these debates is to 
analyze how the social stratification of intellectuals has influenced their political 
orientations and, in turn, their influence on the state and society. Among different 
scholarly works, Gramsci is the first theorist to propose the study of intellectuals in terms 
of their role in the process of development of specific historical hegemonic systems 
(Salamini, 1981). Gramsci well recognizes that the political orientation of intellectuals 
has to do with their unique social location.
Gramsci's Organic Intellectuals
The study of Gramsci's analysis of the formation of ideas is closely related to his 
notion of "organic intellectuals" (Gramsci, 1971). Gramsci has recognized the 
complexity and malleability of intellectuals' social-structural ties and their influence upon 
the ideological outlook of these intellectuals. By contrast most Marxists have either
^Mannheim modified his notion of classless intellectuals by saying that intellectuals are relatively classless. He also acknowledged 
the complex ways in which the social position of intellectuals has influenced considerably their political ideas. For details, see, for 
example, Brym (1980) and Mannheim (1956).
^The debate on the rise o f the "new class' as formed by intellectuals has been influenced by the classical elite theorists, Pareto,
Mo sea and Michels; see also the forth-coming discussion in chapter 9.
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located intellectuals in the working class or regarded intellectuals in capitalist society as 
petit bourgeois in terms of their social position and their outlook. Gramsci conceives that 
different social groups will develop and create their own set of intellectuals, recruited 
from and therefore "organically" tied to these groups. According to Gramsci, all men are 
intellectuals since all work requires "a minimum of creative intellectual activity" no 
matter how degraded and mechanical the job is (Gramsci, 1971: 8). Along the same 
lines, all men are intellectuals since all men operate in a network of social relationship 
(Gramsci, 1971: 9). Gramsci says,
"[every man,] outside his professional activity, carries on some form of intellectual 
activity, that is, he is a 'philosopher', an artist, a man of taste,... therefore contributes to 
sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, this is to bring into being new modes 
of thought". (Gramsci, 1971: 9)
Though Gramsci sees all men as intellectuals, he also points to the fact that not all 
men have the function of intellectuals in society. The criterion of distinction lies with the 
function, that is, the "general complex of social relations" (Salamini, 1981: 104). The 
analysis of the functions of intellectuals should be understood in terms of the socio- 
historical context where the intellectuals live and the dynamics of their class relations."* 
The function of intellectuals, according to Gramsci, is not confined only to the cultural 
realm. We must understand the organizational functions of intellectuals in the widest 
sense. Gramsci rejects the traditional and vulgarised notion of intellectuals as including 
only the man of letters, the philosopher and the artist; he therefore extends his definition 
of intellectuals to all those who have the function of organizers in all spheres of society. 
Putting his position a step forward, Gramsci distinguishes between "organic intellectuals" 
and "traditional intellectuals". Gramsci consistently maintains that every class has its
own "organic intellectuals", he says,
"coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of 
economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of 
intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in 
the economic but also in the social and political fields". (Gramsci, 1971: 5)
draw this insight from Salamini (1981).
24
In this sense, organic intellectuals are directly related to the economic and 
political structure and thus to the class which they represent. It is apparent that they are 
far from an autonomously classless stratum. Unlike Mannheim’s notion of free-floating 
intellectuals, Gramsci does acknowledge intellectuals as bound by their social locations 
or social positions. Gramsci also urges us to recognize that intellectuals are socially 
mobile through the social structures. At the same time, we have to acknowledge that the 
social structures are in a constant state of development. This leads us to conclude that the 
structural properties (class position) of intellectuals are dynamic, being in a state of flux. 
In a more specific sense, intellectuals may be connected to various social groups to 
varying degrees and their political ideas are certainly the products of these connections 
(Gramsci, 1971).
Similar to Mannheim's notion of "competition”, Gramsci also maintains that these 
organic intellectuals, eager to influence the ideological realm, must also confront the 
existence of "traditional intellectuals" who are recruited from the older dominant class 
and who also exert ideological influence over the entire population. Gramsci suggests 
that the organic intellectuals will struggle "to assimilate and to conquer 'ideologically' the 
traditional intellectuals." (Gramsci, 1971: 10). Instead of speaking of competition, 
Gramsci proposes the idea of "hegemonic control". His emphasis upon ideological 
hegemony, consciousness, and totality has led him to devote considerable attention to the 
role of intellectuals whose function is to conquer the ideological hegemony or 
consciousness in the revolutionary process. Gramsci also suggests that any revolutionary 
struggle is merely an ideological process, which involves an organic fusion of the 
"personal", "cultural" and "political" realms. In this regard, it is a total transformation of 
the old order. The establishment of a new socio-political order, according to Gramsci, is 
accomplished not merely by means of force or coercion but by a process of ideological 
construction, that is, to develop a new kind of culture — ideological hegemony as an 
integral part of a total revolutionary process (Gramsci, 1971 and Boggs, 1980).
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On my reading, Gramsci has described the ideological allegiance of intellectuals 
squarely in terms of power over various classes and social groups. To Gramsci, the 
opportunity structures are shaped by relative power of these classes and groups that 
contend for hegemony. He has highlighted the notion that neither do intellectuals freely 
choose their allegiances without any constraint nor are their partisan loyalties mere 
mechanical and static responses to their current class and other group locations. Instead, 
their loyalties are the product of their mobility patterns. In this way, we must trace their 
paths of social mobility with particular reference to their social origins and social 
destinations. Additionally, Gramsci urges us to be aware of the political socialization of 
intellectuals during or after their formal education especially their political and 
occupational ties to a variety of social groups (Gramsci, 1971; see also Brym, 1980, 
1987). In essence, the examination of political ideas of intellectuals lies at the heart of 
the complex process of social affiliation and disaffiliation. All in all, we may logically 
claim that there is certainly "competition" inherent in the process of the conquest of 
hegemony. Under this rubric of thought, we can grasp the intimate relationship between 
political ideas and social location of intellectuals. It is therefore important for us to 
construct a more refined, structural theory of intellectuals' political affiliations (Brym, 
1980; 1987).
Bourdieu's Field of Forces
Like Mannheim and Gramsci, Bourdieu also considers the understanding of 
intellectual thought to be not independent of their social origins. He proposes the concept 
of "intellectual field", whose emphasis is to study intellectual ideas and texts as a 
configuration or a network of relationships rather than an aggregate of isolated elements 
(Bourdieu, 1969).^ Bourdieu sees intellectual field not as the study of individual discrete 
cases but as a field at a given time and place, made up of agents taking up various 
intellectual positions. It has been suggested that what Bourdieu calls the field is not "to
^Ringer has presented Bourdieu's ideas o f the intellectual field succinctly and my argument follows closely that o f Ringer (1990), 
see also, Craig Calhoun (1993) and Jenkins (1992).
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be considered as a field with a fence around it, or in the American sense of domain." 
What he really means is a "field of forces" (Harker, et al. 1990: 8). According to 
Bourdieu, intellectual field is not only a partially autonomous field of forces, but also a 
field of struggle for positions within it. Hence, it is common to see intellectuals in the 
field in conflict with each other. These struggles can be interpreted as a means to 
transform and conserve the field of forces (Bourdieu, 1983: 312). Positions of 
intellectuals in the field are determined merely by the capital that they possess. In this 
way, the conflicts and struggles in the field have basically to do with the power relation 
among the intellectuals (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984). By virtue of this unique view, we can 
conclude that what Bourdieu has suggested is the positional and relational attributes of 
ideas.
Besides, Bourdieu also acknowledges the competition in defining ideology and 
interpreting the world. He makes it plain that there is a close relationship between the 
educational system and class relations. He proposes to study sociology of education in 
light of a wider field which is concerned with power, inequality and social order (see, 
Bourdieu, 1979). Furthermore, he also points out that the habitus of each group is 
generated by their contrasting positions within the "objective structures" of society. In 
this regard, people are not free from the constraints of the social structures but instead are 
socially determined by diverse interests of different social groups. Bourdieu adds that 
people have no choice if they continue playing the game. He writes,
"[people have] no other choice than to struggle to maintain or improve their position in 
the field, thus helping to bring to bear on all the others the weight of the constraints, 
often experienced as intolerable, which stem from antagonistic coexistence."(Bourdieu, 
1990: 193)
This reasoning clearly highlights "power relations" in the "ideological war" 
among different intellectual fields, pointing out the competitive nature in the process of 
cultural reproduction (Bourdieu, 1977).
Furthermore, relationships in the field must be considered as a dynamic process
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since different alliances or relationships are formed at different points of time. 
Intellectual field, according to Bourdieu, is a system of agents, typified by forces of 
differing strength either in opposition or combination to structure the field at any specific 
moment. Unlike Mannheim's notion of free-floating intellectuals, Bourdieu believes that 
intellectuals are not autonomous enough, but constrained by their intellectual milieu and 
social location. Ringer reiterates the idea of field clearly:
"[t]he elements in the field are not only related to each other in determinate ways; each 
also has a specific right' or authority, so that the field is a distribution of power as well 
... They compete for the right to define or to co-define what shall count as intellectually 
established and culturally legitimate. The participants in the field may be individuals; 
or they may be small groups, 'schools', or even academic disciplines." (Ringer, 1990: 
270)
Ringer also points to the fact of conflicts and alliances among the intellectuals in 
the field. He says,
"[w]e almost habitually perceive certain groups of ideas in our own culture as 
intellectually allied, and affinities of this sort have been thought to exist in other 
historical contexts as well. But even more remarkable is the degree to which opposed 
positions within an intellectual field condition each other; their interaction is dialectical 
in the strictest sense of that term." (Ringer, 1990: 270)
With this reasoning, I wish to assert at this point that it is apparent that conflicts 
and competition are inherent in the field. Hence, the study of intellectual field has to do 
with the intellectual position, charting its complementary or oppositional relationship 
with other elements in its intellectual field. Bourdieu holds that an intellectual within a 
field is influenced by the concerns and conflicts of that particular social class and is also 
mediated by the position he holds within the field. The relative autonomy of intellectuals 
rests upon their openness to outside influence. Up to this point, we can conclude that 
fields thus identify areas of struggle (Bourdieu, 1984: 222ff; 1985: 195ff). It is, 
therefore, advisable for us to examine the dynamic power relation among intellectuals. 
Besides the impact of social position of intellectuals on their political orientations, their 
educational orientation is also regarded as another force in shaping their political 
orientations.
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EDUCATIONAL ORIENTATION AND IDEOLOGICAL FORMATION
Binding Function of Education
When discussing the variables shaping political ideas of intellectuals, Mannheim 
not only sheds light on the significant impact of the social location but also highlights the 
effect of education. Though he has not directly stated the impact of education on 
ideological formation, he has implied the close relationship between intellectual ideas and 
educational orientation. He makes it abundantly clear that education has the unique 
function of binding intellectuals together.
"Although they [intellectuals] are too differentiated to be regarded as a single class, 
there is one unifying sociological bond between all groups of intellectuals, namely 
education, which binds them together in a striking way. Participation in a common 
educational heritage progressively tends to suppress differences of birth, status, 
profession, and wealth, and to unite the individual educated people on the basis of the 
education they have received." (Mannheim, 1955: 155)
According to Mannheim, the amalgamation of intellectuals rests mainly on the
common sharing of educational milieu through which the differences and variations in
outlook tend to be suppressed (Mannheim, 1955). Though we may not agree that
education can really unite and bind all intellectuals together as a homogeneous group, it is
an undeniable fact that education does play a significant role in shaping ideas of
intellectuals. What Mannheim has ignored here is that there are differing educational
orientations, though not necessarily opposite to each other. The "unified version" of
educational orientation seems to be more a romanticized notion rather than a social
reality, especially in an advanced pluralistic society. Thus I do not wholly accept the
concept that education can unite intellectuals, or even enhances their synthesis of the
conflicting world views. However, I am not thereby saying that we have to abandon
totally the assertion that education has considerable influence upon ideological formation.
To the contrary it seems clear that intellectuals have been influenced by various
educational orientations through which different political orientations are produced.
Concerning this matter, Gramsci has his own words.
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Education and Ideas
In understanding the ideological outlook of intellectuals, Gramsci pays particular 
attention to educational institutions through which the political orientation and 
consciousness of intellectuals is shaped. He also believes education has considerable
impact on the outlook of the class to which it is attached. Gramsci states clearly that,
"The complexity of the intellectual function in different states can be measured 
objectively by the number and graduation of specified schools: the more extensive the 
'area' covered by education and the more numerous the 'vertical' levels' of schooling, 
the more complex is the cultural world, the civilization, of a particular state". (Gramsci, 
1971: 10-11)
It suffices for us to realize that education has tremendous influence on the 
development of culture and civilization and thus of the ideas. In the same vein, Brym 
argues that educational institutions do exert significant impact on ideological formation 
among intellectuals. He points to the stratified school systems practised in Britain, 
Germany, Russia, Canada and the USA in which students from different classes and 
strata are channelled through different types of educational institutions. It is through such 
educational institutions various types of class consciousness have been imprinted (Brym, 
1980: 59).
Schooling Effects on Cultivated Habitus
Bourdieu’s idea of ’’intellectual field” also points toward the effects of educational 
institutions and practices as well as the content of education on the production of ideas. 
Education is seen to have exerted tremendous influence on the value orientations, 
transmitting implicit as well as explicit aspects of the cultural heritage. According to 
Bourdieu, institutionalized education plays an extremely important role in reproducing 
the conditions of their own existence, making themselves as distinct fields. 
Institutionalized education, in the mind of Bourdieu, is a process of inculcation to 
produce a habitus and the emphasis is put on pedagogy/education (Bourdieu, 1977: 31). 
As a ’’habit-forming force”, the educational system inculcates socially differentiated types 
of thought. It is what Bourdieu calls the ’’cultivated habitus” of the highly educated
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(Ringer, 1990: 275).
In understanding ideological formation, Bourdieu pays a great deal of attention to 
the relationship between schooling and the intellectual life from an historical perspective. 
In his "Systems of Education and Systems of Thought", Bourdieu tries to investigate 
whether school culture and thought have replaced the role of religion in socializing 
people. He concludes, "[t]he school is the fundamental factor in the cultural consensus in 
as far as it represents the sharing of a common sense which is the prerequisite for 
communication" (Bourdieu, 1967: 341). Bourdieu maintains,
"In all cases ... the patterns informing the thought of a given period can be fully 
understood only by reference to the school system, which is alone capable of 
establishing them and developing them, through practice, as the habits of thought 
common to a whole generation", (Bourdieu, 1967: 342)
No matter what, Bourdieu speaks of "intellectual field" or "habits of thought" and 
"the cultural unconscious", which is subsequently incorporated into the concept of 
habitus. The formation of habitus, according to Bourdieu, is closely related to the 
educational institutions which directly bear on those who actually attend schools. No 
matter how divided the school organization, its influence is still diffused throughout the 
whole society by means of its forms of symbolic domination (Honneth et al., 1986, see 
also Harker, 1990). It is against such a background that we have to examine how "the 
school" has actively generated the habitus or shaped the "schemes of beliefs",^ In 
addition we must analyze the formative impact of social location and educational 
orientation on intellectuals’ ideological production, a fuller understanding draws us to 
examine also how the unique context in which intellectuals live has influenced their 
ideas.
^Ringer (1990) echoes the view of Bourdieu, putting forward the notion that education has created its own academic culture, a 
significant segment of the wider socio-cultural system. He conceives that an academic culture is "a network of interrelated and explicit 
beliefs about the academic practices of teaching, learning, and research, and about the social significance o f these practices" (Ringer, 
1990: 279).
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CONTEXTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS
Cultural-sociological Knowledge
Mannheim contends that the main concern of sociology of knowledge is an
analysis of ideas in relation to historical-social situations:^
"the main task consists in specifying, for each temporal cross-section of the historical 
process, the various systematic intellectual standpoints on which the thinking of creative 
individuals and groups was based". (Mannheim, 1952: 189)
What Mannheim proposes here is a contextual analysis of ideas, relating closely to 
his ideas on "Cultural-Sociological Knowledge". Besides, Mannheim’s sociology of 
knowledge cannot be separated from his earlier works on sociology o f  culture and 
historicism, which emphasize the social-historical-cultural orientations of knowledge. In 
brief, Mannheim argues that there is a strong relationship between people’s ideas and 
their world view.
For Mannheim, sociology of knowledge involves a reflection on the possibilities 
of sociological understanding in general rather than a reduction of knowledge’ to any 
epistemological criteria® (Tim Dant, 1991). Mannheim’s concern, simply stated, is to 
understand the various 'world-views’ with special reference to the social and historical 
situations of particular social groups. Mannheim does not support the notion that there is 
'truth’ and only one kind of 'knowledge’, instead, he proposes the sociology of knowledge 
as a perspective to interpret thoughts and ideas in terms of a 'totality', that is, a contextual 
analysis of ideas.
"On the one hand, it [sociology of knowledge] aims at discovering workable criteria for 
determining the interrelations between thought and action. On the other hand, by 
thinking this problem out from beginning to end in a radical, unprejudiced manner, it 
hopes to develop a theory, appropriate to the contemporary situation, concerning the 
significance of the non-theoretical conditioning factors in knowledge." (Mannheim 
1936: 237)
It is clear then that the sociology of knowledge is an enquiry into the relationship
^For a more detailed discussion of the nature of the sociology of knowledge, see, Simonds (1978: 23-48); Curtis and Petras (1970) 
has a detailed discussion on the sociology of knowledge which deserves attention.
^For details o f the discussion on how Mannheim deals with the epistemological issues, see Woldring (1986); Remmling (1975) and 
Loader (1985).
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between thought and action, differing from the psychological and philosophical 
approaches which are mainly concerned with the immanent development of knowledge or 
thought (Tim Dant, 1991: 12)/
As the prime concern of the sociology of knowledge is the relation between the 
ideas and the social settings, the following discussion will be divided into three different 
levels, namely, the social, knowledge, and the relations between the two/°
In the discussion of the relation between the social and knowledge, Mannheim 
introduces the term "correspondence" for he believes the sociology of knowledge is a 
form of thought produced in a specific constellation of factors. To understand fully the 
ideas, it is desirable to look into the whole set of factors involved in shaping ideas. 
Mannheim says, "...the aspiration [is] to make this relativization total, relating not one 
thought or idea, but a whole system of ideas, to an underlying social reality" (Mannheim, 
1952: 144).
In addition, he is not interested in the intrinsic side of thought, rather, Mannheim 
relates the intellectual content to the outside world to see the relationship between them. 
In his work on Historicism, he makes it plain that the process of change in thought is the 
result of changes in the development of history (Mannheim, 1952). To Mannheim, the 
changes in a society greatly influence the total outlook and thinking of any social group. 
He argues "we can understand the transformation of the various ideologies only on the 
basis of changes in the social composition of the intellectual stratum corresponding to 
them" (Mannheim, 1952: 186). Here, Longhurst extrapolates two important implications 
of Mannheim’s observations. First, the relationship between society and knowledge lies 
in how the development of thought correlates to, or corresponds with, the development of 
society and history. Second, this relationship is evident in how ideologies and styles of
^There has been discussion on the differences between Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and the philosophical and 
psychological approach to knowledge. It is also argued that Mannheim's knowledge fails to deal with epistemological issues. 
Mannheim was well aware of the problem of epistemological issues in knowledge, tried to offer another alternative to seeing 
knowledge from a social-historical dimension. For details, see example, Woldring (1986) especially part III; and Loader (1985).
'°Such a classification is adopted firom R. K. Merton's work on discussion o f Mannheim's sociology of knowledge; see R. K. Merton 
(1968) and Longhurst (1989).
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thought have reflected the different interests of social groups (Longhurst, 1989: 48-49). 
In this way, historicism is an intellectual labour that provides a worldly basis or worldly 
perspective for grasping the meaning of people’s thoughts and actions.
Unlike the Marxist view of sociology of knowledge, Mannheim argues that the 
relation between the social and knowledge is not solely economically determined. 
Instead, he proposes to analyze the complex linkages between different aspects of the 
social structure and thought. His prime concern is social change and historicity. As 
Longhurst observed, "a sense of history and of dynamic development are important 
aspects of his [Mannheim's] thought" (Longhurst, 1989: 53). Under the rubric of social 
change and historicity, Mannheim has put a great deal of weight on the competitive 
nature of the human social world. This explains why Mannheim believes that the 
understanding of social conflicts and competition among different groups helps one also 
to understand different degrees of "committedness" to their interests in particular and 
their social locations in general. It also sheds light on the notion that competition is the 
central theme in Mannheim’s discussion of historicity and dynamic development of 
society. In short, Mannheim has strived to examine how socio-historical changes 
influence the ideas of people.
The above discussion has so far recapitulated the central ideas of Mannheim’s 
sociology of knowledge. His proposal to study ideas from a contextual framework has 
directed us to analyze the socio-historical and socio-structural factors in the formative 
influences on intellectuals. Gramsci’s conception of intellectuals is similar to those of 
Mannheim (Salamini, 1981: 104). His conception of the functions of intellectuals and his 
conception of the praxis of philosophy have demonstrated his view on the importance of 
contextual and historical analysis.
The Importance of Historical Process
Gramsci has proposed the functions of intellectuals in terms of the dynamics of 
historical processes. He is regarded as the first theoretician suggesting the examination of
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the role of intellectuals in terms of the process of development of specific historical 
hegemonic systems (Salamini, 1981: 103). The unique position of the organic 
intellectuals, according to Gramsci, has to do with their dialectical relationship with the 
elite and the masses in an historical development leading to the ideological and political 
formation of hegemonies. The rise of organic intellectuals and the conquest of 
hegemonic control must be understood in light of the whole historical context. In a more 
specific sense, the gradual development of the intellectual stratum is an historical 
development from a negative condition characterized by partial, determinate class-based 
economic interests to a condition in which it turns into the instrument of new ethical- 
political forms. It is clear then this development is precisely a cathartic process from 
economy to politics, signalling a transformation from economism to political 
consciousness. The development of a new culture, the new ideological hegemony being 
integral to the whole revolutionary process, must be interpreted in terms of the whole 
historical process. The significant role of intellectuals in the midst of a war of position 
and the conquest of the hegemonic control, and thus of their success in correcting the 
false consciousness of the mass, have not only shed light on the complex relationship 
between the structure and superstructure but also unfolded the dynamic interaction 
between the social transformation and the historical context (Gramsci, 1971)." Up to this 
point, the understanding of Gramsci's sociology of intellectuals must deal with the 
"problem of identifying the group which, in varying historical contexts, exercises the 
intellectual function" (Salamini, 1981: 107).
Gramsci's emphasis on historical bloc and contextual analysis rests not only on his 
discussion of intellectuals but also on his belief in the historical importance of 
philosophy.
"A great deal of research and study on the historical significance of different 
philosophies is utterly sterile and fanciful because it fails to take account of the fact that 
many philosophical systems are exclusively, or almost exclusively, individual 
expressions and that part of them which can be called historical is often minimal and
"M y discussion here draws light from Boggs (1984) and Salamini, (1981).
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swamped in a complex of abstractions whose origins are purely and abstractly 
ratiocinative. " (Gramsci, 1971: 346)
Having seen such a situation, Gramsci therefore suggests,
"If it is true that every philosophy is the expression of a society, it should react back on 
that society and produce certain effects, botii positive and negative. The extent to which 
precisely it reacts back is the measure of its historical importance, of its not being 
individual 'lucubration' but 'historical fact'." (Gramsci, 1971: 346)
Defying the "form of anti-historicist abstraction" that dissolved history into an
inert series of concepts and categories, Gramsci states further,
"It has been forgotten that in the case of a very common expression (historical 
materialism) one should put the accent on the first term — historical' — and not on the 
second, which is of metaphysical origin. The philosophy of practice is absolute 
historicism', the absolute secularization and earthiness of thought, and absolute 
humanism of history. It is along this line that one must trace the thread of a new 
conception of the world." (Gramsci, 1971: 465)
All in all, Gramsci has highlighted the historical importance in understanding all 
ideas, of whatever consciousness, philosophy or ideology. Gramsci makes his position 
more explicit.
"We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, 
knowledge and reality are also becoming and so is objectivity, etc." (Gramsci, 1971: 
446)
Cultural and Intellectual Force of Habitus
Bourdieu, drawing from the work of Panofsky (1967), has suggested that the 
main thrust of the intellectual field also participates in a broader cultural field 
characterized by a cultural unconsciousness (Bourdieu, 1969: 91). Bourdieu repeatedly 
asserts that history and sociology are inseparably linked (for example, Bourdieu, 1990: 
42; Wacquant, 1989: 37; and Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 90-99). It is note-worthy that 
Bourdieu's conception of intellectual field also draws attention to the cultural 
preconsciousness of the texts (somewhat parallel to Mannheim's Cultural-Sociological 
Knowledge). In his earliest attempts to explicate the meaning of habitus, Bourdieu 
(1971: 192-3) refers to it as "a set of basic, deeply interiorized master-pattems", 
constituting a cultural unconsciousness, which "may govern and regulate mental process 
without being consciously apprehended and controlled". Habitus, then, is a force
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governing consciousness which force is itself unconscious (Bourdieu, 1971: 181). 
Bourdieu amply states that people's thinking is greatly influenced by the habitus, "a 
common meaning already established" under which ideas are formed. He also points out 
the close link between society and culture, seeing ideological production as a pedagogic 
work of the education system. To Bourdieu, institutionalized education is not only a 
process of cultural reproduction but also social reproduction revealing class relations 
within "objective structures" of society. Throughout the process of ideological 
production, the influence of the habitus is significant; people are exposed to "the 
common source of themes and forms which define the cultural tradition of a society and 
an age" (Bourdieu, 1971: 183). In order to develop a more coherent framework of 
ideological formation, we must analyze one's thinking contextually. Bourdieu also 
writes,
"The habitus is a system of durable, transposable dispositions which function as the
generative basis of structural, objectively unified practices". (Bourdieu, 1979: vii)
These unconscious categories or principles can be interpreted as neither 
apprehended nor apprehensible, and it is reasonable to say that they may structure and 
determine what can be apprehended.
What Bourdieu has highlighted here is a set of dispositions, created and 
reformulated through the conjuncture of objective structures and personal history. 
Bourdieu believes that dispositions are acquired in social positions within a field, 
implying a subjective adjustment to that position. Moreover, his ideas of the intellectual 
field, social space and habitus go hand in hand, suggesting the "forces" which have 
shaped people's ideas and value orientations.^^ Following the ideas of "mental habit" and 
of a "habit-forming force" from Panofsky (1967), Bourdieu puts it differently and 
suggests habitus as "structuring structure". To Bourdieu, habitus is one of those entities 
that are never observed directly but he regards it as the cultural pre-conscious in its active 
form. He maintains that habitus is shaped and transmitted by the social and institutional
draw this line from Harker et al., (1990: 9-12).
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environment, especially through the educational institutions, and by the practices and 
traditions of a culture. The "cultivated habitus", put in this way, can be interpreted as a 
"force" governing and regulating the thought of people, engendering particular schemes 
in the realms of thought. In brief, the understanding of the intellectual ideas or texts 
must investigate not only how the text speaks for itself but also how it is related to an 
intellectual field. This may involve historical and cross-cultural comparisons. I believe 
that the notion of "habitus" is similar to Mannheim's idea of "world-view". The habitus 
or "the cultural unconscious" of Bourdieu, the world-view or "cultural-sociological 
knowledge" of Mannheim and the stress of historical importance of Gramsci, taken 
together, put emphasis again on the contextual analysis of ideas.
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: PROBLEM OF STRUCTURE AND AGENCY 
In the previous sections, we have attempted to develop a framework for the 
analysis of the social-political ideas of specific Chinese intellectuals. The foregoing 
discussion has presented the ideas of Mannheim, Gramsci and Bourdieu with particular 
reference to their notions of knowledge production. Three scholars generally agree that 
knowledge can be understood only in its relation to its socio-historical location. No 
matter what Mannheim's stress on historicism, Gramsci's historical process and 
Bourdieu's habitus, they commonly believe that knowledge production is related to the 
unique socio-historical context in which knowledge is produced. In addition, these 
scholars also point out the "competive" nature of knowledge because of different social 
locations of intellectuals, with which divergent social and political ideas are formulated. 
No matter what notions of "competition" (Mannheim), "war of position" (Gramsci) or 
"strategising" (Bourdieu) they propose, these scholars are well aware of positional and 
relational attributes of knowledge. In short, as intellectuals change from one location to 
another their ideas change also.
Analyzing along the foregoing discussed scholarly line has enhanced us to
develop a more coherent understanding of production of knowledge. However, the 
central problem of the sociology of knowledge remains unresolved, that is, the tension 
between social structure and social agency in general and how ideas are formed as they 
are socially and culturally bound on the one hand; and individuals act differently in 
réponse to their unique environments on the other. Despite acknowleding the external 
constraints imposed upon individuals’ formation of ideas, Mannheim also considers that 
individuals do have autonomy to think freely and creatively but this freedom operates 
within constraints because of the social location/position of the indivuduals. This line of 
thought also explains why Mannheim rejects "over-deterministic" nature of knowledge 
and considers the relationship between social context and knowledge production as 
"social connectedness" (see also Simmonds, 1978 and Tim Dant, 1991). Well aware of 
the fact that cognition is not totally determined by socially given presuppositions, 
Mannheim points it out plainly that the degree of determination from the external 
environment varies with the sociality of the object of knowledge. As Dant writes, 
"[Mannheim's] sociology of knowledge proposes that both the individual knowing 
subject and some of the contents of thought are determined by the specific social and 
historical existence of the individual. Mannheim leaves intact the immanent process of 
thought to the extent that knowledge is determined by 'theoretical' (ie. cognitive) 
antecedence" (Dane, 1991: 22). In short, Mannheim conceives knowledge as formed in a 
concrete social basis while leaving some, relative, autonomy to the cognitive processes of 
individuals. Society, in this sense, does not exert total control on people's thought but 
renders a "world-view" or "reference" which influences ideological formation. Despite 
the fact that Mannheim acknowledges individual's' relative autonomy in ideological 
production, he has not provided any conceptual tool to describe the interactive process of 
structure and agency. It is at this point Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is criticized 
for being too its general and broad, and at times the relation between thought and society 
defined mechanistically. Following the same logic, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge
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gives the impression that individuals simply respond passively to the social context, 
define their ideas and change them when the social context changes. This line of inquiry 
may have ignored the dynamic between social structure and social agency.
Bourdieu's Strateev and Stragetising
In order to resolve this problem, Bourdieu's notion of "strategy" and "strategising" 
is useful here. Like Mannheim, Bourdieu believes people are influenced by their unique 
environments and culture. As we pointed out before, Bourdieu's notion of habitus (like 
Mannheim's world-view) penetrates people's social life since primary social experiences, 
no matter you like it or not, have a disproportinate weight. However, Bourdieu does not 
see people as so passive that they are just controlled by the external forces. He makes it 
clear that:
"Habitus is what you have to posit to account for the fact, without being rational, social 
agents are reasonable — and this is what makes sociaology possible. People are not 
fools; they are are [sic] much less bizarre or deluded than we would spontaneously 
believe precisely because they have internalized, through a protracted and multisided 
process of conditioning, the objective chances they face. They know how to 'read' the 
future that fits them ..." (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 130)
Rejecting a deterministic nature of knowledge production, Bourdieu believes
"habits is not the fate that some people read into it" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:
131). Instead, it is the product of history, an open system of dispositions that varies
according to individual experiences. He also acknowledges the complex nature of the
constitution of habitus but he makes it plain that people are not immune to the influences
of habitus, a relative irreversible process, in which ideas are constructed by prior
experiences. Having said that, Bourdieu also qualifies his argument by showing that
habitus reveals itself only in reference to a definite situation. Amply put, discourses or
practices are related to certain structures that habitus produces. Regarding social agents
as the product of history, of the history of the whole social field and of the accumulated
experience within any sub-field, Bourdieu also maintains that social agents actively
determine the situation that determines them. He states clearly that "social agents are
 ^ draw this light from Dr. Alan Swingewood, Senior Lecturer o f the Department of Sociology, London School o f Economics.
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determined only to the extent that they determine themselves" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992: 136).
Dissatified with the static description of social practice as functionalism and 
structuralism suggested, Bourdieu argues that "habitus may very well be accompanied by 
a strategic calculation of costs and benefits which tends to carry out at a conscious level 
the operations which habitus carries out in its own way ..." (Wacquant, 1989: 45). 
Disagreeing with the view that agents' expectations necessarily and mechanically 
replicate their objective opportunities, Bourdieu makes his position clear that variations 
are common because individuals retain a certain amont of autonomy in choosing 
different strategies reacting to the external environments. Bourdieu makes it explicitly 
clear that:
"the tendency to preserve in their being that groups owe, among other reasons, to the 
fact that the agents who compose them and endowed with durable dispositions capable 
of surviving the economic and social conditions of their own production, can be at the 
basis of maladjustment as well as adjustment, of revolt as well as resignation. It 
suffices to evolve other possible forms of the relationship between dispositions and 
conditions to see in the anticipated adjustment of habitus to objective conditions a 
'particular case of the possible' and to avoid unconsciously universalizing the model of 
the quasi-circular relation of near-perfect reproduction which is completely valid only 
in the case where the conditions of production of habitus are identical or homologous to 
its conditions of fimction" (Bourdieu, 1990a: 62-3, cited in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992: 132-3)
It is in this light that we can argue that the internalization of objective chances in 
the form of subjective hopes and mental schemata plays an important part in Bourdieu's 
analysis of social strategies. His theoretical move "from rules to strategies" demonstrates 
that Bourdieu is conscious about the dynamic of social practice. According to Bourdieu, 
actors do have goals and interests, they are also desired to locate the source of their 
practice in their own experience of reality (their practical sense or logic). Jenkins (1992) 
suggests that Bourdieu's model of strategy and strategising have two separate but 
intimately related dualisms. First, social interaction is characterized by a mixture of 
freedom and constraint; and second, practice is a product of processes which are neither 
wholly conscious nor unconscious. Having conducted anthropological studies, Bourdieu
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finds that people adopt diverse strategies reacting to their socio-cultural environments. 
In his analysis of the Kabyle sense of honour, honour-related behaviours are not rule- 
governed but a diffuse and generalized "sense of honour". He also discovers that the 
understanding of the Kubyle honour-related transactions only made sense over time and 
understood in the proper context of an ongoing family strategy (Bourdieu, 1960 and 
1965).
Opposing to rational choice theory, Bourdieu interprets social practice as an 
ongoing result of the interaction between the dispositions of the habitus and the 
constraints and possibilities which are the reality of any given social field. Jenkin (1992) 
points out that Boudieu's notion of strategising is an important link between the notions 
of practice, habitus and field. By strategising, Bourdieu means calculation of costs and 
benefits against a context of constraints especially to do with resource allocation. Seeing 
human beings not as conscious and rational as such, Bourdieu is therefore very critical of 
those social science models depicting that human behaviour as intrinsically rational & 
calculative.^^ Putting the foregoing observations together, we reach the conclusion that 
there is tension between social structure and social agency. We can therefore argue that 
though individuals are structurally and institutionally bound, they still maintain a certain 
level of autonomy to choose how to respond to the external stimuli or threats. Following 
the same logic, individual variations are common since different people may have 
divergent interpretations or perceptions of their socio-political environments. Therefore, 
knowledge production should not be analyzed too mechanistically, avoid also reducing it 
as passivity of human beings in relation to their social stmcture.
GENERATIONAL LOCATION AND IDEOLOGICAL FORMATION
In addition to the foregoing proposed perspectives on the analysis of ideas, the 
present research is also interested in exploring how intellectuals’ different generational
l^For details ofBourdieu's notion of strategy and strategising, see, for example, (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 128-131; Jenkins, 1992: 
38-45 and chapter 4)
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locations affect their conceptions of democracy. Mannheim has suggested the 
momentous impact of the generational location on the ideas of intellectuals. For 
generational location, Mannheim means a particular experience and a special way of 
looking at the world. As Mannheim says,
"The fact of belonging to the same class, and that of belonging to the same generation 
or age group, have this in common, that both endow the individuals sharing in them 
with a common location in the social and historical process, and thereby limit them to a 
specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic 
mode of thought and experience and a characteristic type of historically relevant 
action". (Mannheim, 1952: 291)
In the same vein, Julian Marias also points out the interconnection between 
generational succession and historical change (Marias, 1970). Both Mannheim and 
Marias have proposed a methodology which begins with identifying a collective identity 
for a group of intellectuals who have been brought up in a similar historical context or 
affected by certain key, transforming events through which their ideas were formed. 
Following the assertion of generation location, each generation is endowed with its own 
special style and character, shaped by its own upbringing, its own spirit, its virtues and its 
limitations. With such exploration the range of potential experience and the 
characteristic mode of thought and experience will become more specific (Mannheim, 
1952). Li Zehou and Schwarcz (1983/84) also emphasize this:
"In modem Chinese history, political events seem to be the most important influence in 
distinguishing and shaping the social life of various generations. These political events 
may be seen as symbols of a generation's identity, especially for those intellectuals who 
were involved in these events". (Li and Schwarcz, 1983/84: 45; emphasis added.)
Li Zehou and Schwarcz have also proposed a generational overview of 
intellectual ideas. They suggest a scheme involving six generations of modem Chinese 
intellectuals. Our examination of different generations of contemporary Chinese 
intellectuals, each generation having its own way of confronting issues and each facing 
different treatment from the state, should elucidate the link between their ideas and their 
socio-historical/socio-political contexts. Chang Hao (1987) when studying ideological 
formation of the late Qing scholars, suggests that the particular environment where
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intellectuals live should have influenced their ideas. Equally important, Chang points out 
that the study of "existential" situation, that is, typical situations of human life as 
perceived by different intellectuals, must be informative when studying people’s ideas. 
Holding such a view, Chang thus suggests that only when we can develop a more 
coherent picture of their thought can we analyze people’s ideas in the context of their 
different life courses. One point which needs to be addressed here is that though the 
notion of generational location enhances us to develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of ideological production of intellectuals, this analytic tool also has its 
limitations. First, it fails to explains why some intellectuals, with similar generational 
experiences, have different interpretations of social reality. Second, it is difficult to 
locate intellectuals in different generations as the classification of which is somehow 
arbitrary. When using the generational location as a conceptual tool to examine 
intellectuals’ knowledge production, we must be conscious that what people make of their 
experiences depend on their personal strategies and the context of organizations they are 
in. In this sense, we must be aware of the tension and dynamic in which ideas are 
formed in relation to generational location and personal choice. Thus, personal 
uniqueness and biography of individual might have also affected how people interpret 
and conceptualize their ideas or ideologies.
In addition, the present research will also examine the relationship between 
intellectual radicalism and the socio-economic and socio-political opportunities to which 
intellectuals have access.
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND INTELLECTUAL 
RADICALISM
Brym suggests that intellectual radicalism is closely related to political and 
economic opportunities. He also maintains that whether the intellectuals adopt a radical 
stand greatly depends on the number of intellectuals, the level of group organization of 
the intellectuals and the resources that they possess. We can see that although there may
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not be a definite causal relationship between the alienation of intellectuals and their 
radical acts and ideas, they are closely related/^ Therefore, it is advisable to investigate 
carefully how such a "mechanism" influences the political ideas of intellectuals.
The present research also attempts to unravel how resources that the intellectuals 
can mobilize (Brym, 1980) and their political opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1989; 
Brockett, 1991; and McAdam, 1982, 1988) have influenced their political stance. The 
theory of social mobilization has suggested that the mobilization of massive support and 
the access to resources should have influenced the success of social movements (see for 
example, Tilly, 1978 and McCarthy & Zald, 1987). Unlike the three most dominant 
approaches in analyzing social movements,'^ the resource mobilization approach stresses 
both societal support and constraints of social movements. Questioning the commonly 
shared belief that there is a causal relationship between preexisting discontent and 
grievances, generalized beliefs (loose ideologies) and uprising of social movements, the 
resource mobilization approach suggests the study of social movement in terms of the 
variety of resources available to the participants, the linkages and networks of different 
groups of activists, the external support to the movement. One of the representative 
scholars in this approach, Charles Tilly argues that social movements flow directly out of 
a population’s central political processes rather than a momentary expression of 
discontents within a population (Tilly, 1973; see also Snyda & Tilly, 1972). McCarthy 
and Zald (1987: 18), along this line, suggest that "there is always enough discontent in 
any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is 
effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established
’’Some scholars have proposed that there is a strong relationship and even a causal relationship between the alienation of 
intellectuals and intellectual radicalism. See, for example, R. Michels (1932); C. Brinton (1938); W. Kotschning (1937), etc.
'^In the literature of social movement, different scholars may have diverse interpretations. Some scholars assume a close link 
between the frustrations or grievances o f the participants and the rise and decline of movement activity. In this regard, they propose to 
study social movement in terms of the social psychology of the participants (see, for example, the Critical Mass Bulletin, 1973-74). 
Questioning such a theoretical centrality concentrating on psychological explanation, some scholars view social movements from a 
distinctly structural perspective, considering how structural strain, generalized belief and deprivation have shaped the course of 
movements (see, for example, Heberle, 1951, 1968). Dissatisfied with above notions of social movement, the theories o f activists 
suggest investigating how the infrastructure of society and movements, problems of mobilization, the manufacture of discontent and 
tactical choices have affected social movements. Ron Eyerman & A. Jamison (1991) have a very good discussion on social 
movement, suggesting studying the subject-matter firom a cognitive approach, that is, how ideological formation influences the course 
o f social development.
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elite group". Such an assumption has also led them to investigate the dynamic of social 
movements in terms of support base, strategy and tactics and relation to larger society to 
which the participants have access. The review of research and theory about social 
movements in the preceding part may hopefully enhance our understanding of intellectual 
radicalism in the post-Mao era. The ability to mobilize intellectuals' resource may have 
influenced the extent of their radicalism and eventually shaped the relationship between 
the state and the intellectuals.
The resource mobilization approach, however, was challenged by other theoretical 
and empirical findings in the 80's. Instead of considering only "resources" in social 
movements, some scholars point also to the political environment in which the social 
movements arose. "Political opportunity structure" has been suggested by various 
scholars as a means for gaining a better understanding of the rise of social movements 
(see, for example, Eisinger, 1973; Tarrow, 1989; Brockett, 1991; McAdam, 1982, 1988; 
Kitschelt, 1986). Eisinger affirms a relationship between political environment and its 
particular structuring function in "political opportunity".
"Political environment is a generic term used variously in the literature of political 
science to refer to, among other things, aspects of formal political structure, the climate 
of governmental responsiveness, social structure, and social stability ... In short, 
elements in the environment impose certain constraints on political activity or open 
avenues for it". (Eisinger, 1973: 11)
It is clear then the political environment has facilitated and constrained political 
activity. Eisinger continues,
"The manner in which individuals and groups in the political system behave, then, is not 
simply a function of the resources they command but of the openings, weak spots, 
barriers, and resources of the political system itself. There is, in this sense, interaction, 
or linkage, between the environment, understood in terms of the notion of a structure of 
political opportunities, and political behaviour". (Ibid)
The political opportunity structure, in this way, is under tremendous influence of 
the political environment. Scholars have also suggested a cluster of variables structuring 
political opportunity (see, for example, Tarrow, 1989 and McAdam, 1988). In our 
present study, the spotlight is put on the availability of powerful positions within the
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formal political institutions and the extent of support for and anticipated opposition to 
their political actions (Tarrow, 1989; Brockett, 1991 and McAdam, 1982, 1988)/^ The 
relevance of the literature on social movement and political environment to our present 
research is twofold. First, the analysis of the political opportunity structure may 
hopefully shed light on understanding the relationship between the extent of radicalism 
and the bargaining power of the participants in the movement. Second, the examination 
of the political opportunity structure and the political environment from a wider context 
can enhance our understanding of the power relationship among different groups through 
which different strategies and ideologies are formed.
This line of inquiry corresponds to Brym’s suggested investigation of the 
relationship between intellectual radicalism and the economic and political opportunities 
to which the intellectuals have access. More interestingly, this idea again points to the 
fact that a better understanding of ideological formation is not isolated from the complex 
and dynamic power relations among intellectuals, which repeatedly shows the positional 
and relational attributes of ideas. In addition, it is also observed that the structural 
changes in society, together with bureaucratization of intellectuals, have led to a decline 
in intellectual criticism. McCarthy and Zald (1987) also suggest that intellectuals will 
become more critical of the society at large or of specific institutional-professional 
arrangements as they acquire more education. Alongside this, they also consider 
professionalization of intellectuals and change in occupational structure (expansion of the 
service sector), combined with a relative degree of autonomy in modem organizational 
settings, have contributed to intellectual radicalism. According to this reasoning, the 
extent of intellectual radicalism can be predicted by intensive calculation and evaluation 
of the intellectuals' resources and political opportunity structure.
'^The focus on these two variables is because they have been commonly discussed by most scholars in this particular field.
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THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY
Despite the common beliefs that Mannheim, Gramsci and Bourdieu share, there 
are some differences among them. Gramsci’s "war of position" from capitialist to 
communist hegemony is a totalising hegemony based on class struggle. The notion of 
ideological war or conquest of hegemony, according to Gramsci, involves moving from 
economism to political and cultural consciousness through which a new world-view and a 
new philosophy would be formed. In spite of the totalising nature of Mannheim’s project, 
what he has suggested is not based on class struggle as such. Though Mannheim 
acknowledges the competive nature of knowledge production, he rejects Marx's notion of 
class determinism of ideology. For historical transformation, Gramsci’s is a revolutionary 
prazis, whereas Mannheim’s is one of understanding or at most of comprehending 
conflicts and arbitrating them empirically. In addition, Gramsci suggests a critique of 
knowledge and of civil society but there is no such hint in Mannheim’s work. Unlike 
Gramsci and Mannheim, Bourdieu’s habitus is far more micropolitical and structural 
despite the fact that it also concerns the means of reproducing class relations.
The discussion of the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of intellectuals and 
the intellectual field in the preceding part has defined our focus for the scrutiny of 
ideological formation. The conceptual framework developed here closely follows these 
intellectual paths, for they are not isolated but complementary to one another. Though 
many of the concepts discussed in the previous sections are not directly applicable to 
modem Chinese conditions. In this study, we are going to derive and modify some of the 
discussed concepts as our analytic tools to examine how Chinese intellectuals 
conceptualize their notions of democracy with particular reference to how socio-historical 
context and social location have affected their ideological formation. Following 
Mannheim’s notion of social location, it would help if the relation of the intellectuals to 
social group is worked out especially as the ideas developed by an individual relate to the
draw this light from Dr. Stephen Feuchtwang, Reader of the City University, London.
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collective social forces at work within the "social location". With this conceptual tool in 
hand, we hope the following study would illuminate how did Chinese intellectuals 
develop their specific radical ideas. Was it simply an intellectual response to the context 
in which they lived or was it an interactionist relationship? The examination of 
knowledge production in the light of "social location" may hopefully show us the 
dynamic between social structure and social agency.
In addition, the present study attempts to contextualize the socio-political ideas of 
a selected sample of contemporary Chinese intellectuals in terms of Bourdieu's idea of 
"field". Despite the fact that there is no sense of field as such in China as Bourdieu 
suggests, the idea of "field" is of particular value in this research. In the post-Mao era, 
Chinese intellectuals have been trying to expand the public sphere and exert their 
intellectual autonomy and professional independence. As the CCP has lost control over 
the ideological realm after the death of Mao Zedong, it inevitably creates room for the 
intellectuals to redefine and reconceptualize their own ideologies. Following Bourdieu’s 
contrast between "apparatus" (dominant values) and "field" (autonomy of values), it 
seems that Chinese intellectuals have persisitently attempted to develop their own "fields" 
in contrast with the "apparatus" (see chapter 4 and the following case studies). 
Acknowledging the fact that there is not such conflicts and struggle between different 
intellectual fields in mainland China as her western counterparts do, the notion of striving 
for autonomy of values (field) as Bourdieu suggests is insightful to our present study. It 
is in this particular light that Bourdieu’s notion of "field" is helpful here to demonstrate 
how the selected sample of Chinese intellectuals have endeavoured to control the public 
sphere and eventually to develop a civil society in China. We only use Bourdieu’s field 
concept within such limits. However, it is note-worthy that Bourdieu’s idea of habitus is 
difficult to conduct empirical study in this research as it is not a study of ethnology. 
Though the general discussion of habitus is highly illuminative to us that how people are 
not immune to the dispositions of habitus, it is emipirically difficult to prove in this
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study. For this reason, we have no intention to directly apply this concept in this 
research. In order to investigate the interactionist and dynamic nature of knowledge 
production, the present study will adopt Bourdieu’s idea of "strategy” and "strategising" to 
see how different intellectuals react to the similar socio-historical context but with 
different access to socio-economic and socio-political opportunities. In this conjucture, 
we can bridge the idea of "political opportunity structure" and Bourdieu’s idea of 
"strategy" tobether, exploring how Chinese intellectuals select different approaches and 
strategies in response to their external stimuli or threats. Acknowledging the fact that 
individuals are structurally, institutionally and personally bound, the present study 
attempts to demonstrate how different Chinese intellectuals interact with the external 
constraints and find their coping strategies. Up to this point, we can see that though we 
cannot totally and directly apply Mannheim’s and Bourdieu’s concepts in the study of 
Chinese reality, we can adopt and borrow some of their ideas as analytic tools in this 
study.
For Gramsci, his classification of organic and traditional intellectuals are highly 
indicative to our understanding of the role of intelligentsia but we have to admit that we 
cannot apply Gramsci an concepts in our present study directly. Despite the usefulness 
and insights that we have drawn from Gramsic in the general discussion of intellectuals 
and ideological production, it is empirically difficult to make use of his ideas in China. 
What Gramsci suggests involves moving economism to political and cultural 
consciousness and which is also a totalising hegemony based on class struggle from 
capitialist to communist hegemony, the direct application of Gramsci’s ideas seem not to 
be appropriate to socialist China. More specifically, Gramsci’s "war of position" is 
problematic given the weakness of Chinese civil society and failure to develop 
autonomous institutions separate from the state. The same constraint also applies to the 
use of Bourdieu "field" notion. Therefore, we should not directly apply these concepts 
without modification. Putting these observations together, it suffices to us that the
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sociology of knowledge is of particularly complicated nature. It is extremely difficult to 
make these connections directly and produce a perfect case to link the theoretical logic 
and empirical fact together. Having said that, it is still worthy to conduct a research on 
Chinese intellectuals in terms of sociology of knowledge. This study will use their 
insights where possible to the Chinese context.
The following chapters will analyze the formation of intellectual ideas involves 
the examination of four elements: (1) the particular socio-historical, socio-political and 
socio-cultural contexts which the thinkers inhabit; (2) a historical perspective on the 
social location or social position and the generation location of the intellectuals; (3) the 
institutional factors, their educational and occupational orientations and social networks; 
and (4) their economic and political opportunities, to see how these variables interact 
with one another to produce their particular interpretations of the world in general and the 
political thoughts in particular.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MAY FOURTH SCHOLARS AND THEm DEMOCRATIC THOUGHTS
Advocacy for democracy and protection of human rights is far from a newly 
aroused agenda in modem China. Early in the May Fourth Movement (MFM), the 
Chinese scholars began to look into the concepts of 'democracy' and science'. The 
principal goal of this chapter is to chart the social and historical contexts of the MFM and 
to analyze the ideas of democracy and political thoughts of Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi and Lu 
Xun in light of our theoretical framework.^ In order to understand the nature of the 
MFM, we have to examine the particular socio-historical and socio-political contexts 
under which the MFM erupted.
SOCIO-HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXTS OF THE MFM
Late in the late Qing period, the collapse of the traditional cultural-political order 
created intense nation-wide ideological and legitimation crises. In the past, the Chinese 
scholars merely tmsted and closely followed Confucian thinking. Confucianism, being 
the most dominant idea before the MFM, guided the behaviour of people and regulated 
the social formation, setting the standards for social life. In traditional China, the 
political and socio-cultural realms were integral. Weber considers the establishment of a 
centralized bureaucratic state since the Qin dynasty as a very important political stmctural 
factor for a unified empire. In addition to the structural factor, cultural unity has a 
decisive impact on the nature of the patrimonial state (Weber, 1951). In the Han dynasty, 
Confucianism was elevated to the status of a state ideology, thus the Confucian cultural 
system was fully integrated with the political structure. King (1990) labels such a 
cultural-political structure as "Institutionalized Confucianism". He also points out the
^The MFM was supported not only by students and intellectuals but also by other walks o f life. Unlike the communist writers who 
mainly consider the MFM as a mass movement supported by the working class, Chen (1971) and Ikeda Makoto (1952) the MFM as a 
people's movement supported not only by working class but also by merchants, urban people, labourers and national c^ ita lis t class. 
In this regard, the MFM can be interpreted as a popular movement rather than merely a movement organized by intellectuals and 
student masses.
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fact that the Imperial Chinese state system was based on not only Confucian ideals but 
also a legalistic doctrine. Karl Burger highlights a similar idea as he writes in another 
context.
"We can no more speak of 'Confucian law' in China than we can speak of a Confucian 
state'. All dynasties since the Qin have retained the fundamental principle of the 
legalist." (Quoted in Schram, 1987: 227)
In this regard, the state system since Qin can be interpreted as a mixed product of
Confucianism and legalism. King (1990: 7) also maintains that "it was the Han's
amalgam of Confucianism and Legalism which constituted a cultural-structural basis for
the imperial rulership of the successive dynasties". Confucianism acted as the ultimate
source of legitimacy for the imperial rulership for the successive dynasties. Thus, the
relationship between Confucianism and the imperial rulership "was an institutional-
cultural complex including the imperial institutions, patrimonial bureaucracy and
Confucian cultural values" (Ibid). Such a cultural-political unity of the patrimonial state
was prone to the disintegration of both socio-political and cultural-moral orders whenever
any part of them was threatened.^
To understand the Chinese Imperial history, one point which must be noted here
is that the ultimate authority rested in the hands of the emperor. Schwartz argues that the
dominant shared Chinese cultural orientation is "the idea of a universal, all-embracing
socio-political order entering in the concept of a cosmically based universal kingship" (B.
Schwartz, 1985: 413). The universal king was entrusted with the Mandate of Heaven,
and as the proprietor of all territory. Being the highest sovereign over all people, he also
acted as the link between the cosmos and the people. In the minds of Chinese people, the
^Li Zehou (1990a) and Jiang & Liu (1990) also consider the political and cultural orders o f traditional China as integral. Such an 
"integration" rendered China a relatively stable social and political order. Along this they also suggest that the contemporary social 
and political structure is similar to that of the traditional one. Socialist ideology has been used as an integrative mechanism to 
consolidate the CCP’s rule. Besides, the CCP also controls the society by means of party organization and mass organizations. Lucian 
Pye (1985) argues in the same vein that the CCP developed a particular type o f ideology or guiding principles to legitimatize its rule. 
According to Pye, such an ideology differed from orthodox Marxism but was a unique integration o f traditional Chinese values and 
Marxist-Leninist principles, together with Mao Zedong's thought. Pye calls it "Leninist-Confiicianism" and it is this "value" system 
which consolidates the foundation of the CCP. Ogden (1992) also suggests that the CCP, like other parties in developing countries, 
develops its own ideological basis upon an integration of both a traditional value system and "imported" values. Putting these 
observations together, I can claim that the social and political structure of the CCP is similar to that of traditional China. With such a 
cultural-political unity, the CCP is also prone to be threatened whenever its ideology is losing support, see also (Schurmann, 1968).
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Son of Heaven (Universal King) was not only a ruler but also the agent of Heaven on 
earth to maintain the cosmic harmony. Having such a unique and sovereign position, the 
universal king exercised not only political but also religio-spiritual authority. Through 
the proper performance of his ritual and non-ritual duties, the King mediated between 
both the human social order and the sacred cosmic order. Thus, the Son of Heaven was 
regarded as "a sort of cosmological linchpin functioning at the centre of the world and 
radiating a universal authority on earth" (Chang Hao, 1987:5).^ In regard to these 
observations, the bureaucratic authority was "only derivative, coming directly from the 
emperor" (Yu, 1976: 50).'*
The preceding discussion has so far highlighted two important points. First, the 
incorporation of an elaborate organismic cosmology (the ideas of yin-yang) into 
Confucianism institutionalized and reinforced the notion of universal kingship, 
consolidating the socio-political and the cultural-moral orders and made them an integral 
whole. Second, the integration of the socio-political order and cultural-moral order 
made the political-cultural structure much more rigid, creating the possibility for the total 
collapse of both orders when any part of the system was threatened. When cosmological 
kingship lost its ideological hold on the minds of Chinese intellectuals, a new crisis of 
consciousness inevitably emerged, cumulating in a crisis of order. Universal Kingship 
acted not only as the institutional foundation of China's socio-political order but also 
constituted a universe of meaning for Chinese people, it became an orientational symbol 
to maintain coherence of the socio-cultural order. The dissolution of the cosmological 
Kingship inevitably caused the breakdown of the socio-cultural order. Such observations
^In addition, from the Han Dynasty onwards, Confucianism incorporated the yin-yang and "five elements". Lin (1979: 12-16) 
regards such a development as a facilitator to the establishment of the Chinese empire. Incorporating Confucianism and the ideas of 
yin-yang together, the position of universal king was further consolidated because he was regarded as yang. The relationship between 
the people and the king was characterized as yin and yang. Under this rubric o f thought, universal kingship was also believed to have 
been the link between the cosmic order and social order since the yang would always exist in the cosmos while the universal king 
would rule over the world. For details o f  the cosmological symbolism in relation to the Chinese concept of Kingship, for example, see 
Lin (1979) and Chang Hao (1989: 33-78).
^Contrary to this line o f reasoning, Y.C. Wang argues that the authority and power o f emperors in Imperial China was limited since 
the bureaucracy headed by the "prime minister” was more influential. See, Wang (1966, especially introduction) and Tu, (1991: 103- 
138).
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indicate to us why the attack on the political structure in the late Qing dynasty led to the 
downfall of the cultural-moral order/ One point must be stressed here is that 
Confucianism itself went through several convulsions. Even though there is continuity of 
Chinese culture and polity, the official ideology of different ideology had diverse 
interpretations. For instance, scholars modified Confucianism in Sung and Ming and 
even in Qing dynasties. It is in this light we argue that we should not overstress the 
rigidity and continuity of Chinese culture and polity.^
It is against such an disintegration of the political-cultural order that an identity 
crisis was created for the May Fourth intellectuals. Being the interpreters of official 
ideology, the intellectuals were expected to be standard-bearers of morality, preserving 
traditional ethical values. They had been playing the role as gatekeepers and source 
persons of ideas and ideologies (Cheng, 1990), engaging in the scrutiny of the received 
ideas and assumptions of their milieu (Yu, 1987: 84-112).^ Wang (1966) suggested that 
Chinese society would have had a different structure and no scholarly class without 
Confucianism.* From the late Qing to the May Fourth period, the intellectuals confronted 
a dissolution of hope, realizing the cold reality that Confucian thinking had failed to gain 
the hegemony of the socio-political realm. Moreover, their exposure to Western ideas, 
which merely portrayed a progressive and modernized Western world, further forced 
them to question Chinese tradition. Under such circumstances, Chinese intellectuals 
began to feel "cheated" by the traditional values, more aware of the need to create a 
meaningful cosmos through a search for an alternate world view (Chang Hao, 1987).
’For details of the social and political structure of traditional China, see, for example, Lin (1972: 23-58, 1979: 10-25) and Schwartz 
(1985).
^The discussion in the previous section only concentrates on one of the dimensions of Confucianism and the socio-political structure 
o f Chinese past. However, there is no intention to argue that Chinse culture and polity is so rigid and static. Other scholariy works 
have good discussions of Chinese past and Confucianism, see, for example, Weber (1951) and Elvin (1973).
^For details of the role of literati and intellectuals, see, for example, Wang (1966); Yu (1987); Tang (1989); Gramsci (1971) and 
Denitch (1979).
'Y . C. Wang (1966) conceives that certain dominant Confucian ideas greatly influenced the behaviour o f the intellectuals and, 
through them, society at large. The May Fourth scholars, like their forerunners, the literati, were also influenced by the Confucian 
thinking.
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Clarification of this context enhances our understanding of the nature of the MFM, 
especially the intellectual tide during this period.
THE NATURE OF THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT
Concerning the nature of the MFM, the most dominant theme is the search for a 
new China. It has been suggested that even though the May Fourth Scholars had 
different approaches to solve China's intense crisis, they had the common ground that the 
revitalization of Chinese society required most basically a "Cultural Revolution". Despite 
their differences regarding the relative importance of political action versus cultural 
reform in resolving China's problems, transformation of the cultural superstructure 
seemed to be the antecedent to both the liberal faction headed by Hu Shi and the 
revolutionary faction headed by Chen Duxiu (see, Solomon & Sullivan, 1973). Seen in 
this light, the cultural crisis set the intellectual milieu for these May Fourth Scholars.
The nature of the May Fourth Movement is so complicated that waves of debate 
on its nature and significance have continued since 1919.^ Some scholars suggest that the 
movement is a "Chinese Renaissance" which they associate with the European 
Renaissance since the spirit of criticism and destruction of the ancient culture constituted 
the whole movement. This term was proposed by Huang Yuan-yuan in 1915 before the 
movement was started (cited in Chow, 1960). Scholars holding this view maintain that 
the similarity of both movements lies in the objective of emancipation. Jiang Monlin, 
one of the May Fourth scholars, wrote of the European Renaissance as an "emancipating 
movement". He also observed,
"the recent May Fourth Movement is a first step toward this kind of emancipation. We 
are going to change our attitude toward life and bring about a Chinese Renaissance, 
emancipating emotions, emancipating thought, and demanding human rights." (Jiang, 
1919, cited in Chow, 1960: 338)
After examining the nature of the May Fourth Movement some liberal authors 
also considered it as Renaissance since it produced "a new literature in the living 
language of the people to take the place of the old literature in the classical language" (Hu
’For details of the debate, see, for example, B. Schwartz (1972); Chow (1990); Yu Yingshih (1989) and Lin (1989).
56
Shi, 1934, citedin Chow, 1960: 339).
Apart from that, the May Fourth Movement was regarded as a humanist 
movement "led by men who knew their cultural heritage and tried to study it with the 
new methodology of modem historical criticism and research" (Ibid). Some scholars, 
having been exposed to Marxist and liberal thoughts, held that the May Fourth period was 
similar to the features of Greek and Roman civilization since the Chinese economy 
evolved from a medieval condition toward a capitalist condition as its counterparts 
(Chow, 1960: 339).
Having seen the spirit of criticism and destruction of the ancient culture among 
the May Fourth scholars, some researchers even suggest that the Movement was a 
Chinese version of the French Enlightenment of the eighteenth century.’® Their appeal to 
reason rather than custom, to nature not man-made law, and to humanitarianism and 
aesthetics instead of ethical rules and religion highlighted the nature of that 
enlightenment. Their sceptical view, subjecting everything to question before they found 
enough evidence to support their belief, also indicated a fundamental change of their 
conceptualization of social reality.” Such change, to these researchers, is similar to that 
of the French Enlightenment.
Rejecting any association of the movement with the European Renaissance, Chow 
(1960) suggests that the nature of the May Fourth Movement is far from a Renaissance 
since the principal goal of the movement is not a cultural revival but just the contrary.
For Renaissance is a cultural revival of ancient civilization.
"The Renaissance in Europe was in a sense the rebirth of interest in an ancient 
civilization, a seeking to substitute Greek and Roman ideas for those of medievalism... 
But the May Fourth Movement was far from being a restoration movement. On the 
contrary, it aimed at the transplantation of a modem civilization into an old nation, 
accompanied by bitter criticism of the old civilization." (Quoted from Chow, 1960: 340)
Seen in this light, the notion of anti-traditionalism raised throughout the May
*°For details o f this view, see, for example, Schwarcz (1986).
"Even though the May Fourth Movement possessed something like the spirit o f enlightenment in France, we cannot directly 
consider the Movement totally as an enlightenment like that of France. For details of the similarity & difference, see Chow (1960: 
341-42); Schwartz (1986); Grieder (1970) and Hu Shi (1935).
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Fourth Movement is then contradictory to the essence of a cultural revival. King (1987) 
argues along the same lines that the May Fourth scholars intended not to revive the 
ancient culture but to replace it by Western ideas. Those May Fourth Scholars who 
supported the New Culture Movement were motivated by their "admiration" of Western 
culture rather than the urge to revive Chinese tradition. Concerned primarily with 
strengthening China, these scholars considered the Chinese tradition outdated; and they 
therefore criticized the old tradition. At the beginning a movement to criticize old 
tradition, the May Fourth Cultural Movement developed into a movement to criticize old 
tradition to a movement of anti-traditionalism because these intellectuals believed that the 
cultural crisis could be resolved only by learning from the West. The call for total 
westernization indicates that the MFM was a movement of reformation rather than 
Renaissance (King, 1986: 199-212).'^
In addition, Chow (1960) considers that the notion of "reorganization of the 
national heritage" suggested by Hu Shi and other May Fourth scholars as a later 
development of the movement. The main concern of those May Fourth scholars, was 
how to maintain sovereignty and to free China from Japanese invasion, was exposed in 
the student protests of 1919. Students attacked the warlord government for making a 
secret agreement with the Japanese government with the intention of expanding military 
forces. Besides, they also criticized the Western countries not only for allowing Japan's 
invasion of China but also for not condemning such a move.'^ Out of their prime concern 
of national survival and national construction, the students organized themselves to join 
the popular protests in 1919. The most pressing issue confronted by these May Fourth 
scholars was the national crisis, especially when the country was in the midst of 
disintegration in both political and orientational orders. Imbued with patriotism, 
intellectuals sought alternate ways for saving China. The student protests thereby
’^For details of the view o f the May Fourth Movement as a "Chinese Reformation", see, for example, Chow (1960: 341-342); see 
also Schwarcz (1986) and King (1987: 199-212).
'^For details of the historical context of the movement, see, for example, Chow (1960: 84-170) and Fairbank (1983).
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developed into a nation-wide popular movement.
Despite the general agreement shared by most May Fourth scholars the most 
fundamental problem that China confronted had to do with the cultural crisis, different 
intellectuals adopted diverse strategies to tackle such intense crises. Early in 1917, the 
May Fourth scholars staged the movement discarding old Chinese tradition on the one 
hand and supporting democracy on the other. They also painstakingly explored questions 
such as "what is the role of traditional Chinese culture in the restoration and renewal of 
Chinese civilization amidst the general crisis of a cultural failure-of-nerves?", "should the 
traditional culture be simply discarded, or persistently reaffirmed even in the face of 
formidable challenges?" The different stances of the scholars toward the solution of the 
cultural crisis revealed the controversial and complicated nature of the problem. On the 
one hand, the May Fourth positivist and the left-wing scholars totally rejected Chinese 
culture, whereas the National Essence school adopted the stance of reaffirming the moral 
superiority of Chinese tradition. Sitting in the middle were the New Confucians who 
struggled against both extremes and maintained their moderate ground.
Despite the fact that the Chinese intelligentsia had emerged as a visible group of 
new social types in the 1920s as Chang Hao (1987) suggested, they were far from a 
coherent and cohesive group. It is observed that these intellectuals were of diverse 
political stands, the growing division among them inevitably created heated intellectual 
debates and controversies. No matter how critical and iconoclastic Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu, 
Li Daozhao and other intellectuals of China's tradition and culture, they were only "part" 
of the whole Chinese intellectual community. With divergent views on China's problems 
and ways to solve the intense social and political crises that China was confronting, some 
scholars such as Liang Shuming advocated the restoration of Chinese past. Like the first 
generation of Chinese intellectuals: Liang Qichao, Wang Guowei and Cai Yuanpei who 
were of divergent and even conflicting views on China's problems and adopted different
'^Chang Hao (1987) discusses the ideological formation and response of the first generation of Chinese intellectuals in modem 
China to the intense cultural crisis which deserves particular attention. For details o f the divergent stands in solving the cultural crisis 
in this period, see, for example, Fairbank (1983); Bianco (1977); Chow (1960; 289-370) and Li Zehou (1990b).
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approaches in solving them. Seen in this light, the May Fourth intellectuals were a 
divided group of people, having different interpretations and strategies in coping with 
China's immediate crises. Therefore, we should be aware that despite the iconoclastic 
elements shared by many of the second generation of intellectuals, we cannot make an 
over-generalizing claim that all of these May Fourth scholars formed a homogeneous 
group with coherent and unifed political platform. The following discussion will further 
demonstrate how diverse intellectuals and their ideas are even though they are regarded 
as "reformists" supporting democracy and anti-traditionalism. With different social 
locations and from diverse intellectual fields, together with different socio-political and 
socio-economic opportunities that they accessed, intellectuals selected different strategies 
in response to their unique socio-historical circumstances.^^
MAJOR THEMES OF THE MAY FOURTH SCHOLARS’ THOUGHT
Putting this socio-historical context into perspective, we observe that the central 
problem confronting the May Fourth intellectuals involved the interplay between the 
forward-looking and far-reaching life style of modernity and a stubbornly sustaining and 
old-fashioned tradition. The extent of the crisis is not only a matter of individual 
interests concerning the role of the intellectuals themselves but also a matter concerning 
the whole nation. Despite the fact that many issues of concern were raised during this 
era, the central themes are emancipation and national salvation, new epoch and modernity 
and almost unanimous calls for democracy.
Emancipation and Anti-traditionalism
The spirit behind their cultural iconoclasm and total rejection of tradition is the 
strong urge for emancipation and liberation of man.^^ "Emancipation of man", to most of 
the May Fourth scholars, had to do with the rejection of the old traditional "norms and
^^For details o f the divergent stands in solving the cultural crisis in the May Fourth period, see, for example, Fairbank (1983); Bianco 
(1977); Chow (1960: 289-370) and Li Zehou (1990b) .
'*For details of their cultural iconoclasm and totalistic anti-traditionalism, see Lin Yusheng (1979) and Chow (1960).
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regulations" {Li jiao) embedded in the feudal cultural-political order. Many of them 
believed that destruction of the old would bring a new order for China. Kang Lin, whose 
study is on May Fourth fiction, highlights the fact that the central conflict which 
confronted the May Fourth scholars was between the awakened individual on the one 
hand and the society in its entirety on the other. Kang Lin also suggests that the basic 
cause of this conflict between individual and society lies not in literature itself but in 
social realities (Kang, 1987: 171). In this regard, a deeper understanding of such a 
conflict requires a contextual analysis of the ideas of these intellectuals.
Chen Duxiu denounced the traditional Confucian thought and openly declared 
"unless the old [society] is demolished, the new one will not arise" (Chen, 1916). He 
condemned Confucian thought, arguing that it had sustained superfluous ceremonies, 
preaching the morality of meek compliance with authority, and disparaging struggle and 
competition. Hoping to rejuvenate China, Chen (1915) steadfastly emphasized the 
significance of individuality. He openly abandoned the Confucian ethics such as filial 
piety and loyalty to one's leader, the caste system condoning the unequal status of 
individuals, and the sexual double standard causing inequality between the sexes and 
impracticality for everyday life, considering the Confucian principles outmoded. He 
even openly declared that "Chinese thought is a thousand years behind Western thought", 
advocating a total rejection of the past and putting faith in progress, democracy and 
science (Chen, 1915, 1916, 1919). Lin Yusheng suggests that the fundamental source of 
Chen's idea of anti-traditionalism lies in the role nationalism played in his thinking (Lin, 
1979: 59). Nationalistic iconoclasm is clearly found in his ideas.
"All our traditional ethics, law, scholarship, rites and customs are survivals of 
feudalism. When compared with the achievement of the white race, there is a 
difference of a thousand years in thought, although we live in the same period. 
Revering only the history of the twenty-four dynasties and making no plans for progress 
and improvement, our people will be turned out of this twentieth-century world, and be 
lodged in dark ditches fit only for slaves, cattle, and horses. I really do not know what 
sort of institutions and culture are adequate for our survival in the present world if in 
such circumstances conservatism is still advocated. I would much rather see the past 
culture of our nation disappear than see our nation die out now because of its uniqueness 
for living in the modem world. ... Whatever cannot skilfully change itself and progress 
along with the world will find itself eliminated by natural selection because of failure to
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adapt to the environment." (Chen, cited in Lin, 1979: 66)
In view of China's deep cultural crisis, Chen believed the learning from the West 
and the quest for modernity as the only way to national survival. With his single-minded 
wish to save China, Chen attempted whatever possible ways to 'cure' China's illnesses. 
Such an observation might shed more light on the frustration of Chen's political stands, 
ranging from liberal to Marxist.
Like Chen, Hu Shi attributed the fundamental cause of China's backwardness to 
its feudal and outmoded culture. One point in common between Hu and Chen lies with 
their interpretation of tradition — the rejection of feudal norms and regulations {Li jiao). 
However, Hu adopted another way to resolve China's problem. He pointed toward the 
importance of enlightenment of the people by which he also supported the destruction of 
the old and the construction of the new. Even though he did not admit that he was a 
cultural iconoclast, his speeches and writings during the May Fourth Movement revealed 
his ideas of anti-traditionalism (Wang Dezhao, 1979). In his short story "The Island of 
Unchanging Reality", Hu hoped "to destroy superstition and enlighten the people's 
intellect". Hu also criticized the Chinese people for their unwillingness to think (Hu Shi, 
1954). Early in 1917, Hu wrote his work Yibusheng Zhuyi to condemn Chinese tradition. 
He also wrote a script for a drama supporting the liberation of women from feudalistic 
family and marriage systems. These works affected the Chinese intellectual community 
greatly, invoking debates on anti-traditionalism (Hu, 1917). In his preface to the writings 
of Wu Yu, (another May Fourth cultural iconoclast who strongly condemned feudalistic 
family systems and outdated rituals and rules in Chinese tradition) Hu praised Wu as a 
respectable hero in attacking Confucian thought (Wang Dezhao, 1979). Differing from 
Chen who participated in political movements and became a leader of revolutionary 
activities to save the country, Hu Shi used intellectual reorganization of Chinese culture 
throughout his whole life with the intention to enlighten the people.
' ’For details o f the development of Chen's thought, see the following discussion, Li (1990a); Chi (1986) and Wang Hongmo (1985). 
Solomon and Sullivan (1973) and Pepper, S. (1973) had a good discussion on the ideological formation of these May Fourth Scholars 
which deserves attention.
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Lin Yusheng (1979: 83) observes that Hu Shi was embedded in a life-long 
contradiction — "between his commitment to both the evolutionary reform of Chinese 
tradition and the total rejection of that tradition". Such a life-long contradiction is 
reflected not only from his ideas but also from his real life. Hu Shi condemned the feudal 
marriage which was not free but was arranged by parents. Hu Shi intellectually rejected 
such a stubbornly sustained tradition, but emotionally he himself had to accept his 
marriage to an illiterate woman to please his mother. Even though he found himself a 
good girl friend during his studies in the United States, he finally gave up his wish (Zhou 
Mingzhi, 1989).'® Such an observation has indicated the complicated social psychology 
of Hu.
Similar to Chen and Hu, Lu Xun also attacked Chinese tradition, especially the 
feudal rituals and thoughts. Some questions central to Lu Xun's thought are: What is the 
ideal nature of man? What is the greatest deficiency in the nature of the Chinese people? 
What is the root of the sickness of the Chinese people?'^ In his "Diary of a Madman", Lu 
Xun pointed out that traditional Chinese rituals and thought patterns which had 
suffocated the people must be totally rejected. In his "True Story of Ah Q", Lu Xun 
exposed the weaknesses of the national character of the Chinese people. Ah Q is 
characterized by what Lu Xun suggested is a vile, cunning and megalomaniacal 
personality. Ah Q used "the method of securing spiritual victory" to rationalize the 
humiliations which he experienced in order to make himself more comfortable. With 
such a portrait of Ah Q's personality. Lu Xun tried to unravel the fact that the Chinese 
people not only had failed to admit their weaknesses but also had tried to escape from 
reality rather than to evaluate themselves genuinely. With the story of Ah Q, Lu Xun
**In addition, Hu Shi originally opposed the traditional idea that having offspring is very significant to family continuity. He once 
said that he did not want to get married for he did not regret having no offspring. However, he eventually got married and had a child 
afterwards. Hu wrote a poem to his newborn child expressing no mercy for him, and indicating that his rearing and care o f  him was 
mere responsibility. He therefore told his son that it was unnecessary for him to observe the Confucian ethics o f filial piety. Through 
this incident we learn that a deeper level of conflict confronted Hu Shi. Zhou Wen, another May Fourth intellectual, also experienced 
a similar conflict for he also sacrificed his love in the cause of filial obedience. See Zhou Mingzhi (1989) and Kang Lin (1987: 178).
These questions are cited in Lin (1979).
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intended to criticize the Chinese tradition and to arouse the people’s deeper reflection 
upon themselves.
"My method is to make the reader unable to tell who this character can be apart from 
himself, so that he cannot back away to become a bystander but rather suspects that this 
is a portrait of himself as well as of everyone [in China]. Therefore, a road to self- 
examination may open up for him." (quoted from Lin Yusheng, 1979: 124)
In addition, we also observe that the central conflict between individual and
society is embedded in Lu Xun’s works. In In the Tavern {Zai jiulou shang). Lu Xun’s
protagonists are both idealistic fighters and socially oppressed slaves. His A Happv
Familv {Xinfu de jiating) also reflects a similar conflict in which a young writer made a
decision to ’’overcome all obstacles” in order to emancipate himself five years ago but is
now unable even to conjure up ”a happy family”. Lu Xun pointed out that the desolation
of life, the responsibilities of supporting a family and the heavy household load had
contributed to his ’’failure” in realizing emancipation.^®
National Salvation Eclipsed Emancipation
The foregoing discussion has highlighted the fact that many of these May Fourth
scholars had a prime concern for individual freedom and emancipation. A persistent
theme of the dichotomy between reformism and revolutionism which had pervaded the
late 19th Century (see, for example, Rankin, 1971 and Chang Hao, 1987). It bifurcated
into reformists who proposed to solve the political crisis by means of cultural
transformation while revolutionists adopted more radical political action to deal with the
national crisis. However, one question that emerges here is why reformism failed to
create a consistent force to transform Chinese society in the twenties. To answer this
question, we must again turn back to the particular socio-historical context of the May
Fourth era. The urgent national crisis required an immediate solution, but emancipation
required much time to be realized. Because the May Fourth scholars recognized that the
^°The central conflict between individual and society and the strong urge for emancipation also constitute the theme o f the May 
Fourth fiction. As one of the May Fourth writers Yu Dfu said, "[The greatest success of the May Fourth Movement lay, first o f all, in 
the discovery of individual personality." For details o f such discussion, see, Kang Lin (1987). Putting these observations together, we 
conclude that the common concern among these scholars is humanism and emancipation o f man, coupled with a strong urge to solve 
China's immediate cultural crisis.
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intellectual and cultural transformation of China was difficult to achieve quickly, some of 
the May Fourth scholars turned to politics, adopting the revolutionary practice of 
Marxism-Leninism. Li Zehou (1990a) suggests a dual thesis for the MFM, arguing that 
the Movement is characterized by dual themes of enlightenment and national salvation. 
He also argues that even though these two components are different, they are mutually 
interactive. The urgency of national salvation had finally eclipsed the demands for 
enlightenment.^* This idea also explains why liberalism had lost ground in China and had 
to give way to Marxist ideas. In order to achieve a wholesale transformation of the 
values and spirit of the people, some May Fourth intellectuals changed their moderate 
approach to a radical one, believing that to follow Russian way of revolution could 
resolve China's immediate crisis. The Russian revolution set them a practical example, 
satisfying their thirst for national unification and national independence. As Li Zehou 
(1990a) suggested, the early revolutionaries like Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Zhou Enlai and 
even Mao Zedong had not studied and understood wholly the works of Marx and Lenin. 
They adopted Marxism and Leninism because the ideals of Marxism were consistent with 
their aspirations. Lin Boqu, one of the CCP members who converted from liberalism to 
Marxism in the 20's, ascribed such a change mainly to their disappointment in the 1911 
Revolution. Originally, they expected that there would be peace after the 1911 
Revolution. When the Revolution failed, and democracy could not be achieved 
overnight, they then took the Marxist path in order to save and transform China 
immediately (Lin Boqu, 1941). In addition, the "hypocritic nature" of the Western world 
in the settlement of the World War I also made Chinese intellectuals disappointed.^^ Li 
Dachiu, one of the earliest leaders of the CCP, observed that the First World War had
^'Wu Sheng (1981), a historian of Party history in socialist China, also considers the prime concern of the people in the May Fourth 
period national salvation.
^^President Wilson of the U.S.A. promised Chinese people that he would help China retain Shantong province getting it back from 
Germany in the peace settlement of WWI, but he did not keep his promise and allowed Japan to occupy this area without China's 
agreement. One point that deserves emphasis is that the critical thinking o f the May Fourth scholars is not only applied to the 
evaluation of the old Chinese tradition but also to Western thinking. The hypocrisy of the West made these scholars disappointed. 
Experiencing the pain of imperialism, they realized that a western style of democracy was only a dream. Against such a background, 
they turned away from liberalism to Marxism (see, for example, Ju Chouba 1982: 34, 35)
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already shaken the foundation of European civilization and inevitably led to a deep 
suspicion among Chinese people toward the sincerity of the West (Cheng, 1990). 
Questioning the value of European civilization, these early revolutionaries eventually 
adopted a more radical approach, believing that the Marxist path could transform China. 
Wu Sheng (1981: 10) maintains that the basic cause for the conversion into Marxism of 
those early revolutionaries is the hope given by the Russian Revolution, depicting a 
blissful picture of the liberation from feudalism and economic backwardness. Because of 
similarities between China & Russia — both countries were politically feudalistic and 
economically backward, they therefore turned to the socialist path. Similarly, Geng 
Yunzhi (1990: 91) also remarks that "it is quite obvious that Marxism was accepted at 
first as a weapon for national salvation, not as general thinking." It is in this regard we 
support the notion that the strong urge for national salvation replaced the call for 
emancipation during the 1920s.
Strong Sense of New Epoch^^
A parallel call alongside total anti-traditionalism is "modernity" including the 
ideas of "science and democracy" and "developing new epoch" as the ideal means for 
modernizing China. A closer examination of the thought of the May Fourth scholars 
reveals their "universalistic" orientation in conceptualizing social reality (chaoliu yishi). 
Chang Hao (1989a) has summarized the thoughts of May Fourth scholars clearly, arguing 
for a new awareness of an outside world had emerged since the 19th century, which 
awareness was deepened and exacerbated when China was repeatedly defeated by the 
external world. Under such circumstances, the May Fourth scholars strived to leam from 
the outside world, trying to keep pace with development there. They put forward the idea 
of epoch (shidai) which is also a logical intellectual development as they rejected the old 
tradition and searched for something new. It is suggested that shidai was first introduced 
in the decade before the founding of the Republic and became popular in the twenties, 
especially acting as a catchword among those radical intellectuals.
“ The material o f this section is mainly based on the article of Leo Lee (1991).
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"shidai's most important connotation came to be 'the present time' or 'our time', always 
with the implication that it is a time of breathlessly rapid changes and incessant 
innovation." (Sun, 1986/87: 52 cited in Leo Lee, 1991: 163)
The idea of new epoch was repeatedly and consistently mentioned in the 
magazines and publications during the May Fourth era. For instance, the manifesto of the 
Xinchao (New Tide) stressed a comprehension of the new epoch. Luo Jialun, one of the 
founders of New Tide, proclaimed "knowing your shidai" as a clarion-call. Wang 
Quqing, a radical poet, stated clearly "knowing your shidai! Your shidai — that is the 
present developmental stage of society you are living in — foredains [sic] what you 
should do, and whence to start" (Leo Lee, 1991: 163). We also observe that the notion of 
Xin (new) is popular in May Fourth publications like Liang Qichao’s "New People" 
(Xinmin), Chen Duxiu's "New Youth" (Xin qingnian), "New Literature and Art" (Xin 
wenyi), "New Life" (Xin shenghuo). "New Society" (Xin shehui) and "New Epoch" (Xin 
shidai) (Ibid, 159). The spirit of "new" sheds light on the understanding of the MFM in 
which most intellectuals had attempted to destroy the old and establish the new with the 
intention to save the country. Their adherence to "new" also indicates a strong urge for 
"modernity" in the May Fourth era. Thus, a new historical consciousness was induced 
among the May Fourth scholars. Having such a historical consciousness, these scholars 
realized the entry into a "new epoch" of world history and began to acknowledge the 
destiny of their country as no longer separate but an integral part of mankind (Ibid). It is 
against such a socio-intellectual background that different Western ideologies and 
thoughts began to take root in China. The introduction of Darwinism and evolutionary 
ideas shocked the whole Chinese intellectual community. Yan Fu, one of the late Qing 
scholars, translated Darwin's ideas and suggested,
"The greatest and most irreconcilable difference between Chinese and Western thinking 
is that the Chinese love the past and neglect the present, while the Westerners strive in 
the present to surpass the past. The Chinese believe that to revolve from order to 
disorder, from ascension to decline, is the natural way of heaven and of human affairs. 
The Westerners believe, as the ultimate principle of all learning and government, in the 
infinite, daily progress, in advance that will not sink into decline, in order that will not 
revert to disorder." (cited in Leo Lee, 1991: 160)
Yan Fu's introduction of social Darwinism and Spencerian principles of "natural
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selection" and "survival of the fittest" had tremendous impact on the Chinese intellectual 
community, not only giving rise to a nationalistic imperative for China to strive for 
survival but also stressing the importance of human progress in the new epoch of human 
history. Having been influenced by such ideas, many May Fourth scholars adopted 
Darwinian ideas of progressivism. Chen Duxiu, in his plea to youth, stressed the
significance of "progressivism" to be one of the characteristics of new youth. In his
social organism, Chen compared individuals to the cells of an organism. He anticipated 
that a country would decline and eventually perish if it remained unchanged. Alongside 
this, Chen considered progressivism as a universal law in social development (Chen, 
1915: 1-6). In another well-known article "The French and Modem Civilization", Chen 
pointed toward evolutionism as one of the French contributions to mankind. In his article 
"The Year 1916", Chen proclaimed a consciousness in the twentieth-century,
"The epoch in which you are living, what epoch is this? It is the beginning of the
sixteenth year of the twentieth century. The changes of the world are evolutionary,
different from month to month, year to year. The shining history is unfolding faster and 
faster ... To live in the present world, you must raise your head and proudly call yourself 
a person of the twentieth century, you must create a new civilization of the twentieth 
century and not confine yourself to following that of the nineteenth. For the evolution 
of human civilization is replacing the old with the new, like a river flowing on, an arrow 
flying away, constantly continuing and constantly changing." (Chen 1965, 1: 41)
Bonnie McDougall (1971), in the same manner, suggests that the idea of 
evolution was discussed in other literary writings of many May Fourth scholars. She has 
discovered that the general philosophical writings and general literary histories about 
Western literature and literary theories of Chinese writers were based, in part or in whole, 
on Western books such as Thilly, History o f Philosophy’, Perry, Philosophy o f  Recent 
Past & Present Philosophical Tendencies', Marvin, History o f  European Philosophy’, 
Elliot, Modern Science and Materialism’, works closely associated with the idea of 
evolutionism.^"^ Thus, ideas of evolution and progressivism certainly influenced these 
May Fourth scholars. Along the same lines, Leo Lee (1991) also observes that the "idea 
of progress" and "evolution & eugenics" are commonly discussed and quoted in the
^^These titles are taken from Chen Zhengmo {1933) Xiandai zhexue sichao, as cited in Leo Lee (1991).
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writings of the May Fourth scholars like Chen Changheng and Zhou Jianren (the brother 
of Lu Xun). Thomas Metzger, after examining the ideas of the May Fourth scholars, 
suggests that a new personality characterized by "the zealously ideological, heroic se lf  
emerged among these intellectuals. According to Metzger, it is with such a new 
personality of "heroic" type that most May Fourth scholars "habitually expressed great 
optimism about the imminent change for the better in world affairs". Such an historical 
consciousness had also provided these scholars with a new "philosophy of life" based on 
energy and optimism (Metzger, cited in Leo Lee, 1991: 163). Thus we may conclude 
that Western thoughts and ideologies contributed greatly to the social-intellectual context 
which shaped the works of such May Fourth scholars as Chen, Hu and Lu.^^
Call for Democracy
Imbued with patriotism and nationalism, most of the May Fourth scholars 
believed that Western thinking and technology could help transform the old-fashioned, 
nearly out-dated Chinese tradition even though they had no concise conception of 
Western ideas. Moreover, they hoped to borrow Western thoughts to fill the ideological 
void resulting from the cultural disintegration. The success of the West, in the eyes of 
the May Fourth scholars, related directly to the ideas of "democracy" and "science".
Chen Duxiu initially advocated democracy in the magazine, Qingnian, (Youth). 
Chi (1986) suggests the understanding of Chen's democratic thought in terms of three 
stages. In the beginning of the New Culture Movement, he turned to the prominent 
American liberal John Dewey's concept of democracy, hoping it could modernize China. 
In his series of lectures in China just before the May Fourth Movement, Dewey proposed 
that China might use its old guild system to build a democratic society based on a model 
similar to that of county governments in the United States (Dewey, 1973 first published
^^The awareness of new epoch was not initiated in the May Fourth era. Among the first generation of Chinese intellectuals in the 
late Qing period, Liang Qichao was aware of the need to transform China in terms of new ideas and values. After receiving an 
education in the West, Liang was captured by some of the Western ideas such as democracy, modernity, evolution, rights and freedom, 
etc. The May Fourth scholars followed the foot path o f their forerunners and made the sense of new epoch more explicit For details 
o f the ideas of the first generation of Chinese intellectuals, see, for example, Levenson (1959); Sun Huiwen (1966) and Lin Qiyin 
(1989) and Chang Hao (1987).
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1919). Chen was much impressed by Dewey. Thereafter, he published several articles 
supporting Dewey's ideas and advocated that they be put into practice. Chen simply 
quoted, accepted and divided Dewey's ideas into four categories. First, political 
democracy is to protect people's rights constitutionally through a parliamentary system; 
second, democracy of rights is a system in which the freedom of speech, publication, 
religion and domicile are protected; third, social democracy is to uphold the principle of 
equalitarianism; fourth, economic equality is concerned with the elimination of economic 
inequalities and redistribution of wealth between the rich and the poor (Chen, 1919:13).
In regard to his early conception of democracy, we can observe that Chen 
interpreted democracy as a means not only to resolve social and political conflicts but 
also to improve society. Chen criticized Dewey's ideas as not being thorough enough; 
therefore he modified them, and asserted people have the right to formulate the 
constitution to protect their civil rights. In other words, Chen emphasized people's rights 
and urged the control of bureaucratic power. He also promoted local self-rule 
government and trade associations to lay the foundation for democracy at this stage.^^ 
However, his adherence to liberalism was short-lived. Having found that these proposals 
defied easy implementation, Chen forsook liberalism for Marxism-Leninism. His 
disillusion with the Western countries' "betrayal" in allowing Japan's invasion of China 
had forced Chen to re-evaluate democratic ideals as projected by the West. With Li 
Daozhao and some other intellectuals, Chen gradually shifted from advocating various 
forms of democracy to supporting Marxism-Leninism. Having seen the success of the 
Russian Revolution, they also adopted the more radical method of transforming China 
through revolution. Their sudden conversion to Marxism again reveals their strong urge 
to save the country.
The democratic thought of Chen during the communist period can be 
characterized by his concern for the interests of the masses. Chen evaluated Western 
democracy and pointed out the fact that Western democracy was suitable for the
^*For details of Chen's political thought, see, for example, Chi (1986); Chow (1960); Feigon (1983) and Wang Hongmo (1985).
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bourgeois class. He admitted that he was wrong to devote his time only to the 
reconstruction of China catering solely for the intellectuals. Such a reflection had caused 
him to shift to mass politics, especially his concern for the working class. He condemned 
dictatorial rule and preferential treatment to any sectoral interests. With this belief in 
mind, Chen held that capitalistic economic relations would probably lead to exploitation 
of the working class. Chen therefore turned to Marxism in order to actualize his ideal of 
equal society and emancipation. In "The Awakening of the Workers", Chen argued that 
workers were the pillars of society, and were most useful and important to social 
development. Having this notion in mind, Chen tried to awaken the consciousness of the 
workers to revolutionize the country (Chen, 1920: 1-2). In his "Talk about Politics", 
Chen made his position clear that the most suffering group in this world was workers. 
He, therefore, argued that workers should struggle for political power (Chen, 1920: 4).
The expulsion from the party in 1929 and his disillusionment with Stalin’s 
dictatorial rule in the Soviet Union made Chen aware that the communist ideal was only a 
myth. Rethinking the essence of democracy, Chen thereafter pointed out that the 
dictatorial rule of Stalin lay not only in the ruler himself but also in the political structure. 
In his "The Last Views of Chen Duxiu", he made it distinctly clear that what he adhered 
to was the assertion of people’s rights, which he considered as fundamental to democracy. 
He criticized the "democracy of the proletariat" as a weapon to destroy "concrete 
democracy" (Chen, 1950: 15). Chen (1950) commented,
"though Lenin was then keenly aware that 'democracy is the antidote to bureaucracy,' 
nevertheless, he did not seriously adopt democratic measures, such as the abolition of 
the secret police, the permission of the opposition party to exist legally, the realization 
of the freedoms of thought, press, strike and election." (Quoted from Chi, 1986: 217)
Chen put his position a step further and suggested that democracy could transcend
time, class and social systems. He stated the concrete contents of democracy:
1. No government agencies, except the courts should have the right to arrest individuals.
2. No taxation without representation.
3. The government cannot levy taxes without parliamentary approval.
4. Opposition parties should have the freedom to organize, and the freedom of speech and press.
5. Workers should have the right to strike.
6. Peasants should have the right to cultivate land.
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7. There should be freedom of thought, of religion, and so forth. (Chen, 1950: 15, quoted from Chi, 1986: 
218)
Putting these observations together, we conclude that the central theme of Chen's 
democratic thought in his last days is the protection of the people's rights. Chen believed 
that democratic rights should be vested in the masses rather than any minority or any 
class. He also asserted the freedom of the people under which emancipation can be 
realized. These observations echo the view of Gu Xin's analysis of Chen's democratic 
thought, arguing that Chen's conception of democracy is characterized by "democracy for 
ordinary people" {Pingmin zhuyi minzhuguan)F
In response to the high tide of the emancipatory movement, a group of liberals 
(including Cai Yuanpei, Wu Zhihui, Hu Shi and Jiang Monlin) sought individual freedom 
(Chow, 1960). In varying degrees, they advocated freedom of thought and expression 
(Cheng, 1990: 74-75). Unlike the leftists, the liberals tended to avoid political 
entanglement and, therefore, suggested educational and cultural movements to realize 
reform in China. In Hu's view, the solution to the predicaments of China should not rest 
on all-embracing "isms" but concentrate on the study of practical and specific problems. 
With an immediacy to transform China,^* some liberals joined Li Dazhao, the new 
Marxist convert,^’ and published a "Manifesto of the Struggle for Freedom". In this 
manifesto, they demanded the abolition of police oppression, the enforcement of laws and 
regulations governing the press and publication enacted in 1912 and governing 
emergencies enacted in 1914. They also called for freedom of publication, speech, 
assembly, and association; secrecy of communications; the writ of habeas corpus and the 
supervision of elections by a nonpartisan organization (Hu Shi, 1920: 133-134; see also
’^For details, see Gu Xin's analysis in Lin (1989: 215-240) and see also Chow (1990: 505-512).
®^In this period, there were some political groups with divergent views and approaches to reforming China such as the liberals, the 
leftists and the conservatives in the late Qing period. These groups struggled to control the ideological hegemony. However, without 
the support of the warlords, their political proposals were doomed to failure. See, Cheng (1990) and Faitbank (1983).
’^This coalition between the liberals and the leftists does not mean that they abandoned their original political stands. They 
cooperated together when they had some common ground. Even though Chen & Hu adopted different political stands the former 
tended to be more radical while the latter more moderate, they had common concern for Chinese culture, seeing cultural & political 
change as inseparable. This common concern was revealed through their support o f literacy reform. See, for example. Bianco (1971); 
Cheng (1990); Solomon and Sullivan (1973).
72
Cheng, 1990). This manifesto, in a word, clearly demonstrates what the May Fourth 
scholars with liberal thought really wanted. Their conception of democracy rested upon 
their demand for an open and responsive government. Rejecting autocratic rule, they 
intended to create a "democratic" government which allows more individual freedom and 
autonomy. Their adherence to democracy also reveals their strong urge for individual 
freedom which protects people from restriction and constraint from an autocratic and 
feudalistic government. This idea is also consistent with their dream for a "free society" 
without much state interference.^®
The democratic thought of Hu Shi can be characterized as an "evolutionary 
approach" because he believed democratization in China could not be achieved overnight. 
His notion of democracy is consistent with his idea of "drop-by-drop" reform. The 
ultimate goal for Chinese democracy, according to Hu, was the establishment of 
democratic constitutionalism in which the people's rights were well-represented and 
protected. Like Chen, Hu condemned dictatorial rule and consistently fought for 
democracy in both cultural and political realms. In the midst of debate for either 
dictatorial or democratic rule in the twenties and thirties, Hu appealed to the people that 
the only hope for China would be the actualization of democratic politics.^'
Democratic constitutionalism, in Hu's mind, is a simple system of politics, which 
is suited to train people with little political experience and competence. Hu suggested 
that people should be allowed to leam how to exercise their civil and political rights 
through which process they would gradually grasp the concept of democracy. He 
considered the practice of democratic constitutionalism as the kindergarten level while 
dictatorial rule is the graduate level. In this regard, he urged people first to enter the 
kindergarten rather than jump to the graduate level (Hu, 1933). Here again we can see 
the idea of progressivism underlying his democratic thought. On 1 August 1948, Hu
“^Scholars suggest that the May Fourth intellectuals considered nihilism since they were disillusioned by the feudal political order. 
Their call for emancipation also led them to adopt the path of nihilism, See, for example, Li Zehou (1990a).
^'For details o f the debate and Hu's democratic thought, see, for example, Chi (1986) and Grieder (1970).
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made a radio speech in Beijing appealing to the people for three ideal common goals of 
modem world culture: first, to use science for diminution of human suffering and 
improving human life; second, to raise the economic standard of the people through a 
socialized economic system; and third, to realize the emancipation of man through the 
establishment of a politically democratic system in which the people could enjoy freedom 
of thought, creativity, independence and self-actualization (Hu, 1950: 8). In addition to 
these assertions, Hu also associated liberty and democracy together. His respect for 
freedom and liberty made Hu believe that the natural evolution of human history moves 
man inexorably toward freedom in the form of constitutional democracy. In order to 
realize these goals, Hu supported parliamentary government in China, arguing that 
oppositional forces in politics are healthy. When he was in Taiwan, Hu declared that 
only freedom could liberate China’s national spirit; and the implementation of democratic 
reform would bring real emancipation and further development to China’s future (Hu, 
1950: 17). Having such observations, we may conclude that Hu Shi is a political liberal 
whose democratic thought reflects a strong sense of Western liberalism.^^
After examining the views of the May Fourth scholars toward democracy and 
science, Sheridan (1977: 110) suggests that ’’westernization, thus conceived, implied the 
purposeful displacement of Confucian political institutions and social values in order to 
serve the transcendent need of building national power”. In the minds of the May Fourth 
scholars, the virtues of democracy could fill the ideological void, which was the 
immediate solution to the national crisis. It is also argued that despite their call for 
democracy and science, they had no precise understanding of Minzhu (democracy) 
(Cheng, 1990). Their demands for political freedom and individual autonomy, in a word, 
only reflect their general view against the autocratic government. Their conceptions of
^^The May Fourth scholars supported not only Western democracy but also science. It is suggested that many o f these scholars 
advocated Western science, treating it as a means to transform China. They even made science their faith in modernizing China. The 
rise of scientism has been widely discussed in the May Fourth literature. Li Zehou (1990a: 55-104) also suggests that it is also against 
the tide of scientism that some of the May Fourth scholars finally supported Marxism since they were influenced by Marxists' claims 
that their ideology was scientific. Associating modernity with science, these intellectuals eventually joined the path o f Marxism and 
Leninism. For details, see, for example, Chow (1990); Tang (1989).
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democracy are not well-defined and far from mature.”  Some researchers argue that the 
May Fourth scholars just treated "science" and "democracy" as a "faith", trusting it could 
help the transformation of China, while other studies also point out that the idea of 
"democracy" among the May Fourth scholars is undeveloped, fragmentary and 
inconsistent (see, for example, Lin Yusheng, 1989; Wang Ruo & Gao Like, 1989). Wang 
(1966: 315) also comments that "[the May Fourth intellectuals] accepted the value of 
liberty and democracy without question even if they did not really understand the deeper 
implications of these concepts". Lin Yusheng and Vera Schwarcz, in a similar manner, 
argue that the May Fourth scholars simply rejected the traditional values as a whole 
without ever rationally thinking through the question of what to keep and what to discard 
from the legacy of the past (Lin, 1989: 198-240; Vera Schwarcz, 1991). Deeply in their 
minds, the May Fourth scholars could not really forget the traditional values. These 
observations support the view of Levenson, arguing that the May Fourth scholars were 
emotionally attached to China's past and intellectually committed to Western values 
(Levenson, 1959). This writer observes at this stage that we should analyze and evaluate 
these May Fourth scholars' democratic thought in light of the particular socio-historical 
and socio-cultural contexts. The whole intellectual community of this period was 
overwhelmed by the intense national crisis. As Oxnam suggested, Chinese people have 
been questing for "motivating ideology",”  attempting whatever forms of ideology and 
value to fill the already disintegrated cultural-moral order. It is thus understandable that 
people had no systematic study of them but adopted with the intention to strengthen 
China immediately.
we evaluate the concept o f democracy o f the May Fourth scholars in light of the Western notion of democracy as characterized 
by procedural rule and checks and balances in the government, we can argue that their notion of democracy is far from mature. For 
details o f Western democracy, see, for example, Pennock (1979) and Macpherson (1973).
got this insight from Robert Oxnam, a senior research fellow of Columbia University, who spoke on "The Power of the Past in 
Today's China" for the conference "Continuity & Disjuncture: China in the 20th Century" organized by the Asia Society-Hong Kong 
Centre, Jan. 1994.
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TOWARD A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE MAY FOURTH SCHOLARS' 
IDEAS
People’s ideas are influenced by the particular socio-historical context and the 
situations that they face. Only when we understand their ideas in the context of their 
different life courses and historical situations can we thus develop a more accurate picture 
of their ideas. In addition, we shall examine how the social locations of intellectuals have 
influenced the ideological formation of intellectuals. We also hypothesize that the 
institutional factors, educational and occupational orientations and social networks of 
intellectuals might have formative influences on their ideas. In spite of structural and 
institutional constraints upon the knowledge production of intellectuals, individual 
variations and diverse interpretations are common. This line of reasoning demonstrates 
the dynamic and interactive process between the social structure and social agency, 
revealing also the tension between social and cultural constraints and individual choice. 
Different social locations and generational experiences, coupled with differed political 
opportunity structure, individuals may have adopted different coping strategies reacting 
to their environments. The following section discusses the ideological formation of the 
foregoing discussed intellectuals' ideas in the light of our proposed analytic framework. 
Social Location and Ideological Formation
It is our contention that the political ideas of the May Fourth scholars were 
influenced by their unique social locations. Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi and Lu Xun not only 
shared a similar socio-political context but also had close association with one another. 
They were the activisits supporting the same academic activities, publishing their views 
and political opinions on New Youth, one of the most important magazines of the May 
Fourth period. Chen Duxiu was the founder of New Youth, but soon many of the most 
brilliant avant-garde intellectuals joined its editorial committee. Because of the pre­
eminent position of Beijing University {Beidd), New Youth attained an immediate 
prominence in the May Fourth intellectual circles. The first issue, entitled, "A Call to 
Youth" was writtened by Chen himself. He encouraged the May Fourth young people to
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make use their golden opportunities to transform the country, involving themselves into 
the development of a new culture and new era for China. He concluded with six 
principles that the youth should follow: "Be independent, not submissive; progressive, not 
conservative; outspoken, not reserved; cosmopolitan, not parochial; practical, not 
formalist; and scientific, not imaginative." (cited in Bianco, 1971, 37-38). Hu Shi 
published his "revolutionary " manifesto of January 1917 under the title "Some Tentative 
Suggestions for the Reform of Chinese Literature" in New Youth introducing the idea of 
replacing the traditional language {wen yan) with the vernacular {bai hua). Hu's view 
received a warm endorsement of Chen. Like Hu and Chen, Lu Xun also revealed to us 
that the true nature of Chinese people through a lucid madman. Gripped by a persecution 
mania and the conviction that his family, his neighbours and others in this world 
attempted to kill him so they could eat him, Lu's madman wonders whether man has 
always eaten man. Being dissatisfied with stubbornly sustained and excessively ritualistic 
tradition and classical culture. Lu proclaimed that Chinese tradition had killed and 
"eaten" people, depriving people's rights and freedom. Lu made it explicitly that "I am to 
a history that counts four thousand years of cannibalism" (quoted from Bianco, 1971: 38). 
After the publication of New Youth, it was well received by students and intellectuals. 
Students not only supported New Youth but also took its every editorial pronouncement as 
an article of faith. With its popularity among the Chinese intellectual circles. New Youth 
bacame the forum for public discourse, creating the room for heated debates concerning 
the intense social, cultural and political problems that China was confronting. As Bianco 
(1971) suggested, New Youth, in a sense, played the role of Le Globe, a French magazine 
founded in Paris in 1824 as the literary and phiosophical organ of the rising Romantic 
school, creating the forum for creative writing and free expression of ideas in the midst of 
curtailed freedom of press and restricted publication. Most significant. New Youth 
seemed to be a strong "intellectual force" as what Bourdieu described which influenced 
the ideological formation of intellectuals and the intellectual tide of the May Fourth era. 
In addition. New Youth also provided the link for these May Fourth scholars, bringing
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them together to form a basis not only for cultural critique but also for formulation of 
plans for solving China's immediate crises.^^
In addition, Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao also came from the same 
educational instituiton, Beijing University. Sharing a similar educational culture and 
institutional framework, these scholars supported each other, or put in other words, 
reinforced the critical attitude toward Chinese tradition of one another. One prominent 
May Fourth scholar must be named here is Cai Yuanpei, the Chancellor of Beijing 
University during the most critical period of May Fourth Movement. Cai was also 
regarded as the Father of the Chinese Renaissance who supported and initiated reforms in 
Beida. Well aware of students' moral well-being, Cai not only supported the formation of 
a Society for the Promotion of Virtue at the university in 1918 but also defended 
academic freedom against government pressure. Cai also recruited a heterogeneous 
group of academics and allowed pluralistic schools of thought. During the office of Cai, 
Chen Duxiu was appointed as Dean of the Faculty of Letters, one of the four schools 
which made up the university. Hu Shi was made the professor of the history of Chinese 
philosophy and Li Dazhao was also recruited as the university's head librarian. Having 
these people together, Beida inevitably became a unique intellectual field which had 
significant impact on students' movement in particular and the intellectual current of the 
May Fourth era. Thus, the magazine New Youth and the Beijing University provided the 
necessary basis for the May Fourth intellectuals who could make use of this as forum for 
public discourse to form their political platform. Having a strong educational assocaition 
and social and political ties, these intellectuals therefore shared similar views on China's 
immediate problems. As Sullivan and Solomon (1973) observed, the scholars who 
associated closely with New Youth generally agreed that China was confronting a cultural 
crisis which required immediate solution. Putting these observations, it is evident that 
ideas of intellectuals are influenced by their institutional networks and political ties.
In spite of the similar views that they shared toward the diagnosis of China's
Sullivan and Solomon (1973) has a detailed content analysis of New Youth which deserves particular attention.
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problems, different intellectuals adopted divergent strategies or approaches in solving the 
problems. It is our hypothesis that the difference among these scholrs lies with their 
unique social locations.
Chen Duxiu
Chen’s ideas had been greatly affected by his role as a revolutionary and cultural 
iconoclast. Chen persistently fought for democracy, and his life concern was to revive 
China politically and culturally. Unlike most of the May Fourth scholars, whose main 
concern was the question of cultural change, Chen's major interest was centred primarily 
on political and social affairs. With a different perception of the role of intellectuals, 
Chen tended to be more "action-oriented” as he actively participated in political and 
social movements to save China. He was a veteran revolutionary since he took part in the 
1911 Revolution, overthrowing the feudal monarchy. However, Chen did not join the 
Tongmeng Society (the organization sponsoring revolution against the Qing dynasty) and 
the KMT. Seeing the KMT as too bureaucratic, Chen therefore advocated popular 
politics based on freedom and autonomy, considering real democracy and republican 
institutions as the most fundamental system for modem China. He also pinned his hope 
on the youth, urging them to free themselves from deep-seated customs and traditions and 
to become citizens with new ideas of independence and freedom.^^ The conversion from 
liberalism to Marxism-Leninism highlights not only the change of his political stand but 
also his interpretation of democracy. After meeting George Voitinsky, Secretary of the 
Far East Department of the Comintern in 1920 Chen adopted communism and founded 
the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. From that time on. New Youth began to publicize 
ideas of Marxism rather than liberalism and democracy. It also published a special issue 
commemorating International Labour Day on 1 May 1920 indicating New Youth's close 
association with the working class. However, the political thought of Chen was not 
without constraint because of his chairmanship of the CCP from 1921 to 1927. Even
^*His role as political activist was clearly indicated from the founding of the Weekly Critic, a paper to promote his political ideas and 
to serve his political purposes, see, Chow (1960: 57) and J. Chen (1971).
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though Chen did not totally support the collaboration between the CCP and KMT, he had 
to uphold the party line to ally with the KMT after having been pressured by the 
Comintern. Under such circumstances, Chen published Guide Weekly to promote the 
official policy of Communist-Kuomintang collaboration and propagated a national anti­
imperialist revolution in China. After all, Chen reluctantly went along with the 
Comintern view that because the CCP was still too weak to gain support from the 
people, he had to give up his view eventually. Nevertheless his support of collaboration 
with the KMT was finally castigated by other party members in the August Seventh 
Meeting of the CCP held in 1927. Chen was criticized for rightist opportunism toward 
the KMT, and forced to resign from the party chairmanship, thereby diminishing his 
influence in the CCP. The cause of Chen's expulsion from the CCP, his stance toward the 
Chinese Eastern Railway incident, is worth mentioning here. In 1929, Zhang Xueniang, 
a young marshal, attempted to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Soviet Union sent 
a large number of troops to Manchuria. The CCP supported the move of the Soviet 
Union, espousing slogans such as "Oppose the Chinese Imperialist Invasion of the Soviet 
Union" and "Support the Soviet Union in Arms". Chen criticized the CCP's stance and 
denounced it as treasonous to China. Not surprisingly, his critique eventually led to his 
expulsion from the party.
Having such experiences and disillusionment with Stalin's dictatorial rule in the 
Soviet Union, Chen began to favour Trotsky's revolutionary theory. He, therefore, began 
to establish contacts with the followers of Trotsky in Shanghai and openly criticized the 
Stalinist leadership and the current line of the CCP in "A Statement of Our Political 
Opinions" in December 1929. Chen published Le Prolétaire in Shanghai in 1930 to 
promote Trotsky's revolutionary theory. Against the "main stream" of socialist 
revolutionary theory, Chen's support of Trotsky, of course, was condemned and he was 
labelled as a Trotskyite even though Chen claimed that he no longer belonged to any 
party in his later days. Being expelled from the main stream of the Marxist revolutionary 
movement, Chen was also caught by the KMT and sentenced to 13 years of imprisonment
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for his anti-government propaganda. During his time of imprisonment, Chen reflected 
deeply upon his revolutionary ideas and conception of democracy.^^ His emphasis on 
emancipation and individuality also indicates his recognition of the essence of autonomy 
and independence. Chen’s change in social location from party chairman to prisoner, 
coupled with perception of his "existential" situations, had influenced his political ideas 
in his last days.
Hu Shi
Hu Shi, like Chen, was not immune to the impact of his social location. Being a 
scholar and cultural critic, Hu not only advocated the destruction of feudal tradition but 
also initiated the reorganization of Chinese culture. Realizing the difficulties in 
democratization, Hu spent his life in scientific interpretation and reorganization of the 
ancient Chinese culture. In addition to the role of cultural critic, Hu had been closely 
associated with the Nationalist government. Hu was initially critical of the Nationalist 
government; but from the Japanese invasion of Manchuria onwards, Hu became 
supportive of the government. Despite his dissatisfaction with the government in many 
ways,^* Hu still pinned his hope on this government to resist Japanese militarism. In 
September 1938, Hu was appointed as Chinese ambassador to the United States (a post he 
held until September 1942). His close affiliation with the Nationalist government 
nevertheless offended many intellectuals. Not surprisingly, Hu was criticized for his 
compromise, cooperation and partial apology for and involvement with the practical 
politics of the KMT.^’ Despite the criticism from the intellectual circles, Hu's close 
association with the Nationalist government became clearer when he advised Mao 
Zedong not to establish another political party based on military force and to give up the 
use of armed force during the conflict between the KMT and CCP. In September 1945,
’^For Chen's biographical details, see Chi (1986).
’*For details o f his criticism on the Nationalist government, see Chi (1986: 108-114).
^'For details of his relationship with the KMT, see Chi (1986) and Grieder (1970 especially the appendix on CCP's criticism of Ku 
Shi).
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Hu was appointed as the president of Beijing University and later he was also elected as 
the chairman of the People's Congress after the Nationalist government's entry into the 
Nationalist constitutional period. When the CCP took over the mainland, Hu went with 
the Nationalist government to Taiwan. Later, he went to the United States to continue his 
scholarly work. During this time, Hu still expressed openly his support for Jiang Jieshi, 
the leader of the Nationalist government, regardless of how difficult the situation might, 
be. Hu returned to Taiwan and was appointed president of the Academia Sinica and held 
the post in Taipei from 10 April 1958 up to June 1964 when he died suddenly of a heart 
attack."*® Hu's role as an establishment intellectual and life-long career as cultural critic 
thus affect his political stand and conceptualization of social reality.
Lu Xun
Being a social and cultural critic. Lu Xun was also affected by his social location. 
Unlike Chen, Lu was not a political activist but a scholar. In the beginning of the May 
Fourth Movement, he supported the New Cultural Movement, seeing it not only as a 
possible means for Chinese enlightenment but also an opportunity to establish a new 
socio-political order. He therefore denounced the Chinese tradition as other cultural 
iconoclasts did. In his later years. Lu Xun became a sinologist working in the field of 
Chinese literature. With such a role he began systematically to revive and reorganize 
Chinese culture. His ideas of anti-traditionalism, according to Lin Yusheng, are far from 
total rejection of China's past. Instead, Lu Xun never escaped from the tension between 
intellectual rejection of but emotional attachment to Chinese tradition (Lin, 1979). 
Putting these observations together, there is a definite and powerful relationship between 
the intellectuals' affiliation with social and/or political organizations and their intellectual 
production.
Equally important, the perception of their particular socio-historical situation 
exerts also formative influences on them. Geng Yunzhi (1990: 96) suggests that most of 
the May Fourth scholars were disappointed by their particular social and political
“^Forthe biography of Hu, I depend on Chi (1986).
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situations. Direct confrontation with "political corruption, intellectual chaos, inordinate 
respect for everything ancient, strong inertia, the restoration of lifeless things and the 
adherence to pernicious customs all combining to stifle society" in the 1920s made them 
fhistrated. Under such political and social circumstances, most of these scholars lost their 
interest in politics, considering it as dirty and without merit. Huang Yuanyong, one of 
the most prominent journalists in the May Forth era, wrote that "all one can find in 
today's politics is defects, never merits" and "nothing in the current situation offers a 
topic of discussion" (cited in Geng, 1990: 96). Their realization of the hollow framework 
of the Republican system, together with their consciousness of the need to revive the 
national spirit, drew most of their attention in search of solutions for the immediate 
cultural and ideological problems. Because Hu Shi and Lu Xun perceived themselves 
essentially as scholars and thinkers, coupled with the fact that they had no political power 
and influence in the early May fourth period, they initiated cultural change in China 
rather than taking part in the revolutionary movement. Whereas Chen Duxiu perceived 
himself not only a cultural critic but also a political leader, he therefore became a 
revolutionary. In short, their perceived role of intellectuals and their diagnosis of the 
existing situation influenced their action during this period (for details, see Geng, 1990). 
The foregoing discussion has so far indicated that even these scholars were of the same 
socio-historical and sicio-political contexts, they adopted different strategies because they 
had diverse perceptions of their roles and also the secondary ties such as their political 
affiliation also influenced how they reacted to the external crisis or threat.
Generational location and Intellectual Radicalism
In addition to the influence of social location on intellectuals, I also suggest that 
their generational locations also had formative influences on their political stand and 
ideas. Chen, Hu and Lu were bom in a similar socio-historical context in which they 
encountered immense national crisis. In light of the schematic form of generational 
location, I regard Chen, Hu and Lu as members of the second generation of intellectuals 
in modem China.
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Hu Shi was bom in Shanghai on 17 December 1891 in Anfei province. Chen 
Duxiu was bom in Huai-ning on 8 October 1879, 12 years before Hu, within the same 
province of Anfei. Lu Xun was bom on 25 September 1881 in Shaoqing, Zhejiang 
province. Though their ages were different, they were bom in a similar socio-historical 
context and experienced similar socio-political crises. Li and Schwarcz (1983/84: 46) 
suggest,
"Generational identity is not necessarily self-conscious or obvious. The age of any 
particular intellectual in itself cannot explain fuUy to what generation he or she belongs. 
Certain intellectuals, such as Hu Shi, for example, although much younger than Lu Xun 
and Chen Duxiu, may be said to be part of their generation nonetheless. Others, such as 
Liang Qichao and Lu Xun, play key roles in the lives of more than one generation ... 
Some people keep repeating, in new ways, the views of previous generations, keep 
pursuing earlier ideals."
In this regard, it is difficult to categorize intellectuals into distinct and separate 
generations, but it is nevertheless important to classify intellectuals in terms of different 
generations to illuminate how the historical situations that they encountered influenced 
their intellectual production.
The second generation of Chinese intellectuals in modem China confronted both 
intemal socio-political crises and extemal threat. This generation of intellectuals 
emerged in the early stages of the disintegration of the feudal socio-political and cultural- 
moral orders and the rise of an immature republican govemment especially grappling 
with intemal instability caused by unceasing conflicts among warlords and by foreign 
invasion. Being exposed to such a socio-historical context, these intellectuals were 
profoundly coloured by patriotic devotion and imbued with a strong national-salvation 
ideology. Under the threat of national survival, they were confronted with an 
unprecedented challenge to find immediate solutions to the intense and urgent crises in 
order to save the country from total bankruptcy. The complexity of the problems made 
the ideas of the second generation of intellectuals very complicated. They had to think 
through a series of difficult questions such as the integration and evaluation of Eastem 
and Westem civilization, political ideologies and ideologies for the cultural-moral realm 
in modem China. Their major concem is the stmggle between tradition and modemity in
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which they had to find the way for the modernization of China. It is also suggested that it 
is difficult rather than easy conditions that produce civilization, especially when 
civilization must be achieved with a hitherto unprecedented effort as a response to a 
challenge which has shaken the fundamental socio-political and cultural-moral orders. 
The sudden crushing defeat of the traditional political-social order in the late Qing period 
forced those intellectuals to chart a new course for the country. That explains why many 
Chinese intellectuals considered the salvation of China politically and culturally as the 
most significant task to which they were anxious and willing to devote themselves. 
Different proposals and thoughts for China's rebirth can be seen as the products of this 
particular socio-political context.
According to Li & Schwarcz, Chen, Hu, and Lu are regarded as the architects of 
the Chinese Enlightenment Movement. Their disillusionment at the failure of the 1911 
Revolution caused them to look for new ways to solve China's cultural dilemma. Li & 
Schwarcz suggest,
"Whereas the previous generation was consumed with national salvation, the second 
generation was able to turn its full attention to the anti-feudal new culture movement. 
This was a thoroughly iconoclastic generation, which tried to chart new directions in 
literature, through a new vernacular language movement. It was also the first to explore 
Marxism, as well as to champion the slogans of science and democracy." (Li & 
Schwarcz, 1983/84: 48-49)
Unlike their previous generations whose main concem was how to restore the 
political order, the second generation eagerly put their energy to the task of establishing 
not only a strong political order but also a new cultural identity as a mechanism to 
integrate Chinese society and to fill the ideological void. Up to this point, we conclude 
that the unique generational locations to which the intellectuals belonged greatly 
influenced their ideological formation. Again, we must be conscious of the limitations of 
the notion of generational location since different intellectuals, despite having similar 
generational experiences, may have reacted and behaved differently to their extemal 
environments. It is in such a conjuncture that we have to link Bourdieu's "strategy" and 
the idea of "political opportunity stmcture" together to have a deeper analysis of their
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ideological production.
Educational Orientation. Intellectual Field and Ideological Formation
Apart from the impact of the generational location, we must also examine how the 
climate of thought in general and the intellectuals' educational orientations in particular 
influenced their ideological formation.
It is intellectually stimulating to know how different sorts of intellectual 
influences provided "symbolic resources" for or set constraints on their responses to their 
socio-historical context. More specifically, we must examine how the range and 
configuration of ideas, values and beliefs influenced the ideological formation of there 
scholars. Their exposure to the intellectual milieu may have taken formal or informal 
channels. Most important of all, Chen, Hu & Lu were provided with similar " symbolic 
resources", that is, their training and exposure to the Chinese classics before they went to 
study abroad. At the age of six, Chen began his formal studies in Four Books and Five 
Classics in the traditional manner of learning by rote. His grandfather was a strict teacher 
who asked Chen to recite passages properly. Such a training gave Chen a solid 
foundation in Chinese classics (Chi, 1986). Like Chen, Hu Shi began his Chinese study 
when he was only three years old. His father taught him and his mother who was also 
illiterate, Chinese characters. They learned Chinese by using red paper cards. At the age 
of nine, after his father's death, Hu was taught by his uncle and later by his cousin, at 
family school. From 1895 to 1904, he studied ancient texts. Once, Hu accidentally 
found the popular novel The Water Margin, the reading of which influenced his writing 
style and also led him to organize a literary revolution later (Ibid). After examining Hu's 
thoughts, Chi suggests,
"Although Hu Shih [Hu Shi] has generally been grouped among iconoclastic scholars, 
his attitude toward Chinese history, especially in his later years, differed greatly from 
that of scholars who wanted to destroy everything traditional and who dismissed almost 
everything traditional as valueless." (Chi, 1986: 115)
In his article "Old Way to Look at Chinese Ancient Political Thought", Hu Shi 
demonstrated his moderate stand as a cultural iconoclast. Instead of totally abandoning
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Chinese culture, Hu reappraised the Chinese past.
Lu Xun, like Chen and Hu, had a strong foundation in Chinese classics. We must 
not ignore the fact that Lu Xun was one of the prominent scholars in the history of 
Chinese literature.'*' Lin Yusheng, having examined the works of Lu Xun, points out the 
fact that Lu Xun failed to abandon totally the Chinese tradition even though he had 
attempted to do so. Lin observes that Lu spent much time in scholarly research on 
various aspects of that tradition. Lu Xun's decision to embark on a literary career is a 
catalytic rather than a decisive factor in giving up his medical studies since he had a 
profound interest in literary and artistic matters. He was also an avid reader in Chinese 
ancient texts. Having an extensive reading of some standard collection of poems and 
orthodox histories during his study in his home town. Lu Xun developed a solid basis in 
Chinese literature. Apart from orthodox texts. Lu also read "unorthodox" books such as 
traditional novels, folklore, Daoist texts and commentaries, local histories, heterodox 
historical works and treatises on printing. With such an intellectual background, it was 
easy for Lu to take up a career as social critic in his later years. Lin also observes that Lu 
Xun’s works demonstrated a close link with Chinese traditional thoughts.
"He [Lu Xun] made use of some traditional stylistic techniques in his creative writings.
Personally and aesthetically, he appreciated a number of elements in the tradition." (Lin,
1979: 137)
His Brief Historv of Chinese Fiction is a pioneer work in this field, treating 
judiciously the evolution of traditional Chinese fiction. Lin suggests that Lu’s scholarly 
treatment of traditional Chinese fiction and his iconoclastic totalism seem contradictory 
(Lin, 1979: 138). Lu Xun experienced no tension as a result of this apparent 
contradiction since he believed the element of realistic humanism in traditional Chinese 
fiction was universally applicable to literature whether in the Westem or the Eastem 
world (ibid). Nevertheless, such an assertion of Lu Xun still leaves unresolved the 
problem of his willingness to discard some positive elements in Chinese tradition, albeit
eminence in Chinese study is well-recognized as the late professor Tsi-an Hsia regarded Lu Xun as one o f  the most learned 
professors in the field o f Chinese literature.
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cross-cultural ones. This unanswered question indicates the dilemma confronted by Lu 
Xun: remembering and forgetting the Chinese cultural inheritance.
Even Chen Duxiu, who persistently fought for democracy and supported totalistic 
anti-traditionalism in the May Fourth period, still recognized some general and cross- 
cultural positive elements in the Chinese tradition.
"My anti-Confucianism does not imply that the [Confucian] virtues of cordiality, 
uprightness, courtesy, temperance, deference, faithfulness, righteousness, honesty, sense 
of shame, and the [Confucian] way of conscientiousness and reciprocity are worthless. 
However, these virtues are common to all practical moral systems of the world. 
Therefore, we should not take pride in the fact that Confucianism has them." (Chen, 
1917, cited in Lin, 1979: 80)
His appraisal of Chinese culture and assertion of the positive values in 
Confucianism have indicated that Chen did not totally reject the Chinese tradition.
The preceding observations indicate that these three intellectuals discussed found 
it difficult to forget or abandon totally the Chinese tradition because of their strong 
foundation and knowledge in Chinese traditional thought and classics. Even though they 
had attempted to discard the tradition totally in the early phase of the movement, they 
never forgot their learning in Chinese classics. They were still susceptible to the subtle 
but important appeals of Chinese tradition. Their attachment to tradition may have 
stemmed from what Levenson (1959) calls "cultural identity". With this particular 
identity, these intellectuals confronted a complex and dialectical relationship between 
rejection of old tradition and acceptance of other values. Thus a complicated social 
psychology was formulated among of the May Fourth scholars. Li and Schwarcz 
(1983/84: 43) suggest that the May Fourth scholars "being still full of the notions of 
traditional scholar-officials (shidafu) they often lapsed back into conservatism. Many 
returned to the embrace of feudal culture" (Li & Schwarcz, 1983/84: 43)."*^
In addition to the influence of Chinese tradition, their direct exposure to the West 
also exerted significant impact on their political and philosophical orientations. Studying
■•^Kang Lin (1987) and Geng Yunzhi (1990) have a detailed discussion about the social psychology of the May Fourth scholars and 
they consistently argue that the central conflict confronting these intellectuals is not merely in ideas themselves but they are the 
products o f their particular socio-political and socio-historical settings. Such an observation helps explain why Hu Shi, Lu Xun and 
other May Fourth scholars advocated "reorganization of Chinese culture" in the later phase o f the Movement.
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abroad had become more popular since late Qing especially when the leaders attempted 
to adopt Westem technology to transform China and restore the social-political order. 
Many young scholars were sent to study in Europe, America and Japan."*^  From 1912 to 
1929, a steady flow of students travelled to America. Most of the students studied 
technical subjects such as agriculture, engineering, commerce and mining while only 
20% of them enroled in subjects like law, finance and education (see, Wang, 1966: 111).
Hu Shi went abroad to study in the College of Agriculture at Cornell University 
after he successfully got the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship. Hu found he was uninterested 
in farm practice and pomology after being exposed to this field. After a year and a half, 
he decided to transfer to the College of Arts and Sciences. He got his B.A. in 1914. 
Upon his graduation, he was admitted to Columbia University to study philosophy under 
the guidance of John Dewey. Hu Shi was greatly influenced by Dewey and Thomas 
Huxley. In his article "On Introducing My Own Thoughts", he acknowledged that his 
ideas were stimulated by both thinkers. Huxley taught him to be skeptical, subjecting 
everything to doubt before securing sufficient evidence. John Dewey’s pragmatism had 
penetrated Hu’s thoughts, stimulating Hu to think and consider at all times the existing 
problems and the effects of a thought. Having been taught by Dewey and Huxley, Hu 
began to understand the nature and function of the scientific method (Hu Shi, 1953: 608). 
As a disciple of Dewey, Hu followed pragmatism closely, arguing that dialectical 
materialism was meaningless. This also explains why Hu put forward the idea of dealing 
with pragmatic issues rather than discussing "isms" in the twenties and his consistent 
adherence to liberalism instead of Marxism."*"*
Chen Duxiu, like Hu Shi, had the chance to study abroad. He started his studies 
in Japan in 1902. Later, he made several more trips to Japan. It is reported that Chen 
attended six schools in Japan including Kobun Institute, Tokyo Higher Normal school.
^^For detailed research on the students studying abroad &om late Qing period to the establishment o f new China, see Wang (1966: 
74-192) AndMingbao Yuekan (Sep. 1993).
^F or details o f the philosophical foundation o f Hu's thought, see, for example, Hu (1953); Chi (1986: 102-108).
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English Language School, and Waseda University. Some reports also suggest that Chen 
studied in France from 1907 to 1910, where he grew to admire French culture, but this 
information is not sufficiently proved (Chi, 1986; 200). Even though we are uncertain 
what subject Chen studied abroad, he had become politically active during his years of 
studies in Japan. It is also suggested that his ideas of democracy and revolution were 
formulated throughout his trips and study in Japan (Ibid).
Chen's political thought, like that of Hu, was greatly influenced by his exposure to 
Westem ideas. A closer examination of his ideas has indicated that Social Darwinism, 
democracy and Marxism shaped different stages of Chen's ideas. Influenced by Social 
Darwinism, Chen adhered to progressivism, believing that China would have to pass 
through difficult, even bmtal, straggles to achieve reconstruction. He urged China to 
adapt to changing conditions. Having been exposed to Westem ideas of democracy, 
Chen considered democracy as the only way to save China. We have discussed in the 
foregoing part that Chen's early interpretation of democracy was merely related to 
individualism. He even perceived democracy as a means to improve society. Thus, these 
observations have shown that Chen's democratic thought is influenced by Westem 
democratic thought. Needless to say, Chen's later ideological development is intimately 
associated with Marxism. Throughout his years working as a revolutionary in the CCP, 
he promoted Marxism in China even to the point of involvement in revolutionary 
activities. The changing socio-political context and his participation in the socialist 
revolution at last made Chen realize the myth of socialism and he tumed to liberalism 
again in his last days.
Lu Xun, like Chen, also went to Japan to study after his graduation from the 
School of Railways and Mines in Nanjing, He first received two years' language training 
at Kobun Institute in Tokyo and thereafter went to Sendai Medical School. According to 
his own biography, he attempted to be a physician in order to help the people who were 
suffering from mistreatment of traditional Chinese herb doctors. His personal experience 
of the death of his father because of mistreatment directed Lu Xun to the medical field.
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Lu Xun recalled,
"I had a beautiful dream that I would cure patients like my father, who had been 
mistreated, upon my return to China: I would serve as an army doctor and thereby I 
could strengthen the faith of my countrymen in modernization." (Lu Xun, 1956, 1: 4)
Although he performed well in his medical training, he finally gave up his 
training and tumed to literary endeavour. His commitment to work in the intellectual and 
cultural realms was by no means a sudden change. Deep down in Lu Xun’s mind, the 
intense crisis of the May Fourth era was related to China's cultural crisis, and the root of 
China's backwardness was due to weaknesses in Chinese national character. He therefore 
devoted himself to literary work in order to enlighten Chinese people. He believed the 
modernization of China lay not only in science and technology but also in the spirit of the 
people (Lu Xun, 1956, 1: 52). Against the tide of emphasizing military and technological 
modernization. Lu pointed toward the failure of such a narrow view of transformation 
and argued that a new spiritual and cultural foundation should be established without 
which he believed China could not successfully achieve the goals of modernization. It is 
in this light that Lu Xun was also influenced by the tide of "modemity" in the May 
Fourth period.
In addition to the impact of the general socio-intellectual background of his time, 
his stress on "individuality" and liberalization had a close link with the ideas of 
Nietzsche. Lu Xun wrote in New Youth to urge the youth to abandon the traditional and 
feudal thoughts and rituals. Besides, he appealed to the youth to assert their individuality
as a fundamental means to revive the spirit of the people. Lu Xun stated,
"The concept of individuality of Nietzsche though difficult to be realized in this world, 
the spirit behind this idea is very significant for which can bring with a harmonious 
world." (Lu Xun, 1956, 2: 44-45)
Because of Nietzsche's influence. Lu Xun lamented that the Chinese people 
lacked the "arrogance of individuals" which Lu considered as a real emancipation of man 
from feudalism (Lu Xun, 1956, 2: 30).'’^  Moreover, Lu Xun was exposed to other
^^Kelly (1991a) has researched the impact of Nietzsche on Lu Xun and other contemporary Chinese intellectuals.
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Western scholarly works, citing Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Ibsen to illuminate his 
conception of free development of individuality (Lu Xun, 1956, 1: 185-91).
Putting these observations together, we then conclude that these May Fourth 
scholars were influenced greatly by their educational orientations and the intellectual 
milieu. One point which worth stating here is that these intellectuals came under Western 
influence after they became adults. In this regard. Western influences were superimposed 
on their minds already steeped in traditional culture. This does not belittle the role of 
Western influence on their ideological formation but this observation sheds more light on 
the dilemma confronted by these scholars.
The preceding part has discussed different political stances among the May Fourth 
scholars. In spite of their common concern for national salvation and cultural revival, 
they adopted varied approaches to resolve the problems. Their affiliation with different 
social and political groups also shaped their ideological and political orientations, which 
were further reinforced and influenced by their unique intellectual fields. Examination of 
the May Fourth scholars has indicated that Beijing University provided the intellectual 
basis in which many May Fourth scholars exchanged their ideas of democracy and shared 
their views of how to modernize China. New Youth was also the magazine where most 
May Fourth scholars like Lu Xun, Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi published their views 
attacking the Chinese tradition and promoting their ideas of emancipation and 
democracy. Having such a connection and intellectual basis, these scholars successfully 
formulated their intellectual field, creating a strong intellectual force to initiate change in 
both the cultural and political arenas. This finding not only highlights relational and 
institutional attributes of ideas'*^  but also indicates to us how these May Fourth scholars 
endeavoured to develop their fields in contrast with apparatus as Bourdieu suggests. 
Even though Bourdieu's notion of "field" cannot be directly applied in 1920's China since 
the civil society was still weak, the struggle and strategy that these intellectuals had
^^Solomon and Sullivan (1973) systematically analyzed the content of New Youth, suggesting that cultural themes are the core 
message o f such publications. Despite the fact that splits among intellectuals were observed, they had a common view that China's 
fundamental crisis is cultural crisis.
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striven is highly indicative to us how intellectuals exert their autonomy of values in 
replace of the state dominant one.
Acknowledging the fact that Gramsci's notion of "war of position" should not be 
directly applied in China, we still observe that the May Fourth scholars were involved in 
a struggle of hegemonic control (it seems to be a war of position in Gramscian sense). 
With different political stances and varied approaches toward the solution of Chinese 
cultural crisis, these scholars opposed each other in order to control the ideological realm. 
This cultural-ideological conflict was acute in the debate on the choice between 
liberalism which signified a pragmatic and progressive way to China's modernization and 
Marxism-Leninism which advocated radical revolutionary activities. During this intense 
debate, Hu began to ask people not to speak of "isms" but to give their attention to 
practical matters. His idea of pragmatism caused him to support the KMT, which he 
considered as the only and strongest force to resist the Japanese invasion. Not 
surprisingly, Hu's advocacy was criticized by the CCP (see Chi, 1986; Chow, 1960 and 
Grieder, 1970).
In addition, the May Fourth scholars were also involved in debating whether the 
adherence to science could solve China's crisis. Some conservative scholars pleaded 
support for the revival of Chinese tradition to restore order whereas the liberalists 
supported science and democracy. Such a debate on science and philosophy in the 
twenties is highly indicative to us that a war of position was part of the May Fourth 
intellectual movement."*  ^ The debate between the Neo-Confucian scholars such as Liang 
Shuming and the liberal Hu Shi on Eastern and Western civilization and different 
alternatives for China's modernization again demonstrates the struggle for hegemonic 
c o n t r o l P u t t i n g  these observations together, we thus conclude that struggle or 
competition were common within the intellectual circles of the May Fourth Movement.
’^For details o f this debate, see, for example, Li Zehou (1990a: 55-104); Chow (1960, 1990) and Tang (1990: 395-414). 
For details of such a debate, see Li Zehou (1990a) and Faiibank (1983).
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CONCLUSION
The present chapter has briefly recapitulated the socio-historical and socio­
political contexts in which the May Fourth Movement took place. The preceding 
discussion has also indicated that ideological formation of intellectuals is influenced by 
different variables. The next chapter will discuss various pro-democracy movements in 
the post-Mao era.
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CHAPTER THREE
PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENTS IN SOCIALIST CHINA:
A STUDY OF DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY
"Down with bureaucratism, return to us democracy", "Long live democracy, down 
with autocracy", "Give us freedom or let us die" were the catchwords in the pro­
democracy movement in Tiananmen Square of 1989. The spontaneous demonstrations 
that broke out in Beijing and other cities were unprecedented and unanticipated in the 
history of the People’s Republic of China. Although the movement was formed by the 
students and intellectuals, it was also joined by the urban workers, ordinary citizens, 
government bureaucrats and even overseas Chinese. Su Shaozhi (1990), the former 
director of the Institute for Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought at Chinese 
Academy of Social Science (CASS), also regards the 1989 democracy movement as the 
largest mass movement in recent Chinese history since it received broad participation 
from many circles.^ The movement not only revealed the deeply-seated grievances of the 
students toward the education system and unfair treatment of intellectuals in particular, 
but also pointed out social evils such as corruption, inflation, profiteering and economic 
difficulties in general. Besides, it also brought antagonism between the state and the 
urban population into the open. More sociologically significant, the June Fourth incident 
also apparently unravelled the intense sense of identity crisis among the youth in post- 
Mao China (see, for example, Rosen, 1992 and chapter 4). Scholars suggest that because 
students are more open to new knowledge, especially in the interaction of the educational
'The following part will discuss the nature of the Tiananmen Square Incident as a people's movement in detail. As suggested by 
some scholars such as Tony Saich (1990), Frank Pieke (1992) and J. Unger (1991), the student demonstration o f 1989 developed into 
a people's movement in the big cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. According to one source, the number o f injured and killed 
people around the Square and in the edge o f Beijing Shi was up to several thousand. It was also reported that thousands and thousands 
o f civilians supported the movement, hoping to protect the student hunger strikers in the Square. Some o f them even used their bodies 
or any kinds of harriers to prevent the martial troops from entering the Square. This source o f information is adopted from an informal 
interview with a Chinese scholar in London, October, 1992. In this regard, 1 believe the movement was widely supported by people 
from different walks o f life especially in Beijing. See also Unger (1991).
system and socialization, they may become more sophisticated, in receiving Western 
ideas. It is also observed that students are patriotic and politically minded, having strong 
aspirations for reforms and revolution, and they are eager to change the existing political 
and social systems (see, for example, Lauer, 1976: XIV-XV; Emmerson, 1968: 415-416). 
Lipset also argues in a similar manner that students have often been the carriers of 
modem ideas of liberty, socialism, industrialization, and equal opportunity especially 
under autocratic mle. They always play a major role in fighting for freedom and 
democracy as was shown in the liberation movements and revolutions in Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia (see, Lipset, 1969: XV and 1967: 8-9). Student protests 
and student-led social movements are not "unique" or "particular" phenomena in Europe 
but have been documented in Chinese history as well.
The call for democracy constituted the central ideology throughout the movement 
of 1989, which brought the students on different campuses together and made their 
demonstrations a coherent movement across the country. Though democracy was 
certainly their battlecry, it is still futile to discuss democracy in the abstract. To different 
students, democracy may have different meanings and interpretations. It is meaningless 
just to describe the June-Fourth demonstrations as a democratic movement without a 
precise understanding of their concepts of democracy. It is against such background that 
we are going to examine the cognitive side of these pro-democracy movements,^ looking 
into how the movement intellectuals conceptualize democracy.
^By pro-democracy movement, I mean that the organizers and participants demanded more political freedom and individual 
autonomy. Students repeatedly employed the slogan "Long Live Democracy" as their symbol throughout their demonstrations since 
1919 (see the discussion in last chapter). Thus I use 'pro-democracy' movement to describe the nature o f the various movements in 
modem China.
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ADVOCACY FOR DEMOCRACY IN SOCIALIST CHINA
Crisis in Socialism and Pro-democracv Movement^
In recent years, the crisis of socialism has become a topic of contention among the 
scholars and intellectuals in both mainland China and East European countries. The 
ideological disintegration of Communism has become a common phenomenon 
throughout the socialist states since the majority of the people seem to have lost their 
faith in the practice of Communist ideals. The past four decades of the 'socialist 
experiment' in mainland China have demonstrated clearly the problems in the praxis of 
Communist ideals. People living in China have encountered endless social upheavals. 
The agony of the Cultural Revolution and the growing awareness of the failure in praxis 
of Communist ideals in the last two decades have caused the people to lose faith in 
Communism."* According to Su Shaozhi, "the Party and the government discredited 
themselves by promoting multiple campaigns and making many mistakes" but they have 
not corrected them immediately (Su, 1990: 7). Predicaments and difficulties have been 
experienced not only by the general public but also by the educated people like the 
university students and the intellectuals. As observed by Kelly and Brugger (1990), 
"there was talk of China's dire 'predicament' and 'crisis'", particularly concerned with 
surges in inflation, the disclosure of graft and corruption in high places, and continuing 
malaise among students, intellectuals, and the population generally. In the same vein. He 
Pochuan (1989) and Li Ming (1989), both intellectuals in mainland China, pronounced 
the immense crises confronting China and urged immediate attention and resolution 
toward these intense predicaments. Under such circumstances, decline of ideology or 
self-legitimation crisis is easily observed in post-Mao China (see, for example. White, 
1993 and Kelly, 1991).
In order to rebuild the rapport between the state and the people, the Communist
^For details o f the discussion on legitimation crisis or crisis of socialism in post-Mao China, see, for example, my master dissertation 
written in 1990-1991, unpublished thesis of the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
^There have been many publications discussing the crises in China ranging from the socio-political to the socio-economical realms 
in the post-Mao era. See for examples, Li Ming (1989); Ho Pochuan (1989); Li Honglin (1980); Zhang Zhou (1990); Liu 91982) and 
Rosen (1992); White (1993).
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leaders launched the Four Modernizations in the 1970s with the principal goal to quicken 
the economic development and to improve the life of the people. Apart from that, as the 
post-Mao leaders tried to secularize ideology, a process of depoliticisation or political 
demobilization (for details, see. White, 1993).^ After the national crisis of the 1989 
Tiananmen Square Incident, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly stressed the importance of 
economic modernization and promised deepening reforms in China. Even though his 
over eighty-eight years of age, he travelled round the special economic zone. His tour 
was labelled "Deng's Storm". Furthermore, his idea of economic reform was later 
confirmed as party policy in the 14th Party Congress of the CCP held in October 1992.^ 
However, predicaments in economic and political reforms have brought about discontent 
and outrage. The overheating consumption, uncontrollable inflation, the stubbornness of 
bureaucracy and the delay in political reform, all have proved the existence of a deepened 
crisis in socialist ideals and practice. As Nathan observed, though the reforms have the 
principal goal to redeem the Party's legitimacy by radically improving the economy, the 
inflation and devolution of power brought by the success of reform have contributed to a 
decline in the regime's authority, giving rise to a wave of profound questioning about the 
rule of Communist China (Nathan, 1990: 108-109; see also Hicks, 1990). A general 
crisis of faith in socialism and a particular crisis of legitimacy have developed in the post- 
Mao era. The outspoken physicist Fang Lizhi flatly told a foreign journalist that 
Marxism was dead in China. Ideological retrogression in the post-Mao era has set a kind 
of God-is-dead atmosphere in China (Brugger and Kelly, 1990).
Realizing the failure in the Communist praxis and the direct experience of the 
totalitarian and authoritarian rule, the people in mainland China have begun to seek 
emancipation and democracy. The exposure to the West has made the people of China
^The senior leaders o f the Communist Party have restated and stressed the importance o f reforms in the post-Mao era since 1978. 
The central theme constituting the reforming era is four modernizations. See, for example, the speeches o f Deng Xiaoping (see, Deng 
1984 and 1993). However, four Modernizations have fallen away in recent years.
®For details of this discussion, see, for example. The Nineties and Zheng Ming (different issues in 1992), which have a series of 
report sand commentaries on this issue. See also Jiang Zemin's (1992) speech addressed in the 14th Party Congress o f the CCP. In 
this meeting, market reforms were confirmed officially.
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further believe the success of democracy and technology. From the late 70's onwards, 
there have been several pro-democracy movements in China, notably the 1976 
Tiananmen Incident of "Qin Shihuang, your age has passed",^ the Democracy Wall 
Movement in 1978-83, the student protest in 1986-87 and the June Fourth Incident in 
1989. Each social movement accentuates the demand for democracy and paves the way 
for the rise of the intellectuals (Calhoun, 1991).
Social movement (yundong) is not new to post-Mao China because mass 
movements were common under the reign of Mao Zedong. The Red Guard activities 
were mobilized partly by the central authority. From the late 50's to mid 70’s, various 
mass movements or campaigns were initiated and mobilized by the elite in the party. For 
instance, elite initiates were manifested in the targeting of "capitalist readers", the 
organization and leadership of factional bands in the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Socialist 
Education and Four Clean Campaign. As Dittmer (1994: 136) observed, "elite initiates, 
however, played out in a context of considerable mass spontaneity." The Party elite 
orchestrated many mass and social movements behind the scene. Schurmann (1968) and 
Townsend (1969) argue along the same line that the CCP had a successful record in the 
mobilization of the masses to support its policies. From this point of departure, large- 
scale campaigns or mass movements are not totally new to the post-Mao movement 
activists. It is also such a yundong tradition set off the Democracy Wall Movement and 
subsequent movements.
The Democracv Wall Movement in the Late 1970's
A "Democracy Wall Movement" erupted on the streets of Beijing in the second 
half of November 1978 and later spread to other cities in China demanding "democracy, 
freedom, human right and law".® Unlike the June Fourth Movement, this movement was
^Qin Shihuang was the emperor of Qin dynasty and he was infamous because of his autocratic rule. Qin Shihuang was condemned 
for treating people harshly, killing people without proper reasons and he was regarded as one of the evil rulers in Chinese history. The 
association Deng with Qin implies that people were extremely angry and dissatisfied with the existing government, especially the 
autocratic rule under Deng's regime.
®The Democracy Wall Movement in the late 70's captured the attention of the West, and it was also regarded as a "Human Rights 
Movement". For details, see, for example, Aelette Laduguie (1980).
99
mainly supported and organized by the youth who were sent to work in factory or in 
village/ Concerning the social background of these activitists, one point which deserves 
attention is that some of those participants were educated youth returned from the 
countryside. Having experienced the 'tragedy' of the "going to the mountains and 
villages" campaign, these educated youth raised their grievances regarding their "lost 
youth", especially their missing opportunity in education and suffering from lack of 
economic and political opportunities during the past decade. After the Revolution, some 
of these activists took the opportunity to enroll themselves in university. For instance, 
Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming received university education and they were active in 
student activities and movements (For detail, see, Goldman, 1981). Unlike other 
educated youth, this group of young scholars received education at all levels at the time 
and had also to be workers or peasants for years at a time. In the light of Gramsci's 
notion of organic and traitional intellectuals, these educated youth seemed to be the 
"organic one" because they were not working in state apparatus or supported/established 
by the state as other educated youth. Instead, this group of young people regreted for 
what they had lost in the Cultural Revolution, being conscious of their independent role 
and relationship with the state, they were eager to equip themselves in order to be more 
intellectually independent and academically autonomous.
U nlike the May Fourth Movement and the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution, the 'Democracy Wall Movement' was not based 
on student activists. Most of the activists were workers aged between 25 and 35, with a relatively homogenous social background. 
Besides, most of them were the sons and daughters o f the middle and upper-middle strata o f Chinese society. They were the children 
of cadres and intellectuals who, prior to the Cultural Revolution, could have expected better education up to tertiary level; but they 
were "sent down to the front line of production" during the "dark age". Thereby their future was ruined. Moreover, they were 
regarded as "wrong class background" because o f their parents who were either in disgrace or under suspicion during the ten year 
tragedy. Their parents had privileged positions before 1966 and were "well-connected"; that's why they were able to protect their 
children from being sent to the countryside, going instead to the front of the production line. After the Cultural Revolution, the 
majority o f them had already missed the chance to have higher education. Even if  they did return to college they were in 
disadvantaged position. Having lost their "golden opportunity" for developing themselves, these activists were antagonized. For 
instance, Wei Jingsheng was an electrician at the Beijing Zoo and his father was a cadre in the CCP in Beijing, enjoying the privileged 
position o f deputy director of a department in a central ministry. Yang Guang, Wei's collaborator on "Exploration" (an unofBcial 
publication during the movement) was a student at the Worirers' University and a classmate of Hua Guofeng's daughter (the former 
Party chairman). Yang's father was also a higher cadre and engineer in the Ministry o f Light Industry. In this regard, we may 
conclude that most of the activists shared similar social background and similar experiences. They devoted their youth and energy to 
support Chairman Mao but eventually found that they had been "cheated". It is against such socio-political backgrounds that they 
criticized the existing political system, doubted the practical value o f socialism, and pointed out the problems o f dictatorial rule in past 
decades. The so-called "Three-Faith Crisis" was the "product" o f this circumstance. For details, see, Goodman (1981) and Chiang 
Chenchang (1981).
^®Black and Munro (1993) have a detailed discussion on how some of these movement intellectuals who supported the 1976 Tiananmen 
Square Movement developed themselves as socially and politically independent groups maintaining a detached relationship with the state.
In examining the social locations of these intellectuals in the light of Gramsci's notion of intellectuals, we must be catious Üiat what 
Gramsci suggested might not be totally applicable to Chinese case since he anticipated the rise of organic intellectuals against a capitalist
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The understanding of their social location thus sheds light on the reasons behind 
their slogans such as "We want work!", "We want food!", "Going to the mountains and 
villages is reactionary!", "We demand human rights!", "Young people working in 
production groups are exploited!" (cited in McLaren, 1979: 6). The discovery of the 
socialist myth made these people conscious of the importance of human rights and 
freedom. At first, the participants attempted to establish a free speech area, which they 
named "Hyde park" and which became known as "Democracy Wall". Wall-posters were 
posted at the very beginning but unofficial press, magazines, newspapers and pamphlets 
flourished later. To describe this incident as a movement one would expect a greater 
degree of uniformity in ideas and unity of organization. In reality, the Democracy Wall 
Movement had no united idea and organization. Instead, it emerged spontaneously 
various self-styled "mass societies" such as China Human Rights Alliance and the 
Enlightenment Society. The major concern of these participants was "democracy, 
freedom, human rights and law". One of the groups within the May Fourth Movement 
had a slogan of "Democracy and Science", while another group the April 5th Movement 
raised its critique of late-Maoist China as feudal, fascist and lawless. Most of these 
activists were merely concerned with the rights to have options, to discuss opinions, to 
experiment, and to express themselves. "Science, Democracy and Law" is thus a digest 
of all the wall-posters which appeared on Democracy Wall (Goodman, 1981)."
Not surprisingly, democracy had different meanings to different individuals and 
groups without a united platform or ideas. In Goodman's view, these participants had no 
clear conception of what democracy was but merely replaced "Revolution" by 
"Democracy", seeing it as the shibboleth in the new language of politics (Goodman, 
1981: 7). Like the May Fourth scholars, some of those participants just interpreted 
democracy as the immediate "withering away" of party control while others conceived
society instead of socialist society as such. From this point of departure, the adoption of Gramscian notion here is that we believe the 
educated youth right after the Cultural Revolution were more more conscious of their independence and avoided becoming state appentage.
 ^fro r  details o f their demands and conceptions o f democracy, see, for example, Goodman (1981); Nathan (1985); Lin Zhongjian 
(1978) and Wang Xuzhe (1981).
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democracy as Liberal Democracy, Capitalism or Christianity or even the mixture of them 
(see, for example. Lu Min, 1979: 17 and Qimeng, 1 Jan, 1979: 11-27). In addition, some 
activists also regarded both the United States and Yugoslavia as models for democracy. 
Different advocates had different definitions of democracy; for instance, Wei Jingsheng's 
conception of democracy was to maximize individual freedom and non-Marxist 
socialism, whereas some defined democracy as the Paris Commune. For most of the 
activists democracy was interpreted as "being under the leadership of the CCP, even 
though at times this might entail some amazing contradictions" (Goodman, 1981: 8).
We can also basically classify their demand for democracy into two major 
categories: cultural and political democracy. What they really wanted was to free 
themselves from the autocratic political system and to liberate the realm of literature and 
arts, A contextual analysis of their ideas reveals that their demands were the "product" of 
their particular historical situation. Their dreadful experiences in the Cultural Revolution 
made them realize the myth of socialist ideals, causing them to question the essence of 
socialism and thereafter to look for other alternatives. However, not all of them felt 
totally disappointed in the socialist system. Some of them still supported reforms within 
the socialist system. They hoped to reform the existing system and develop a real 
socialist state. That explains why even though most of the activists criticized dictatorship 
and problems of bureaucratization in Mao's era, they still adopted a Marxist framework 
to analyze existing problems . Nathan (1985) also argues along this line that people who 
joined the democracy movement had no intention to overthrow the existing regime. Most 
of these activists supported socialism, trying to correct the wrongdoing in past decades 
and hoped to transform China into a real socialist state. In the same manner, Goodman 
(1981) points out that most participants agreed "to persevere in carrying out the long-term 
struggle to realize socialist democracy" and to defend their constitutional rights. Most of 
them believed that real socialist democracy can bring greater freedom and emancipation 
for man. They hoped to institutionalize a legal system to ensure the success of socialist
'^This classification of democracy is based upon the observation o f Goodman (1981).
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transformation in China. They also hoped that the people’s congress at grassroots level 
would be strengthened in order that people’s rights could be protected. Most of these 
participants such as the Lash group in Guangdong mainly complained about 
administrative malpractice, dictatorial rule and bureaucrats, abuse of power and the 
suppression of people’s rights. Having seen the discrepancy between socialist ideals and 
practices, they therefore became more concerned about people’s rights and freedom (for 
details, see, Hua, 1976 and Wang, 1976).'^
Contrary to the dominant belief in self-perfection within the CCP, Wei Jingsheng, 
editor-in-chief of Exploration, an underground Beijing publication, openly and 
forthrightly demanded not only freedom and democracy but also radical change in 
socialist China. Wei’s examination of the problems of bureaucratic malpractices and 
dictatorial rule convinced him that the root of the problems lay in the political system and 
official ideology. Wei, having faced the horrors of the Cultural Revolution and having 
discovered the myth of socialist ideals, denounced the dictatorial Communist state and 
exposed the dark side of Chinese Communist rule. He demanded that people should have 
full rights to enjoy freedom and democracy, arguing that human rights were basic to all 
human beings (Xie, 1989), Wei believed,
"for the right to live, everyone should have the right to engage in political activities. In 
other words, every person should have the basic political rights to speak, hold meetings, 
form associations, publish, believe in whatever religion he prefers, move from one place 
to another, and strike for better conditions."(Xie, 1989: 49-60)
Underlying Wei's ideas is a strong sense of anti-dictatorial feeling, the expression
of which also reveals a deep-seated crisis of faith in Communist ideals. Wei contended
that the mask of the Communist Party’s monolithic rule and monopolistically dominating
mode of authority had suffocated the development of democracy, Wei openly criticized
'^In the post-Mao era most people, especially the intellectuals, supported the reform programme and the call for Four Modernization 
sinitiated by Deng Xiaoping. They thought that socialism could be transformed from within and the actualization o f socialist society 
depended greatly on reform. Receiving a relatively liberal and open signal from Deng Xiaoping, most people therefore showed their 
support and hoped that China would be strengthened. In addition, Deng also openly told the overseas journalists that people in the 
mainland had the rights to self-expression and to criticize the government as written in the state constitution. However, the 
Democracy Wall Movement was suddenly suppressed, revealing that Deng just made use o f the movement to strengthen his own 
political position. Having consolidated his position, Deng turned to a repressive approach in dealing with these activists. For details, 
see, for example, Goodman (1981) and Nathan (1985).
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Mao and the totalitarian system from a self-stated socialist standpoint/"* adding,
"... disasters caused by the autocratic rulers, by Fascism under a Marxist-Leninist 
signboard, by totalitarianism, and by those who toyed with hundreds of millions of 
human lives according to the vagaries of a small number of persons." (cited in 
Goodman, 1981: 5)
He went on to say that "if we don't want to be further enslaved, if we want our 
living standard to improve in accordance with the progress of modernization, we must 
first have democratic politics" (Xie, 1989: 50). What Wei actually advocated was 
freedom, democracy and human rights. Indeed, he argued that without such conditions 
the "Four Modernizations" initiated by the government were unobtainable (Xie, 1989: 59- 
60).
Unlike most people who trusted Deng Xiaoping to reform China, Wei believed 
that, without institutionalized democracy, China would again fall into despotic politics. 
In another article, "Democracy or New Dictatorship", Wei watchfully warned the people 
that the dictatorial rule was not yet over, implicitly pointing to the undemocratic rule of 
Deng Xiaoping. He not only rejected Mao Zedong's proletarian dictatorship but also 
searched for a system of checks and balances of the leadership by the people. Wei was 
not like other democrats in his time, most of whom sought not for institutional change of 
the political system but rather for a more responsive government,*^ Wei advocated 
somewhat a Western kind of democracy in the Chinese society. In Andrew Nathan's 
words, "Wei Jingsheng's [notion of democracy] was the only extended statement of a 
position close to the liberal Western mainstream" (Nathan, 1985: 104) since Wei 
highlighted the fundamental sense of the "human essence", human rights. Wei's emphasis 
on human rights seemed a breakthrough in the Chinese tradition, particularly when it has 
long regarded the rights of individuals to be subordinate to the collective rights. Not only 
has the traditional Chinese society upheld such a notion, but also the Communist rule has
'^The idea o f "self-stated socialist standpoint" is based on Goodman (1981), whose discussion is very illuminating to us in the 
analysis o f the Democracy Wall Movement in the late 70's.
'^On the discussion of the ideas o f other democrats, see, for example, Hou Jiliang (1989); Leijonhufvud (1990); Pan Jia-ching 
(1980) and Zhengming (Feb. 1989: 26-29).
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also adopted such a stance. As Henkin observed, "to Marxists, in building socialism, 
individualism is an obstacle to be overcome. Freedom as commonly understood in 
bourgeois societies is negative, destructive ... Man can achieve true freedom only in 
community" (Henkin, 1986: 23). In keeping with this line of reasoning, human rights 
have been neglected in China. Therefore, individuals are expected to make all kinds of 
sacrifices, including the sacrifice of their rights, to serve the interests of the socialist 
state.^ ®
In upholding his notion of human rights, Wei steadfastly condemned the dictators 
and painstakingly sought for the liberalization and democratization of politics (Nathan, 
1985: 87-106). However, the 'liberal' ideas of Wei Jingsheng on human rights were too 
isolated from the central tradition of Chinese democratic thought. Wei not only failed to 
get much support in the earlier post-Mao era but also received criticism from other 
intellectuals. Some democrats even rejected Wei's theories and criticized them as 
"opposed to Marxism and in violation of our constitution",(Nathan, 1985: 106) since 
most democrats in the time of Wei still believed the individual rights should be sacrificed 
to those of the collective. For them, a democratic government was simply more open and 
responsive to people's needs, with a more enlightened and strong leader to guide the 
people; and this government was willing to rectify the wrong-doings in the Cultural 
R e vo l u t i on . A  comparison of the majority's ideas of democracy with those of Wei can 
easily show that Wei proposed to have not only a responsive government but a 
government 'by the people, for the people and of the people'. Wei also believed that
'^Article 51 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) says, "the citizen of the PRC, when exercising his 
freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the interests of the state, o f society, or o f  the collectives", which indicates the 
subordination o f individuals to the collective in the PRC.
' ’it is also reported by some of the contemporary intellectuals that they supported the reforms as proposed by Deng Xiaoping 
because they considered reforms and modernization to be coherent to the historical tide. Therefore, most of the intellectuals showed 
their support to the reform programme especially in late 70's and early 80's, believing Deng's sincerity in improving the social 
positions o f the intellectuals. Unlike the Western intellectuals who adopt an anti-establishment attitude, the Chinese intellectuals are 
part of the establishment This can explain why the influence of the dissident intellectuals is always minimal. 1 draw this light fk>m 
the interview with Yan Jiaqi (see interview 1, Paris, 1992).
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people should have the ultimate control and final say in any policies.** Though Wei's 
boldness and courage were admired by many in China, his ideas were accepted by few 
people (Nathan, 1985: 106). Wei Jingsheng's painstaking and laborious acts in the 
promotion of democracy and emancipation earned him fifteen years of imprisonment.*’ 
Though Wei was prosecuted and imprisoned, his call for democracy and protection of 
human rights has far-reaching significance, not only inspiring the later democrats but also 
laying the foundation for future movements for democracy.^**
Following the path of Wei Jingsheng, some educated youth who returned from the 
villages and countryside, also protested against violations of human rights and democracy 
in the early 80's. Hu Ping and Wang Juntao, editors respectively of the underground 
publications Beijing Spring and Fertile Soil, together with other college journals like Red 
Bean of Zhonshan University, Thinking, New Age and The April 5 Forum o f  Science of 
Beijing University consistently voiced their grievances. The central thrust of these 
publications involves not only criticizing the autocratic rule of the CCP but also 
demanding democracy, freedom and emancipation of people's minds. Most important of 
all, these students began to be aware of the importance of people's rights, asserting their 
rights to supervise the government, and to press for genuine democracy in electing 
representatives in the People's Congress at the local level. These activists not only 
criticized the maladministration of the government but also questioned the legitimacy of 
the CCP as well as the truth of socialism in the early 1980's. They even openly declared 
that the Wei Jingsheng case was mistakenly judged. Questioning the meaningless
‘^Although Wei did not directly employ the notion o f "by the people, for the people and o f the people", a close scrutiny of his ideas 
can reflect the above-mentioned line o f thought underlying his conception of democracy. At least, he stressed the concept o f "right" 
which I think is fundamental to democracy. See, for example, Nathan (1985, 1990); and Xie (1989).
•’After fourteen and a half years o f imprisonment, Wei was just released in September 1993. In an interview, Wei said that he felt 
no regret for what he had done, and he said that he still wanted to fight for democracy and human rights in China. However, Wei 
thinks that democratization should not bring instability to the present regime. When asked o f his attitude toward Deng Xiaoping who 
insisted to retain Wei in prison, Wei was at ease and even said that he hoped Deng might live on. (See a news programme produced 
by the Asia Television Company H.K. Sep, 1993.) In another interview, when asked his role in society, Wei replied that he was a 
dissident. He also told the news that he had written continually to the socialist leaders during his imprisonment, advising them not to 
ignore people's rights and reemphasized the importance of freedom and democracy to people. For details, see Mingbao, (25, O ct 
1993; 10) and Open Magazine, (No. 82, pp.22-23).
^°Fang Lizhi, the most prominent democrat in the post-Mao era also openly admitted that he was influenced by Wei Jingsheng. 
Fang wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping, calling for the release of Wei in Feb. 1989, see Chong,(1989); Zhengming, (Feb. 1989: 23-25)
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sacrifice during the Cultural Revolution, students also advocated all-out social 
reformation to realize a power division and democracy in both political and economic 
realms. Putting these observations together, we conclude that these educated youth and 
college students became more conscious of human rights, striving for democracy and 
rethinking their relationship with the state (see, Chiang Chen-chang, 1981 and Yeh Hung- 
sheng, 1981).^^
The 1986-87 Student Demonstrations^^
The 1986-87 campaign against bourgeois liberalism was sparked off by the 
massive student demonstrations throughout China in 1986.^  ^ Political reform and 
demands for democracy constituted the central theme of the demonstrations. Throughout 
the fall semester of 1986, extensive discussions about political reform were held in 
university campuses, organizing special symposia in political studies {People’s Daily, 3 
Nov. 1986). Students in Beijing brought out posters reading: "We want democracy, we 
want tfeedom, we support the student movement in the University of Science and 
Technology", "We want law, we do not want autocracy", "We’ll fight for democracy, we 
will fight for freedom, we fight for freedom of the press." In other universities, they 
called for a similar motif: "We will fight for democracy; China should work for the 
people, not for a small group" {Central Daily, December, 15, 19, 1986; Ming Baa, 
December 26, 1986: 2; The Nineties, Jan. 1987: 17-18). The student demonstration was 
triggered by the issue of electoral reforms in late 1986. In December, the students at the 
University of Science and Technology in Hefei protested against the lack of power to 
nominate candidates for the People’s Congress. On December 9, the students at Hefei 
demonstrated for three hours to protest against Japanese aggression in 1935. '^* The
^'Some o f these student leaders continue to participate, organize and support the pro-democracy movement. Wang Juntao is still 
imprisoned for his support of the 1989 student movement. Hu Ping is now in exile in the United States, organizing pro-democracy 
movement overseas.
^^For the chronological details o f the 1986-87 demonstrations, see Stavis (1987: 96-104).
"According to one count, the demonstrations swept 150 campuses in at least 17 cities {South China Morning Post, 12 Jan. 1987).
"The 1935 Incident was the invasion by the Japanese military forces causing harmful effect to Chinese economy and political 
stability.
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students in Wuhan, supporting the Hefei students, gathered at their campuses to 
commemorate the 1935 incident. The movements of Hefei and Wuhan students excited 
the students in Shanghai. On December 10, students at Jiaotong University in Shanghai 
put up wallposters to show their support of the Hefei students, as well as to voice their 
dissatisfaction with conditions on their campus. Receiving the news from Shanghai, 
students in Beijing also put up wallposters. Later, on December 19, students in Shanghai 
marched to the municipal government office, carrying placards asking for democracy and 
freedom. The student demonstrations started from Shanghai and later extended to other 
major cities in China. Similar activities were reported on campuses in Tienjin, Nanjing, 
Kumming, Hangzhou, Suzhou, Guangzhou, and other cities. Student demonstrations 
reached a climax around December 20. The size of these demonstrations varied, ranging 
from a few hundred in Guangzhou to 30,000 in Shanghai {The Nineties, Jan. 1987: 17- 
20). A Taiwan newspaper reported that the student demonstrations affected at least 17 
cities and about 150 of the 1016 institutes of higher learning in the country {Central 
Daily, January 7, 1987: \\ Achievement o f  Education in China: Statistics, 1980-85, 1986: 
6). It showed that the call for democracy had brought the students on different campuses 
together. If we closely look into their demands, we will probably ask what they were 
really fighting for. Were they fighting for a representative government, universal 
suffrage or any forms of government in the spirit of Western democracy?^^
At first glance, it seems that because students were dissatisfied with the limited 
freedom and immature democracy in China, they became restless and thus demonstrated 
for freedom and democracy. However, a close examination of their demands reveals that 
the students left the term 'democracy' undefined and vague. Their demonstrations can 
show their activism and social consciousness but they did not really fight for a democracy
^^Tbe author is well-aware that there are different models of democratic government, including the presidential system in the States, 
the parliamentary system in the U.K., the democratic form o f government of France and various other forms o f democracy. Simply 
stated, the essence of democracy, is closely related to the control o f corrupted human nature. The establishment o f a more democratic 
form o f governmental structure is to have a proper mechanism to check the power exercised by the ofGcials, to correct the wrong­
doings and abuse o f power. It sets the procedural details to guide the work of government in order to minimize the mistakes o f people 
in the process o f decision-making and implementation. In this sense, democracy is to prevent the abuse of power and to protect the 
rights o f people. It is with this reasoning that democracy declares people should have the final say in both policies and the choice of 
government. See, for example, Williams (1976) and Popper (1966).
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with a multi-party system or democracy in organizational management. What really 
concerned them were matters related closely to their personal interests.
In the several years preceding the 1986 demonstrations, students had enjoyed the 
fruits of reforms taking place in universities for they had picketed and put up wallposters 
complaining about poor food services and administrative problems in universities. 
Moreover, students could raise their demands and lodge their complaints directly to the 
university authority and the presidents of their universities. Students also participated in 
the president's advisory council in some universities. The university administrative 
bodies did address the grievances of students, withdrawing the policy of making campus 
cafeterias financially self-sufficient and made improvements in both administration and 
services (Kwong, 1988: 976-977). The demonstrations in late 1986, therefore, were not 
completely surprising since students had been encouraged to voice their opinions and 
grievances in the preceding few years.
Their demands throughout the demonstrations suggested that they were voicing 
their displeasure at the reform measures being introduced on campus for they believed 
there was still room for improvement. Their demands, in a word, had basically to do 
with university administration and their quality of life. They put forth their 
dissatisfaction about the limited space on campus, complaining about crowded living 
conditions in dormitories (for there were often six students living in one small room). 
They also pointed to the fact of the declining quality of food at ever increasing prices. 
They believed that the reason behind the lowered quality of services was not simply 
inflation but was fundamentally related to government cuts in university subsidies {The 
Nineties, Jan. 1987: 17-19; Beijing Review, 30: 1 and 4, Jan. 5 & 26, 1987). Other
^®For the past few years, some prominent intellectuals, like Fang Lizhi and Wen Yuankai, both from Hefei's University o f Science 
and Technology, argued for greater autonomy in university administration and encouraged students to fight for their rights and 
independence. Within such a context, students were motivated to voice their opinions openly. It is therefore natural that the 
demonstrations initially broke out at the University of Science and Technology, and Jiaotong, Tongji, and Wuhan universities. See 
Renmin Ribao (December 4, 1986: 4; January 25, 1987: 1); Beijing Review (30: 8, February 23, 1987: 17). Kelly (1987) also suggests 
that the 1986-87 student demonstrations were encouraged and even indirectly mobilized by the intellectuals who had been dissatisfied 
with the present govemment It is against a context o f widespread critical discussion on academic freedom and o f autonomous 
intellectual environment that students were imbued with courage to break their silence. Some prominent intellectuals such as Fang 
Lizhi, Liu Binyan, Su Shaozhi, Wang Ruoshui and Wang Ruowang repeatedly asserted intellectuals' independence and strongly called 
for the liberation o f the cultural realm. Under the impact of these intellectuals, students were made bold enough to openly voice their 
demands. See, for example, Kelly (1987).
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changes which affected and bothered them much were the revised curriculum, the 
elimination of automatic student aid and a stricter evaluation system. Students also 
vehemently grumbled at the introduction of tuition fees to cover some university 
expenses, for they had been enjoying free higher education since 1949. It is for these 
reasons they became annoyed and defiant. Thereafter, they used the demonstrations to 
voice their dissatisfaction their present living conditions.
The Hong Kong media published similar reports of some of the students' 
grievances. For instance, the students in Beijing were dissatisfied with the university's 
practice of turning off lights at eleven. Students in Nanjing complained about the 
inclusion of political studies in the curriculum. The students in Zhongshan University of 
Guangzhou pointed out the problems in the conservative university administration since it 
banned discussions on sexual liberation. Other students in Zhongshan Medical College 
also petitioned for better salaries on graduation and improved job allocation. Students at 
Shenzhen University also demonstrated against the imposition of tuition and residence 
fees based on their academic performance (Kwong, 1988: 979; The Nineties, Jan. 1987: 
17-18). Accordingly, most of the issues that the students raised did relate closely to 
inconveniences and annoyances in their campus lives. What they protested against seems 
to suggest that they were fighting for their personal interests rather than for democracy. 
Stavis (1987) also argues along the same lines that most non-student participants did not 
consider a more democratic political system necessary. Rather, some may see democracy 
as a desirable goal for the distant future. He also observes that some citizens commented 
that those student protestors had more freedom than other social groups for which reason 
not many factory workers joined the demonstrations fighting for democracy. Up to this 
point, we can argue that the explosion of the student demonstrations had a close 
relationship with their direct experience of the declining living standard and their 
perceived uncertain future. Having been accelerated by the social crises, they did raise 
some issues which went beyond their personal concerns and interests to major social 
concern at a larger societal level. They also pointed to the bureaucratism, profiteering,
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inflation and declining living standard in general. The rising expectations for reform 
were unmet by the existing reform measures. They felt frustrated with the regressive 
reform in the economic realm and the half-hearted attitude toward political reform. This 
caused general dissatisfaction among students and some urban dwellers {The Nineties, 
Jan. 1987: 17-19).
The demonstrations used 'Democracy' and 'Freedom' as catchwords to excite and 
unite the other students and they proved that strategy was effective. However, the 
students themselves probably did not really understand the precise meaning of 
'democracy'. Their demand for democracy may not directly tackle the immediate 
problems that they were facing. As Kwong observes, "the juxtaposition in wallposters 
and slogans of democracy with social ills, bureaucratism, and insensitivity to students' 
well-being seemed to suggest that democracy was either the solution to these problems or 
their popular opposite" (Kwong, 1988: 980). Besides, they might misinterpret democracy 
merely as freedom of speech and expression, only hoping that democracy could solve any 
problems when the people could have freedom to express themselves. As Kwong 
observed, "like their predecessors at the turn of the century, the students seemed to have 
an overly optimistic view of what democracy could deliver" (Kwong, 1988: 980). 
Democracy, to the demonstrators, seems to be "a broad, utopian concept, unrealistically 
proposed as a panacea for China's problems" (Kwong, 1988: 980). Most of them were 
protesting primarily to reveal their concern over the social ills of the country and their 
impatience over the slow pace of change. Because the students had a high expectation for 
the reforms, the failure of the university authorities to move quickly further antagonized 
them. This explains why they acted together to voice their grievances, pointing to the 
fact of social evils in general. Even though they attacked bureaucratism in a wider social 
context, the heart of their complaints still lay in their dissatisfaction with the 
bureaucratism on campus (Kwong, 1988; The Nineties, 1987, 1: 17-19). Neither did they 
suggest checks and balances or any concrete proposals for institutional changes in the 
political structure. On the contrary, the students just adopted a broad notion of
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democracy in order to accommodate their varied grievances, views and differing 
interpretations on different campuses (Kwong, 1988). Without a strong organization and 
well-defined ideology, the demonstrations were finally suppressed in early 1987. This 
also brought the downfall of the former party secretary, Hu Yaobang, as punishment for 
his lenient attitude toward the demonstrations. After the incident, the students became 
silent. Their silence did suggest their rethinking of democracy, cogitating upon their role 
and looking at the future of China. In the late 80's, students did organize some open 
seminars discussing the future of China and issues concerning democracy. Wang Dan 
and Shen Tong were organizers of "democracy salons" on their campuses. Both of them 
were student representatives and organizers in the 1989 Tiananmen Democracy 
Movement (For details, see, for example, Chong 1990; Oksenberg, 1990 and Schell, 
1988). Bonnin and Chevrier, in their study of Chinese intellectuals and the state in the 
post-Mao era, also suggest that Chinese university students and intellectuals had 
attempted to expand their influence over the public sphere, creating their own field in 
cotrast with the sate apparatus. According to Bonnin and Chevrier (1991: 576), "the 
purpose of the minzhu shalong was to open a political sphere in an open contest with the 
existing political order, not to look for convenient niches within that order and for 
suitable mentors in the power elite" as it was started in its early phase. With the socil and 
economic changes in the post-Mao era, Chinese intellectuals had attempted to explore 
more possibilities to assert their professional autonomy and intellectual independence. 
Even though Bonnin and Chevrier (1991: 578) suggested that "a sphere of economic and 
social pluralism emerged between the official sphere of the state and the private sphere of 
the individual, but no independent political sphere was associated with it", the relaxed 
socio-cultural and socio-ideological realms inevitably rendered Chinese intellectuals with 
more autonomy.
The Pro-democracv Movement in 1989
On April 15, 1989, the sudden death of the former general party secretary, Hu 
Yaobang provided another opportunity for the rise of students. In the 1986-87
112
demonstrations, Hu was purged and forced to resign from all posts in the Party after the 
anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign/^ People had commemorated the downfall of Hu, 
whose sudden death brought a grief-stricken atmosphere and triggered off anger among 
the students in Beijing. In order to give remembrance to their beloved leader, some three 
hundred students from Beijing University went to Tiananmen Square to lay wreaths in 
memory of Hu. The number began to grow when students from other universities joined 
the commemoration of Hu. On 18 April, the students organized their sit-in demonstration 
at Tiananmen Square, requesting a proper réévaluation of the performance of Hu 
Yaobang and affirming the essence of democracy and freedom. They also asked for 
rehabilitating the 1986-87 student movement and those who participated in it; revealing 
and reporting the financial situation of the senior officials’ children; freedom of press and 
allowing newspapers to be published by the public; increasing educational subsidies and 
improving the status of intellectuals; abolishing the regulations concerning freedom of 
movement and demonstrations and asking for a fair report of this movement. Some 
students even brought out placards saying "Down with bureaucratism", "Down with 
corruption", "Rise of Democracy", "Long Live Freedom" and "Strengthening China" 
{MingBao, 1989. April 18: 2; South China Morning Post, April, 18, 1989). On April 20, 
several thousand students gathered outside Zhong Nanhai, China’s political nerve centre, 
asking premier Li Peng to come out to talk with them. The sit-in demonstration resulted 
in an open confrontation between the students and the police, in which some students 
were injured in the fight. However, the official reports did not mention the injuries of the 
students but just said that "trouble-makers" had incited the incident and caused the police 
injuries. This incident clearly gave impetus to further protests.
After the brush with authority, students became antagonized. A huge group of 
students from more than 20 universities marched shoulder to shoulders to Tiananmen
’^The 1986-87 demonstrations were diagnosed by the Communist Party as a bourgeois liberalization. The concomitant move of the 
Party was to crush the movement and to find fault with the former party secretary Hu Yaobang for his lenient attitudes toward 
bourgeois liberalism. Some prominent pro-democracy intellectuals, Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan and Wang Ruowang were expelled fixim 
the party and openly condemned by the hardliners for inciting the demonstrations and spreading the bourgeois ideas to students. See, 
for example, Chen Chang-chin (1987); Chou Yu-sun (1987).
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Square, chanting stronger and more unified slogans demanding democracy and human 
rights. The students bellowed in unison, "Long live democracy, long live freedom" on 
April 22th, the day of the memorial service for Hu Yaobang. The students also raised 
high their banners with slogans like "Yaobang — glory (yao) to the country (bang) in 
life, glory to the country in death", "Leader of youth, fighter for democracy", "Model of 
upright govemment", "Punish the bureaucratic profiteers" and "Freedom of the press". 
Beside the huge funerary portrait of Hu Yaobang, the students hung a big banner reading 
"China's Soul" on the Monument to the People's Heros, which made the atmosphere in 
the square even more solemn {South China Morning Post, April 22, 1989; The Hong 
Kong Standard, April 22, 1989; Ming Bao, April 22, 1989: 2). Hoping to attend the 
funeral of Hu, students waited outside the Great Hall calling, "Say one more farewell to 
Yaobang", "Let us see Yaobang one more time" (Li Qiao, 1990: 27). After twenty 
minutes, the ceremony came to a close and Hu's body was hurriedly carried away without 
allowing the public to say farewell. Knowing such an arrangement, students boiled with 
rage and began to chant rhythmically, "We want dialogue, we want dialogue". Four 
student representatives tried to present their petition to the govemment; three of them 
knelt suddenly on the steps of the Great Hall as a traditional show of submission but no 
one came out to receive them. As the crowd on the Square saw this, they shouted to the 
three to get up. Guo Haifeng, one of the representatives, replying to those workers who 
wanted him to get up, said "I won't. We knelt for the national emblem, not for some 
persons. The premier is the people's servant. He should have come out to talk with us. 
We didn't ask for an immediate reply, but only asked that he receive our petition" (Li 
Qiao, 1990: 29). The act of these student representatives moved many people, further 
pointing out the autocratic and irresponsive govemment in the eyes of people. Their 
petition basically reiterated their demands on April 18, adding "to strictly punish those 
who beat the students and people, and demand those who did the beatings to apologize to 
the ones who suffered", which clearly showed their anger toward the govemment's 
treatment of the 20th April incident (Li, 1991: 23).
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An April 26 editorial of Renmin Ribao titled "Resolutely Oppose Turmoil" 
condemned the student movement.
"A small minority of people, taking advantage of the opportunity, [the memorial service 
of Hu] circulated rumours and singled out several party and national leaders for attack 
... They circulated every kind of rumour, confusing the people's attention, to throw the 
whole nation into disorder, and to destroy the stability and unity of the political 
situation. This is a planned conspiracy. It is a turmoil designed to negate socialism." 
(Renmin Ribao, April 26, 1989, emphasis added)
The uncompromising view of the govemment was the key to the entire course of 
events on Tiananmen Square. The Li Peng govemment tried to intimidate the students 
into submission, threatening the demonstrators, and hoped to divide the students into two 
groups by defining the movement as "a planned conspiracy" (Li, 1991: 42). Having read 
the editorial, students at Tiananmen Square were in a fume, being frustrated by the 
govemment's stand toward their patriotic and well-intended motive. Imbued with anger, 
the students organized another demonstration, joined by a huge number of participants 
such as teachers, urban workers and ordinary citizens. When marching to the Square, the 
demonstrators shouted, "Official profiteers! Official profiteers! If we don't attack, they 
won't fall!, "We want mle of law, not mle by man", "We want science, not sentiment! We 
want democracy, not dictatorship!", "Guarantee human rights; abolish privileged!", 
"Long live freedom! Long live democracy!", "Peaceful demonstration is not instigation of 
turmoil!" Most eye-catching were the banners saying "Support the Communist Party's 
correct leadership" and "Carry on with the reforms" (Li Qiao, 1990: 33). There was no 
sign of overthrowing the existing govemment; most of their placards and banners just 
condemned the malpractice of the govemment and demanded freedom and democracy.
Failing to get recognition from the govemment for their patriotic movement, 
students seemed to have only one altemative left, a hunger strike. Most of the 
demonstrators, using the model of the traditional remonstrators, believed that their hunger 
strikes would probably demonstrate their national loyalty. On 13 May, after the 
govemment's minimal steps to address their demands, three thousand students began a 
hunger strike. Their act attracted worldwide attention and genuine sympathy from the
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public. The strikers stated, "in this the most beautiful period of our youth, we have no 
choice but to sever ourselves from all of life's goodness and beauty and leave them 
behind". Confronting the deep national crisis, the students believed they were the only 
group to awaken the govemment. The hunger strikers remarked that, "The country is our 
country. The people are our people. The govemment is our govemment. I f  we do not 
call out, who will? If we do not act, who will?" They also explicitly pointed out their 
motivation, saying, "What are we to do? Democracy is the most noble condition of 
human existence. Freedom is the inalienable right of all people. But for these we must 
exchange our young lives. Is this something that the Chinese people can be proud of? A 
hunger strike is an act of last resort, and right now there is no altemative" (Xinwen 
daobao. May 12, 1989). The demonstrators used the strike to demand an equal-footing 
dialogue with the premier Li Peng. On 18 May 1989, the dialogue between Li Peng and 
student representatives was held but ended without any agreement. The students, after 
the meeting, said that it was not a dialogue but only a meeting.^®
Later on 20th May, Li Peng with the hardliners and on behalf of Party Central 
Committee and State Council, delivered a speech denounced the student demonstrations 
and regarded them as turmoil. The govemment also threatened to impose martial Law in 
part of Beijing municipality. Besides, the Communist Party (CCP) openly admitted that 
the state had sent troops to Beijing in order to restore public order. The act of the CCP 
further added oil to the flames of the demonstrators and also moved the urban population 
to join the movement supporting the patriotic acts of the students. It is evident that the 
ordinary citizens, urban workers, and even some of the govemment officials allied with 
the students. They not only participated in the movement but also became directly 
involved in saving the students, obstmcting the entry of the People's Army and 
contributing money to the demonstrations (Saich, 1990). At this stage, the student 
demonstrations were developed into a full scale People's movement, joined by people of 
different walks of life regardless of their age and geographical locations (Unger, 1991
^®For details o f the dialogue, see, for example, Saich (1990); Oksenberg (1990; 269-281); Peter Li (1991: 46-56).
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and Walder, 1992). No matter how wide the support for the movement, it ended in 
bloodshed on & around the Tiananmen Square and the participants were defeated by the 
military forces. With massive persecution and arrests after the movement, some student 
leaders and intellectuals were forced into exile.
DEMOCRACY — THE INTERPRETATION BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS
Throughout the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, the demonstrators' demands for 
democracy came as a warning to the conservatives. The demonstrators strongly believed 
that reforms should be intensified, not halted, and only democracy could get to the root of 
the problem. However, we must ask the same questions we asked of the 1986 
demonstrations: were they fighting for democracy, meaning the Western party-politics 
and popular participation? If not, what were they really seeking ? Why did they fight for 
these issues? We shall turn to these questions in an effort to understand the idea of 
democracy in the minds of the demonstrators.
The petitions of the students basically fall into three categories: first, on a 
personal level, the students fought for the improvement of educational policy, requesting 
a large-scale increase in educational funds and asking higher salaries for intellectuals; 
second, on a social level, the students complained about bureaucratic corruption, official 
profiteering, differential treatment and the declining living standard; third, on a political 
level, the students sought freedom of the press and freedom of expression.
Redress their Unresolved Grievances in 1986-87 Demonstrations
Their request for the réévaluation of the 'anti-bourgeois liberalization' movement 
of 1986 to review the verdicts against those who were unjustly treated during that period 
and their demand for the rehabilitation of Comrade Hu Yaobang's accomplishments and 
wrong-doings can be interpreted as unresolved grievances since the 1986-87 student 
demonstrations. Being frustrated with the suppression of the 1986-87 incident, they 
picked this opportunity to restate their demands and grievances. The rehabilitation of the 
1987 movement and the réévaluation of Hu had a significant meaning to them. Hu 
Yaobang, was supported and regarded as the patron of the students and intellectuals. Hu
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was sympathetic to intellectuals and thus his death was lamented by the students and 
intellectuals. The students and intellectuals regarded the loss of Hu as a possible symbol 
of the decline of the pro-democracy movement.^’ The death of Hu was not only a great 
loss to the country but also an obstruction to democracy in China.^° Their outcry for 
réévaluation of the "anti-bourgeois liberalization" goes hand in hand with the quest for 
the rehabilitation of Hu. ITie unresolved ill-feeling since 1986, added with the sudden 
death of Hu Yaobang and the intensified social evils of the late 1980's, finally set the 
stage for the students' 1989 demonstrations.
Democracv Undefined bv the Demonstrators
After a close scrutiny of their ideas, I find that June Fourth dissidents, too have 
no well-defined notion of democracy. The student demonstrators just used 'democracy' 
and 'freedom' as catchwords to unite other students, but their understanding of 
democracy is far from mature. Some students even misinterpreted the meaning of 
democracy, just associating it with freedom of speech and freedom of expression. In my 
interview with Wan Runnan, the leader of the Front for Democratic China (FDC) (1991- 
1992), the organization supporting the pro-democracy movement in China, he said, "the 
students have no concise conception of democracy. They do not clearly understand the 
meaning" (Interview 2, Paris, 1992). Liu Binyan, and Su Xiaokang despite their support 
of the student movement, considered most students did not understand democracy clearly. 
After the June Fourth Movement, Su and Liu openly pointed out the mistake of students, 
hoping to lead them to have a deeper reflection on what democracy was. Nevertheless, 
Su and Liu became unpopular among students who regarded them as conservatives, who 
opposed the movement and were undemocratic (see Interviews 4 & 5, Princeton, 1993).
April 19, 1989, the World Economic Herald and New O bserver']o\nÛy sponsored a forum in memory o f Hu Yaobang. A lot of 
prominent intellectuals like Su Shaozhi, Wu Jiang, Yu Haocheng, Yu Guangyuan, and Yan Jiaqi, etc evaluated the life o f Hu Yaobang, 
commenting that his Ufe was candid and courageous. The forum reflected the deep respect for Hu and their sorrows at his passing.. 
See World Economic Herald {Apnl 19, 1989); Li Qiao (1990: 14-21).
^°In interviews with some Chinese intellectuals in the summer of 1987 and 1988, Tony Saich found that the intellectuals specifically 
referred to Hu's dismissal as a key turning-point in their belief that the regime was capable o f reforming itself. Zhao Ziyang, in their 
eyes, did not have a high regard for issues of intellectual freedom. It is under this context that the sudden death o f Hu seems to break 
their dream of further intellectual liberalization and democratization. See, Saich (1990: 183).
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Other intellectuals that I interviewed also made similar comments: such as,
"The students were merely demanding individual autonomy and freedom from the Party 
constraints. They hoped to improve the social conditions rather than to achieve a 
concise political platform", (Interview 3, Paris, 1992)
According to other sources, the students talked about democracy as a struggle for 
freedom of expression through speech and the press and freedom of association. In 
particular, they wished the government to recognize their autonomous student bodies and 
allow greater freedom in conducting the affairs of their own lives. Furthermore, student 
demonstrators also had a wrong interpretation of press freedom, believing that it could 
help modernize and save the country (Mark, 1991). In discussing multi-party elections, 
students saw direct election as a good thing, but civil liberties loomed much larger in 
their immediate vision of democracy (Calhoun, 1989: 574). Really what they struggled 
for was a responsive government which took the people's interests into account. Calhoun 
states that "they [the demonstrators] sought to be the 'voice of the people' and understood 
themselves as speaking ideally for the country as a whole" (Calhoun, 1989: 578). Pye 
also argues in the same vein that "the students' reaction [to Hu's death] was in line with 
the classic Chinese tradition of aggrieved parties wailing before the Yamen door, of 
publicly dramatizing their unhappiness by petitioning officialism — and they expected 
that the louder the wailing the more likely their petition would be heard" (Pye, 1990: 
337). In this regard, students were not fighting for universal suffrage for they merely 
interpreted pluralism' as their unanimous voice to be heard.^^
Some student demonstrators not only lacked a comprehensive conception of 
democracy but also misinterpreted it. Jackie Smith, an American studying Chinese at
^'In contrast, some Chinese intellectuals who were also the supporters of the 1989 movement such as Su Wei and Fang Lizhi 
believed that the student participants had a clear conception of democracy in their protests. When asked about whether they consider 
student participants are clear of what democracy is, Fang Lizhi told me that students did have some general conceptions o f democracy. 
He also said that those student participants understood the concepts of rights and freedom. However, Fang added that the students had 
no concrete political platform or detailed proposal for the institutionalization o f democracy in China. If we judge the students' 
understanding of democracy in this particular light, according to Fang, we might well say that they were far beyond the satisfactory 
level. In my interview with Su Wei, he commented that Chinese students were clear of what democracy was and understood the 
concept thoroughly. He also made statements in defence of Chai Ling, one of the student leaders who is criticized as autocratic and 
undemocratic in and after the movement by the media. Such observations seem to suggest that intellectuals who have close 
association with the student movement would not only support but also defend the students from any criticisms. In the following part, 
we elaborate this point in light of how different social location has formative influences on ideological formation o f intellectuals (see. 
Interview 3, Arizona, 1993; Interview 5, Princeton, 1993).
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Fujian, asked the students at Fuzhou what democracy meant to them. The respondents 
defined democracy as a policy accepting [educated] people into government roles based 
upon their skills and not upon their connections. The students believed democracy could 
ensure a proper channel for their entry in governing posts and for getting rid of official 
corruption (Kraus and Erbaugh, 1990: 153). Some scholars also observed that the student 
demonstrators in Fujian did not really understand their protest objectives. Kraus pointed 
to the fact that most participants in Fujian replied with vague remarks, only asking for 
freedom but without specific demands. It seemed that they had no proper aims and 
objectives. More ironically, their slogans did not closely match with those of Beijing 
(Kraus and Erbaugh, 1990). Unger (1991) also reported that though there were strikes 
and petitions around in many cities other than Beijing, the demonstrators did not have a 
clear platform for petition. Unger says, "everywhere, people waited to see what would 
happen in Beijing", but the tide of demonstrations was motivated by their anger against 
inflation and mounting corruption. Democracy, according to them, was simply an 
independent judiciary, beyond the reach of a party leader’s sway. More concretely, they 
wanted freedom from the constraints imposed from their units, additional freedom of 
speech and expression, allowing them to criticize the government. Up to this point, it is 
then clear the demonstrators were not seeking a procedural and institutional change in the 
political system. They just left the concept of "democracy" undefined and vague. In my 
interview of Fang Lizhi, he commented that students had a general understanding of 
democracy but they had not thought thoroughly about a detailed democratic political 
system, (see. Interview 3, Arizona, 1993)
More importantly, the demonstrators did not speak of 'one person one vote’. A 
series of reports by Mike Chinoy of Cable Network News aired in April and May 1989 
reported that the students did not understand the foreign tradition of democracy. They 
just used democracy as a slogan (Walder, 1989).^  ^ Furthermore, the demonstrators were
^^The Time (New York) (May 28, 1989, p.2I) and The Washington Post (May 25, 1989) also reported that the students did not really 
support democracy in the Western sense.
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fearful of popular democracy, believing that the general public would rule out the 
intellectuals as a minority group (Kraus and Erbaugh, 1990). As Unger observed, most 
intellectuals and students did not want "one person, one vote" because they did not want 
to see the nation's leader determined by the dominant number of peasants (Unger, 1991; 
see also Pieke, 1989). Some of the intellectuals even supported the idea of neo- 
authoritarianism,^^ though they did not admit it publicly. Apparently, not many of the 
demonstrators were genuine supporters of democracy (Kwong and Chan, 1990; Su Wei,
1992). Nathan comments that the student demonstrators "cast themselves ... as loyal 
followers, appealing to the authorities to live up to the values the authorities themselves 
had articulated" {The Nation, April, 23, 1990: 564).
Undemocratic Acts of the Demonstrators
Apart from that, judging from the behaviour and performance of the pro­
democracy movement leaders, I argue that they did not really internalize the essence of 
democracy. It has been reported that the members of the Front for Democratic China 
(FDC), the organization supporting the pro-democracy movement in China, do not 
possess the necessary leadership qualities. It was widely reported that many leaders of 
the organization lacked a democratic spirit, let alone democratic behaviours. One of the 
student leaders, Wu'er Kaixi was found misusing the public funds from the FDC by 
leading an extravagant life style. Hu Ming, an aide to Wan Runnan, the former chairman 
of the Front, and Yan Jianli, a front board member from Berkeley, admitted failing to 
deliver donations from abroad to the Tiananmen students {The Nation, April 23, 1990, 
see also Shijie ribao, 25 Dec. 1989). Some journalists who have had direct interaction 
with and observation of the student leaders told me that there were power struggles and
was the heated debate on "neo-authoiitananism" in mainland China in the late 1980s. Some Chinese intellectuals advocated 
"neo-authoritarianism", suggesting that what China needed was not Western democratic institutions but a strong and competent leader. 
Holding the view that stability and prosperity are prime concern of Chinese people, these scholars therefore pinned their hope o upon a 
strong political leader. Presumably, this leader is able to maintain political stability, providing a favourable in&astructure for future 
economic development. In addition, people supporting such idea also believed that democratization would take place after economic 
reforms have succeeded. It is with such conceptions that they support authoritarianism rather than democracy. For details, see 
Oksenberg (1990). Womack (1989) argues along these lines that it is impossible to develop Western democratic structure in China 
when there is no corresponding socio-political and socio-cultural foundation as her Western counterparts. Hence, Womack suggests 
that China can modify its "party-state democracy", making it more accountable to and democratic for the people.
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conflicts among the student leaders. One of them told me,
"On the second anniversary of the movement in Paris, I was responsible for reporting 
the event. I found the meeting not only unorganized but also revealed the power 
struggle among the leaders. Failing to see Wu'er Kaixi, I directly asked Chai Ling 
where Kaixi was. I was shocked when Chai told me that the organizing committee had 
failed to contact Kaixi. After several months, when I came across Kaixi in Paris, I 
immediately asked him why he was absent from the event. Kaixi told me that he was 
not supported by the organizing committee. Therefore I began to understand the reason 
behind and discovered the power struggle among the student leaders". (Interview 4, 
Paris, 1992)
Some journalists from Hong Kong and Paris also complained of the irresponsible 
and corrupt behaviour of the leaders and criticized them for having no concrete political 
ideals. One of them angrily told me her impression of the student leaders, noting,
"some prominent student leaders perceived themselves as 'people's leaders' and the 
great hero' since they considered that they had sacrificed for China. Thus, they wanted 
to be respected and honoured. I think they have forgotten that many anonymous people 
died on the Square to make them famous". (Interview 4, Paris, 1992)
Some journalists even doubted the integrity of the student leaders. One Hong 
Kong correspondent in Paris said,
"Chai Ling was always late for appointments with us (the journalists) but without 
showing any regrets. You know, she even criticized us for wasting her time. It is not 
only my feeling, but also the impression of some Paris journalists. I remember that we 
(the H.K. journalists) had been waiting to interview her just a few days after her arrival 
at Paris. We were extremely frustrated that she refused to see us but only interviewed 
with some foreign media". (Interview 4, Paris, 1992)
"Once when we could get hold of Chai Ling and Feng Congde, the former husband of 
Chai, we tried to interview them. Feng said to us that because they had given an 
interview with TVB(the biggest T.V. broadcasting company in H.K), there was no need 
to have other interviews. Having heard this, I was depressed and felt I was being 
discriminated against". (Interview 4, Paris, 1992)
The journalist had another occasion to observe Chai Ling's misinterpretation of 
democracy. She added, "when I tried to interview her on another occasion, Chai iLing 
said to me "whatever I want to say, I have right to say"; "if I don't want to say anything, it 
is my human right" (Interview 4, Paris, 1992). According to these journalists, Chai Ling 
just asserted her rights but she failed to respect other people. Liu Xiaobo (1992) 
evaluated the 1989 pro-democracy movement and commented that most student leaders 
just talked about rights without also considered responsibilities. He also criticized them
for their undemocratic acts and personality cult. To Liu, it is unacceptable, indicating
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clearly their immature understanding of democracy. '^*
From the interviews with the journalists, I find that some of the student leaders 
have failed to lead a democratic life. In a conference raising funds for the movement in 
Taiwan, Chai Ling, being the guest in the meeting, embarrassed those who attended, 
saying that they could not legitimately speak for the Chinese people. She said that only 
she was "qualified" to speak on behalf of Chinese people. As a result, she was harshly 
criticized because she conceived of herself as the hero of the movement {The Nineties, 
10, 1992, 14-15). Feeling frustrated with the undemocratic acts of the student leaders, 
some foreign and Hong Kong journalists told me that they were no longer interested in 
reporting the news concerning the movement (Interview 4, Paris, 1992). I discovered 
that many local Chinese in Paris and in New York who originally supported the 
movement, no longer offered donations because of the corrupt acts of the student leaders. 
When asked their impression of the student leaders, one of the local Chinese vehemently 
criticized their behaviour (Interview 3, Holland, 1992 and see also interview 4, Princeton,
1993). According to these reports and experience, I can conclude that some of the 
student leaders are far from mature in both democratic thinking and acting. Their 
performance damaged the movement. Yan Jiaqi also claimed that not all the organizers 
of the pro-democracy movement are democratic; some of them are still authoritarian and 
dominant (Interview 1, Paris, 1992). It was reported that the Front also received funds 
from the Taiwan government, which act greatly deterred the organization’s move toward 
independence. Some leaders of the Front, indicated that they favoured the particular 
brand of capitalism practised in Taiwan (The Nation, April 23, 1990). Evidence also 
reveals that the members in the Front have not closely followed the democratic 
procedure. For instance, only a few members monopolized the leadership on the ground
^^One point that needs to be stressed here is that Liu Xiaobo's reflection and evaluation o f the 1989 pro-democracy movement was 
criticized by some Chinese intellectuals and student community. Liu was rejected and condemned because he wrote the statement o f 
repentance, eliciting that he did not witness any body had been was killed on the Tiananmen Square during the massacre. Having 
been released from the prison, Liu found himself vulnerable and rejected by others. It is suggested that Liu's evaluation o f the 
movement was written against such a background. Thus, some commentators have general agreement that Liu justified what he did by 
making other people infamous. I got such insights from the interviews conducted in June to July 1993 in the United States of 
America.
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of "selectiveness" rather than allowing a mass membership organization (Kwong and 
Chan, 1990:560). Chen Jun, an activist who initiated a petition to free Wei Jingsheng, 
criticized the undemocratic acts of the Front leaders, saying "the front's leaders do not 
trust people outside their circle over whom they have no control" {The Nation, April 23, 
1990). Another group of students from Columbia University, willing to help in any 
future democracy movement, submitted suggestions to the Front but failed to receive any 
reply and acceptance. Tang Yiming, a doctoral candidate at Columbia complained, "we 
met to prepare for Paris, submitting suggestions on the draft program and nominating 
delegates. But we never heard from them" {The Nation, April 23, 1990). In addition, the 
leaders manipulated finances and personnel matters, centralizing power in a small group 
of leaders. All these acts reflect "non-democratic" elements in the Front. As a result, 
people have become skeptical about their capacity to launch a democracy movement in 
China while they themselves have failed to demonstrate a grasp of democracy. Though 
they do not reject democracy, their attitudes toward multi-party democracy have been 
ambiguous (Kwong and Chan, 1990: 564). I also heard from some dissident intellectuals 
who are exiled in Princeton that conflict and competition for leadership between Chen 
Yizhi and Wan Runnan was intense (Interview 5, Princeton, 1993).^  ^ Power struggle was 
acute among these exiled pro-democracy leaders.
In addition, Yan Jiaqi, one of the leaders of the Front, still hoped to reform the 
party from within, appealing to the wisdom of the ruler, but he did not intend to 
challenge or overthrow him {The Nation, April 23, 1990). Fang Lizhi and Chen Yizhi 
stated in interviews that they also supported the liberal wing in the socialist leadership to 
initiate reforms, hoping to have a more relaxed environment for deepening structural 
changes in China (Interview 3, Arizona, 1993; Interview 2, Princeton, 1993). Unger and
commemorating the 4th anniversary of the June-Fourth Incident in London, I personally saw that different leaders o f the pro­
democracy movement had conflicts with each other. One incident o f interest is that some of the organizers o f the meeting even openly 
debated whether to sing the song o f 'Internationale' in fiont of the audience. Without a compromise, one of the organizers went off the 
stage to protest against it (field work observation 1, 1993). I was also told that the 2nd anniversary of the June Fourth Movement held 
in Los Angeles was mainly supported and organized by the Hong Kong students rather than by the students &om mainland China. 
People who had direct experience in organizing such activities told me that they were disappointed by the students from mainland 
China, complaining that they would not assume any responsibility, let alone commitment (field wodc observation 2, 1993)
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Chan (1990:80) also concede that the demonstrators envisaged democracy as merely 
'freedom', stating "the word [democracy] meant above all freedom from the petty and 
arbitrary controls that the leaders of Chinese work units and schools still exercise over so 
many facets of life". Most of them adopted the view that democracy was put forward as 
a long-term goal, while economic and social structure were given higher priority {The 
Nation, Jan 22, 1990).
Democracv Vaguelv Perceived bv the Public
The foregoing line of investigation is also consistent with some social surveys 
conducted in China. A relatively small opinion survey testing students' attitude toward 
democracy in a number of Beijing universities in 1986 indicated that 80% of the 
respondents regarded the United States as the most democratic country in the world and 
96% believed that China would have a long way to go on the democratic path. However, 
the survey reported that most respondents did not really support the idea of multi-party 
politics. About 77% disagreed with the idea that democracy meant the alternation of 
political parties in power, (Wang and Wu, 1989). Another survey conducted at Henan 
University in April 1989, just before the June-Fourth Incident in Tiananmen Square, 
showed the overriding characteristics which students associated with democracy was 
good, honest, law-based government rather than the choice of a multi-party system. The 
respondents even described the 'democratic centralism' practised in socialist China as 
democracy instead of the multi-party system. Though most of them (65%) believed that 
democracy was the best system, they also realized China lacked a democratic cultural 
foundation to 'breed' democracy. It is therefore natural that most respondents still 
adhered to the Confucian principles of having a sacred ruler instead of the democratic 
government adopted in the West (Chang Hao, 1989: 18-22).
From 1985 to 1988, some political scientists conducted a nation-wide opinion 
survey testing the political culture of the mainland Chinese people.^^ It was reported that
^*This opinion survey was the first nationwide social survey conducted independently of the state since the formation o f the PRC, 
with a huge sample of 1500,000 cases. This survey can be seen as the first systematic social survey on political culture o f Chinese 
since 1949, see Min Qi (1989; 1-4).
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75% of respondents supported democratic politics but they did not really understand the 
meaning of democracy. The research indicated the respondents had confused the idea of 
democracy, correlating it with the traditional idea of Minben?^ When asked about the 
meaning of democracy, some respondents (24.98%) thought of democracy as only 
'democratic centralism' like that adopted in socialist China (Min Qi, 1989: 139). About 
20% of the respondents envisaged democracy as a responsive government, consulting 
public opinions, and meeting the needs of people (Min Qi, 1989: 149). Only 6.55% of 
the respondents chose the statement "it's people's right to choose their leaders" as the 
meaning of Minzhu (Min Qi, 1989: 181) Most respondents put their highest priority in 
individual freedom and individual dignity; freedom of speech, second; and right to 
election and being elected, in a lower priority (Min Qi, 1989: 183).
Like the earlier movements, most of those involved in the 1989 pro-democracy 
movement just used 'democracy' as a slogan without a comprehensive and precise 
meaning. They were not seeking either popular democracy or multi-party politics. 
Neither did they want to overthrow the Communist Party nor institutionalize universal 
franchise. What they were really fighting for basically relates to the gloomy future of 
intellectuals because of the further decline in educational investment and worsening 
treatment of intellectuals. Unlike the 1986-87 student movements, the demonstrators' 
demands did go well beyond the personal level to the societal level, addressing the 
general fear of declining living standard, the unbearable inflation, official profiteering 
and corruption. Hoping to break through the restrictive policy on expression and press, 
the demonstrators also demanded freedom of press and freedom of expression. Their 
common call for democracy and vehement attack of the social evils did receive massive 
support from the people and thus a widespread People's Movement was developed. Up to 
this point, we observe a consistent call among these activists throughout different 
movements in the contemporary era for the "assertion of human rights". No matter how
^^Minben means the ruler has the mandate of Heaven but he should respect the ruled, being considerate and attentive to the welfare 
o f people. However, it is different from the essence of democracy in which emphasis is put on the rights o f people, ruled by the 
people.
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they perceive the concept of human rights, it is most important that the ideas of "rights" 
and "individuality" have not only been cultivated but also have taken root in the minds of 
the people.
This chapter has discussed the conceptions of democracy throughout various pro­
democracy movements in contemporary China. A better understanding of the 
conceptualization of their democratic thought and political demands must be analyzed 
against the particular socio-economic and socio-political contexts. One significant point 
which must be addressed here is that even though the 1980's was marked by a decade of 
struggling for democracy in mainland China, different people in mainland China still had 
diverse and even conflicting views on what democracy is or how to practise it. This 
chapter has highlighted the fact that even people lived against the same socio-historical 
context, they still had diverse interpretations of their environments. Therefore, we must 
analyze their ideological production in relation to not only the context in which they lived 
but also their social locations, political opportunity structure and fields in order to 
understand the dynamic and complicated phenomenon of knowledge production. Strating 
from such a socio-historical and socio-political contexts, the next chapter will discuss the 
political ideas of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident in light of the proposed analytical 
framework.
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CHAPTER FOUR
TOWARD A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1989 
PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT
Scholars suggest that student movements can be categorized by two different 
orientations (Feuer, 1965; Altbach, 1967). The 'norm-oriented' movement is one under 
which the participants have specific goals, fighting for a specific limited issue. The 
'value-oriented' movement, in contrast, is concerned with broader ideological issues. The 
literature of social movement also points out that most revolutionary political movements 
are 'value-oriented'.^ In the student community, these value-oriented' groups have not 
only long term influence but also a leading function in norm-oriented' actions. In 
contrast to this, the norm-oriented caused-group' aims at reducing fees or securing a 
change in college administration (Altbach, 1967). Not surprisingly, these student groups 
are side by side in educational institutions and it is normal to see some overlap between 
these two types of groups in a student community.^ It should be pointed out that a limited 
protest fighting for some isolated issue may be developed into a sustained movement. 
Altbach (1967) suggests when the norm-oriented movement is supplanted by students' 
interest in capitalizing on a particular movement regarding wider ideological and political 
issues, it may become a 'value-oriented' movement which addresses wider societal and 
political issues.
In last chapter, I have presented the ideas of democracy in various pro-democracy 
in contemporary China. The principal goal of this chapter is to examine contextually the 
demands and ideas throughout the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident in light of the
'It is also suggested that on-going student political organizations, particularly 'underground' groups, light for broader issues such as 
ideological commitment to Marxism, Hinduism, or other ideological concepts (Altbach, 1967).
^Petras (1964) suggests the term etudialist' to describe those movements primarily fighting for student welfare, fee increases, and 
administrative harassment o f students. This type of student protests, according to Petras, are always militant over issues concerning 
student welfare. At the same time, they are occasionally interested in issues with broader concern. Contrasted to such movements are 
society-oriented' student movements under which wider societal issues and political matters are addressed.
proposed analytical framework. A primary hypothesis is that the social location, the 
access to economic and political opportunities and the secondary socialization in terms of 
educational orientation of the students, and occupational and political ties of intellectuals, 
have tremendous impact on their intellectual radicalism. I also hypothesize that the broad 
participation in the 1989 pro-democracy movement is mainly because of similar 
economic predicaments and social injustice that confronted people from different walks 
of life. I also believe that the achievements and failures of reform have been impinging 
greatly on students and intellectuals on the one hand and urban employees on the other 
under which circumstance the political eruptions of 1989 were caused. I therefore hold 
that there may be a strong relationship between economic difficulties and the uprising of 
the June Fourth Movement. It is my contention that student movement developed from a 
'norm-oriented' into a value-oriented' movement, especially when the movement was 
imbued with widespread support from both local and overseas Chinese.
DEPRIVED SOCIO-ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES AND DISADVANTAGED 
SOCIAL LOCATION AND INTELLECTUAL RADICALISM
In socialist China, treatment of the intellectuals was harsh and unjust, especially 
during the anti-rightist campaign and the Cultural Revolution. They were coarsely 
attacked and criticized (see for example, Fairbank, 1987 and Goldman, 1981). In the 
post-Mao era, the CCP has stressed better treatment of intellectuals from time to time, 
allying them with the working class, and has reemphasized the position and importance 
of intellectuals in the Four Modernizations (Deng, 1980, 1983: 308, 1984: 224, 302; 
Zhao Ziyang, 1987 and Jiang Zemin, 1992).^ Though the treatment of the intellectuals 
has shown some improvements since 1978, their quality of life is still far below the 
average of other walks of life in the reforming era (Deng Ziduan, 1992). The poor 
salaries, deprived living conditions, insufficient health care and the lack of autonomy in
the post-Mao era, Deng repeatedly states the important role of intellectuals involved in the modernization o f China. Intellectuals 
are also regarded as part of the working class, the definition o f which symbolizes the official recognition o f intellectuals. However, 
their social position is vulnerable, subject to the changes in state policy toward them. Because of having no independent economic 
position, critical, they are not immune to political constraint and are especially restricted by their social role as establishment 
intellectuals. For details, see, for example. Cheek (1986 and 1992: 124-145 and chapters 5-9).
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work as well as the limited chance for development are objective evidence showing their 
disadvantaged social position. I believe this continual suffering may strongly influence 
their intellectual radicalism.
Income Gap between Intellectuals & other Occupational Groups
Different surv^eys and studies have reported a consistent chronic decline of 
intellectuals' salaries. Reports indicate that the incomes of most intellectuals not only lag 
behind other sectors even more than they did in the 1950's. For instance, the salaries of 
higher intellectuals (including professors, associate professors and researchers) dropped 
from a range of 345-149 yuan in 1950's to 225-122 yuan in the 80's. The rate of decline 
is 7.7% (see table 1) (Zhou Fangniang, 1989: 91). According to Qian Jiaju, a Chinese 
economist, argues that the real wage of the intellectuals today is only one-tenth of what 
intellectuals earned in the 1930s (Qian, 1988).
1950's 1980's
Year
rank
professor 207 160
associate professor 149.5 122
Table 1: A Comparison of income of the university lecturers between 1980's and 1950's (Unit: in Rmb) 
(Source: Zhou Fangniang, 1989: 91)
According to a 1987 survey, the intellectuals in Beijing who began their careers 
between 1970 and 1975 received an average income 10.2 % lower than those with other 
employments {The Nineties, April, 1988: 20). Table 2 also shows the income gap 
between mental labour and manual labour in 1982 and 1988.
The income discrepancy between factory workers and intellectuals has widened 
especially when longevity is considered. (See table 3) Thus, a factory worker can earn 
more than an intellectual with the same length of service. And the discrepancy is 
exacerbated by the fact that an intellectual must spend more time in education before 
entering the work force. This situation has made intellectuals angry and discontented 
(Deng Zhiduan, 1992: 14).
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Among all age groups, the middle-aged intellectuals are least advantaged when 
work loads and incomes are compared. When comparing their average incomes with 
other age groups, these middle-aged intellectuals lagged behind by as much as 17% 
(Zhou Fangniang, 1989: 94). Usually, the middle-aged group is the majority in their 
professions for these people have much working experience and they are able to bear key 
responsibilities in organizations. In 1987 a survey conducted by the Beijing Commission 
of Science among 3000 middle-aged scientists and technicians showed that 45.6% of the 
junior and middle level scientists and technicians had senior level responsibilities but 
their salaries had remained unchanged for years. This survey also found that 52.8% of 
these scientists had much greater more responsibilities than their juniors with resultant 
heavy work loads (Guangming Ribao, July 15, 1987: 4). Such unacceptable conditions 
placed immense pressure on these intellectuals.
This income gap has also been reported in other surveys. In 1987, the average 
monthly salary of Beijing employees in science and technology, education and public 
health was only 99 yuan while the average wage for construction work was 152 yuan; in 
public enterprises, 119 yuan; and in commerce, 114 yuan (Zhongguo Zhi Chun, Nov. 
1986: 66). These figures further suggest that having more education does not mean better 
remuneration.'* With little income, they have suffered more than others under the 
circumstance of soaring inflation. As Zhongguo Zhi Chun suggested, the average 
consumer spending in Beijing was 89 yuan in 1986, nearly 100% of the limited 
disposable income of an intellectual {Zhongguo Zhi Chun, Nov. 1986: 66). A similar 
study examining the income differentiation between the intellectuals and the workers 
reportedly found that the more educated received less income. (See table 4)
^According to the State Statistics Bureau, the workers with university level received 139.1 yuan monthly while the workers with 
only primary level had 121.9 yuan. The income of workers with higher education was only 14% more than that o f the workers with 
lower education. Workers with senior secondary level received 12.9% less than those with only junior secondary level as reported by 
a survey in Beijing. The figure shows us, to some extent, that most manual woricers earn more than most low level mental workers 
(Zhou Fangniang, 1989: 93-94).
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Age income of university 
graduate (mental labour)
income of primary & 
secondary students 
(manual labour)
income gap between 
them
25 or below 59.8 67.18 -7.38
26-28 63.4 71.55 -8.15
29-31 63.4 77.63 -14.23
32-34 65.9 76.22 -10.23
35-37 68.5 83.32 -14.82
38-40 73.4 88.32 -14.92
41-43 77.5 87.6 -10.1
44-46 78.3 97.1 -18.8
47-49 87.1 99.72 -12.63
50-52 103.6 102.83 0.77
53-55 124.7 107.1 17.6
Table 2. Monthly Income Gap between Manual & Mental Labour in 1982 (Unit: in Rmb) 
(Source: Jingji Yanju No.8 1982:38)
Years in work force Mental work Manual work Mental vs manual
10 years & below 142Y 167Y -25Y(17.6%)
10-19 years 167 Y 183 Y -16Y (9.6%)
20-29 years 201Y 201Y OY (0)
30 years & above 202Y 230Y -28Y (3.9%)
average 172Y fsicl 182Y Fsicl -lOY Fsicl (5.8%)
Table 3. Income Gap between Mental & Manual Labour in China, 1988 
(Source: Jingji yu Guanli Yanju, No.2, 1990:41)
Occupations
average annual income 
(Unit: in Rmb)
construction 1556
transportation 1452
manufacturing 1285
public utilities (manual workers) 1234
finance & monetary 1216
research & education 1182
Table 4: A Comparison of Incomes of different Occupational Groups in 1985 
(Source: Zhang, 1989: 141)
Putting the foregoing observations together, it is therefore not surprising to hear 
the saying that "the one who writes books is inferior to those who sell them". The 
deprivation that intellectuals are experiencing clearly shows that more education means 
diminishing returns. This phenomenon is characterized as '"naoti daoguo" in mainland 
China, meaning that the manual labourer has a better prospect for income than the mental 
labourer {Jingji Ribao, 21 Nov. 1990). In this circumstance, people commonly believe 
that "education is useless".
^The above cited figure does not include all workers in all these occupations.
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The income gap has grown ever wider since the beginning of the Reform era. 
The major reason for this is that households running industrial and commercial businesses 
have enjoyed enormous increases in their incomes {United Daily News, June 28, 1988; 9). 
It is also argued that the beneficiaries of the reform have been individual households 
since they have made profits through commercial transactions. Peasants have earned 
more by increasing their production and by working longer hours. People also 
complained that corrupt cadres have embezzled public funds and engaged in bribery. In 
addition, the preferential treatment of the coastal areas^ has given rise to what are called 
'10,000 yuan families’ {wanyuan hu)J A 1988 official survey revealed that the monthly 
income of an independent businessman in the Beijing area was about seven times that of 
a typical middle school teacher; and many owners of private enterprises had incomes 
more than ten times those of college professors {Jingli Ribao, Feb. 22, 1988; see also Li 
Qiang, 1993: 265-271). According to one well-known mainland Chinese reformist. Wen 
Yuankai, twenty percent more people feel that they have lost out as a result of the reform 
than those who have benefited from it. In the reforming era, the urban workers generally 
got higher salaries than the intellectuals. After the wage reforms, workers could get 
bonuses and subsidies from profits retained by their enterprises (see Walder, 1992) while 
the intellectuals in the areas of education, scientific research, culture and health have not 
kept pace with the increment in wages, let alone other benefits. Compounding the 
situation is the fact that other occupational groups can get incomes in addition to their 
wages gained from their work units, (see table 5 & 6). Under such a circumstance.
^Deng Xiaoping proposed the idea that the people in the coastal areas be allowed to get rich first. He believes other people from 
the interior parts o f China will become better off since they will benefit fiom the economic boom in the coastal areas. Thus, the Party 
has given preferential treatment to the economic zone sand coastal cities, offering them special allowances for customs and tax, and 
autonomy in trading with the overseas investors. This policy creates disparities between the coastal cities and the inner regions o f 
China. However, these incentives now cover most of China especially when the CCP firmly re-states the importance o f socialist 
market reforms in October 1992.
’it has been observed that millions o f Chinese were employed in export processing enterprises by the late 1980s. Additionally, 
millions more were starting up their own businesses and the south-eastern coast and most Chinese cities were opened up to foreign 
investment and trade. It is also reported that the growth o f urban private enterprise grew fiom a base o f 140, 000 registered urban 
enterprises in 1978 to more than 3 million units by the late 80's. In addition to the formally registered private entrepreneurs, 
university students, intellectuals, reformers and ordinary woikers have also engaged in legal but unregistered & untaxed economic 
activities. These observations seem to suggest that people fiom different walks o f  life also participate in doing business. Such a 
phenomenon is highly indicative to us that many more people in the mainland have become richer in the post-Mao era (see, for 
example. Gold, 1991; Rosen, 1987/8).
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intellectuals’ socio-economic position is even lower.
In 1988, Beijing Ribao ran a series of articles under the title "How to Deal with 
the Income Gap", it which it was reported that a taxi driver could earn over 3000 yuan a 
month; average income of private doctors was 460 yuan a day; however, middle school 
teachers were paid only 96 yuan monthly. In the field of education, middle-aged teachers 
of elementary or high schools are in the most disadvantaged position. Generally 
speaking, these teachers have more than 18 class sessions each week, not including time 
for marking papers and preparing lectures. In spite of such a heavy work load, they 
received the lowest incomes of all fields of employment for decades.
When we compare their situation with those who run private businesses with 
annual incomes up to 250,000 yuan (that is, over 20,000 yuan a month),* this further 
indicates the deprivation of Chinese intellectuals {Renweibao, June 5, 1988: 14).
OY
(%)
Below
50Y
(%)
51-
lOOY
(%)
101-
150Y
(%)
151-
200Y
(%)
201-
300Y
(%)
301-
400Y
(%)
401-
500Y
(%)
Above
500Y
(%)
illiterates/semi-
illiterates
37.1 28.5 11.4 4.6 11.6 0.7 6.0
primary school 43.0 28.3 13.0 5.3 5.0 2.9 1.4 0.5 0.5
secondary specialized 
school
60.7 19.9 9.0 3.1 3.5 2.3 0.8 0.1 0.7
senior secondary 
school
49.1 25.1 7.2 4.7 4.6 5.5 0.6 0.4 2.8
secondary technical 
school
58.4 22.0 6.5 4.1 4.3 2.3 1.1 0.5 0.8
college 63.3 23.0 5.6 2.3 2.2 0.7 1.9 0.9 0.2
university
undergraduate
55.7 24.5 9.4 2.1 3.7 2.2 1.1 0.7 0.7
university graduate 52.9 24.9 11.4 1.6 4.4 3.4 0.9 0.4
graduate & above 7.6 54.1 10.5 7.6 17.6 2.5
Table 5. Distribution of income earned outside the unit by staff, by educational level, 1992(%)
(Unit: in Rmb)
(Source: Li Qiang, 1993:262)
Within such a social-historical context, it thus becomes a common phenomenon
that "tailors earn more income than surgeons; selling eggs on the street makes more
^The figure cited here may be the upper limit but I think the average is not so much. One point which must be stated here is that it is 
difficult to determine whether the figure is an average or not because the Chinese source does not make it explicitly clear.
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money than launching missiles" (Chen Kang, 1990). Many people in mainland China 
complained that "those using their brains are inferior to those using razors, and those who 
design atomic bombs are inferior to those who sell salted eggs". Even worse, "those who 
teach students to play the piano are inferior to those who move pianos" (Chia Chen- 
chang, 1989: 41). Under severe economic pressure, some intellectuals have been forced 
to do other part-time work like selling snacks, stationary, and school uniforms. Some 
school playgrounds were also turned into car-parks to collect parking fees. Some 
teachers have even relied on selling apples in the streets (Chen Kang, 1990: 5).’ Under 
this difficult situation, an increasing number of intellectuals have left the teaching 
profession for other employment. According to a survey conducted by the Beijing 
Teachers College, 50% of its graduates of the past six years wanted to leave their 
teaching jobs. Among these people, 60% of them complained of the low income and 
social status {Zhongguo Qingnian, Mar. 4 1988). Another report also revealed many 
vacant teaching posts (about 2200 each year) to be filled in Beijing {The Nineties, April, 
1988: 20). According to statistics published by the Education Committee of Hunan, there 
have been a sharp increase in teachers quitting their job. It is reported that about 6292 
provincial teachers left their posts between 1990 and 1992. Most of them were under 45 
years of age. The reason behind such a huge withdrawal rate, according to the report, 
was the poor income and prospect, especially compared with other occupations {China 
Focus, Vol. 1.4: 6). In the face of falling income and social status of intellectuals, it is 
obvious that young people have no interest in the teaching profession (see for example, 
Guangming Ribao, 14 August, 1986; Zhongguo Qingnian, 9 Sept. 1986). That also 
explains why the "theory of the uselessness of knowledge" is so popular among Chinese. 
The disadvantaged position of intellectuals may have made university students worry 
about their future. In order to have a better future, they demanded further improvement 
in education during the June Fourth Incident 1989.
N athan discusses the social aftemiaths of the economic reforms clearly, pointing out the worsening social mood because o f the 
income differentiation. See Nathan (1990, particularly chapter 6).
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<
lOOY
(%)
101-
150Y
(%)
151-
200Y
(%)
201-
300Y
(%)
301-
400Y
(%)
401-
500Y
(%)
501-
800Y
(%)
801-
lOOOY
(%)
>
lOOOY
(%)
illiterates/semi­
illiterates
7.9 21.3 31.1 26.2 10.9 2.6
primary school 6.4 17.9 26.1 29.5 13.6 4.9 1.3 0.1 0.1
secondary specialized 
school
6.2 18.6 25.6 32.9 11.6 3.2 1.7 0.1 0.1
senior secondary 
school
4.5 26.1 25.9 29.1 10.6 2.9 0.8
secondary technical 
school
7.1 22.2 25.6 30.4 9.0 3.1 2.2 0.2 0.2
college 2.4 15.1 25.8 39.8 12.8 3.0 1.0 0 0.1
university
undergraduates
1.6 11.6 26.9 42.7 12.5 3.2 1.3 0.1 0.1
university graduate 0.9 8.9 22.7 42.9 15.9 5.2 1.6 0.3 1.6
graduate & above 0.9 6.7 29.1 37.1 18.6 5.8 1.5 0.4
Table 6. Average monthly income from the work unit, by different qualification level (1992) 
(Unit; Rmb)
(Source, Li Qiang, 1993:273)
Insufficient Housing for Intellectuals
Poor salaries and declining real incomes reflects only one side of the story. 
Combined with low income is the problem of living environment. According to a survey 
in West Beijing City, the living condition of the middle-aged teachers was extremely hard 
and poor. The average area per person was less than four square meters and the buildings 
in which they lived were old and shabby. For example, a family with four members were 
cramped in a quarter with only seven square meters. Most of the respondents reported 
that they had been living together with three generations. Ironically, some newly-married 
middle-aged intellectuals, owing to the shortage of housing, were forced to live apart, 
either staying with their original family or just sharing a flat with other students {The 
Nineties, April 1988: 19-21; Zhengming, August 1987: 62-63; Zhou Fangniang, 1989). 
Even though the living conditions of intellectuals have been improved in the post-Mao 
era, many young and middle-aged intellectuals are still on a waiting list for apartments.
‘°Deng Zhiduan (1992) argues that the housing shortage for higher intellectuals has been improved for they no longer have to live 
with children & grandchildren in an apartment room. However, the living conditions o f other intellectuals generally remained 
unchanged.
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The lack of space has affected their quality of life. Most of the middle-aged intellectuals 
have to share the desk with their school-age children. Many of them either have to 
prepare their lessons after their children go to bed or return to their school office to do 
their work {Central Daily News, Taipei, August 3, 1982: 5).
Another study done by the State Statistics Bureau also reported that half of the 
200 high and middle-level intellectuals had housing problems; and 5% of them even had 
no house at all. In the same survey, it showed 5% of them had less than 4 square meters 
of living space while 45% of them had three generations living together in a small room 
{Guangming Ribao, Sep. 19, 1988). "Insufficient housing" has frustrated them and made 
them more impatient for changes. Fully 48% of researchers at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences complained about a "housing shortage" in 1987, for some were forced to 
live in basements. When comparing with other people, the intellectuals again find 
themselves in an underprivileged position. For instance, the average living space of the 
population of Beijing was 6.7 square meters while the intellectuals had an average of six 
square meters at Beita {Quangming Ribao, July 15, 1987). Another source reported that 
most intellectuals considered housing a higher priority than other people {United Daily 
News, Taipei, Dec. 29, 1988: 9). Such inadequate housing and poor living conditions 
have prepared the ground for their radicalism.
Poor Health Care for Intellectuals
In addition to the poor incomes and living conditions, the acute insufficiency in 
health care further puts the intellectuals into a position of extreme suffering. According 
to some reports, the death rate among middle-aged intellectuals has been increasing. As a 
result of heavy work loads, poor living conditions and emotional stress, life expectancy 
of the intellectuals is in general 10 years shorter than that of other walks of life. Statistics 
show that the average life span of the intellectuals is about 58.5 years, much lower than 
that of the general population (Zhou Fangniang, 1989: 96-97). The "Internal Reference 
News", a Chinese newspaper for high-ranking officials, revealed the following facts 
concerning life expectancy of Chinese intellectuals: first, the average life expectancy of
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senior intellectuals is 58 years, 10 years shorter than that of other groups; second, 1/3 of 
the mid-level (equivalent to that of assistant professor) and senior intellectuals died 
between the ages of 40 and 50; third, 1/2 died before 60; fourth, the major causes for 
their deaths are cancer (53.7%) and heart diseases (20.1%) {The Nineties, April 1988: 
19). Without a systematic health scheme, they have suffered from serious illness.“
Among intellectuals, the middle-aged group suffers the most. A survey conducted 
in Guangzhou examining the health situation of the middle-aged intellectuals found that 
more than 42% of the respondents were having illness. A similar study in Beijing 
discovered that more than 81% of the middle-aged intellectuals were suffering from 
illness. When comparing the death rate of the middle-aged intellectuals with the same 
age group in the rest of the population, the death rate of the former is 20 times that of the 
latter (Zhang, 1989: 143). The researchers concluded that the high death rate was due to 
their poor living environment, stressful working conditions, frustration and dissatisfaction 
in job prospects. With malnutrition and poor health care, the intellectuals have been 
forced to the edge of death. Though the state has indicated a determination to improve 
health care for the intellectuals, there have been no substantial improvements.^^
Loss of Autonomv in Work Place
In addition to the inadequate socio-economic opportunities, the intellectuals also 
lack political opportunities and opportunities for personal development. Despite the 
supportive policy to intellectuals announced by the state, the cadre bureaucrats in the 
managerial level have not really implemented the policy to make good use of intellectuals 
(see, for example, Deng Zhiduan, 1992: 323-337). Those intellectuals who have joined 
the state-run enterprises found poor opportunities for promotion, unfair treatment and 
constraints in professional development. They, therefore, preferred to work in the private 
firms if they got the chance (White III, 1990). However, the job market is constrained by
“ Various surveys conducted in Tianjin, Beijing, Shanghai repeatedly report that intellectuals are confronting serious health 
problems. Compared with other social groups, the health problems of intellectuals are apparently more serious. For details, see 
Zhengming {\9Z1 .%•. 62); Quangming Ribao (July 15, 1987).
“ One survey at Liuning showed that the medical fund for teachers was only 1.5 yuan per head. It was reported that the situation 
became worse after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident (see. The Nineties, April, 1988: 20; Ming bao, 15 Mar. 1991 and 9 July, 1991).
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the system, which makes it difficult for intellectuals to change jobs. It was reported that 
when some technical specialists applied to change jobs in Lanzhou, their bosses 
immediately stopped their salaries. Some other discriminatory policies toward the 
intellectuals are common in China. Having lost the chance for further their studies to get 
proper qualification during the Cultural Revolution, most of the middle-aged intellectuals 
are not 'well-qualified'. The Dean of the Psychology Department at Hangzhou 
University pointed out the fact that the middle-aged intellectuals "have a low level of 
education", and therefore cannot be promoted very easily. The Dean explained, "[these 
middle-aged teachers] can only become lecturers; they cannot become associate 
professors" (Rai, 1991: 144). Without a formal qualification, they cannot get a 
promotion. Their devotion to the teaching profession has earned them an extremely 
deprived life.*^
In China, it is extremely difficult to get access to resources without proper social 
networks. Unluckily enough, most middle-aged intellectuals have failed to secure a 
proper network (Guanxi), without which they lack opportunities for personal 
development and have no political influence. For instance, they have found difficulties in 
publishing their writings. The head of the Comparative Education Department at the 
Hangzhou University admitted that "it is very difficult for young authors [to publish]. No 
one trusts you ... One associate professor of Chinese language earned YIO 000 from the 
royalty of a book. I got Y 2800 for one publication" (Rai, 1991: 146). In addition, the 
intellectuals have to raise funds to publish instead of having monetary rewards for their 
works. Despite the difficulty in publication, they are still eager to get their works 
published. One case reveals that a professor not only had to sell most of his property to 
raise funds but also sold his blood two times in order to get sufficient funds to pay debt to 
the publisher. The report says that this professor is fortunate to have succeeded in getting 
his work published. For most of the intellectuals, publication is still a dream, far beyond
'^Su Xiaokang (1989a) has published a book revealing the crisis of education in China, especially pointing to the exceedingly 
severe conditions of the middle-aged intellectuals. His report has received wide support in mainland China. See also other scholars 
who have also pointed out the fact of crisis in education o f China, for example, Li Ming (1989) and He Pochuan, (1989).
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their imagination (Huaqiao ribao, 12 Nov. 1992).
Another problem directly confronting the intellectuals is the under-utilization of 
their abilities and the lack of career development. A 1986 study surveying 10,000 
technical specialists at 400 colleges and research institutes in Shanghai indicated that only 
30% of the respondents could develop themselves in work while 36% reported that they 
could partially use their specialty at work. Even worse, 7% said they could not do it; but 
20% showed that they had been denied the job for which they were trained {Guangming 
Ribao, Dec.2, 1986). A national sample survey of 35 000 middle-aged intellectuals 
revealed a similar finding that 14% of the respondents could not independently and fully 
do their jobs; 61% could enjoy a minimal degree of autonomy but were confined to a 
very basic level of work. In this sense, their skills and expert knowledge are not well 
utilized. Among the respondents, less than 25% were satisfied with what they were 
doing, feeling they could fulfill their roles {Quangming Ribao, July 15, 1987). 
According to another study, 34% of the respondents reported that they could not actualize 
their potentials. These surveys reveal intellectuals’ wish for professional autonomy and a 
dissatisfaction at its lack. With raising expectations in professional autonomy and 
intellectual freedom by the reforming regime of 1978, the limited opportunities for 
personal development and political development have further made them angry and 
depressed {Renmin Ribao, 5 May, 1988).
Discrimination Against Young Intellectuals
In particular, the young intellectuals have been facing adverse situations. One 
study revealed that the young intellectuals have been victims of discrimination. Only 5% 
of the intellectuals under 40 could get higher posts. It was also reported that the average 
age of committees in the Chinese Academy of Social Science is 73; the average age of 
the professors in the colleges under the State Educational Committee is 59-60, while the 
associate professors are 53-54 {Renmin Ribao, 25 May, 1988). The lack of promotion
'^Deng Zhiduan (1992) examines the causes for the brain drain problem in China, suggesting that one of the major reasons for such 
phenomenon is the lack of professional autonomy which they could enjoy overseas. For that reason intellectuals prefer to stay in 
other countries rather than return to China.
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and professional development has suffocated the intellectual community as a whole. In a 
national survey, when the intellectuals were asked to evaluate whether or not their self- 
interests and personal aspirations were realized, most of the respondents (average 70%) 
were dissatisfied with their present circumstances. More than 72% of the respondents felt 
that their income and living conditions were well below a reasonable level. Most of them 
(average 70%) expressed dissatisfaction with their present social and political status. 
They complained of lacking opportunity for self-actualization and personal development. 
They also thought that they had been deprived of freedom of expression (Min Qi, 1989: 
80). Other studies also report similar findings. Most of the respondents consider the 
most important factor in their work to be "power", suggesting that power implies social 
status in the intellectual community. In addition, they also report that discrimination 
toward the young intellectuals is still acute. They complain of the limited chance for 
promotion and the criteria for assessment based on seniority rather than merit (Xingdao 
ribao, 28 Nov. 1992). Phenomena such as favouritism, antiquated promotion policy, 
excessive reliance upon seniority, over-staffing, political prejudice and deterrents to 
labour mobility have been commonly experienced by Chinese intellectuals. Under­
utilization of talented manpower, coupled with mistreatment of intellectuals and poor 
working conditions and poor prospects are crucial factors for intellectual radicalism.
The perceived disadvantaged social position of intellectuals and the limited social 
and political opportunities have already made them exceedingly depressed {Xingdao 
ribao, 28 Nov. 1992). Against such a background, the intellectuals boldly condemned 
corruption for causing social inequality and sought better treatment for the intellectuals 
and improvement of education, seeing changes in the present regime necessary. That is 
why they spelled out their reason for protests on a poster : "We having nothing, only our 
conscience " (Ostergaard, 1989:29). Deteriorating living conditions have also united 
them, enabling them to use their professional associations, like the Writers' Associations, 
the All China Journalists Association and the Association of Young Economists to apply 
influence on the state to change. As Yan Jiaqi, the leader of the Association of Beijing's
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Intellectual Circles, stated "at a time when the fate of our nation is in the balance, 
conscience calls us; and intellectuals, who are usually modest, kind, courteous, restrained 
and magnanimous, can no longer be silent. Our reason tells us that we should no longer 
be divided. Intellectuals should organize in this great patriotic democratic movement" 
{Ming Bao, 20 Feb. 1989, quoted from Ostergaard, 1989:29-30). It is evident, then, that 
the underprivileged social position of the intellectuals has moved them to radicalism. 
Inadequate Educational Subsidies and Student Radicalism
Aware of the disadvantaged position of the intellectuals, the student 
demonstrators feared that they would face a similar future. The government's inadequate 
educational investment had greatly fhistrated them. Since the 1986 student 
demonstrations, the students had been complaining about the tightening educational 
subsidies from the state. From 1985 onwards, the State Education Committee had 
reduced its financial support to universities and students. The actual expenditure for 
academic use was reduced from 40% to 20% in the total expenditure of a university 
budget (Zhou Fangniang 1989: 297-298). In the past four decades, the state investment 
in education showed a regressive trend rather than a progressive one. According to 
Hongqi, (Red Flag), one of the official newspapers, the average national expenditure in 
recent decades on education was about 2 % per annum (of the gross national products) 
{Hongqi, no.9, 1988: 19). If we compare the statistics of 1984-1987 with that of 1977- 
1983, we find that the expenditure in education as a proportion of the total national 
budget was further cut {Jiaoyu yanjiu, no.7 1988: 24-25). With the school population 
increasing from 1.4 million to 1.7 million in 1987, the actual support for education was 
reduced (see, Beijing Review, no. 8, Feb 23, 1987: 21-25). A study in Tianjin showed 
that the academic expenditure was further cut from 37.5% in 1986 to 11.46% in 1988. 
These figures show us that the actual academic expenditure in 1988 was less than 1/3 that 
of 1986, showing declining capital investment in higher education {Achievement o f  
Education, 1991). It was also reported that the Chinese national expenditure in education 
was placed 149th of 151 countries in the mid-80's {Gaodeng jiaoyu xuebao, no. 1, 1985:
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64).''
If we take the inflation rate into account, (for instance, with double-digit inflation 
from 1987 to 1989) the "disposable" investment in higher education is cut in real term. 
The total capital investment in education from 1989 to 1990 dropped {China Statistics 
Report, 1991). Such an inadequate investment in education caused a wave of complaints 
over intellectuals' salaries and living conditions during the Seventh National People's 
Congress, where many delegates raised this issue including Ding Shisun, the President of 
Beijing University. In response, Li Peng had to acknowledge the problem openly in the 
press, trying to assuage the feeling of discontent among the popular masses and college 
students {Renmin Ribao, Haiwaiban, July 4, 1988: 1).
In addition, limited investment in education directly affects teaching and research 
in China. Although academic and scientific research facilities have improved since 1978, 
they still fall short of international standards. With chronic funding shortages, both 
library & laboratory facilities are still far from satisfactory. Researchers in universities 
often find difficulty in getting sufficient material from libraries to complete their projects. 
According to Dr. Hemy Rosemost, an American scholar who spent almost two years at 
Fudan University in Shanghai, its libraries are "one step away from chaos" because 
"massive efforts in cataloguing & recataloguing are required, borrowing & return 
procedures must be streamlined, and the holdings of contemporary books & journals — 
especially in Western languages — must be updated and expanded" (Rosemost, 1985: 
44). Without enough financial support for education, students and intellectuals have 
found difficulties in pursuing academic work. According to some statistics, the average 
cost of books rose by 2.3 times from 2.10 yuan in 1984 to 5.10 yuan in 1988. Even 
worse, the cost of foreign books increased by three to four times. This inevitably led to a 
shortage of books (Zhou Fangniang, 1989: 298). In a survey conducted in Hubei 
Province in 1987, most of the 514 middle-aged intellectuals interviewed described
‘’The CCP admitted that average per capita government spending on education was US$ 11.2 in 1989, which not surprisingly 
placed China the second fiom the bottom among all the countries surveyed in terms o f educational investment See Issues & Studies 
(April, 1989); Gai Che-sheng (1990); see also Lo (1989; 1993).
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themselves as 'operating on overload' (Rai, 1991: 147). Teachers stated that, "the acute 
problems confronting them are difficulties in borrowing books, writing books and 
publishing books, all of which have resulted in difficulty in teaching and research" (Zhou 
Fangniang, 1989: 198). Owing to the shortage of funds, the intellectuals cannot go to 
conferences or engage in basic research. From 1983 onwards, the cost of experiments 
has increased two to three times, and the concomitant result is insufficient funds for 
experiments. Students have to share experiments instead of individually conducting 
them. Even worse, some of them have to observe the demonstrations by teachers rather 
than doing actual experiments (Zhou Fangniang, 1989: 298). Under these circumstances, 
quality of teaching was declined. Therefore, a common complaint of Chinese scientists is 
that many potentially excellent research projects are put aside because of insufficient 
funds and inadequate facilities.
More seriously, the inadequate educational funds also put students and 
intellectuals into a physically dangerous' situation. They have been forced to live in 
dormitories with poor maintenance. According to a study of the top universities in 
Beijing, most of the student dormitories were hazardous, but the university authorities 
had no funds to repair them since costs had doubled or even trebled. These financial 
impediments caused the university authorities to incur great financial debts. It was also 
reported in Jinsu, indicating that 17.2% of the school buildings were in danger of 
collapse. The situation in the primary schools was even worse, showing more than 70% 
of the school building structures to be dangerous (Zhou Fangniang, 1989). It is also 
suggested that the impasse in education is related as much to the wrongful allocation of 
funds as to insufficiency of funds {Kuaibao, 21 Dec. 1991). The poor living conditions 
and gloomy future for education have made students frustrated. The slow pace of reform 
and poor development of education, seen in this light, are the driving forces for the 
students and intellectuals in the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989. Having seen the 
difficulties of their forerunners, the "budding intellectuals" in university worried about 
their future. Without hope that education might develop and aware of the falling
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importance of knowledge an increasing number of student are withdrawing from school. 
An Increasing Withdrawal Rate of Students
If we consider the June Fourth Incident as an outburst of their anger, we may infer 
that the increasing withdrawal rate of students from school and university is an indication 
of their long-term dissatisfaction with the falling social position of intellectuals. It has 
been reported that most students do not enjoy their studies and have doubts about their 
future. One writer suggests that there are four main schools of thought among university 
students. Those in the 'T school' are preparing for the TOEFL test, hoping to study 
abroad. The 'M  school' students spend their time in playing 'Majiang' whereas the O 
school' students are dancing their way through college. Last, the students in 'L  school' 
are engaging in love affairs (Chen Kang, 1990; see also Zhou Fangniang, 1989). 
According to a survey at Shanghai examining the leisure activities of students, 70% of 
the sample just tried to do nothing special to 'kill' time; 20% of them simply had nothing 
to do, feeling aimless and without direction (Li Ming, 1989: 231-232). Here, we can see 
their loss of interest and direction in both studies and life. In 1988, 8500 students 
withdrew from school, approximately 6% of the junior students in secondary level at 
Dalian. The withdrawal rate at Fuzhou came up to 42%; while the students quitting their 
studies at Huibei even rose to 100 000 within several months (Zhongguo jiaoyubao, 20 
July, 1988). Such high withdrawal rates are found not only in the secondary level but 
also in both the undergraduate and post-graduate level (see for example, Kuaibao, 29 
Apr. 1992). From 1987 onwards, the withdrawal rate of the post-graduate students has 
been rising {Beijing qingnianbao, 4 June, 1988). Lo (1989; 1993) argues that there is a 
consistent upward trend of rising students withdrawal rates since the late 1980's. Lo 
suggests one of the reasons for such a phenomenon is the insufficient government support 
of education. Table 7 indicates a continual decline in the number of postgraduates since 
1987.
Some departments received no applicants and many research students left their 
studies. They conceived that education was no longer useful since it could not ensure
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them a better jobs after their graduation {Guangming Ribao, 9 August, 1988; Zhongguo 
qingnianbao, 2 Jan. 1988). Other evidence also confirmed these observations (Su 
Xiaokang, 1989; Zhou Fangniang, 1989).*  ^ Most young people are more anxious to find 
ways of making money than to continue their education,
Year
No. of Post-graduates in Institutes of Higher 
Education
1987 106,185
1988 100,810
1989 91,001
1990 84,158
Table 7: The Number of Post-Graduate in the Institute of Higher Education 1987-1990.
(Source: Dept, of Planning & Construction, State Education Commission, The PRC, Achievement o f  
Education in China, People's Education Press, 1991: 42)
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated clearly the declining social position of 
the intellectuals and the insufficient investment in education. The lack of the 
opportunities for both economic and personal development have made both the students 
and intellectuals exceedingly depressed .H av ing  seen the soaring inflation and acute 
corruption in the Communist bureaucracy, they became restless and intolerant of delay. 
The students were further antagonized by the government decision to reintroduce the 
political job-allocation system. They rejected such a system because they had doubts that 
their future could be appropriately determined by the Party, particularly are controlled by 
family relationships and connections. (Ostergaard, 1989:31).’’ It is against such a
'*Su Xiaokang (1989b) not only attacked traditional Chinese culture in Hexiang but also pointed out the intense education crisis, 
suggesting that the state should respect intellectuals and improve education in China.
'^Some surveys testing the values of youth in China, show that they have become more concerned with obtaining money and 
material well-being. See, for example, Rosen (1990); Hicks (1990); Hamrin & Cheek (1986).
*®The insufGcient subsidies in education upset the students' interest. Well before the 1989 demonstration, students had begun to 
complain vehemently on the university campuses. For instance, the students in Beijing University openly denounced the educational 
policies, creating posters to express their desire for jeform in China's educational system. Complaints o f the hardships in education 
and declining standard of welfare for students had been rife among students. Studies indicated that many students were malnourished 
{Mingbao, 12 July, 1991; 18 July, 1991). In this light, we can claim that the unresolved crisis in 1986-87 student protests eventually 
cumulated in the uprising o f the June-Fourth Incident of 1989. Hence, they demanded improvement in the life o f intellectuals and 
upgrading their professional status. However, the more changes they demanded, the more enraged and alienated they felt since there 
was no sign o f concrete improvement {Mingbao, 4 August, 1988).
’’Ostergaard (1989:31) who was in China when the 1989 Incident erupted, and had the chance to interview students, observed that 
the core demands o f students throughout the movement was "Better wages for teachers and more investigations of the educational 
system", "implementation of the rights granted in the constitution such as the right to organize and press freedom and the popular
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background that the student movement escalated from simple demands for better 
treatment toward intellectuals and fair evaluation of Hu Yaobang, their beloved houtai, to 
a full-brown value-oriented demonstration movement addressing societal issues. 
SECONDARY SOCIALIZATION AND INTELLECTUAL RADICALISM
It is evident that the student leaders had been greatly influenced by their 
secondary socialization especially by their teachers who had been supporters of 
democratization in China. Some of the student leaders, Wang Dan and Shen Tong, well 
before the 1989 demonstrations, had engaged in organizing 'democracy salon' seminars, 
concerts and exhibits to discuss the issues of democracy and political reforms. They were 
frustrated by the Party's half-hearted attitude toward political reforms. Encouraged by 
their teachers, the student demonstrators had been thinking about the future of China.^° It 
was widely believed that Wang Dan had been influenced by the ideas of the outspoken 
democrat. Fang Lizhi and wife Li Shuxian, while Wu'er Kaixi was influenced by his 
teacher Liu Xiaobo, a cultural critic (for details, see, Chong, 1989; Black and Munro, 
1993; Bonnin and Chevrier, 1991). In an interview, Wang Dan openly admitted that he 
was inspired by Fang Lizhi and always consulted with Li Shuxian, but he did not accept 
totally their ideas (Fan, 1989: 203-206).^^ Throughout the movement, Wu'er always 
followed the advice of Liu Xiaobo. According to one of the student leaders from Beijing 
Normal University, "Wu'er is our leader in practical matters, but Liu Xiaobo is our 
ideological leader" {Renmin Ribao, 29 Sep. 1989).^  ^ Liu rejected the necessity of 
intellectuals' loyalty to the state. He said, "it is exactly the faithful character of Chinese
demands for combating inflation and profiteering practices among officials".
^°It was reported that a Hungarian-American businessman ,had supported a range of autonomous intellectual activity with the 
established China Fund. A New York - based journal TTie Chinese Intellectuals was also published and issued on the mainland before 
June 1989. The model o f democratization set by Taiwan also encouraged the participants in the 1989 movement (Gold, 1990:144- 
45).
^*There is some research discussing the network between the 1989 student demonstrations and Fang Lizhi and Li Shuxian. See 
Chong (1989). In the past few years, Fang openly denounced the socialist system and demanded democracy and total westernization. 
Fang also had initiated and implemented administrative reforms when he was the vice-president of the Chinese University o f 
Technology and Science. The speech and action o f Fang had great in ta c t on the students. See Schell, (1988); Barme and Miniford 
(1989: 327-340).
^^The students were also advised by other intellectuals, either their teachers or close associates, see Zhengming (May, 1990).
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intellectuals that makes it difficult for them to break their attachment to the despotic 
system". He added that "intellectuals should be loyal to their own belief and the law" 
{Zhengming, April, 1989 and Liu Xiaobo, 1990). Unlike other intellectuals' support to 
the reformers, Liu sought for independent thought and intellectual creativity. He was not 
only critical of authorities but also emphasized the growth of civic consciousness. He 
asked for a self-critical reflection and strived for personal courage, daring and freedom 
(See chapter 8).^  ^ Deeply influenced by Liu, Wu'er was bold enough to ask the premier 
Li Peng not to waste time, seeking equal-footing dialogue with the state and the 
recognition of the autonomous student bodies.
The ideas of Su Shaozhi, Wang Yizhou and Yan Jiaqi, three outstanding and 
prominent social scientists in China, had great impact on the youth. Su and Wang were 
accused of inciting youth to action in 1989 while Yan's ideas on democracy were 
condemned as advocating a system of Western capitalistic democracy for China {World 
Economic Herald, 19 April, 1989). Yan Jiaqi, in a Chinese Youth interview, asked for 
more democratization in the political structure. He also encouraged students to remember 
the spirit of Science and Democracy as emphasized in the May Fourth Movement. Su 
Shaozhi and Wang Yizhou also reminded students of the "triple anniversary" of the 
French Revolution, the May Fourth Movement and the liberation of China, and the role 
of youth in the forefront of these struggles {Zhongguo qingnian, Jan. 1989: 1-2 and Sept. 
1989: 11; Zhongguo jiaoyubao, August 8, 1989:1, August 22, 1989: 4). Liu Binyan, the 
most outstanding writer of reportage literature in China, along the same lines, urged 
people to be critical and independent in thinking. He also introduced the concept of the 
"second kind of loyalty", which is characterized not only by a strong sense of mission to 
help the country but also a kind of critical support to the state. Liu's ideas had great 
impact on the youth, making them more critical (Schell, 1988; Barme and Miniford, 
1989: 354-360). It is clear then that their social network with the prominent liberal
^^Liu Xiaobo (1992) has a detailed discussion on his relationship with Wu'er and other student leaders of the 1989 pro-democracy 
movement.
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intellectuals^'* had tremendous impact on their political orientation. With such a 
secondary political socialization, students became more critical and outspoken. These 
lines of argument also suggest a close relation between secondary political socialization 
and political affiliation and ideological formation.
A LIBERAL AND RELAXED SOCIO-INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT AND 
INTELLECTUAL RADICALISM
The Influence from the West
In addition to the influence of their teachers, exposure to the outside world is 
certainly be one of the variables influencing the liberal thought of students. It has been 
reported that the university students were influenced by Western ideas, for they had read 
many foreign books and materials in the reforming era. When asked "what kind of books 
do you like to read?", more than 45% of the respondents replied that they read many 
foreign novels and stories, and books in their own speciality (Ye Jun, 1983: 320). The 
same study also showed that many of the respondents read Sartre’s works and 
commentaries, while others heard about them from others (Ibid: 328). In addition, the 
student demonstrators were influenced by the ideas of Popper. Karl Popper defends 
'democracy' against tyranny’ from the view of scientific progress. Adopting the view of 
Popper, Wang Dan’s 'democratic salon’, Shen Tong’s The Olympic Institute’ and Wu’er 
Kaixi’s ' Confucius Study Society’ began to discuss problems in the philosophy of science. 
The popularity of Popper was due to his attack on Marxism as a methodological and 
logical "pseudo-science". Under the impact of Popper, student leaders adhered to the 
view that democracy’ is more conducive to the growth of knowledge than is tyranny 
(Chong, 1990). In addition, the intellectual community was influenced by the ideas of 
Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Freud. Kelly also observes the great impact of Nietzsche on 
the youth, especially his ideas of nihilism and individualism. The personal courage, 
daring and freedom of these Western scholars attracted many young Chinese intellectuals
'^’Liberal intellectuals refer to those intellectuals who have been the supporters o f the political and economic reforms in the post- 
Mao era. They have been more open and sympathetic to the Western political thought I get this insight from the interview of Yan 
Jiaqi, (see, Interview 1, Paris, 1992).
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(Kelly, 1991a). In addition, democratic salons were popular in the University campuses, 
offering a relatively relaxed arena for both students and intellectuals to discuss different 
socio-political issues in China. Prominent intellectuals like Fang Lizhi and his wife, 
LiShuxian also participated in and supported the students through these meetings. Liu 
Xiaobo, another young and critical scholar, offered not only support but also advice to 
student leaders. Thus, scholars suggest that there has been an emergence of a "public 
sphere" in Chinese society, despite its pre-mature nature.^^ As Shen Tong explained the 
origin of his salon "The Olympic Institute", he said, "student organizations have always 
been a safe haven for intellectuals, a place for free thought and discussion" (PEN 
American Centre Newsletter, Dec 1989: 17). In the midst of a general cultural crisis and 
an identity crisis in the intellectual community, the Western ideas do occupy a significant 
position in the socio-cultural realm of Communist China. Tolerance toward this 
discourse on the campuses, coupled with a relaxed liberal educational orientation, made 
the students more critical and bold enough to confront the government directly.
The contact with the West was not confined only to the educational institutions. 
The extraordinary openness of China after 1978 had created an environment allowing 
Western influences to penetrate the life of the people. Compared with the 1970's, the 
students in the 1980's really got direct experience of the West. Table 8 shows that the 
number of students going abroad steadily increased between 1980 and 1985.
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
No. of Students Studying 
Abroad
2124 2992 2326 2633 3073 4888
Table 8: Number of Students Studying Abroad 1980-1985
(Source: Department of Planning, State Education Commission, PRC, Achievement o f  Education in 
China, Beijing; People's Education Press, 1986: 50)
Prior to the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, more than 70000 Chinese students were
^^There have been many scholarly works discussing the emergence of "public sphere" or "civil society" in post-Mao China. See for 
example, Walder (1989); Rowe (1989); Gold (1990) and White (1993); Wakeman (1993) & Huang (1993) and the conclusion o f this 
project
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estimated to be abroad. There have been about 190,000 Chinese students studying abroad 
since 1978 {Mingbao Yuekan, Sep. 1993). Surveys^^ conducted before and after June- 
Fourth of 1989 also confirmed that most of the university students ranked studying 
overseas as the first priority (Zhao Ying, 1989: 93-96; Tang Yucheng & Yin Qing, 1988: 
54-58).^^ According to the statistics collected by the American National Research 
Council, most of the Chinese students in the United States either intend to stay in the 
States or have not made up their minds. It must be noted that less than 10% of them have 
decided to go back China (Deng Zhiduan, 1992: 312). There has been a popular saying 
in post-Mao China that there are three routes for ambitious youth, namely, black, red, and 
gold. The black route means leaving China to study abroad to earn a black graduation 
cap & gown. The red is to join the CCP and becoming an official. The last one, the gold 
route refers to going into business to get rich (Rosen, 1990). According to one survey 
conducted in the Qinghua University, among 344 graduating students, 73.8% chose the 
black route; 5.5% chose the red; and 9.3% preferred to pursue the gold route. However, 
it is reported that only half of them were willing to go back to the mainland China after 
June Fourth 1989 {Jingji ribao, 17 Apr. 1991; see also Wenhui Bao, 21 & 22 Aug. 1992; 
Mingbao, 27 Apr. 1992). According to China’s State Education Commission, only 30% 
of all departures prior to 1988 had returned to China {The World Journal, Oct. 8 1989) 
while many of these students had legally or illegally changed their status to remain 
overseas (Leo A. Orleans, 1988: 112).^ ®
Contacts with the outside world have formative influences on students’ values and 
ideas. Rosen (1989) after conducting and analyzing a series of surveys, concludes that
^^Despite the fact that the surveys quoted here indicate us that many students had strong intention to study abroad, we must be catious of 
the quality of the surveys with particular reference to the way the questions were structured and the samples chosen. In this light, we can 
derive from these surveys a general picutre of how students' view toward overseas studies but we cannot claim that the above-cited figure as 
absolutely reflective of the reality.
^^According to People' Daily, the Chinese government planned to send about 3500 students and scholars abroad in 1989. Another 
source also shows that the number of new Chinese enrolments in American universities in fall o f 1989 did not decrease even after the 
crack-down of the pro-democracy movement in China. See People's Daily (Jan. 10,1989) and The World Journal (Nov. 7 1989: 3).
^^For details o f China's brain drain problem, see Deng Zhiduan (1992); see also Mingbao Yuekan, (Sep. 1993: 12-35) and Li Qiang, 
(1993: 221-224).
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Chinese students have become more individualistic in thinking, adopting the Western 
ideas and standards. Surveys show that most respondents dare not criticize others for 
what they consider their "private matter". This line of reasoning plots a trend that the 
students have experienced fundamental changes in their thinking, primarily concerning 
behaviour and the avoidance of moral judgements about others. Moreover, the former 
collectivization of morality in Mao’s era has already disintegrated. A sufficient 
illustration of this is the failure of the Communist Youth League (CYL), an official 
organization to educate and organize youth activities, which in recent years has not been 
able to effect students’ thinking in collectivism nor in political thought.^^ Given such 
relaxed control, the youth were allowed to establish autonomous student organizations. 
A large-scale survey conducted among Beijing’s fifty universities in 1986 indicated a 
steady growth of autonomous groups on the campuses.^® For example, from 1983 to 
1986, there was a 58% increase in the growth of associations, with participation in such 
activities growing from 13, 000 to 40, 000. Other studies from different localities also 
reported the same trend. A 1989 study in Guangzhou showed more than 70 such 
associations at Zhongshan University with more than 56.2 % of the students having 
participated in activities organized by these groups (Yi Zhifeng, et al. 1990: 2-6). The 
development of autonomous associations had really opened the students to a plurality of 
ideas and experiences, making them more liberal and open-minded, more accepting of 
ideas other than the orthodox one.
The acceptance of such individualistic and pragmatic attitudes among the youth 
greatly influenced their values and behaviour. A number of surveys found the findings 
that the youth were more conscious of 'professional improvement’ than ' socialist 
morality’. They considered their career opportunities as substantial while political 
progress was insubstantial. Most youth who joined the Party did so only as a means of
some surveys asking their attitudes toward the CYL, most respondents felt that it was disorganized & useless to them. Most of 
them preferred to join autonomous student organizations and activities. See Rosen (1990, 1992); Yuan Zeqing (1989); Daily Report 
(11 Jan. 1989:31-32).
^^This study surveyed more than 500 such autonomous groups. These groups had more than 40,000 members, approximately one 
third o f the city's university students, see Wang Ling, et al. (1988: 239-256).
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obtaining a good job assignment (Student Work Department, 1988: 71-77). According to 
one survey testing the motives of the youth in joining the Party, more than 59% of the 
respondents "in reality ... want a 'Party card' which can be used as capital to receive 
future benefits" while only 4% "believed in Communism and wanted to make a 
contribution" (Zhao Yicheng, 1988: 29). A study of over 1500 youth in Guangzhou 
reported that the most popular thought among them was their "concern with concrete 
matters relating to their work" (Wushi) (Wang Zhixiang, et al. 1989: 15-16). They 
considered freedom of choice and getting rich as their prime concerns {Shanghai jiaoyu 
keyan, 1989: 36). Some fourth and fifth graders in Hebei also forthrightly admitted that 
"we all want to join the Party. This is because you can get promotions when you are a 
Party member. You can have power when you are promoted. And with power you can 
become rich... With power, things can be done easily" (Rosen, 1990: 67). Though they 
condemned the practice of bureaucratism and official profiteering in 1989, they 
themselves also dreamed of power and m o n e y . T h e s e  figures indicate that the youth 
have become more pragmatic in pursuing the substantial' benefits rather than any 
ideological-political goals.
In addition to its influence on social values. Western thought also had great 
impact on the political thought of Chinese people. As Rosen observes, "a broad spectrum 
of the population seemed to agree that Western thought could be beneficial to China" 
(Rosen, 1992: 174). A national survey of Chinese political culture conducted in 1989 by 
an independent group of young and middle-aged Beijing political scientists reported that 
not only the highly educated and urbanized segment of the population but also Party and 
CYL members have adhered to Western ideas regarding assertion of individual choice 
(Min Qi, 1989: 123). Another study indicated that the respondents considered freedom of 
expression as important, especially supporting unrestricted speech in a wide variety of 
contexts, and they hoped to have freedom of speech as enjoyed by their Western
also had a discussion with a young Chinese official in the Shunde county office. He told me that he intended to become a CCP 
member for the reason that much convenience could be obtained. Well aware o f the fact that China is still ruled by the CCP, he 
believes having Guanzhi (network) and houtai (political patron) are significant (Fieldwork observation 3, 1993).
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counterparts (Zhi Ming & Lian Xuehua, 1988: 42). Even after the crackdown on the pro­
democracy movement in 1989, a wide variety of survey data revealed that students still 
admired Western democracy and supported capitalism. In asking whether they 
considered the Western political system as democratic, 62% in Xian, 66% in Tianjin, and 
53.5% in Jiangsu either agreed or totally agreed. When asking their attitude toward 
equality before the law, 46% in Xian, 49% in Tianjin, and 35.4% in Jiangsu either agreed 
or totally agreed that everyone was equal before the law in Western countries (Tan 
Shumin, 1989: 26-29). Just before the 1989 Incident, surveys of universities in Beijing 
reportedly found 45% of the students either rejected or were skeptical of Marxism; while 
53% of them supported "bourgeois democracy" (Quan Singlian, 1990: 15-18). 
According to another survey, conducted after the 1989 incident, 72.87% of the students 
still either basically or fully agreed that "democracy must be fought for from the bottom 
up, not bestowed from the top down" (Zhang Yibin, 1989:8-13). This orientation toward 
Western liberal thoughts made the students more critical of their present situations, 
causing them to be impatient with the slow changes. Their adherence to Western ideas 
also imbued them with a strong sense of crisis to reform and change.
The above discussion has highlighted the influence of the West on the student 
demonstration of 1989. Thus, it is not surprising to see student demonstrators bristling 
with foreign symbols and allusions, such as the replica of the Statue of Liberty in 
prominent public places {The New York Times, May 20, 1989). They located their 
movement squarely in the stream of world movements for democracy and human rights. 
Wallposters and placards were displayed, paraphrasing Abraham Lincoln and Martin 
Luther king; Mikhail Gorbachev, Lech Walesa and the American civil rights movement 
{Time, New York, May, 1989). Selden also observes that "student leaders emulated the 
white headbands worn by South Korean dissidents and flashed the V sign favoured by 
anti-Marcos activists who fought for people's power in the Philippines" (Selden, 1990: 
25). Such changes in their political perception toward a Western liberal orientation are 
closely related to the socio-historical and socio-political changes in the post-Mao era.
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The students had general contact with the West through more overseas experiences, 
listening to the Voice of America (VOA) or the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 
and reading Western publications/^ These kinds of exposure had already made the 
students and intellectuals more cosmopolitan. Comparing their lot with students in the 
outside world, they became dissatisfied with the present situation, culminating in the 
outburst of anger in attacking the government.
The Soviet Influence
Aside from the Western influence, changes taking place in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe also influenced the demonstrators' political perceptions. 
Gorbachev's glasnost introduced in the Soviet bloc had already received the attention of 
the Chinese intellectual circles, thereby influencing the thinking of both the intellectuals 
and the students. The conservatives' argument that the collapse of socialism in the USSR 
could be correlated with bourgeois thoughts from the West and the converted forms of 
democracy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe confirmed their fear and attribution 
of blame.. Furthermore, the student demonstrators also admitted that they had been 
affected by the recent developments in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's liberal attitude 
toward political democratization was welcomed by the Chinese students. They thought 
that Gorbachev was better than the Communist leaders in China (Calhoun, 1989). In 
addition, the historic visit of Gorbachev to Beijing in 1989 was a golden political 
opportunity for those student activists since most of the world media were present in 
capturing such an important moment. Making use of this opportunity, the student 
demonstrators believed that they could draw the attention of the whole world and through 
which to exert pressure on the government. Yan Jiaqi revealed to the New York Times 
that the movement of 1989 was greatly encouraged by the Soviet changes, stating "China 
used to be afraid of influence from the West. Now we are afraid of influence from the 
Soviet Union ... if we want to keep out Western influence, we can say we're against
was reported that more than 50% of the university students in Beijing listen to VGA or other foreign broadcasts, with the number 
rising to more than 80% when there were important domestic or foreign events (Rosen, 1992: 176).
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bourgeois liberation, or 'total Westernization' but we can't use that pretext [anti- 
westemization] against Soviet influence ... there is no ideological concept to resist it" 
{New York Times, May 14, 1989). Walder (1989) also argues in the same vein that the 
Chinese pro-democracy movement had been encouraged by the Soviet liberalization in 
recent years. The changes which took place in the Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
affected the whole Chinese intellectual community. They began to follow the Soviet 
Union, trying to learn the lessons of eliminating "the obstacles of bureaucratic and 
privileged stratum ... organizing the election of people's representatives ... and giving the 
people's congress the right to veto laws passed by the Presidium of USSR Supreme 
Soviet" (Rai, 1991: 157-158; see also Zhengming, 1989). Chen Yizhi, a former director 
of the Institute for Economic System Reform under China's State Council, commented 
abroad that the pro-democracy movement of 1989 was consistent with the international 
trend. Criticizing the CCP for discouraging democratization, Chen argued that "a market 
orientation and internationalization of the economic system, pluralism and 
democratization in the political system" is a logical development in modem society (Chen 
Yizhi, 1990: 150).
The deputy Party secretary at Beijing University also observed that "political 
changes in Eastern Europe had bolstered the 'liberal' forces inside China, and helped 
form 'underground' opposition and political organizations (FBIS/90/088/28). After their 
exposure to Western ideas, the students had found their motherland lagging behind the 
Western capitalist countries, even well behind the pace of development of the Four small 
dragons: Taiwan, Hong Kong, S. Korea and Singapore. Adding the recent changes in the 
European socialist states, the students had been awakened and thus demanded further 
reforms in China. The awareness of the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
had already widened the horizon of the students, causing them to demand not only 
Western democracy but also Soviet-style reforms. Some demonstrators even displayed 
placards praising the Soviet leader and calling for more glasnost and perestroyka for 
China (Walder, 1989: 33). It was also reported that thousands of students at Beijing
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University petitioned for Gorbachev to speak on campuses {The Washington Post, May 
21 and 24, 1989). In short, the widespread influence of Western ideas, coupled with 
sudden socio-political changes in Eastern Europe, not only shaped the political 
perceptions of the students and intellectuals but also made them much more restless and 
impatient with slow changes. Hence, such a comparison with the outside world provided 
them not only a point of reference but also a source of crisis to the viability of the 
authoritarian Chinese regime. In this regard, we may conclude that the international tide 
for democracy might have exerted great pressure for democratization in China.^^
Apart from the above-mentioned variables, their perception of what intellectuals 
should behave also has significant impact on their actions, particularly when these student 
leaders were still under the shadow of the literati tradition.
The Perceived Social Role and Political Orientation
From the very beginning, the students made it clear that because they supported 
the regime, their requests for changes and improvements were a reflection of their loyalty 
and patriotism.^"* As one of the student leaders, Wang Dan, boldly stated, "as an 
organizer of — and active participant in — this student movement, I feel I can already 
say I have a clear conscience, for this movement has made the Party realize the actual 
opinion of the people and has made the people, for the first time in forty years, aware of 
their own power" (Wang Dan, 1989). The demonstrators, hoping to contrast their moral 
righteousness against the corrupt and despotic government, staged hunger strikes. Their 
acts fundamentally demonstrate their righteousness, implicitly revealing the Confucian 
morality. The student demonstrators merely conceived of themselves as the only group 
to speak for the people, stating, "if we do not call out, who will? If we do not act, who 
will?" {Xinwen daobao. May 12, 1989). They urged the leaders to be more responsible.
^^ 1 develop this point from O'Donnell though he is not talking about "external force" as such. His analysis o f the relationship 
between the democratic transition and the crisis o f the state is stimulating. See O'Donnell et al., (Pt IV 1986).
^^Yan Jiaqi also stated to me that the student movement of 1989 was a patriotic one since the students did not want to overthrow the 
government in the first place. Their principal objective was to raise their grievances and attempt to advise the government to achieve 
further inq)rovement. See (Interview 1, Paris, 1992).
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As the hunger strikers proclaimed, "we will use the spirit of death to struggle for life ... 
But death is certainly not what we are seeking — if the death of one or a few can 
improve the lives of many, if it will make the fatherland thrive and prosper, then we do 
not have the right to be cowards and continue to live." They continued, "farewell, our 
country men. Please allow us to reluctantly express our loyalty this way" {Xinwen 
daobao. May 12, 1989, emphasis added). Some hunger strikers openly expressed their 
belief that their death would be worth it, if they could arouse the nation. As Perry 
observed, "the seemingly cosmopolitan and contemporary style of the demonstrations 
masked a deeper reality that was essentially Chinese" (Perry, 1991: 131). Accordingly, a 
strong sense of a martyr's death was clearly shown. Solinger suggests that the 
demonstrators showed "a proclivity to moralize and demand high behavioral standards 
from rulers" (Solinger, 1989: 625; see also Feigon, 1990; Esherick and Wasserstrom, 
1990 and Pye, 1990).
Chai Ling, one of the student leaders among the hunger strikers, said that, "we are 
using our lives to write our oath[the hunger strikers' statement]; it must clear the skies 
over the republic!" (Liang, 1989) "We love democracy more than rice", the student 
demonstrators shouted as they gathered at the Square (Feigon, 1990). Their overriding 
message elicits a tradition of "romanticism and revolutionary impulse fused with a cult of 
action" (Elvin, 1978: 18). Following the model of the literati, the demonstrators hoped 
their martyr's death would earn them glory, further outmoralizing the authority and 
thereafter they could capture the moral higher ground (Pye, 1990). Their idealism 
provides them a share of the intellectuals' feeling of responsibility to save the nation. 
More interesting, Wasserstrom (1990) holds that the student demonstration of 1989 is 
similar to that of the student movements in the republican era 1911-1949. Not only 
assuming the role of the literati, these students protestors also employed similar protest 
tactics, slogans and organizational strategies as their forerunners did. We can conclude 
that the students were more seriously concerned with the ideologies and values, as Lipset 
(1966) suggested. Having a strong sense of social conscience, these student leaders
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therefore elevated their demonstrations to the level of general social concerns.
SOCIAL CONSCIENCE: PROCLAMATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRISES
In the mid-80's, students, intellectuals and the general public experienced a 
decline of living standards. According to the social movement literature, it has been 
suggested that a crisis in a regime contributes to the rise of social and political 
movements. It likewise suggests that crises in a regime have a significant impact on the 
"political opportunity structure" (Tarrow, 1989; Brockett, 1991). Limited political and 
economic opportunities that people can access may become a force for the emergence and 
growth of a social movement (McAdam, 1988).^  ^ In this way, the perceived crises and 
threats to the cherished traditions and core state institutions can be interpreted as a 
political force for change.^^ In light of this argument, I hypothesize that the intense crises 
in mainland China had created the ground for the uprising of various social movements 
pledging support for democratization. The demonstrators, playing the role as the people’s 
spokesmen, openly uncovered the crises and criticized the social evils.
A Widening Income Gap among People and Official Profiteering
One of the social evils which we documented earlier was the ever-widening gap 
among the incomes of different social groups. A second significant social evil against 
which the students demonstrated was official profiteering. Hua Sheng, a social scientist 
and ally of Zhao Ziyang, points out that the fundamental cause of the June Fourth 
Incident of 1989 was the unresolved problems created by the discrepancy between 
economic and political reforms. Without proper planning in economic structural reform 
and the lack of a sophisticated legal system and political structure, unresolved issues in 
the economic realm not only became barriers to further reform but also caused economic 
difficulties for people (Hua Sheng, 1992). Su Shaozhi has a similar view that without
^^Oksenberg and Dickson (1991) have suggested "the perception of crisis" by the leaders, potential leaders and/or populace has a 
crucial effect upon the initiation of "great political reforms". They also regard one of the great political reforms o f a regime as 
"democratization" in the midst of crisis. I got this insight &om a discussion with Dr. Shing Ming, a colleague o f mine in the 
Department of Public & Social Administration, City Polytechnic of Hong Kong.
^^Argued along the same lines, the literature o f democratization highlights the close relationship between the socio-economic and 
socio-political crises in the democratic transition. This literature indicates that crisis phenomena of a regime should not be regarded as 
merely negative but can be seen as a positive force for change. See O'Donnell et al. (Pt IV, 1986).
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political reform, the problems associating with economic reform in past decades became 
much more difficult to handle; and these difficulties eventually created the context for the 
June Fourth Incident of 1989 (Su, 1990). The fundamental problem, in short, is the 
internal contradiction of economic and political policies that the CCP has adopted since 
the post-Mao era, characterized by "fighting against the Left in the economic field, and 
fighting against the Right in the political field" (Xu Luo, 1990: 85).^^
Against such a background, the students pointed to the structural imbalance in the 
Chinese economy since the central government began its program of decentralization. 
"Independent feudal kingdoms" enjoying special economic benefits have formed in 
different localities (Perry and Wong, 1985). The real power had fallen not to the 
enterprises, as the policy objectives stated in the decentralization policy, but to the local 
authorities. It resulted in the problem of "positional economy" and uncovered the 
problem of corruption. Hua Sheng also accused the cadre bureaucrats of using their 
position to manipulate the public resources. Hua claims that some scarce commodities 
had passed through officials' hands several times before even leaving the warehouse, with 
the price jumping several times. This practice had created a 'second market' in which 
executive authority became the commodity; signatures, permits, account numbers and 
licenses, items of barter. This official profiteering not only demonstrates the structural 
risks of economic reforms but also signifies the present chaos in the economic realm 
(Hua Sheng, 1988). Official trading, profiteering and unfair distribution have become 
central problems for the people. Under the existing multi-level price system, those with 
special connections could buy one ton of steel at the official price of 700 yuan and 
immediately resell it at the market price of 2100. Most of the government officials, 
retired government employees, or their offsprings had become instant millionaires. This 
provided reason for the 1989 demonstrators to display wallposters, complaining about the
have no intention to say that reforms launched in the post-Mao era have had no substantial result and positive contribution. 
Economic reforms implemented since 1978 have positively transformed Chinese economy. However, we cannot deny the fact that 
economic reforms have been full o f contradictions such as class polarization, agriculture stagnation and net disinvestment, 
disintegration of rural social services, environmental deterioration, exacerbated spatial inequality and corruption and inflation. It is in 
this light that I argue that we should evaluate the significance and drawbacks o f reforms in post-Mao China. For details, see Selden 
(1988 & 1990: 22-26).
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official profiteering. One wallposter in Beijing University complained that Deng 
Xiaoping's son engaged in profiteering because of his special relationship to Deng. The 
poster also revealed that the Kanghua Company, a company closely associated with some 
senior officials, could get a special "quota" for export and "cheap" materials for 
manufacturing. Having such a privilege, the company could profit simply by selling the 
"quota" to others. That is why there is a saying that "power equals so many tons of steel, 
so many kilograms of chemical fertilizer, and a certain exchange quota" {Gongren ribao, 
Beijing, 24 August, 1988). It also answers why the youth associate Party membership 
with power and money. This source of graft is basically rooted in the very symbiosis of 
the public and private sector of the economy. Some goods are obtainable only from the 
state-owned sector, at a relatively state-fixed prices. Local officials, because of their 
position, can "buy cheap" from the planned half of the economy and "sell high" to the 
other half sometimes doubling or trebling the price. As a result, the ordinary people have 
to bear the rising prices and thus the declining living standards.
Alongside this, inflation made corruption less tolerable and it really politicized the 
people to join the June Fourth Movement. Even after the crackdown, workers still felt 
that official corruption should be attacked. According to one survey conducted under the 
auspices of the Women's Research Institute of the Chinese Management Research 
Academy, surveying 2075 workers and staff members in twelve cities to examine their 
perception of China's most pressing social problems, most of workers still considered 
official profiteering as the most urgent problem to tackle (Guoji ribao, 5 Jan. 1990). It is 
against such a context that the demonstrators asked for the detailed disclosure of the 
leaders' property and income as well as the investigation of official profiteering.
Galloping inflation had intensified the economic difficulties. Inflation was seen 
in November 1979 when the retail prices of non staple foods rose by over 30%. The 
situation became even worse in the 80's {Ming Bao Yuekan, August, 1980: 24-25). 
According to the state statistics, the commodity price index increased by an average of 
7.37% annually in the period from 1985 to 1987 (9.43% in the cities), and 11% in the
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first quarter of 1988 (13.4% in the cities). In addition, food prices rose markedly in the 
past few years. For instance, the price of vegetables rose by 153.3%, non staple foods by 
96.6%, industrial products for household use by 6.7%, and household fuel by 15.1% 
between 1979 and 1987 {Wide-Angled Lense, June, 1988: 14). It was also reported that 
the inflation rate was 13% in the first half of 1988 and rose to 19% in June alone. In 
some cities, the inflation rate even exceeded 20% (Chiang Chen-chang, 1989), Galloping 
price rises had led to panic purchasing, which further intensified the rises in price. As 
official statistics showed, prices rose by 18.5% in 1988, while food prices rose as much 
as 23%. As a consequence, the cost of living increased in 1988 by 20.7% in urban areas 
{Beijing Review, no. 18, 1989: v). The situation became worse when the prices rose by as 
much as 25.5% in the first half of 1989 {Summary o f World Broadcasts, 9 August, 1989). 
With such a soaring price increase, the people in mainland China realized a decline in 
their real wages. For instance, their increment in wages was only 18.8% in 1989 but the 
inflation rate was up to 25% {Summary o f  World Broadcasts, 9 August, 1989; see also 
Walder, 1992: 106). This inevitably forced people to use extra money to buy goods on 
the black market. With little disposable income and rising prices, people were generally 
discontented and restless. The foregoing socio-economic problems created the 
prerequisite for the alliance between the students and the urban workers. The common 
cause of their antagonisms lay in official corruption and economic inequality.
The following discussion will show how the economic predicaments politicized 
the public and moved the workers to the June Fourth Movement. In their petitions, the 
urban workers seemed to believe that democracy could solve the immediate crisis in 
economy and financial difficulties {The People's Decree, 29 May, 1989). We have 
already seen the financial plight of the people caused by corruption and inflation. One 
study conducted in Tianjin points out an actual decrease in salary. Though their incomes 
rose with a handsome amount of bonus, their real incomes rose by only 6 to 7 %, less 
than 1 % a year.(See table 9)
When analyzing the data, Walder also highlights the wide variations around the
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mean. If the increase in wages is only minimal among a large group of urban workers, 
we can also conclude that a large group of urban workers were already falling behind, 
suffering a very serious decline in their purchasing power after 1986.
Average Monthly Wage
1976 1986
(1976yuan)
Percent
Change
Blue-Collar Manual Workers (N=381)
Salary 46.62 40.32 -13.5
Bonus 4.68 13.39 +186.6
Total Income 52.42 55.82 +6.5
Table 9: Wage Trends, 1976-1986: Sample of Tianjin Earners
(Source: Adopted from Walder (1992) "Urban industrial workers: some observations on the 1980's" in
A.L. Rosenbaum (ed) State and Society in China, Westview Press, 1992: 107)
The declining living standard is contrary to their rising expectation of the reform 
era. In the early years of reform, some people had really become rich, exciting a 
heightened expectation for a better life. In the late 70's, people aspired to own a 
wristwatch, a foot-powered sewing machine, a name-brand bicycle, and a transistor radio. 
By the end of the 1980's, these things were commonly owned; and they also possessed 
colour televisions, refrigerators, washing machines, tape recorders, etc. Besides, people 
in the urban areas had improved their diets considerably since the 70's. They had been 
accustomed to having more food, consuming much more chicken, fish, eggs and other 
non staple foods (Walder, 1992). Soaring increases in prices meant that people had to 
spend more to maintain their "normal" living standards. Having no real increment in 
wages, people began to realize that their living standards were falling. A worker who 
supported the student movement said, "they [the students] represent the people's thinking, 
the sense that we the people are in control. The leaders cover everything up. People 
don't know anything, and we are no longer the masters. That's why there is this uprising" 
{The New York Times, 28 Apr. 1989). Another ironworker also told the reporter that, "I 
hope student demonstrators will make the government do something about inflation" {The 
New York Times, 5 May, 1989). This strongly suggests that the workers hoped the
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students would influence the leadership on matters concerning their own interests. It was 
also reported that the major concerns of the workers were inflation and freedom of press 
and speech rather than a precise platform for political reform {New York Times, April 28, 
29, May 5, 1989; see also Calhoun, 1989). Their support of the movement, in this sense, 
is motivated by self-interest as well as sympathy. When this intense socio-economic 
crisis was coupled with the disintegration of the socio-political order, a total crisis was 
therefore formed.
Different opinion polls also revealed the most serious problems perceived by the 
people to be corruption and profiteering.^* They supported the students’ slogans 
concerning ’’anti-corruption”, ’’anti-privileges” and ”anti-corrupt officials”. They also
supported the struggle for democracy and press freedom. (See table 10)
Most of the Beijing citizens considered the students’ demands and actions to be 
reasonable. Nor did they mind that the uprising had caused traffic jams and 
inconvenience to their daily lives. Most interestingly, their worry was whether the 
students would be able to keep on protesting {China Information, vol.VI, no .l, 1989, 
table 12A). Most respondents supported the students and considered an equal-footing 
dialogue with the government to be rightful and necessary. They also agreed with the 
objectives of the movement ”to promote democratic reform and dissatisfaction with some 
of the government’s reforms” (63.5% and 50.1%) {China Information, vol. VI, no.l,  
1989: table In general, the people in Beijing showed either extraordinary
Categories of Slogans
%
Anti-corruption(anti-privileges,anti-corrupt official) 37.3
Anti-profiteering by officials 29.8
Pro-democracy(freedom,democracy,science,human rights) 15
Press freedomCthe media must tell the truth) 7.1
Support the CCP(Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles) 4.0
Pay attention to education(improve intellectuals'life) 1.3
Everyone has a share of responsibility of the state 1.3
Others 4.1
Table 10: Slogans Most Agreed With by Beijing Citizens (Source: China Information, Vol.IV no.l, 98)
‘^These polls were conducted by an independent research institute during the May Movement which culminated in the June Fourth 
Incident The result o f the polls was documented in China Information, (vol. IV no.l Summer, 1989.)
’^The total exceeds 100 % because some respondents listed several different possibilities.
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Percentage
extraordinary supportive 50.9
sympathetic 44.5
indifferent 2.5
aversion 0.6
firmly oppose 0.5
no answer 1.0
Table 11: Citizens' Attitude Toward the Student Movement 
(Source: China Information, vol. VI, no.l, 1989: 99)
Some Chinese citizens from Beijing and Guangzhou considered that the reason 
most of the people supported the student movement of 1989 was basically to air their 
grievances against the corruption and soaring inflation. One post-graduate student in 
Beijing said that the students and the people merely hoped to correct the wrong-doings of 
the government. At the beginning of the movement, the demonstrators tried to improve 
the present situations and solve the economic problems. They did not intend to 
overthrow the government nor did they have a clear conception of democracy. Their 
prime concern, in a word, was to improve their living standards and solve the social 
problems.'*®
THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER
In addition to the general discontent with social and economic life in the post-Mao 
era, the loss of hegemonic control by the state also prepares the ground for the outburst of 
public anger. In a survey of 371 intellectuals in March 1989, most of them (about 70%) 
felt that the public image of the party was 'not good’ (Rosen, 1989: see also table 12). 
Many surveys testing people’s attitudes toward the Communist Party reported the 
consistent trend toward a loss of faith in Communism (Rosen, 1992; Min Qi, 1989). 
Unlike the youth in the 50’s or 60’s, who faithfully supported Communism, the youth 
since the 80’s have lost such faith. According to a survey studying the belief systems of
‘*°This argument is based on my informal interview with some Chinese citizens and students who are now living or studying in 
London and Holland, (see, Interview 3, Holland, 1992 & Interview 5, London, 1992)
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2000 university students at Hangzhou in 1990, more than 80% of the respondents did not 
know what their ideals were (66%) or answered that it was impossible to formulate such 
ideals (20%), though they considered having ideals good (Ying Hang, 1990: 17-21). 
Another survey testing the secondary school students' belief system also indicated that 
they had lost identification with the Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and the 
Communist Party. Only 30% of them believed in it while more than 40% either had no 
belief system or did not know what they believed (Wang Shuzhi, 1990: 24-25). (See also 
table 12)
Another survey worth mentioning here is one conducted by an independent 
research group organized by Chen Zhiming and Wang Juntao (who are regarded by the 
CCP as organizers of the pro-democracy movement of 1989 and are still in prison) early 
in 1989. The objective of this survey was to investigate the attitudes and values of people 
toward Chinese socialist government and Marxism.
Junior High 
Students
Senior High 
Students
No belief system or do not know 44.7 41.9
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and Communist 
Party
30.0 30.4
Truth 7.4 5.4
Both Marxism-Leninism and Buddhism 2.1 2.5
God and Jesus Christ 2.6 3.1
Reality 3.0 5.4
Freedom 7.0 8.8
Fate 3.3 2.5
Table 12: The Belief Systems of Secondary School Students (in%)
(Source: Adopted from Rosen, "Students and the State in China", in A.L. Rosenbaum, (ed) State and 
Society in China, Westview Press, 1992, p. 169)
The survey also found that most respondents had a very strong national feeling 
and they maintained that they bore responsibility to serve the country whenever the state 
was in crisis. Besides, most of the respondents (over 70%) held a negative attitude 
toward the notion that "it is reasonable and legitimate to betray your country when the 
country disappoints you".'*' This figure shows us that most respondents still had a strong
‘" it is interesting to note that Chinese people in the mainland have a particularly strong sense of national feeling. They
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patriotism (See table 13). Nevertheless, patriotism to the state does not necessarily mean 
that they are loyal to the present regime. When asked whether they are proud of living in 
a socialist society, approximately half of the respondents had either ambivalent feeling or 
had no pride in living in socialist society. The same survey also indicated more than half 
of the respondents (about 56%) rejected the four Cardinal Principles. (See table 14)
Question Do you agree that you have 
reason to reject your country 
when it makes you disappointed?
Do you agree that you are 
reasonable to betray your country 
when it makes you disappointed?
Number 1712 1705
Opinion Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
Worker 23.64 76.36 13.56 86.44
Individual Labour 37.44 62.56 26.62 73.38
Intellectual 19.10 80.90 9.05 90.95
Cadre 15.21 84.73 9.7 90.30
Peasant 30.81 69.19 16.14 83.86
Total 25.05 74.95 14.32 85.69
Table 13: Chinese People's Patriotism to the State 
(Source: Adopted from Contemporary, 30 Dec. 1989: 17)
In addition, this survey also found that most people had a very negative view of 
the CCP. To be more specific, 61.88% of the respondents had a bad impression of the 
CCP. More than half of the interviewed party members said that they had no pride being 
party members. Among non-members, more than half of the respondents said that they 
had no interest in joining the CCP. Equally interesting, more than 77% of the 
respondents considered the model set by the party members to be bad {Contemporary, 30 
Dec. 1989: table 3). It is also interesting to note that about 70% of the respondents were 
dissatisfied with work style of the cadres. They felt that the cadres far from being 
democratic, abused their bureaucratic powers and performed their work inefficiently. 
Table 15 also shows us even though the majority trusted the government but they were 
dissatisfied with cadres’ work style, implying that people in mainland China were 
annoyed by the bureaucratic and corrupted acts of cadres.
wholeheartedly supported the application for bringing of the Olympics Game to China the year 2000, viewing it as China's glory and 
strength.
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Question Are you proud of being a citizen of 
socialist state ?
There is no need to uphold the four 
cardinal principles in China. Do you 
agree?
Sample 1721 151
Opinion Agree Disagree
Worker 53.74 30.21 13.9 54.4 45.6
Indiv. labour 56.97 28.69 13.93 63.33 34.67
Intellectual 52.84 30.5 15.96 53.12 46.88
Cadre 66.57 21.9 10.95 46.01 53.99
Peasant 44.73 34.39 19.62 46.01 37.8
Total 54.15 29.52 15.22 1.1 56.03 43.98
Table 14; People's Views toward Socialism and Four Cardinal Principles 
(Source: Adopted from Contemporary, 30 Dec. 1989: 17)
Question Do you trust your government? Are you satisfied with the cadres' 
work style?
Sample 1664 1418
Opinion Yes No Yes No
Worker 68.39 21.27 20.63 65.87
Indiv. Labour 69.66 18.37 20.49 62.29
Intellectual 68.33 19.22 13.48 76.09
Cadre 85.34 7.76 21.34 68.66
Peasant 56.73 37.70 19.74 68.94
Total 68.93 22.05 28.44 69.84
Table 15: People's Evaluation of the Party and State Cadres.
(Source: Adopted from Contemporary, 30 Dec. 1989: 18)
This trend again demonstrates an intense ideological crisis in China, causing a 
legitimation crisis for the state and making the youth search for a viable belief system. 
The deepening sense of identity crisis had already shown in the late 70's. The so-called 
literature of Wounds exposed the sufferings and wounds of Chinese people in the 
Cultural Revolution. Bai Hua's film "Unrequited Love" also touched the most 
fundamental question regarding the legitimacy of the CCP, "You love the motherland, 
why doesn't the motherland love you?" This question expressed the arguments of 
countless victimized intellectuals. Furthermore, Cui Jian's 1987 song "I Have Nothing to 
My Name", China's popular rock-and-roll song, has become the anthem of the "new-birth 
generation"; and it also symbolizes nihilism (Rosen, 1990: 212; see also Chong, 1991)."*^  
Students have lost their faith in Communism and fought against orthodox ideological
^^Gold (1990:143-146) has a good discussion on disillusionment in the cultural realm in the post-Mao era, which deserves attention.
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teaching. In late 1988 and early 1989, a seminar was held at Shekou, in the Shenzhen 
special economic zone, addressing the "moral spirit" of such official youth heros as Lei 
Feng, Zhang Haidi and Zhu Boni. The seminar hoped to set the models for the students. 
However, the participants argued that following these models was an "ideological 
burden". They not only denounced this propaganda ploy and called it "empty sermons" 
but also preferred "a discussion of concrete questions". The symposium was widely 
reported and regarded as the "Shekou Storm", reflecting the deep-rooted value conflicts 
and identity crisis of the youth {Shekou tongxun baa, 26 Dec. 1988: 3 and 19 Jan. 
1989:3).
CONCLUSION
In summary, the crises in the post-Mao era can be interpreted as the "threats or 
challenges posed to a political or social object that can, as subjectively perceived, likely 
lead to some changes of the defining characteristics of those objects" (Svensson, 1986: 
134-5). In this way, threats and challenges virtually shattered the fundamental foundation 
of both the socio-cultural and socio-political orders of the regime that inevitably led to 
China's socio-political crisis. Though it is suggested that the economic crisis alone is not 
sufficient condition for setting off the demands for democratization (O'Donnell et al., 
1986: 20), the 1989 crisis, combined with the defection of the political system and other 
social crises, are ample motivation (Haggard and Kanfman, 1992: 324-326). It is in this 
light I suggest that the economic predicaments in the post-Mao era, together with the 
ideological and legitimation crises, created the particular socio-political platform for the 
call for democratization. The June Fourth Incident mirrored many of the deep social and 
political contradictions existing in China. The unprecedented outpouring of support for 
democracy was further shored up by the social pressures from the liberated civil society, 
which virtually shook the foundation of the monolithic and totalitarian rule of the CCP. 
Put in another way, the students' political opportunity structure and their ability to 
mobilize their resources were greatly determined by the existence of socio-economic 
crises shared by all the people. It also supports the hypothesis that the grievances
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commonly felt by the public and the demonstrators have provided the link between them. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the student leaders regarded the movement of 1989 as a 
pro-democracy movement even though they had no precise conception of democracy and 
concrete political platform. The above evidence also explains why the student leaders 
and people misinterpreted democracy and their behaviour was far from democratic as 
indicated in the last chapter. As the 1989 demonstrations took on the moral tone of the 
May Fourth spirit, they became a geniune value-oriented movement in both the social and 
political realms.
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INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDIES
In order to deepen our understanding of the intellectual production of Chinese 
intellectuals, the following discussion will be based upon four case studies to illuminate 
how the social location, educational orientation and secondary socialization of 
intellectuals have shaped their ideological formation. The selection of these cases, as we 
have mentioned in the introduction, is based on the prominence and significant role that 
these intellectuals have played in their particular fields. Because of their infiuential 
position, their ideas should have affected their fields in particular and the Chinese 
intellectual circles in general. In addition, the ideas and speeches of these intellectuals 
are reported widely inside and outside China,* having significant impacts on the public 
discourse in China. Equally important, the scholars of China studies, have generally 
agreed that these intellectuals are not only critical intellectuals but also the representatives 
of Chinese dissidents (see, for example. Cheek & Goldman, 1987; Goldman, 1992 & 
1993; Nathan, 1990; Barme, 1990 and Black & Munro, 1993 and Schell, 1989). More 
interesting, the present selected intellectuals are now exiled in the United States, the 
change of their socio-economic-political circumstances may have led to change in their 
conceptualization of democracy and also their relationship with the CCP. Based upon 
these observations, we therefore consider the examination of their works and ideas as 
enriching experiences to us. One point which deserves attention here is that we do not 
mean the following case studies to represent the political thought of all Chinese 
intellectuals. Rather, we hope to demonstrate some dominant lines of thought shared 
among these Chinese intellectuals. The case studies, seen in this light, are not exhaustive. 
Of course, we do not claim that the contents of the interviews and the actual social 
positions of the selected interviewees represent the whole Chinese intelligentsia in
'The worics and ideas o f Yan Jiaqi, Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan and Liu Xiaobo were widely reported and cited in mainland China and in 
the West. Moreover, some of their works were even translated and introduced to the English speaking world, see, for exanqale, Yan 
Jiaqi (1992); Fang (1992); Liu Binyan (1990a & b) and Barme (1991). See also the discussion in chapters 5-8.
general in the late 1970s and the early 1990s. As we well acknowledge a continuum of 
change in the past decades, we are dealing only with the more marked developments at 
one end of the spectrum. The selection of them, to a certain extent, indicates how these 
prominent and critical Chinese intellectuals have conceptualized democracy and also their 
relationship with the state.
Following the intellectual practices in the fields of sociology of knowledge and 
sociology of intellectuals especially in China s t u d yo ur  present research also adopts case 
studies as major method of investigation. The use of case studies allows the research to 
get close to the data, discovering how the actors define, perceive and interpret their social 
reality. Instead of only looking into how social structure has influenced people's thought 
and ideas, case study can provide a balanced view as it focuses mainly on how 
individuals think. Unlike positivist research which is basically variable-analysis, using a 
set of ad hoc procedures to define, count and analyze the interaction of identified 
variables, qualitative research is primarily concerned with the social construction of 
meaning. Instead of investigating how social structure influences social action, 
qualitative research assumes that systematic inquiry of social action must occur in a 
natural setting rather than an artifically constrained one. As Hammersley (1990) 
suggested, the fundamental features of qualitative research are: the use of everyday 
contexts rather than experimental conditions, giving special attention to the "micro" 
features of social life, and much concern with the meaning and function of social action.^ 
More fundamentally, case study renders qualitative social research appropriate, putting 
unobservable or "inner experiences" into context. Unlike opinion polls conducted 
quantitatively by means of survey method, an intensive understanding of man and his 
ideas should not only rely upon published materials or merely be based upon quantitative 
methods. Instead, a coherent framework of how people think should come to grips with 
how they conceptualize the external world. Qualitative method supplements social
^Research o f similar kind usually adopts case studies as major method of investigation, see, for example. Cheek (1986); Goldman et 
al. (1987) and Barme (1991).
^For details of the nature of qualitative research, see, for example, Silverman (1985) and (1994); Chadwick et al. (1984).
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research with insights of the "inner" side of people's thought and behaviour. The 
definition of the situation of the people, with the help of qualitative method, is thus 
wider. Confining not merely to the study of people's observable behaviours, it explores 
also subjective motives, feelings, and emotions.
Having such considerations, the present project selects case study in terms of 
intensive interview, hopefully, enhances the present research with interpretative 
understanding of Chinese intellectuals and their conceptualization of democracy. 
Notwithstanding the general acceptance of case studies as a qualitative method, we have 
no intention to de-emphasize the significant role of quantitative methods in social 
research. We only intend to highlight that the selection of case studies is more 
appropriate to this project because the method of which can offer us not only a deeper 
level of understanding but also viewing behaviour in a natural setting.^ By means of case 
studies, we hope to construct a fuller picture of ideological production and the unique 
context in which ideas are formulated. Starting from these general considerations, our 
forthcoming chapters examine closely the relationship between the selected intellectual's 
ideas and their "historical uniqueness" by means of intensive interviews, analysis of their 
publications and speeches and the reading of their diaries, letters and personal history.^
The next chapter examines Yan Jiaqi, one of the most prominent Chinese political 
scientists, and his idea of democracy. Chapter 6 will be the discussion of Fang Lizhi, the 
most critical and outspoken natural scientist in China. Chapter 7 concentrates on Liu 
Binyan, the most popular writer and journalist in mainland China, and his political 
thought. The last case study examines Liu Xiaobo, in the youngest generation of Chinese
^Weatherbum et al. (1992) note that many studies have failed to uncover the inner side of people's thought and the meaning that they 
attach to their behaviours when they are conducted by means of quantitative methods. Like other qualitative researchers, they distrust 
explanations of behaviour which reduced social life to a response to particular 'stimuli' or any variables', Weatherbum et al. then adopt 
questions to explore the meanings attached to the behaviour of their sample.
^Plummer (1983) has a very insightful discussion on the problems and literature of a humanistic method. He deals with one o f the 
most debatable issues in sociology, the relationship between social structure and individuals. Having a deeper reflection, Plummer 
urges people to develop a more balanced view of how people think and act by looking intensively into the life o f individuals instead of 
investigating only the formative impacts of social structure on people. This work inspires us to think about some Aindamental 
methodological issues in sociology. For further details o f such matters, see also, Alexander et al. (1987) and Mouzelis (1992).
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intellectuals among these four, especially his critique and dissidence of China’s culture 
and tradition, the Chinese intellectual circles and the national character of Chinese 
people.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE REFORMER INTELLECTUAL: YAN JIAQI 
AND HIS DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT
Yan Jiaqi’s thought not only has influenced the Chinese intellectual circles but 
also the state apparatus. His idea of democracy is also influential among dissident 
thinkers in and out of China. Nathan (1992) says "Yan's representativeness as a Chinese 
democratic thinker makes him important for an international readership." As one of the 
most prominent political scientists in the post-Mao era, Yan Jiaqi and the formation of his 
idea of democracy is the first case study we shall consider. Although Yan's writing on 
democracy began back to the late 70's, he had already begun in the 60's to examine the 
problems arising from the socio-political system (see Yan, 1988). In the late 60's, his 
confrontation with the despotic rule had already made him skeptical of monolithic rule 
under autocratic ruler (Yan, 1988: 11). Philosophical debates on the relationship between 
"ideas" and "matter" in the 60's made Yan begin to question the "truth" of Maoist thought 
and even to move a step further to query the existing socio-political system. More 
significantly, his reading of banned books in the fields of Western political thought, 
world history and biography, and pre-1949 Chinese history provided Yan further ground 
for questioning the theory and practice of Communism. The on-going gleaning of 
considerable information and his personal encounter with socio-political turmoil during 
the Cultural Revolution caused him to doubt the praxis of Communism and contemplate 
the reasons behind the tragedies. This chapter is going to examine Yan's political ideas, 
particularly his ideas of democracy, in light of the analytic framework of the present 
study.
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A BRIEF RECAPITULATION OF YAN'S DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT
From the 1970's onwards, Yan has learned more about international political 
systems and thought, which exposure has advanced his ideas of democracy. By 
comparative study, Yan unraveled the fundamental problem of the Chinese political 
system, its lack of procedural rule and consequent totalitarian politics.
In the late 70's, Yan began to propose the end of life tenure for officials (Yan, 
1990: 159-177). Having experienced the effects of corruption and maladministration 
during the Cultural Revolution, Yan decided that over-centralization of power was the 
central problem in the Chinese bureaucratic system. Thereafter he persistently advocated 
a democratic system of checks and balances as a way of overcoming the over­
centralization of power in China (Yan, 1988: 30-38). Yan attacked the feudal 
characteristics of the Chinese political system, arguing that the socio-political system was 
not transformed even after the peasant revolution and the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. 
Yan observed that the continuing despotic system was characterized by a lack of legal 
limits on absolute power. The existence of a nationwide, monolithic, pyramidal power 
structure was the result of having no horizontal division of power among the officials 
(Yan, 1987a: 2-6). As a result, China has been suffering from what Yan calls the "boom- 
and-bust" cycle, a vicious cycle in Chinese history, marked by the general collapse and 
corruption of a dynasty after its rise to power, its removal and succession by another new 
regime which reigns until it in turn becomes corrupt, thereby beginning a new cycle 
(Yan, 1990: 80).
Intending to document the Cultural Revolution in order to learn something from 
the pain of those dreadful ten years, Yan and his wife Gao Gao collaborated to publish 
Ten-year History o f the Chinese Cultural Revolution. In this work, Yan and Gao not only 
lay out the historical facts of the Revolution, attempting to point out the fundamental 
cause for such a tragedy. Yan hoped that China would not fail to learn lesson of its 
history. Instead of merely uncovering the wrongdoing of the Revolution or using it as 
opportunity to criticize, Yan and Gao tried to point out the most important areas in which
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collective reforms were needed. In this work, Yan and Gao spend much time in defining 
successive power struggles among the senior leaders as the typical feature of Chinese 
politics. This work also points out that this kind of political climate lends itself to the 
development of the excessive personality cult which inevitably led to Mao's dictatorship. 
In the preface of the revised edition of this work, Yan and Gao put forward their 
interpretation of the major factors leading to the Revolution. Condemning the rule of 
man rather than the rule of law, they have suggested that the root of the Revolution may 
be discovered in the very foundation of the Chinese socio-political and socio-economic 
structures. They write,
"there were deep-seated economic reasons why the Chinese were swept up in the 
Cultural Revolution by the hundreds of millions. Before the Cultural Revolution, the 
system of state ownership and a highly centralized, planned economy had put China 
imder a high degree of administrative control. Political authority extended, in effect, 
into every area of people's lives." (Yan, 1992: 216-7)
In addition to the over-centralized economic structure, they also suggest four 
political factors which contributed to the eruption of the Revolution. First, Mao's 
diagnosis of Stalin's regime had a formative impact on the Revolution. In his evaluation 
of the socialist praxis under Stalin, Mao declared that the Soviet Union was on the way to 
capitalism. Denouncing "revisionism" in the Soviet Union, Mao thus directed his energy 
to purify the ideological foundation of the people. In contrast to the Soviet Union, Mao 
was determined to purify the ideological foundation of the Chinese people. In contrast 
to the Soviet Union, Mao moved China toward the "real" socialism to be actualized first 
in terms of socialist education and later in the Cultural Revolution. Second, the rift 
between Liu Shaoqi and Mao Zedong intensified, especially when Mao sensed that Liu's 
policy line was well supported in the Party. In order to ensure his supremacy in political 
leadership, Mao mobilized the youth to attack those so-called capitalists and rightists 
within the party and state bureaucracy. The third reason, according to Yan and Gao, was 
the long-standing problem of factional politics. Yan and Gao believe that the lack of a 
sophisticated political structure to monitor the exercise of power will inevitably result in 
chaos and political instability. Last but not least, they explicitly state China lacks is
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democratic mechanisms to ensure power transfer and to monitor daily administration of 
the government. Having reviewed the history of the ten dark years, Yan and Gao feel 
that it is urgent to institutionalize democratic mechanisms in Chinese politics (Yan, 1992; 
see also Yan and Gao, 1988a). However, they could not spell it out freely when they 
were living in the mainland because their speeches had to be screened and approved by 
the senior leaders of the CCP. What they could say explicitly in the early eighties, they 
tactically and strategically implied by publishing their work within the approved 
boundaries. Though implicit, their call for democracy is clear in this work. What Yan 
and Gao have advocated from the early eighties onwards is to curb dictatorship by means 
of institutionalization of proper political stmctures. With due care to their personal 
security, they aired out something which could be tolerated by the party leaders. As 
Nathan (1992: xii) remarked, "[Yan and Gao] have written an important history of the 
Cultural Revolution — Yan is profoundly informative on the complicated question of 
what ails China politically. In searching for ways to reform the system, he has thought 
hard about its fundamental problems, which he sees as both cultural and institutional."
In the early 80’s, well aware of the boundaries of critique and intellectual 
dissidence, Yan did not attack the government directly. Instead, he dressed himself with 
the "Marxist coat", addressing the problem from a historical perspective and confronting 
the existing problems indirectly. Yan used the policy line of the Party, by attacking the 
"gang of four" for causing corruption and abuse of power, to criticize indirectly the 
dictatorship of Mao and to define the fundamental problem in the socio-political 
structure. In fact, his hidden agenda is the importance of a democratic system of 
government. Without mentioning the term "democracy", Yan adopted a moderate 
approach to suggest changes within the approved parameters. In his "'Imperial Power’ 
and 'Imperial Position': Two Characteristics of Autocracy", Yan made it plain that 
without a proper system of power-checking, life-time tenure would probably lead to 
corruption and abuse of power. A powerful implicit message of "division of power" can 
be observed (Yan, 1980);
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"the modem Western countries established their democratic systems beginning with the 
eradication of two characteristics of supreme power under autocratic rule. In those 
countries that have established democracy, the legislative powers no longer rest in the 
hands of an individual, but reside in a parliament that is periodically elected, thus the 
supreme state power is divided; even those who hold the supreme administrative power, 
the president, premier, or prime minister, have their administrative power doubly 
restrained by the parliament and by tenure of office, or at least strictly limited by the 
terms of office, therefore, the nontransferability of the highest power no longer 
remains", (Yan, 1980; translated in Yang and Bachman, 1991: 15)
Yan was conscious of the central problem in the Chinese political system and he 
also hinted at the importance of regulating the state power. To clear the ground for a 
more effective administration, Yan since the late 70's has advocated the removal of 
overcentralization and nontransferability of supreme state power. His proposal "On the 
Leadership Responsibility System", published in 1983, repeatedly stressed the importance 
of administrative reform. In his publication of "Cadre System" in 1987, Yan sought for 
the establishment of a "retirement system" and "a system of limited tenure" in order to 
curb the pressing bureaucratic problems (Yan, 1987b).
When the Central Committee was in the midst of discussing the revised draft of 
the constitution in 1982, Yan seized the opportunity to spell out in a little more detail his 
concept of constitutional rule, showing the imperative of developing the legal system. He 
tactically and wisely expressed his future-oriented and long-term view of the constitution, 
nailing down most carefully the meaning of the power relationship between the state and 
the people. According to Yan, "the relationship between the government and the people, 
the organic form of state institutions and the mutual relations among them, the 
relationship between central and local governments, and the position and role of the 
armed forces in the country" should be precisely stated in the constitution (Yan, 1982, 
quoted from Bachman & Yang, 1991: 19). The distinctive focus of constitutional rule, in 
Yan's eyes, is twofold, namely "division of power" and "checks and balances" in the 
government. He stressed that the state power originates from the people. Yan clearly 
reasoned thus: "who has the authority to discuss and decide on the constitution? The 
people. The present discussion of the constitution fully reflects the principle that the 
people are masters" (Yan, 1982; quoted from Bachman & Yang, 1991: 22).
Yan's political ideas gradually developed, becoming coherent and cohesive as he
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Consolidated what he had written throughout the past decade. Observing the political 
climate, Yan aired his ideas of democracy in an incremental way hoping to get the 
acceptance of the political leaders. Having briefly reviewed Yan's democratic thought, the 
following discussion will concentrate in the characteristics of his ideas of democracy, 
which have been greatly influenced by the Western ideal of democracy despite the fact 
that Yan does not believe that there is a difference between the Western and Eastern 
notions of democracy.®
Yan argues:
"...in the Chinese philosophical reahn, there is no such idea of democracy. Democracy 
basically was imported from the West more than one hundred years ago. However, I 
think there should be no boundary of 'democracy' between the West and the East. I do 
not support the notion claiming that there is difference between the Eastern democracy 
and the Western democracy. In my view, democracy is democracy". (Interview 1, 
Paris, 1992)
In light of this assertion, it is clear then that Yan considers democracy a common 
right of mankind regardless of their nationalities. What Yan has contemplated is an 
overall perspective of social change, involving reforms in the political, economic, legal, 
and cultural realms, with fundamental changes in the political realm. An examination of 
his works can easily reveal that Yan advocates a socio-political transformation of China 
which inevitably touches all the realms of society; social, economic and political. He 
also mentioned in the interview that reforms in mainland China should not be only 
confined to the economic realm but must extend to the socio-political and socio-cultural 
realms (Interview 1, Paris, 1992).
‘Linguistically, the word 'democracy' simply means government by the people, but it leaves many unresolved problems. In our 
contemporary world, there is no government directly ruled by all people. At this point, democracy refers to government by some or by 
a few on behalf o f the rest, as typified by the representative government in modem politics. As Pickles (1970) observes, democratic 
government in the nineteenth century was seen mainly in terms of equality of political and legal rights, of the right to vote, to express 
their own political views and form their political parties to represent their interests, and of the right to elect representatives to supervise 
or control the government. Democracy, then, is a system which basically rests on two principles, first, the people should have the 
guaranteed right to voice as accurately as possible their opinions on who shall be their representatives and how the country is to be 
ruled. This involves the practice of universal suffiage and a procedural rule in the government. Second, it has to make sure the 
electorate's interests and rights are well-protected, having guaranteed rights to change the government whenever they are dissatisfied 
with its performance. Aside from the institutional perspective o f democracy, it can be interpreted as more a way o f life, concerned 
with some general principles such as upholding social justice, equality and fraternity. However, it gives no guidance to government as 
to how societies can be organized. Therefore, the institutionalization o f a more sophisticated system can put these principles into 
practice. A democratic system, from this point of view, is a mechanism to support a democratic way o f life. Popper (1966) observes 
that democracy is only a mechanism to prevent making big human mistakes, providing a set of procedures to countercheck the process 
o f policy-making. In this way, democracy cannot ensure a perfect leadership nor guarantee that the best people are being selected in 
the govemment It can only offer a legitimate channel to replace the government, protecting the rights o f the people by means of a 
system through which they can exercise their power to elect other representatives to work for them.
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Procedural Rule and Rule bv the People
Yan's conception of power relationship between the people and the state can be 
summarized by the assertion that the state authority originates from the people. Yan 
maintains that people should have the right to change the govemment whenever they are
dissatisfied with its performance (see, Yan, 1988).
"The lack of freedom of speech and freedom to get access to information shows us the 
absence of the foundation of democracy ... In my view, we have to guarantee freedom 
of speech and freedom of press; without them, there is no point in discussing 
democracy. It is also my conception that freedom of speech is fundamental to 
democracy. Without this, how can we talk about decision-making. People should have 
the freedom to express their views, to choose what to say according to their conscience 
(niangxin). In addition, they can either choose to express their own views or remain 
silent. In this way, their freedom of conscience is confirmed". (Interview 1, Paris, 1992)
In his "gongtong whnhua yinsu" (common cultural factors) Yan proclaimed the 
principles of humanism, democracy, and freedom as common to all people regardless of 
their races or countries (Yan, 1988: 64; see also interview 1, 1992: 4). All in all, it leaves 
his readers in no doubt that Yan faithfully adheres to the ideal of democracy. Yan agrees 
with Popper's suggestion that the heart of democracy is "procedural politics",(Yan, 1990: 
49-51) accentuating the importance of the steps and rules in policy-making as well as the 
establishment of a proper mechanism to regulate the govemment.
Central to Yan's political thought is the necessity for links between political 
reform and the mle of law and the constitution. Consistent with the Weberian rational- 
legal model, Yan has been suggesting that rationality is the key for people to live 
harmoniously. In his early writing on "Three Courts for Judging Truth: Religion, 
Rationality & Practice", Yan began to develop his rational stand as the sole criterion for 
judging truth, implicitly attacking the personality cult and the despotic politics of the 
Cultural Revolution (Yan, 1988: 21-29; 115-138). Even after being forced to be a 
revolutionary exile in Paris, he still holds firmly the principles of "peace, rationality and 
non-violence" in stmggling for democracy rather than to advocate terrorist and radical 
means to achieve his ends {Contemporary, 1989, 12: 45). He said, "1 think it is wrong to 
enforce changes by political power or brute force" (Interview 1, Paris, 1992).
This writer concludes that Yan's adherence to rationality is the "product" of his
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profound analysis and evaluation of the despotic rule.
Incremental and Fundamental Approach to Changes: Democratization from the Micro to 
Macro Level
Acknowledging the strengths and limitations of a democratic system, Yan 
proposed an incremental and pragmatic approach to democratization. He has not 
proposed a vehement attack on the present regime, nor a transformation of China into a
democratic state overnight.^ He made this clear to me,
"I don't think that we have to turn China into a democratic state overnight, but at least, 
we have to begin developing our democratic system gradually". (Interview 1, Paris, 
1992)
"I strongly believe that the transformation of society is a process heavily involving
ideological changes in which education and transmission of new ideas and values
become strategic". (Interview 1, Paris, 1992)
Even though Yan was elected as the President of the FDC, an organization which 
supported pro-democracy movement in mainland China, he did not proclaim that the 
FDC was going to overthrow the CCP. Unlike the China Alliance for Democracy (CAD) 
which was in favour of a "reform outside the system", the FDC aimed at "reform within 
the system", expecting that a moderate faction would ascend to power in Beijing which 
would eventually rehabilitate the democratic movement and gradually political 
pluriformity in China. As Chong (1989a; 3) observed, "the FDC has declared that it 
wants to terminate the one-party dictatorship, not by overthrowing the ruling CCP, but by 
preparing the way to a multi-party system". These recent statements indicate us that
though Yan rejects the Li Peng Govemment, he is well aware of the structural and
institutional constraints to overthrow the CCP overnight. Without any independent and 
autonomous social organization or political entity as such existing in mainland China, 
Yan and also the FDC leadership have to choose a relatively moderate strategy in dealing 
with the present situation. It is at this point we get the impression that the choice or 
strategy which these political activists adopt is closely related to the political opportunity 
structure to which they access.
draw this line of argument &om the interview with Yan (1992) and Bachman and Yang (1991).
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Following the same logic, we argue that Yan made his critique and radicalism 
openly in the mid-eighties is also related to the change of his social location and the 
"resources" that he accessed. Living against a socio-political environment which was 
under restricted by the CCP, Yan had to not only observe the political climate but also 
calculate the costs and benefits after openly revealing his critique and attack on the CCP. 
It is therefore understandable that Yan should incrementally or gradually elicit his ideas. 
Yan's proposals for change were refined and carefully enunciated within the official 
constraints. His proposal on administrative reforms at a micro level preceding the 
institutional reforms at the macro level shows his political wisdom on the one hand and 
his pragmatic stand on democratization and transformation of China on the other hand. 
Contemplating democratization in China, Yan does not merely fall into empty slogans. 
Instead, he seriously maps out the framework for political reform in China. His notion 
of direct election starting from the county level, closely follows his advocacy of checks 
and balances in the political system. Yan has envisaged the long-range goal of political 
reform in China to improve the people's participation in govemment. The gradual 
democratization from the micro level, according to Yan, is both politically functional 
and educationally effective.
"In my opinion, the actualization of democratization should start with direct election 
practiced at the xiangzhen level, such as the election in small villages and small towns. 
If democratic elections are implemented successfully at this level, people can 
experience what democracy is. Democratization starting from the local level not only 
has educational function but also consolidates the local administration". (Interview 1, 
Paris, 1992)
The idea of direct election at the xiangzhen level also links with Yan's suggestion 
of the horizontal separation of power between the Party and the National People's 
Congress in order to consolidate constitutional rule in China (Yan, 1990: 107-115; 179- 
182).® His notion of the practice of election at the micro level is similar to that of 
Rousseau, John Stuart Mill and G.D.H. Cole, for they also stress the importance of direct 
experiences in election at the micro level such as small communities and factories
*Yan also stressed this point to the author during the interview conducted in Paris, August 1992.
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(Rousseau, 1913). The institutionalization of the rule of law and the establishment of the 
democratic system, in this regard, go hand in hand to realize the ultimate goal — the 
development of an autonomous civil society where the state power is well-defined and 
limited (Bachman and Yang, 1991: xxviii).
Protection of Minoritv Rights: A New Element in Yan's Thought
Having now experienced life in a democratic society, Yan has further 
observations of the essence of democracy. From my interview with Yan, it is evident that 
the idea of "protecting the minority choice" has been added to Yan's democratic thoughts. 
In the winter of 1989, Yan delivered a lecture in Amsterdam during which he stated that 
the most important characteristic of democracy was "to follow the majority", and he did 
not mention the protection of minority choice.^ If we investigate his early writings, we 
also see his emphasis on the collective rather than individuals. In his "Enlightenment 
from 'Plymouth Rock'", Yan argues that democracy enhances the spirit of the collective, 
thus strengthening the cooperative functioning of society (Bachman & Yang, 1991: 141- 
145). In this way, the will of the majority is stressed but it ignores the views of 
individuals. Yang and Bachman point out the fact that Yan "pays scarce attention to 
discussing the possibility of the tyranny of the majority or the ideas of the protection of 
basic individual rights" (Bachman & Yang, 1991: xxix). Yan's former emphasis on the 
collective is intimately related to his personal experience of living under a Communist 
regime. His life in exile clearly has provided him the chance to realize the importance of 
individual rights, causing him to re-think the essence of democracy.
Yan's view on protection of the minority is consistent with his new concern with 
individual autonomy in thinking and expression, what he calls the "freedom of 
conscience" {[iangxin ziyou). It seems that the respect of individual rights not only has 
been added to his conception of democracy but also has been internalized in his life. 
Despite his prominent position, Yan and his wife still believe that they are only ordinary 
people, and they do not take for granted the freedoms they now enjoy nor the help they
^  draw this from W.L. Chong, the chief editor o f China Information.
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receive from others {Contemporary, 1989, 6: 31)/°
Bachman and Yang argue that Yan also emphasizes the importance of the deeply 
rooted Chinese tradition — social harmony (Bachman & Yang, 1991: xxix-xxx). But a 
reading of Yan's recent ideas reveals that Yan has changed his perception of social 
harmony. Though he earlier stressed social harmony, Yan now frankly acknowledges
that it is normal to see differences among people.
"Our society is not a perfect society. Whenever and whatever problems we face, we 
should deal with them with an open attitude, allowing and accepting criticisms and 
comments from people". (Interview 1, Paris, 1992)
In his term as the chairman of the Front for Democratic China (FDC), Yan found 
it difficult to accommodate different opinions, but he still admitted that having divergent 
ways of thought and styles in doing things is a normal phenomenon {Contemporary, 
1990: 16). His distaste for the Communist rule in China lies with the nature of its 
omnipotence and total control of people's lives.
Further Emphasis on People's Power
Yan prefers the role of educator, spreading and promoting the democratic ideas 
among the public. He would like to be elected as a legislator, speaking on behalf of the 
people.
"It is my personal interest to be elected as a councillor in the National Congress like the 
directly elected legislative councillors Li Zhuming and Situ Hua in H.K., playing the 
role of people's representative". (Interview 1, Paris, 1992)
Unlike the traditional elitist view of the literati who acted as the society's 
conscience, Yan posits the concept that the important relationship between the 
intellectuals and the mass is that the intellectuals are only part of the people, not a special 
class or social stratum (Interview 1, Paris, 1992). Acknowledging the alliance between 
the intellectuals and the people, Yan suggests that intellectuals should support any pro­
democracy movement arising from the people, but they should not organize any 
movement which stands apart from the people. Yan said.
’°When I went to interview Yan Jiaqi, he came to pick me up in person, showing his sincerity and respect for others. I am also 
personally impressed by Yan's sincerity and warm reception during the interview. From my own experience, I hold that the notion of 
"individuality" is playing a more prominent role in Yan's political thought
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"[the intellectuals] are only part of the people, though a little more sophisticated about 
new ideas, playing the role as educator to spread the new thinking and ideology. It is 
why I argue that intellectuals support the same reforms as the ordinary people do". 
(Interview 1, Paris, 1992)
Thus Yan has seen the importance of support from the people especially after the 
massacre in 1989. His former elitist notion of intellectuals as a special minority to rule 
over the majority has changed (see, He Baogang, 1991: 41).
An intensive analysis of his recent reflections on democracy reveals that his 
thoughts have moved more markedly toward the Western conception of democracy. In 
my interview with Yan in August of 1992," Yan explicitly asserted the principles of 
democracy. He said,
"The principle of democracy is to confirm that the people should have the final say in 
decision-making, that is, the authority of the govemment is in the hands of the people. 
Basically, democracy involves three main principles: first, respect the majority rule; 
second, protect the minority choice; and third, decision-making is based on formal 
procedures". (Interview 1, Paris, 1992)
Yan added,
"... democracy not only refers to a political system but also to a way of life in any 
organization ... democratic politics, in brief, can be characterized by 'procedural 
politics'". (Interview 1, Paris, 1992)
The internalization of Western democratic thought and the personal experience of 
democratic life have caused Yan to change his concept of democracy. It is also worth 
noting that his recent proposal to unify China in terms of a federal system reflect his 
evolving conception of democracy, in which individual rights and individual autonomy 
now have a place. In his "Third Republic", the principles of division of power and the 
checks and balances and thus of the interests of the people, will be realized and 
guaranteed (Yan, 1990b).
"The following section is based on an interview in Paris in August 1992 with Yan, discussing his ideas on democracy, the future 
democratization in China and the evaluation of the pro-democracy movement in 1989.
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TOWARD A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF YAN JIAQI’S SOCIAL-POLITICAL 
IDEAS
The scrutiny of Yan’s social-political ideas should be viewed holitically, 
inasmuchas his ideas are not fragmented but well-related to each other. In particular, we 
must analyze Yan's ideas and approaches in the light of his unique socio-historical 
context. Confronted with the constraints which the Communist Party imposed on Yan's 
outspokenness, Yan had to observe the political climate when making open critique and 
criticism of the state.^  ^ It is, therefore, desirable for us to examine his ideas in relation to 
the socio-historical context which often forced him to follow the policy line of the 
Communist Party.
Having realized the deficiency of China's science and technology, the post-Mao 
leadership not only encouraged the development of science and technolgy but also 
revived social sciences for which were severely curtailed in the Mao era. During the Mao 
era, the social sciences had been incoporated into the Academy of Science but they were 
finally separated in the post-Mao period. In 1978, the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS) was established with many research institutes which were to become 
the think tanks and their members later became the advisors to the political reform 
leaders. Seeing social sciences as significant to China's reforms, a staff commentator of 
Philosophy Research made it clear that "Every branch of philosophy and social sciences, 
like natural sciences, deals with a specific subject and follows a rigid logic of reasoning 
... [W]e must foster a general awareness among the people that it is necessary to draw a 
well-defined line between political issues and academic issues" (cited in Goldman, 1994: 
31-32). Supporting a more democratic atmosphere for the development of social 
sciences, many Chinese intellectuals criticized the wrongdoing in the Cultural Revolution 
by labelling social sciences as bourgeois thought. Zhou Yang, a cultural czar of Mao's 
era, said that "Some combrades had some naive and mistaken idea in wanting to mark off
'^For the details o f Communist Party's control over the Chinese society, see Schurman (1968); Rai (1991). Yan also conceded that 
the CCP's control was totalistic before 1989 (Interview 1, Paris, 1992).
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a clear division between politics and academia" and he continued: "Without a lively 
democratic atmosphere they will not develop soundly" (cited in Goldman, 1994: 32). 
Against such a social atmosphere, a number of researchers at CASS openly proclaimed 
that "freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, assembly, association, procession, 
demonstration and the freedom to strike" were stipulated by China's constitution, 
believing that these rights should not be infringed but be protected. As Goldman (1994: 
35) suggested, the intellectual revival of post-Mao China "reclaimed not only the May 
Fourth movement's emphasis on science and experience but its call for democracy". It is 
also against such a unique socio-political and socio-cultural contexts that Yan's social- 
political ideas were formed.
His article "The Meaning of Democracy", published in 1979 shows Yan already 
held a relatively clear concept of democracy. Yan made a clear and unequivocal 
statement that democracy is about the relationship between the people and the state in 
which the state power originates from the people and provides a mechanism to protect the 
rights and the interests of the people. At this point Yan argued that the separation of 
power and the element of election are inherent in a democratic system. Defying the 
undemocratic nature of the traditional political structure, Yan pointed to the fact that 
"minben" is different from ''minzhu''}^ Having discovered the essence of "minzhu", Yan 
asserted in the late 70's that the institutionalization of a democratic system was politically 
exigent. Furthermore, Yan's examination of different political systems around the world 
also moved him to point out the importance of separation of power into executive, 
legislative and judicial branches (Yan, 1980 published in Yang, 1990: 143-152). His idea 
of "separation of power" attracted the attention of most of the prominent social scientists. 
However, this idea was only shared and supported silently in the intellectual community 
but forbidden to be openly published in the late 70's (Yang, 1990: 14-15). It suffices that
"According to Confucian thought, the ruler should make appropriate policies to safeguard people's interests. However, there is not 
the concept of 'people's rights' and rule by people' in Confucian thinking. Accordingly, the respect for people's interests is different 
from the concept o f rights o f people that which every person should possess regardless his/her racial and political background. 
Having such observations, Yan points out the traditional concept of Minben is different from the Western notion of democracy 
Minzhu.
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without official support, Yan could not openly promote his ideas.
In another article entitled "The Question of Political System in Socialist Thought" 
(1979), Yan argued that Marx himself had also acknowledged the importance of 
procedural rule as practiced in the Paris commune. Echoing Marx, Yan sought to set out 
the framework of a democratic system, arguing that democracy is not only listening and 
responding promptly to the people but also institutionalizing a system of procedures in 
the govemment (Yan 1979). Without support from the state, the idea of democracy was 
not widely promoted in the early 1980's. At that time, Deng Xiaoping endorsed only 
reform in the administrative realm but did not approve stmctural reform, thus tempering 
the pace of political reform. Despite this, Yan did not stop thinking about democracy. 
Instead, he had studied different political systems, contrasting different political thoughts, 
and waiting for an opportunity once again to capture the tide to promote his ideas of 
reform. Here, Yan's moderate stance has to do with his socio-political circumstances. It 
is clear that without securing any support form political patrons, intellectuals should have 
found difficulty in making his political views openly. To be more specific, Yan's social 
and political proposals must have got Deng Xiaoping's endorcement. Without Deng's 
blessing, Yan only found himself vulnerable, not to say putting his ideas into effect. In 
the mid-eighties, riding the high tide of political reform, Yan took his position one step 
forward and suggested the institutionalization of a democratic system, involving 
fundamental changes in the political structure.
When the socio-political atmosphere once again relaxed in the late 80's, Yan again 
attempted to break the "political taboo" of discussing democracy. In his Shou nao lun, 
(On the Head of State and Govemment), Yan compared different forms of leadership and 
political system, highlighting the problems arising from the centralization of power, and 
pointed toward a system of "collective leadership" regulated by a procedural framework 
(Yan, 1986). Yan evaluated the leadership of Mao Zedong and made a sweeping 
conclusion that the heart of the problem lay in the life appointment. This system made 
power untransferable and left modem China trapped by its traditional regime of a non­
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procedural form of politics which exaggerates the role of the individual leaders (Yan, 
1987: 84-92; 1990: 83-89). He proposed as a solution the separation of power and the 
establishment of checks and balances in the govemment. To evoke the imperative of the 
institutionalization of a democratic system, Yan also published another book Quanli yu 
Zhenli (Power and Truth), containing a series of short essays on democracy, including his 
conception of power relationship between the state and the people, his studies of different 
political stmctures and his rational thought in judging tmth. Like other Chinese 
intellectuals, Yan had to observe the political climate, deciding what was the right time to 
publish and release his political views. It again shows us how individual choice is 
structurally and institutionally constrained. Notwithstanding the social constrints 
imposed on individual choice in reacting to external threat or crisis, we must 
acknowledge the fact that indivuduals still retain a certain amount of autonomy in the 
choice of strategies responding to their unique environments. As intellectuals change 
from one social location to another their ideas change also. From this point of departure, 
we must not treat ideological change simply as an intellectual response to the context. 
Instead, it is a more complex, complicated and interactionist phenomenon. It would help 
if the relation of intellectuals to social groups is worked out especially as the ideas 
developed by an individual relates to the collective social forces at work within the 
"social location".
Social Location of Intellectuals and Ideological Formation
Putting the foregoing socio-political context into perspective, we argue that Yan 
Jiaqi was one of these social scientists who supported democracy and advocated freedom 
in academic world. With his connection to Yu Guangyuan, a vice president of the 
Academy of Social Sciences and a deputy director of the State Science and Technology 
Commission and also an advisor to Hu Yaobang in the late 1970s, Yan occupied a very 
strategic position as distingusihed with his fellow colleagues.""^ Early in the 1980's, Yan
was a research student of Yu and Yu had a very positive opinion of Yan. It is reported that it was Yu who discovered the 
special potential of Yan and therefore invited him to join his research institute. See my discussion under the heading o f educational 
oreintation and ideological formation in this chapter.
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was only a research assistent of the Philosophy Research Institute of the CASS under the 
supervision of Yu. With his outstanding research ability and publications in his field (see 
the foregoing discussion in this chapter on his development of ideas), together with Yu's 
support, Yan succeed in getting promoted as the director of the Institute of Political 
Science under CASS. In 1987, Yan was made more politically important when he was 
appointed one of four deputy directors in the Political Structure Reform Research Group 
of the Party Central Committee headed by Bao Tong, Zhao Ziyang's effective chief-of- 
staff. The Research Centre was the think tank serving Zhao. Before such an 
appointment, Yan was also invited to a Working Group for Reform of the Political 
System held between September 1986 and November 1987. This Working Group 
consisted of Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili, Tian Jiyun, Peng Chong and Bo Yibo, and had been 
set up with the premission of Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian. This Working 
Group rendered an arena for the discussion of political reform in China on the basis of 
relevant speeches by Deng Xiaoping.
Yan's unique position in the political establishment must have shaped his value 
orientation as well as his political ideas to a considerable degree. The publication of his 
ideas, particularly his political thought, was screened by the Party and, we presume, was 
endorsed by senior leadership. An analysis of Yan's political ideas published in the 80's 
revealed that his thought closely conformed with that of the state. In the late 70's and 
early 80's, Deng Xiaoping also suggested reforms in the leadership and political structure, 
openly advocating a more open and responsive political system (Deng Xiaoping, 1983: 
280-302). The 1982 constitution incorporated his proposal that cadres should have 
specified terms of office, and his idea of developing a civil service system was endorsed 
in the 1988 National People's Congress. It is also suggested by Bachman and Yang that 
Yan's ideas of administrative and political reforms were endorsed by Deng (Bachman & 
Yang, 1991: xxvi). In the high tide of reforms, Zhao Ziyang not only advocated 
economic reforms but also supported a deepening reform in the political system. A series 
of reform proposals on the political structure was initiated in the 13th Party Congress in
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1987. To some extent, then, the political ideas of intellectuals have been "shaped" by 
their relationship with the state. Yan's role as both a member of the Party and an 
establishment intellectual, and especially his close association to the senior Party leader, 
Zhao Ziyang and Bao Tong, made Y an far from independent, particularly before the 
massacre (see, for example, Goldman, 1992).
Before the 1989 movement, Y an still regarded himself as a reformer working 
largely within the existing s y s t e m . W i t h  the blessings from his political patrons, Yan 
could advocate changes only at the margins. This obviously explains why Yan adopted a 
more moderate stand, hoping to assist the state to deepen its reforms. Besides, the 
intellectuals’ preference to be moderate reformers instead of radical revolutionary is 
closely related to political reality. The moderate stand of some significant and influential 
reformer intellectuals has actually motivated political changes in Communist China. 
Yan honestly admits that,
"The reformer intellectuals, including me, have supported Deng's reform programmes 
since we believe that the goal of reforms is also supported by the people. Being part of 
the people, intellectuals should also cast their support to it". (Interview 1, Paris, 1992)
Thus, Yan’s social position was always tenuously linked with their political 
patrons. In the midst of a power struggle or factional politics, the political leaders may 
turn on their advisors as scapegoats in order to retain their pos i t i ons .Or  worse still, the 
intellectuals may lose their political significance when their patrons no longer listen to 
them or "buy" their ideas.
Political and historical reality lay beyond Yan’s understanding, when he lost 
political influence in the late 80’s by Zhao Ziyang’s rejection of most of his ideas on 
political reform {The Nineties, 1989, 2: 23). Yan lost a sense of reality as he lost political 
influence to the ruling elite. Yan also revealed to Li Xifen, a Hong Kong journalist, a
'^Yan told me during the interview in Paris 1992 that he is not a dissident but rather a reformer supporting economic and political 
reforms in C hina.
‘^Yan himself praises this group of intellectuals and says that they have made great contributions to the development of China. See 
(Interview 1, Paris, 1992) and also Bachman & Yang (1991, especially the introduction).
'^Though Hu Yaobang, the former Party secretary, was regarded as the patron o f the intellectuals, he had to criticize the intellectuals' 
capitalist thinking during the political struggle in 1986-87.
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statement that he had failed to persuade Zhao to press for more comprehensive political 
reform (Li Xifen, 1989: 241).
"It has not been the style of Zhao Ziyang to have close association with any individuals, 
for he tends to be task-oriented. It is wrong, as the public beUeve, that 1 had a very 
close Link with the Party secretary." (Li Xifen, 1989: 241, my translation)
"Zhao is not as enlightened as the media have portrayed him. He is a careful pohtician, 
tending not to anger the senior leaders superior to him. Viewed in that way, it is, 
therefore, easy to see that Zhao has given much weight to the senior revolutionaries 
especially paying great respect to Deng Xiaoping." (Ibid)
Yan also revealed that Zhao Ziyang’s political position was weak since he had no 
coterie of personal supporters within the top leadership. Zhao, unlike the projected image 
as a brave and powerful reformer, he only executed what Deng ordered and avoided to go 
against him. Even though Yan regarded Zhao as a decent man, the FDC, as Yan claimed, 
did not pin its hope on his return. Considering Zhao not a man of democratic thought, 
Yan anticipated that Zhao would oppose a multi-party system (Korzec, 1989). His 
expereince in the Research Group proved very frustrating for Yan since all of his ideas 
for political reform were rejected by Zhao Ziyang except for his suggestion of reform in 
the cadre system and the notion of separation of the Party and the state. Other ideas such 
as direct election to the National People's Congress and the local people’s congress were 
renounced by the CCP. Without success in getting his democratic proposals accepted, 
Yan stated that "the Working Group only put forward views concerning aspects that were 
not addressed in them, and problems remained unresolved" (cited in Chong, 1989a: 18). 
The dubious results of these meetings were communicated to those actual engaged in 
research and planning of reform work, such as Bao Tong, Zhou Jie, and Yan himself 
afterwards but these ritual proceedings had never come to any concrete reform strategies 
and proposals for implementation.
In the same vien, Bachman and Yang also observe that Yan could advocate his
political ideas only in the internal meetings of the "think tank", but he was forbidden to
publish his ideas publicly (Bachman and Yang, 1991: xx). Having lost his position in the
Research Centre in 1987, Yan felt frustrated that his political ideas were abandoned. In
addition, Deng Xiaoping’s vehement criticism of Yan’s ideas of unification, condemning
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Yan as even worse than Liu Binyan, (see, The Nineties, 1989, 2: 23) and his open 
confrontation with the massacre in 1989 led to the change of his social location and thus 
of his political orientation. These changes account for Yan’s attack on Deng Xiaoping 
through what he called an "imaginary conversation between Deng and Mao Zedong". In 
this particular piece of work, Yan with his unusual directness criticizes Deng and his 
clique — Li Peng and Yang Shangkun (Yan, Sep. 1989 collected in Yan, 1992). He also 
proclaimed that China was not a republic but an autocratic entity dominated by some 
dictators (Yan, July, 1989 collected in Yan 1992). Confronted with these socio-political 
circumstances, Yan began to realize the cold reality that his social position would be 
threathened without the "consent" of the senior leaders, epecially when he lost the 
blessings from Deng Xiaoping. Having realized his position was shaken, Yan became 
more critical of the socialist praxis. In his dialogue with Wen Yuankai, a prominent 
scientist and reformer, Yan, assuming the social obligation of intellectuals, attacked the 
half-hearted measures of the government in political reform in the late 1980s (Yan, 1990: 
9-23). In a Tokyo interview, Yan even boldly defied the Communist leadership by 
urging the abolition of the Politburo, which he regarded as another government over the 
formal government just before the Tiananmen massacre of 1989 (Ming Bao, Fed. 25, 
1989: 1)
In his interview with Michel Korzec, a Dutch political scientist, Yan said that he
had believed that it was only possible to work for change from within the Party until the
Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989. Yan began to realize that democratization under the
Party was impossible after the massacre (Korzec, 1989). He also admitted that Fang
Lizhi was quicker than himself, Liu Binyan, and Su Zhaozhi to recognize such a fact.
Trusting Deng’s as committed reformer, Yan, like other reformer intellectuals, offered
their support to the CCP before 1989. Nevertheless, they were forced to change their
view as their social location changed after the massacre of 1989. Yan explained,
"It seemed that Deng was on the other side. We then started, albeit in a cations fashion, 
to attack Deng, but we still believed that aU would be well within the Party if we could 
force Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng to resign in favour of Zhao Ziyang. In the past, we 
similarly supported 'reformer' Deng Xiaoping against conservatives' such as Chen Yun.
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But this distinction between conservatives and liberals within the Party was a 
misconception, an illusion. Now that we know that China cannot make any progress as 
long as it remains a one-party state. It must become a multi-party system. That is the 
objective behind the establishment of the FDC." (Quoted from Chong, 1989a: 18)
It is in this light we argue that the change of intellectuals' social location should 
have significant impact on their ideological formation. Yan himself frankly admits that 
among Chinese liberal intellectuals, some do not believe in Marxism at all but simply 
dress themselves in a "Marxist coat". Under the control of the Communist Party, the 
liberal intellectuals (Yan being one of them) have to "uphold the Red Flag in order to 
oppose it", meaning using official slogans as a cover for the purpose of spreading 
dissident view (Hua Shiping, 1990). Their claim to be communists, seen in this way, is 
simply a strategy for dealing with the state. Goldman suggests that "most of the critical 
intellectuals justified their actions in Marxist terms, but their interpretations of Marxism 
drew on their Confucian heritage, the Western democratic concepts introducted into 
China in the early decades of the twentieth century, and Western Marxism" (Goldman, 
1992: 210). Thus, these observations have revealed the fact that Chinese intellectuals are 
not immune to the constraints of their unique social location. Despite Yan's effort in 
developing autonomous values (field) in contrast with the dominant values (apparatus), 
he is not totally freed from the constraints of the context where he lives.
Even during his exile in Paris, Yan continues to use practical tatics in his
allegiance with the other pro-reform leaders to exert external pressure to force changes in 
mainland China (Interview 1, Paris, 1992). Instead of clinging to the simplistic, 
dichotomous distinctions "hard-liners" and "soft-liners" in the midst of democratic 
t r a n s i t i o n , 8^ Yan's political stance has been one of pragmatic compromise.
Since the massacre, Yan's democratic ideas have undergone some changes. He
has become more critical and independent in thinking, criticizing not only the
maladministration but also the political system and ideology as a whole. This change, in 
my opinion, is also closely associated with the change of Yan's social location. His direct
base such dichotonous distinctions on Veiba (1987); O'Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead (1986). One point which must be stated 
here is that such a dichotomy, though insightful, still has limitation because there are many variations in the empirical world that make 
the categorization difficult.
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experience and interaction with the state corrected his mythology and romanticization of 
the role as establishment intellectual. It likewise made Yan more conscious of the 
independent role of intellectuals. As Goldman (1992) suggested, the critical intellectuals 
have become more aware of their independent position after experiencing the dark age in 
the Cultural Revolution, realizing that even rights given to them by an enlightened 
leadership can be taken away (Goldman, 1992). These realities made Yan more critical, 
and moved him further toward the people and the realization that the intellectuals must 
speak on behalf of the people.
It is also suggested by some scholars that the reformer intellectuals had begun to
reevaluate their role and relationship with the state after the anti-bourgeois campaign in
1986-87.“19 Their dream to reform the CCP from within was eventually broken. The
gloomy future of political reform together with the realization of official mistrust of the
intellectuals caused the intellectuals to assess their future role. Yan said,
"The situation has changed since the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, After the 
massacre, many intellectuals have begun to think about de-communism.^o They have 
been thinking of how to abolish one-party rule by the Communists". (Interview 1, Paris, 
1992)
It is against this background that the intellectuals from science and humanities and 
social sciences petitioned the state to release Wei Jingsheng. Their search for intellectual 
autonomy early in 1989, culminated in the pro-democracy movement in June of 1989.21 
The post-Mao intellectuals have acknowledged the problems of autocratic polity and 
demanded institutional and legal guarantees of civil rights and freedom. They question 
the economic and political system that allowed the tragedies of the Cultural Revolution 
and even query whether the leaders are accountable to, and upholding the interests of the 
people. They therefore call for fundamental changes in the system. Thus we see how 
Mannheim's notion of intellectuals' social location influences their political ideas.
^^The reformer intellectuals began to think about their relationship with the state after the purge of some of the outspoken 
intellectuals such as Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan and Wang Ruowang in the anti-bourgeois campaign in 1986-87. See, for example, Schell 
(1988): Kelly (1990) and Goldman (1992).
^^De-communism means the abolition of one-party and the formation of a more democratic government, allowing fieedom for the 
people.
^^For details of the petition of the intellectual community to the state, see, for example, Zheng Ming (1989, 4: 18-20; 1989, 3: 22-38).
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Socio-Economic and Political Opportunities and Intellectual Radicalism
It is further evident that intellectual radicalism depends heavily on the resources 
that the activists can mobilize (Tilly, 1978 and Brym, 1980) and the political opportunity 
structure to which they have access (Tarrow, 1989; Brockett, 1991; and Me Adam, 1982, 
1988). In pratical terms this means that the intellectuals must calculate their bargaining 
power in terms of the size of their community, their level of group organization and the 
resources that they have (Brym, 1980, 1987). They have to evaluate the political 
environment, not only their avalability to powerful positions within the formal political 
actions (Tarrow, 1989; Brockett, 1991 and AcAdam, 1982, 1988). Prior to 1989, Yan 
played by the Party’s rules. Like other establishment intellectuals, Yan had to decide 
what was the right time to speak out. Being both a party member and also part of the 
state apparatus, Yan learnt to be more cautious not to abuse the economic and political 
opportunities to which he had access. Without a strong basis either from any autonomous 
intellectual organization or from civil society in the earlier 1980's, Yan used to a 
relatively moderate approach to test whether the state could tolerate his liberal ideas. 
Nevertheless, the close association with the Stone, a privately-owned computer 
corporation which had close link with Zhao Ziyang, Yan’s political opportunity structure 
thus changed in the late eighties. Wan Runnan, the former president of Stone, strongly 
believed that there was a definite relation between economic reform and political reform, 
he therefore established a research unit to study reform problems and lobby for change. 
As Chong (1989a: 8) suggested, ’’this unit became one of Zhao Ziyang’s think tanks, like 
the Chinese Academy for Social Sceinces (CASS), to which Yan Jiaqi and Su Shaoshi 
formerly belonged.” Cao Siyuan, one of Stone’s top administrators, was also an advisor 
to Zhao Ziyang. It is reported that Stone had given much support to the pro-democracy 
movement of 1989 and it was thus one of the targets of attack by Li Peng. The Guardian, 
a newspaper published in England, reported that Stone had financed a democratic 
meeting held on 26 March 1989, coinciding with the NPC session, and convened secretly 
in the new National Library in Beijing. Stone was also said to have call on the CCP to
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remove all mention of MaoZedong Thought and four cardinal principles from the State 
Consitituion {The Guardian, 28 March 1989; see also, Chong, 1989b). In a conference 
organized by the FDC in Chicago, Wan Runnan revealed that Stone had rendered no less 
than RMB 40,000 per day in support of the pro-democracy movement. He also 
considered that the significant impact of modem electronic equipment on China's social- 
political change should not be under-estimated. He also regarded the availability of 
modem electronic equipment in China was the result of Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang, 
especially with their sympathetic attitude towards modem technology and liberal thinking 
{Jiefang Yuebao, August 1989). Having the support from Stone, the socio-economic 
opportunity of intellectuals must be enhanced. Black and Munro (1993) also argue along 
this line that the rise of relatively autonomous and private enterprises in mainland China 
not only gave additional sources to the Chinese intellectuals especially by supporting the 
activities of research institutes but also attributed to the expansion of civil society in post- 
Mao China (see also Bonnin and Chevrier, 1991). Having the connection to Stone and 
other research institutes, Yan could get access to more resources which eventually 
affected his political opportunity stmcture and als his coping strategies.
Yan's failure to get the consent of the state inevitably moved him to become a 
"critic" of the state. This new relationship with the state and the unprededented 
outpouring of support from the people gave Yan and other critical intellectuals a golden 
opportunity to push for democratization in China. Now in exile in Paris, Yan is free from 
the immediate control of the CCP, therefore he is much bolder and more autonomous to 
express his v ie w s .22 When Yan became the chairman of the FDC (1991-1992)
immediately after the 1989 June Fourth movement, he became much more critical of the 
existing socialist rule in mainland C h in a .23
Like Yan, Su Shaozhi, the former director of the Chinese Academy of Marxist
^^The most up-dated information about Yan is that he now lives in the United States as visiting research fellow. When this thesis was 
written, Yan was still in Paris.
2^11 is also note-worthy that because Yan has received financial support from the French government, his socio-economic and political 
opportunities have improved when in comparison with those of his counterparts in China. With such an improvement, the critical 
stand of Yan is thus enhanced. See, (Interview 1, Paris, 1992).
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and Leninist Thought, after having been labeled by the party as a bourgeois liberalist, 
began to attack the CCP and urged further democratization in the political structure of 
China. His explusion from the party made Su more radical and critical of the existing 
system. His exile in the United States and changes in social location have freed him to 
denounce the CCP (see, for example. Su Shaoshi, 1990).^^
Chen Yizhi, a close associate and advisor to the former party secretary, Zhao 
Ziyang, also considers himself as a reformer rather than a dissident. Before his exile to 
the United States, Chen was one of the reformers supporting democratic and economic 
reforms in China. Chen Yizhi told me in an interview that he was a typical reform- 
minded intellectual who believed that the CCP could be improved. Seeing no other 
alternate party to replace the CCP, he therefore decided to work within the system in 
order to change it (Interview 2, Princeton, 1993). His expilsion from the party and his 
reflection upon the 1989 movement make him aware of the importance of intellectual 
independence. Chen openly declares that he will no longer attempt to reform the party as 
an insider (Ma, 1 9 9 3 ).^^
These scholars, originally establishment intellectuals working within the CCP, 
have now become intellectually autonomous and professionally independent. Their 
disillusionment with the existing regime has made them believe that intellectuals must be 
detached from political power and attached to the rights and powers of the people. Their 
changing social location has pushed them to develop a new set of strategies for working 
with the CCP. Unable to work inside the CCP, these intellectuals have decided to put 
pressure from the external world to impel change in China. The change of their social 
location and their exposure to a new set of socio-political environment, to a considerable 
extent, have forced them to change their approaches and strategies to deal with the CCP.
is one of the founders o f the FDC, the organization supporting the pro-democracy movement in China. Because o f his position, 
Su was denounced by the CCP as a dissident and counter-revolutionary.
^^The notion of "insiders" and "outsiders", though insightful, still has limitation because it is difficult to apply in the empirical world. 
We may argue that some o f the Chinese intellectuals who are establishment intellectuals, being part of the state; while some o f them do 
not work within the state establishment as we can call them as "outsiders" or "non-establishment intellectuals". Given the particular 
Chinese context and special relationship between the state and intellectuals, it is extremely difficult and arbitrary to classfy Chinese 
intellectuals categorically in terms o f "insiders" and "outsiders". It is at this point we must use such a classification catiuosly.
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From the foregoing discussion we can see changes in the intellectuals' social 
location and in their access to socio-economic and political opportunities have great 
formative influences on the intellectual production/^
Educational Orientation. Occupational Ties and Political Orientations
In addition to social position as an influence on the intellectuals' production of 
ideas, the particular intellectual field must have exerted significant influence on thei value 
orientation and conceptualization of democracy, Yan Jiaqi enrolled in the Department of 
Applied Mathematics and Electronic Computing at the Chinese University of Science and 
Technology in Beijing in 1960. Upon his graduation, Yan faced a series of philosophical 
debates on the general issue of the relationship between ideas and existence. The debates 
did influence Yan's thought as he also recalled in his autobiography (Yan, 1988: 8-14), 
directing him to the realm of philosophy. As Yan spelt out plainly, "deeply attracted by 
the ambiguous, conceptual thinking in the philosophical realm, abstract but stimulating, I 
finally decided to abandon the studies in basic particle physics, and moved into the 
impalpable and theoretical realm" (Yan, 1987: 347-348). The focus of the philosophical 
debate in the 60's concentrated on the question of whether "two combined into one" or 
"one divided into two".^  ^ Viewing the Maoist idea of constant struggle and flux through 
the eyes of his new philosophical orientation of dialectics, Yan felt compelled to rethink 
the orthodox ideas adopted by the P a r t y I n  late 1963 and early 1964, Yan published 
two essays on dialectics and attracted the attention of the famous philosopher, Yu 
Guangyuan. Yu encouraged Yan to apply for postgraduate studies in the Philosophy and 
Social Sciences Division of the Academy of Science. Upon admission, Yan, with the 
close supervision of Yu and Gong Yuzhi, another prominent social scientist, directed his
^^Chen Yizhi and Su Shaoshi are now living in the United States. Su is a visiting scholar attached to Harvard University while Chen 
is the president of the Centre for Modem China.
’^For details, see "New Polemic on the Philosophical Yroni", Beijing Review (Ho. 37, September 11, 1964). 
^®The biography o f Yan, I adopt from Bachman & Yang (1991) and Yan (1988).
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attention to the dialectics of nature. During the Cultural Revolution, Yan intensively read 
and critically analyzed the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Zedong while 
engaging in editorial work. Bachman and Yang also note that from 1967 to 1971, Yan 
borrowed banned books from friends, reading widely in the fields of Western political 
theories, world history and biography and pre-1949 Chinese history (Bachman & Yang, 
1991; xvi).
Since 1972, Yan has been studying the history of political thought and 
international political systems. In the late 70's and early 80's, with the institutionalization 
of the Institute of Political Science and the resurrection of various social science 
disciplines, Yan's work on comparative studies of political thought and political system 
was recognized. He published a paper "The Political System in a Socialist State" in 
which he discussed different political systems from a historical perspective, highlighting 
the importance of constitutional rule and the institutionalization of a proper system to 
realize the goal of the People's Republic, implying even then that the state is power 
originates from the people (Yan, 1979). What makes Yan's claim of the state's power 
originates from the people surprising is the way he formulates such an idea. The notion 
of "people's power" is common as stated in "democratic-centralism" which seems to be a 
"taken-for-granted" fact in socialist and marxist countries. Realizing the importance of 
"people's rights", Yan therefore considers the dictatorial leadership in the Cultural 
Revolution as wrong. Like other intellectuals, Yan originally trusted that the CCP would 
protect people's interests since it is the party representing the people. Having a deeper 
reflection of the Cultural Revolution, Yan realized that despotism could be found even in 
a socialist state as China was. Seeing the importance of institutionalized democratic 
procedures in government and politics, Yan pointed out that the essence of People's 
Republic lied with the protection of people's power. Without the dreadful experiences 
that Yan confronted in the Revolution, we doubt whether Yan would have had such a 
deeper analysis of people's power. At a meeting in 1979, his speech about the political 
system of socialist states drew the attention of most of China's prominent social scientists.
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With the development of political studies and the establishment of the Institute of 
Political Science throughout the 1980's, Yan was elected the director of the Institute 
under the CASS, in charge of studying the international political system and translating 
Western political thought and ideas. This occupational affiliation further exposed Yan to 
different perspectives on political systems and ideas of democracy.
Yan's unique intellectual background in both philosophy and science and his 
access to different political thoughts and systems made him a unique political scientist. 
Yan adds, "it is not a crisis of science when the existing theories cannot explain the newly 
discovered phenomena, instead, it is a new beginning and starting point of interest in 
scientific exploration" (Yang, 1990: 14). Internalizing such an educational orientation, 
Yan always poses the question "why". His rational thinking and a questioning mind-set 
are products of his earlier training in philosophy and science. His personal experience in 
the Cultural Revolution, what he called "the empire of theology" (shenxue wangguo) 
typified by the transcendent nature of a god-like leader (Mao's cult), caused Yan to 
explore a new way for China. His contempt of the "theology empire" lies in the fact that 
faith and worship replace science and rational thinking. In his "Three Courts for Judging 
Truth: Religion, Rationality and Pracctice", he envisaged China's adherence to the 
principle of rationality for judging truth. In his "The Scientific World of Three-No's", 
Yan reiterates his openness and objectivity stating that "science should have no forbidden 
zone, no idols, and no principles" (Yan, 1986a).
In his "A Research Report of the Question of Democracy" (1979), an imaginative 
novel involving a journey through different countries from the 18th century to the future, 
Yan compared different political systems, contrasting the autocratic, monachic 
constitutional and republican systems. The nub of this philosophical novel is the theme 
of procedural politics as typified in the republican system. The major emphases of the 
story are advocacy for a system of responsibility, the end of life tenure and the 
establishment of a better personnel system. It is at this point that Yan had begun to learn 
the Western model of democracy. The clearest pointer to his democratic thinking lies
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with his ideas of procedural rule and checks and balances in politics. In order to avoid 
any political persecution, Yan tactically tested the response of the state by means of a 
novel implicitly to sound out his liberal democratic thought. Up to this point, we may see 
the close relationship between Yan's political orientation and his educational and 
occupational background.
The previous discussion has suggested Yan's knowledge production is closely 
related to his educational orientation. His training in science and philosophy, coupled 
with his position as the director of the Institute of Political Science, enhanced Yan to read 
widely and think deeply of what democracy is. In addition, his prominent role in the 
field of social sciences in general and political science in particular should have given 
Yan additional resources. His political position at the CASS and political affiliation to 
the state apparatus can be interpreted as another source to support Yan's radicalism. Our 
discussions of Yan's connections with the senior leadership and also his links with Stone, 
together with his influence and networks in his own intellectual field might have 
strengthened considerably his critical stance, creating a strong social force in support of 
his intellectual radicalism. Seeing many Chinese intellectuals' (from both social science 
and humanities) support of democracy aand their strong demand for the release of Wei 
Jingsheng in early 1989 (for details, see, for example, Chong, 1989 and Bonnin & 
Chevrier, 1991), together with his shaken position after criticized by Deng personally, 
Yan captured the opportunity to change his coping strategy in dealing with the CPF. 
Putting different sources of support together, Yan could therefore choose various 
strategies in reacting to his socio-political situations.
Generational Location and Intellectual Radicalism
Mannheim has suggested the momentous impact of generation location on the 
ideas of intellectuals. It is particularly interesting to explore different generations of 
contemporary Chinese intellectuals. Differences in upbringing and treatment by the state 
would greatly influence their conceptualization of the world. In light of Li and 
Schwarcz's schematic form, I would regard Yan Jiaqi as a member of the fifth generation
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of modem Chinese intellectuals.
The fifth generation is a liberation generation of the late 40's and early 50’s (Li & 
Schwarcz, 1983-84). Yan was bom in 1942 in Jiangsu Province. Although he lived 
through the liberation, Yan was still too young to remember or to be strongly influenced 
by the socialist construction which took place roughly from 1949 to 1955. When the 
Great Leap Forward was launched, Yan was probably mature enough (approximately 
sixteen years of age) to remember and think about such a historic movement. The 
disastrous years of the Leap must have marked Yan deeply, providing him a point of 
reference for contemplating the problems in Chinese politics. During the Cultural 
Revolution, Yan was about twenty-three. Having graduated from the Chinese University 
of Science and Technology in Beijing, he moved to the realm of philosophy. Regardless 
of his education, Yan was still dispatched to mral areas in Hubei and Beijing to 
participate in the ongoing campaigns in the countryside. At the end of May of 1966, Yan 
retumed to Beijing and was assigned to assist editing the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, 
Stalin, and Mao. Yan himself noted that these years marked a move from the "kingdom 
of philosophy to the kingdom of theology" (i.e., the Mao cult)(Yan, 1988: 10-14). The 
years of the Cultural Revolution were a profoundly shaping experience for Yan and his 
countrymen. The direct confrontation with the Cultural Revolution and the examination 
of the thoughts of the Marxist leaders had forced Yan to question the established Maoist 
orthodoxies.
Li and Schwarcz argue that the fifth generation of intellectuals was more narrow 
in outlook and more limited in knowledge inasmuch as their faithful attitude is confined 
to the doctrine of Marxism. They welcomed the liberation sincerely, hoping that the 
Communist Party would make China strong. Having such a vision, the fifth generation 
tend to be enthusiastic and single-minded supporters of the liberation. Li and Schwarcz 
also regard the fifth generation of Chinese intellectuals as "rather timid, [having] had 
little opportunity to make original contributions of their own." However, such a view is 
questionable because people like Yan have demonstrated the ability to think
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independently. Though it was difficult and dangerous, Yan still managed to expose 
himself to different sources of knowledge through which he made himself more 
cosmopolitan in thinking and more liberal toward plurality of thought. Maybe Yan is one 
of the exceptional cases as Li & Schwarcz suggest: "the best among them [some fifth 
generation of Chinese intellectuals], became more reflective in their thought. These few 
have been able to pose certain fundamental questions" (Li & Schwarcz, 1983-4: 44).
Part of the reason for Yan's consciousness may be related to his deeper reflection 
on the social and political turmoil during the dark age 1966-1976, which caused him to 
question the legitimacy of the CCP. Added to his suffering during the Cultural 
Revolution is Yan's unique exposure to the outside world, both of which probably had 
great impact on Yan's conceptualization of the external world.
From his call for the end of life tenure in the late 1970's, Yan went one step 
further in the eighties to suggest institutional changes in the political structure. His 
emphasis on procedural politics, specifying the power relationship between the state and 
the Party; demarcation between social organizations and decentralization of power; and 
the stress on the consolidation of the National People's Congress, strengthening the 
constitutional limits of the government, all reflect his conceptualization of democracy in 
response to his particular socio-historical context in general and the socio-cultural and 
socio-political problems in particular. Yan adopted the view of Hobbes that human 
nature is evil as the philosophical basis underlying his conviction that orderly society and 
government should rest on a coherent, institutional system rather than on the good-will 
and enlightened character of the leadership. Yan's direct exposure to the Cultural 
Revolution impelled him to speak out more persistently and boldly than he had before the 
Cultural Revolution. The cold reality of 1989 also forced Yan to recognize the 
importance of minority rights and respect for individual choice. Yan's unique social 
location and central position in the state apparatus, together with his prominent role in the 
field of social science enabled Yan to distinguish himself from his fellow colleagues. In 
addition, his recent change from an establishment intellectual to a exiled intellectual
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inevitably causes change in his conceptualization of the external world. One point which 
must be addressed here is that even though the notion of generational location is 
insightful in the understanding of how people's ideas relate to their unique generational 
experiences, this conceptual tool still has its limitations because individual variations are 
common despite their similar generational location. As Li and Schwarcz (1983-4) 
observed, some exceptional case can be found within the same generation. This line of 
reasoning again suggests the relation between social structure and social agency is of 
dynamic and interactive nature. Yan, unlike other fifth generation of Chinese 
intellectuals, is more innovative in thinking. His unique social location and his 
prominence in his field may have affected his perceived role and also his coping 
strategies. Up to this point, we argue that Bourdieu's notion of "strategy" and "field" and 
Mannheim's idea of "social location" can enhance our understanding of the interactionist 
relationship between social stmcture, social location, political opportunity stmcuture, and 
individual calculation and choice.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has reviewed the democratic thought of Yan Jiaqi in 
light of the proposed theoretical framework. It is clear that the political ideas of modem 
Chinese intellectuals have been influenced by their social location, generational location, 
educational orientation and the intellectual field to which they belong. Through such an 
exercise, we can have a more comprehensive and dynamic picture of the relations 
between the ideas and the social stmcture, particularly of Yan Jiaqi.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE RADICAL REFORMER: FANG LIZHI 
AND HIS DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT
Fang Lizhi, China's most prominent advocate for democracy and human rights, 
has repeatedly affirmed the significance of freedom and democratization in mainland 
China. His critical stand and boldness have received wide support from the university 
students. His persistent call for respect of human rights and democracy has made him a 
dissident widely recognized in the West. Fang has been regarded as China's Avoid 
Sakharov {Atlantic Monthly^ May, 1988)* and "China's Tom Paine", {Washington Post, 
Nov. 1987) since the anti-bourgeois campaign in 1986-87. Fang believes people have a 
natural right to democracy, saying "democracy is not something to be 'bestowed as a 
favour' from the government". Fang also believes that the future of China lies in total 
reform in all aspects, requiring a complete opening {quan fangwei kaifang) to the outside 
world. As a necessary part of total reform. Fang advocates learning from, confronting 
and competing with those outside (Fang, 1989b: 106, 111, 114, 118, 128). Having these 
ideas in mind. Fang asks intellectuals to shoulder the responsibility of transforming 
society (Fang, 1989b: 1-3, 53-86, 245-249).
In this chapter, I am going to discuss Fang's democratic thought in light of the 
analytical framework of the present study. It is also the intent of this chapter to evaluate 
whether Fang Lizhi is a dissident as such, with particular attention given to the 
examination of his social location in Chinese society, and the extent and level of his 
intellectual radicalism. I hypothesize that when Fang was in mainland China, he was not 
immune to the impact of patronage. His dissidence and outspokenness was considerably 
influenced by his role as an insider and by the social and political opportunities to which
 ^Avoid Sakharov was a prominent dissident intellectual in the former Soviet Union, who criticized the policies and exposed the social 
and political problems underlying the former Soviet system regardless of intense political pressure. His dissidence has earned him praise 
as one of the most independent and critical intellectuals in Russia. For details of Sakharov, see Bailey (1989).
he had access.
A Brief Discussion of the Democratic Thought of Fang Lizhi
Seeing democracy as a universal right of all people, Fang's assertion of human 
rights and democracy inevitably moves him to denounce the autocratic rule of the CCP 
(Fang, 1989b: 9-11, 87-88, 246-249).
Crisis of Faith: Defying Communism as Universal Principle
In Mao's era. Fang tmsted the Communist Party unreservedly.^ Even though in 
the 1950's he was purged and severely criticized for having written a lengthy treatise on 
the need to reform China's educational system in which he urged the liberation of 
scientific research from the control of politics. Fang continued to believe in Communism.
"Even after I was expelled from the Party, I continued to have faith in Chairman Mao 
and believed that it must have been I who was wrong." (Schell, 1988: 124)
However, his faith in the Party and socialism was shaken in the Cultural 
Revolution. The year of imprisonment in a niupeng (cow shed) once more ran Fang 
afoul of politics. Confronted by the government's irrational acts and unreasonable
treatment of intellectuals. Fang began to question Communism.
"Around the time of the Cultural Revolution, I began to notice a lot of things and to feel 
that perhaps Mao was not so good for the country. But because at the time we still 
believed in Communism, it left us with the difficult question, whom should we follow? 
There was, of course, no one else but Mao. He was supposed to be the embodiment of 
all idealism." (quoted from Schell, 1988: 125)
Like many intellectuals in his time. Fang was extremely frustrated by the personal 
cult and dictatorial rule of Mao. Fang added,
"It was only later, although my sense of things was still quite unclear, that I began 
feeling that the Party was not telling the truth. Then, after the Cultural Revolution 
started, everything became much clearer. I reahzed that they had in fact been deceiving 
people and that I should not believe them any more." (Quoted from Schell, 1988: 125)
At this point. Fang began to criticize not only the despotic politics but also the 
socialist system. He sees Marxism as an orthodox thought but not as a science, saying
^During my interview with Fang conducted in Arizona 1993, he told me that, like other young people in the 40's and 50's, he thought 
that Communism symbolized advancement He also believed that freedom could be found in the "liberated" area controlled by the CCP. 
Being impressed by the CCFs call for a multi-party system and institutionalized state control of the army, Fang thus committed himself to 
Communism.
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that "Marxism is the product of an age ... and cannot epitomize all the science of today. 
The essence of science is development, creation, constant self-transcendence, and 
Marxism is no exception" (Fang, 1992: 23). The second dismissal from the Party in 1987 
made Fang even bolder to denounce the failure of Communism in the past four decades 
(Fang, 1989d: 1-4). He pinpointed the fundamental cause of failure and impending 
catastrophe to the socialist system and ideology (Ibid). Fang employed a parable to 
demonstrate that Marxism was outdated, "Marxism is like old clothes which should be 
thrown away because Marxism itself belonged to the cultural platform in the past which 
is now old-fashioned" (Fang, 1989d: 55).
Fang even outraged the top leaders by openly declaring the widespread belief that 
bureaucratic problems and impending crisis were caused by the leadership. Criticizing 
the monolithic and dictatorial rule of the feudalistic, despotic and deceptive politics under 
the Communist Party, he therefore denounced the applicability of state socialism 
practised in China and declared its death (Fang, 1989d: 1-4, 54-55; 117-9; see also 
Brugger & Kelly, 1990).^
What most irritated Fang was the emphasis of class contradiction. Fang explicitly
states,
"Communism, of course, has proved to be a failure in both practice and theory. I have 
to make it clear that socialism is different from communism. They are two separate 
concepts. I still support the principal goal of socialism to eliminate social injustice and 
reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. If anyone calls me a socialist believer, I 
do accept such a label. However, I reject communism. The major reason for such a 
rejection lies with the core philosophy of communism — class contradiction to which I 
most object. The adoption of class contradiction as the means to accomplish communist 
praxis has been proved to be a failure theoretically and practically (Interview 3, 
Arizona, 1993).
Socialism practiced in the Northern European countries gave Fang a reference 
point to evaluate the socialist regime in China. Fang praised the model of non-totalitarian 
socialism in Northern Europe. His observations in Sweden and Austria caused him to 
aspire to the humanistic goals of socialism under which democracy is realized (Fang, 
1989b: 202-204) and to declare the socialist praxis in China a failure {Zhengming, July,
^See also the interview conducted by Terzani in Barme & Miniford (1989: 329-340).
209
1987). Seen in this light, Fang has never opposed genuine socialism and socialist ideals 
as such. His defiance must be understood in light of his criticism against the dictatorial 
rule of state socialism and the orthodox ideology.'*
What distinguishes Fang from other orthodox Marxists is that Fang treats 
socialism neither as universal truth nor as guiding principles. Far from seeing "guiding 
principles" as absolute truth, Fang conceives of principles as a necessary method or path 
to research (Fang, 1985). He suggests that "philosophy provides the guidance for 
scientific research" in terms of some effective methods or tools rather than as leading or 
supreme principles (Fang, 1985). Fang also criticizes those who blindly trust in some 
omnipotent "supreme" scientific methodology.
"The statement that 'Marxist philosophy is the supreme principle and methodology 
guiding scientific research' is itself inconsistent with Marxist principles. It is a form of 
blind faith and ignorance" (Fang, 1985, quoted from Fang, 1992: 23).
Fang extends his concept of the unique relationship between science and 
philosophy to the relationship between the people and the state. Fang's reading in politics 
and his travels abroad widened his horizons and stimulated his deeper analysis of 
democracy and human rights. In the post-Mao era. Fang spent much time visiting various 
countries, attending international conferences and academic meetings at the Vatican, 
Bogota in Colombia, Italy, England, Japan, Australia and the United States.^ Fang 
frankly admitted that his observations and experiences abroad further caused him to 
realize the impasse of state socialism. These trips abroad were to profoundly influence 
the way Fang looked at the Chinese socialist system and the role of intellectuals within it. 
He said plainly during a speech to the Tongji students,
"the change in many people's outlook, including my own, came from seeing the outside 
world ... we discovered our backwardness and were enlightened." (Fang, 1989b: 231)
His speeches always involve comparisons between the Chinese conditions with 
those of the outside world. He declared that "the last 30 years in China have been a
get this insight from Williams (1990), who suggests that Fang attacked the dictatorship of the OOP's pretext of ending exploitation 
while leading the country predominantly to backwardness and stagnation.
^His foreign academic roles included the following: Visiting Professor at the University of Rome as a visiting professor. Senior Visiting 
Fellow at Oambridge University Observatory, Visiting Professor at Kyoto University’s Fundamental Physics Research Institute and 
Research Resident at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. See Schell (1988) and Williams (1992).
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failure in essentially every aspect of economic and political life" (Fang, 1989d: 1-2). 
Fang attributes the failure to despotic state socialism (Fang, 1989b: 199), an opinion also 
shared privately among many in the leadership of the CCP (Ibid). Fang told the students 
that he had seen the Eastern German border guards at the Berlin Wall searching under his 
bus to see whether there were any escapees. Fang thus asked himself "if a society is 
good, why should it fear people trying to run away?" (Fang, 1989b: 198) Applying that 
question to China, Fang urged the Tongji students to acknowledge the existing problems 
and to solve them collectively (Ibid, 199).
Democracv as a Human Rights
Fang conceives that there are broad and narrow views of democracy. The broad 
view of democracy concerns the political culture whereas the narrow one is about the 
political structure of a particular country. Most fundamental of all, democracy is to 
protect people’s rights to have free choice. Even though Fang acknowledges that the 
origins of democracy were not in China but in Europe, he still holds that democracy, like 
human rights, is universal to all mankind. He said in the interview,
"Democracy and human rights have no racial and religious boundaries." (Interview 3, 
Arizona, 1993)
Fang maintains the view that "democracy is not something to be 'bestowed as a 
favour' but is the natural right of people" (Fang, 1989b: 106, 248). Fang speaks of the
protection of human rights as the prerequisite for democracy.
"Without democracy there can be no development. Unless individual human rights are 
recognized there can be no true democracy. In China the very ABC's of democracy are 
unknown. We have to educate ourselves for democracy. We have to understand that 
democracy isn't something that our leaders can hand down to us. A democracy that 
comes from above is no democracy, it is nothing but a relaxation of control. The fight 
will be intense. But it cannot be avoided." (Quoted from Barme & Miniford, 1989: 329; 
see also Fang, 1989b: 245-249)
He also said, "democracy is not something given but something won by the 
people, because what is given can be taken back" (Fang, 1989b: 248). Fang held that 
since the socialist system claimed to have made the people the masters of their own 
country, the people should have the right to know what their leaders were up to (Fang,
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1989b: 119-120). Knowing that the struggle for democracy is never easy but a long 
process, he therefore maintains that the future of China cannot rely solely on the 
resolution of its top leadership. He also believes that social stability and social 
development are determined by the success of democratization.
Seeing democracy as a natural right inherent within the people themselves, Fang 
thus concludes that it is the responsibility of government to recognize that right by 
constitutional sanction (Chin Chung, 1987: 93). Hence, Fang reiterates in his speeches 
that "democracy is something to be gained through persistent efforts, that there is nothing 
to be afraid of, and that criticizing government leaders is a symbol of democracy" (Fang, 
1989b: 108, 120-21, 140,248).
Unlike the notion of "democratic-centralism" adopted by the state. Fang
distinguishes his conception of democracy from the official one.
"My interpretation of democracy is different from that of Mao Zedong, whose 
conception lies with a democratic style of doing things; that is, to listen to different 
opinions. Democracy is not simply a process of consultation but the realization of 
human rights. Though human rights and democracy are two different concepts, they are 
closely related to one another. That is to say, there must be guaranteed right to freedom 
of speech, freedom of thinking, freedom of press and freedom of travel and movement 
... Without such guaranteed rights, it is meaningless to speak of democracy. The 
protection of these rights is the prerequisite for democracy." (Fang, 1989d: 152)
Fang told the students at Jiaotong university to fight for their natural rights. He 
argued "Liberty, equality, fraternity, democracy and human rights" are the great heritage 
of history that China should not be afraid of (Fang, 1987: 114-5).
Fang also speaks of accountability of government. Fang insists that the students 
that the government exists to serve the citizens and not the other way round (Fang, 
1989b: 108, 119-20, 208). As a case in point. Fang maintains that the students have a 
right to opportunities for an education because their parents have really contributed to the 
state (Fang, 1989b: 108-109).
In addition. Fang points to the fact that science, democracy and reason are closely 
linked with each other. If there is no democracy, argued Fang, there are no guaranteed 
rights for people; without rights, it is hard to say that intellectual freedom is protected.
Following the same logic, it is thus clear that there will be no real science without
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intellectual freedom. For this reason, Fang has upheld the Enlightenment banner of 
"science, reason and democracy" since late 1979 during his visit in Rome (Williams, 
1988:27). Advancing his position further. Fang suggests another four principles, namely, 
"science, democracy, creativity and independence" instead of the Four Cardinal 
Principles.
Fang moved beyond speaking about democracy and became involved in 
democratic reforms at Kenan University with the support of his colleagues. In order to 
create an atmosphere for freedom of speech and press, they initiated an open academic 
and political environment at Kenan University by allowing students to adhere to a 
diversity of views and adopt different stances. It was their conviction that anyone should 
be able to put up a hand bill and hold an event on campus without having to seek prior 
approval from the superior administrative branch. Fang not only supported freedom of 
speech among students' activities in the academic realm but also espoused the use of 
demonstration for democracy. Fang declared that the existing political structure should 
be reformed for the sake of democracy and freedom. Though Fang feels that making 
China more democratic is urgent, he also realizes the road to democratize China is a long 
one (Williams, 1990: 476; Kraus, 1989: 298).^ In order to actualize the goal of 
democracy. Fang has pinned his hope on the intellectuals, seeing them as the leading 
force in the "war of position".
I must point out here that Fang's notion of democracy, unlike that of Yan Jiaqi, 
does not intensively rely on any Western political theories. Instead, his conception of 
democracy rests merely on his scientific mentality. The scrutiny of his ideas also 
indicates that he has not suggested a detailed program or concrete political platform in 
democratization. This is highly suggestive that Fang's democratic thought is linked with 
his faith in science and universal laws rather than any sophisticated political theories (see 
Kraus, 1989 and Cheek, 1992 and the following discussion).
^Fang also recognizes that democratization in China will be a gradual process. He therefore sees that the institutionalization of proper 
channels for the people to voice their opinions is the most fundamental feature of democracy (Interview 3, Arizona, 1993).
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The Role of Intellectuals
Fang views intellectuals as the nation's elite, whose efforts are indispensable for 
building a prosperous state. Contending that the backwardness and disintegration of the 
existing regime is due in part to the lack of respect for intellectuals, Fang offered as a 
theoretical response to the socio-political reality a strengthening of the intellectuals' 
consciousness, urging them to fulfill their responsibilities toward society (Fang, 1989b: 
138). In an era filled with impending crises and turmoil. Fang urged the youth to be bold 
enough to face the crises and shoulder their responsibilities to resolve them (Fang, 1989b: 
138; see also Guangming ribao, 22 Sep. 1986). In the interview with Ding Qing, Fang 
explicitly stated the special role that he hoped scientists as intellectuals would play in the
development of modem China.
"almost invariably, it has been the natural scientists who have been the first to become 
conscious of the emergence of each social crisis." (Guangming ribao, 22 Sep. 1986, 
quoted from Schell, 1988: 127)
Following Einstein, Fang invoked the spirit of social consciousness.
"Scientists must express their feelings about all aspects of society, especially when 
unreasonable, wrong, or evil things emerge. If they do otherwise, they will be 
considered accomplices." (Guangming ribao, 22 Sep. 1986, quoted from Schell, 1988: 
127)
Fang believes that intellectuals should not be limited to technological matters but 
should also embrace a sense of responsibility for making a contribution to social progress 
(Fang, 1989b: 99-103, see also Fang, 1989b: 53-86). Moreover he has repeatedly praised 
the potential of younger intellectuals and students, seeing them as a force for democratic 
advancement. Besides, Fang pinned his hope on the young intellectuals and students 
because he saw them as more independent, having a strong wish to take their destiny into 
their own hands. Fang observed, "as intellectuals, we are obligated to work for the 
improvement of society ... this requires that we break the bonds of social restraint when 
necessary" (Schell, 1988: 131). Fang felt that the failure of intellectuals to exert a 
significant influence on society is a sign of backwardness because intellectuals not only 
possess information and knowledge but also create them, a factor which allows them to 
become an actively productive force in society. The intellectuals should utilize their
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knowledge and "intellectual consciousness" to strive for a right direction in social reform 
(Fang, 1989b; 27, 109). Wrote Fang,
"Of course, our goal should be the improvement of society, but our goal shouldn't just 
be some utopian dream that can only be realized a million years down the road ... what 
is much more important is to identify problems that exist now and to try to solve them." 
(Quoted from Schell, 1988: 131-132)
According to Fang, intellectuals’ sense of responsibility to society should extend
even to the degree of sacrificing their own lives. They also have complaints and
grievances, but these concern the advancement of society, not their own personal interests
{Guangming ribao, 22 Sep. 1986). In order to reform the closed society. Fang believed
the intellectuals should speak up to create a more open society where differences are
allowed, making room for the great varieties of excellence that have found expression in
human civilization (Schell, 1988: 134). The future of China lies with the successful
realization of democracy, while the realization of democracy itself lies with the struggle
of the people. Fang urged that intellectuals be independent and form a powerful group to
check the Party and to uphold democracy and the sanctity of human rights (Fang, 1989b:
138-39). He told the World Economic Herald that it was time for Chinese intellectuals to
"straighten their bent backs" and assume their social responsibility. The most significant
task, according to Fang, is to manifest a democratic spirit, starting with the struggle for
their own rights {Shijie Jingji daobao, 24 Nov. 1986).^
His stress on the unique social role of intellectuals is also related to his conception
of education. Fang blames the state for causing the backwardness of education in China.
He not only found fault with the past policies toward intellectuals but also condemned the
state for ignoring education (Fang 1989b: 175-194). Central to his message. Fang puts
exceeding emphasis on developing a particular kind of intellectual consciousness, which
is characterized by critical thinking and boldness to tell the truth (Fang, 1989b: 185, see
also 1989b: 101-106). Yan Xun, writing in the World Economic Herald, quoted Fang’s
^When asked to evaluate whether Chinese intellectuals are critical and independent enough. Fang forthrightly told me that he observed 
that more intellectuals in mainland China had become more critical in thinking, particularly comparing the situation of the I990's with that 
of the late eighties. However, Fang also pointed out that even though Chinese intellectuals had become more critical in their thinking, they 
were still inactive to voice their critical stand. When asked about the reason for such a scenario Fang replied that they might be constrained 
by their particular context, especially restricted by their vested interests (Interview 3, Arizona, 1993).
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lament that Chinese intellectuals have lacked an independent mentality. This mainly 
causes them to yield to power, which in turn links their futures to an official career 
{World Economic Herald^ 24 Nov. 1986). With this profound concern, Fang thereby 
reaffirms the importance of "independent mentality".
Fang's consciousness of independence rests not merely on empty words but on his 
own willingness to put his ideas into practice. In early March 1989, he wrote an open 
letter to the CCP leaders to depict the main concerns of intellectuals as "the trend toward 
corruption, the rampant speculation by bureaucrats, price rises, the fact that people 
become lax in spirit, and the serious crisis faced in the educational, scientific, and cultural 
fields" {Ming Bao, 1 Mar. 1989). These concerns reflected the sincere patriotic feelings 
of the intellectuals. Among them. Fang Avowed advocated political democratization, 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, economic development and elimination of 
corruption.* Having realized the backwardness and intense crises of China, Fang called 
for a complete opening of China to the external world.^
Idea of Total Westernization
Fang has declared that the Party is inept, seeing 'state-socialism' meaningless and 
impractical to China. He is of opinion that Chinese culture has been petrified for which 
reason China should learn from the West in many aspects {Zhengming, July, 1987: 51 and 
March, 1987: 38-41). He therefore advocated opening up to the outside world because he 
thought the transformation of social ideas and elevation of spiritual civilization should 
depend on outside forces (Yen Hsun, 1986).’° His visits to Europe, Japan, Australia and 
the United States had helped Fang to disentangle the truth from the falsehood of 
socialism. The comparisons between the Chinese conditions and those in the United 
States and Western European countries inevitably reveals the backwardness of China. 
His call for the complete opening to the Western world essentially touched the heart of
^For details of crises in the post-Mao era, see Li Ming (1989); He Pochuan (1989) and Nathan (1990).
^Although Fang is now in exile, but he still hopes that he shall return to mainland China. He also perceives himself as an independent 
intellectual, and he is intent upon keeping such a role and upon spreading the idea of democracy in China (Interview 3, Arizona, 1993).
^®What Fang suggests here is that China should not only leam from the West merely in the realm of technology and economy but also 
in the non-economic realms: culture, ideology, and ethics. From this point of departure, we can see that Fang's notion of westernization 
simply means to leam from the West in every aspect.
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the problem, a need to transform China not only technologically and economically, but 
also culturally and politically. The present problems confronting China, according to 
Fang, had to do with the cultural system, specifically, problems with state socialism. In 
order to reform China, Fang told the students to "show a little humility" to leam from 
others (Fang, 1989b: 201). Fang does not consider the essence of total westernization to 
be "the big noses are more beautiful". Instead, he believes that frequent contacts with the 
external world will hopefully enable China to pick up a "democratic and scientific 
mentality" (see Williams, 1990: 477).
Based on these observations, we therefore conclude that the central theme of Fang 
Lizhi is to struggle against the monopolistic rule of Communist China, advocating the 
elimination of such an out-dated and inflexible ideology. Differing from his forerunners. 
Fang sharply denounced the credibility of Communism. He went so far as to allude to a 
total crisis in socialism and to urge the intellectuals to bear their responsibilities in saving 
the Chinese society.
TOWARDS A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGICAL FORMATION
After a general discussion of Fang Lizhi's social-political ideas, the following part 
will analyze Fang's ideas in terms of the proposed analytic framework. Opposing to 
Weber's cultural relativism and sceptical sociology, Mannheim suggests an historicist 
solution, examining knowledge production in relation to the unique socio-historical 
context in which ideas evolve. The mid-eighties can be characterized as a period of 
relative freedom of expression and autonomous organizations in Chinese society 
concided with a continuing drop in income and resources for intellectuals (for details, 
see, for example, Bonnin and Chevrier, 1991 and Black and Munro, 1993). Against a 
relaxed socio-political and socio-cultural contexts in the post-Mao era as we have 
documented in chapter 3 and 4 (see also Goldman et al. 1993 and Brugger and Reglar, 
1994: 247-258), Fang Lizhi, like other Chinese reformer intellectuals, has tried to assert 
his professional independence and intellectual autonomy. Dissatisfied with the declining 
socio-economic opportunities of intellectuals, many of them have become more critical.
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voicing their grievances and even adopted a relatively radical approach to fight for their 
justice.
It is our contention that Fang's unique social location, his prominent role in the 
natural science field, together with the support from the senior leaders, have rendered 
Fang with abundant "capitals" to differentiate himself from other intellectuals. More 
importantly. Fang's popularity in the world media also makes him unique among his 
colleagues. Even though Fang was not totally freed from political and social constraints 
when he was in mainland China, the political opportunity structure which Fang had 
access enhanced him to adopt different strategies in dealing with the suppression or 
threats imposed by the CCP. Besides, Fang gradually broke the conventional boundary to 
develop his own field (autonomy of values) in contrast with apparatus (dominant values). 
Starting from these considerations, let us now turn to how Fang's unique social location 
has affected his fate and also his strategies in response to the external constraints.
Social Location and the Ideological Formation
Fang's radicalism and critical outlook were influenced by his unique social
location as well as his role perception. Fang had been playing the role as establishment
intellectual since the 1950s. It is my contention that Fang remained as part of the state
apparatus until the 80's despite the fact that he had become more critical. I observe that
his dissidence and radicalism are closely related to the support from his political patrons
though he did not openly admit it.” When asked whether he had houtai to support his
critical stand while he was in mainland China, Fang forthrightly replied,
"No, certainly not. I have definitely no relationship with any leaders" (Interview 3, 
Arizona, 1993).
Nevertheless, Fang also acknowledges that intellectual radicalism is bound by the 
particular socio-political environment where intellectuals live. He also maintains that 
intellectuals have to select the right kind of strategies, avoiding saying something which 
may arouse the state's repression of intellectual activities. Under the CCP, Fang suggests
 ^^Though Fang did not openly admit the impact of patronage on him, he did imply such influences in his speeches and interviews. See 
my following discussion and also Cheek (1988: 47-49); The Nineties (Oct. 1988:71).
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that people have leamt the appropriate way, right time and circumstance to speak out 
(Interview 3, Arizona, 1993).
The coping strategies that Fang adopted is greatly affected by the "capitals" that 
he had access from the support of the senior leaders in the CCP. Hu Yaobang, differed 
from his colleagues, was sympathetic towards intellectuals. After his mentor Deng's 
return to the political power in 1973, Hu was made a vice president of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS) and he was in charge of reviving its academic activities. 
Realizing that many intellectuals were treated unfairly in the Cultural Revolution, Hu was 
determined to rehabitate all of them, not only out of fairness but also to heal the wounds 
of the past and to get their cooperation to carry out modernization programmes. 
Goldman (1994: 29) observes that Hu "was the only one who believed that it was 
necessary to undertake not merely administrative reform, such as separating the party 
from the government, but also fundamental political reform." Having a relatively liberal 
view on politics, Hu made use of his connections and position in the CCP to publish 
articles expressing the need to modernize China's political system in terms of democratic 
procedures (for details, see, Goldman, 1994: chapter 2). With the blessings of Deng 
Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and his associates repudiated the anti-intellectual policies adopted 
in the Mao era and they proposed a relatively moderate policy towards intellectuals. 
Getting the support from the elders in the party, Hu could then elicit his view that 
"Marxist philosophy cannot replace natural science" published in the People's Daily. 
Soon after Deng's return to power, Hu, with the support of Deng, began to take steps to 
redress the damage done during the Mao years not only to science, technology and 
professionalism but also to the whole Chinese intellectual community. It is suggested 
that Deng's speech at the National Conference on Science on March 18, 1978 to address 
intellectuals, emphasizing the important role of them, and urged for due respect for 
intellectuals was in line of Hu's 1975 report of the CAS (Goldman, 1994: 30). In 
addition to openly recognize the significant role of intellectuals, Hu also initiated 
democratic procedures in the selection of director and duputy director of the CAS.
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Seeing such a reform in the field of science, a People’s Daily contributing commentor 
article declared that:
"The scientific spirit and the democratic spirit are inseparable in the struggle to build a 
modem and powerful socialist country ... Raising the scientific and cultural level of the 
whole Chinese nation must therefore be closely linked with expanding the scope of the 
nation's democratic life." (quoted from Goldman, 1994: 31)
At a conference at the Institute of Law, Yu Guangyuan, a vice president of the 
Academy of Social Science (CASS), a deputy director of the State Science and 
Technology Commission, and also an advisor to Hu Yaobang, told the participants that 
"without democracy there can be no modernization". This view was echoed in an 
editorial in the People's Daily on January 1979. As Goldman suggested, such an 
intellectual revival reclaimed not only the May Fourth movement's stress on science and 
technology but also its call for democracy (Goldman, 1994: 34-5). Argued along the 
same line, Brugger and Reglar (1994) also consider Hu together with Zhao Ziyang as 
supportive to the Chinese intellectual circles, promoting and encouraging a large number 
of intellectual reformers not only in the field of science but also in social science and 
humanities. Thus, the support rendered from Hu and Zhao and their associates should 
have imbued natural scientists in general and Fang Lizhi in particular with courage to 
chart a new course for their own field.
Fang's boldness and enthusiasm do not grow only out of his own interest and 
courage. In fact, the promotion of democratic reforms at Keda (minzhu banxue) was 
initiated and encouraged by the Central Committee. Early in 1984, a Ministry of 
education report entitled "The Reform of China's Educational Structure" had already 
sparked the light for dramatic changes in the country's university system. The Ministry 
of Education initiated changes in the election of administrators to top positions by 
committees of academics rather than their appointment by the Party (Schell, 1988: 128). 
In addition to this, the reforms practised at Keda were supported by Hu Yaobang, the 
former Party secretary and some senior Party leaders. Wen Li and Hu Qili (see Gin, 
1987; The Nineties, Oct. 1988: 70-71). Renmin ribao, an official newspaper, had a series
of reports on the success of reforms at Keda, which revealed to the intellectuals the
220
approving attitude of the Party leaders (Remin ribao, 22, 26, 31 Oct. 1986; 4, 14, Nov.
1986). In addition, Guangming ribao, a pro-intellectual newspaper, reported in details an 
intersdew between Fang and Dai Qing, indicating warm support for democratic reforms at 
Keda {Guangming ribao, 22 Sep. 1986).
Gin Xiang, a post-graduate student at Anhui University argued that democratic 
reforms at Keda had been approved by the Party and initially supported by Wen Li (Gin, 
1987: 242). Wen is regarded as the liberal reformer who was responsible for the 
rectification of intellectuals after the Cultural Revolution. This new environment 
encouraged the intellectual community to speak out. Reportedly, Wen Li told his 
subordinates to respect the intellectuals and establish a good relationship with them for he 
regarded them as the loyal remonstrators to the state (Gin, 1987: 242), Gin also 
highlighted Wen's great respect the four elites {sidai caizi): Fang; Guan Weiyan, the 
President of Keda and also a reform supporter; Wen Yuankai, another reformer 
intellectual and associate professor at Keda; and Yang like, also famous for his outspoken 
and critical ways {sidai caizi) (Gin, 1987: 242-3). Another reformer official, Hu Qili, 
visited Anhui to hold discussions with the prominent intellectuals, encouraging them to 
express their views freely. He also promised them that there would be no more 
repression and purges and assured them of continued reforms (Gin, 1987: 244). It is 
evident then the reforms taken at Keda were consistent with the will of the Party. With 
support from the Party, Fang became bold enough to advocate democratic reforms.
The reforms at Keda and dissident speeches of Fang were not without some 
opposition at all, however. Some conservative leaders in the Party such as Bao Yibo and 
Hu Qiaomu, openly denounced Fang, criticizing his speeches as damaging to the socialist 
system {The Nineties, Oct. 1988:71). They attacked Fang's critique of Engels in an article 
entitled "Dialectics of Nature" published in May 1986. Some Party members threatened 
to expel him while others demanded his self-criticism. However, Fang was defended by 
some intellectuals in public. Xu Liangying, Head of the History Research Institute of the 
Academy of Social Sciences supported Fang and even threatened to organize a letter of
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protest if Fang were purged (Zhengming, Sep. 1986: 9).
After Fang named and criticized Zheng Baifa, the vice-Mayor of Beijing, for 
wasting public funds to travel abroad, he experienced trouble in gaining a visa to go to 
the United States for his sabbatical leave (Fang, 1989b: 77ff). Hu Qili's intervention in 
the midst of this crisis clearly demonstrated the support of Fang’s political patron (Gin, 
1987: 246). Even though the political platform of Fang had made some Party leaders 
angry. Wen Li backed Fang in public. Under pressure from the conservatives. Wen Li 
arranged a discussion with the leading intellectuals at Hefei in November 1986. Instead 
of putting pressure on them. Wen reaffirmed his support of developments at Keda, but he 
also urged the intellectuals to be disciplined. This line probably was intended to alert 
Fang not to be out of control and to draw his attention to the need to respect the principle 
of "democratic-centralism" (Gin, 1987: 248-249). Despite the intense debate between 
Wen and Fang, they came to the agreement that democracy and freedom are embodied in 
the state constitution (Gin, 1987: 249). After the discussion. Wen reassured Fang about 
his support of reforms, especially after Fang assured him that Keda did not go against the 
Party's rule (Ibid). The foregoing facts make it clear that the dissident and critical stand 
of Fang is characterized by patronage and intellectual paternalism. Put precisely. Fang’s 
dissidence is far from independent and critical when compared with his Eastern European 
counterparts. Putting these observations together, I suggest that before 1989 Fang Lizhi 
was only a "radical reformer" rather than a d iss id en t.B efo re  his dismissal from the 
Party in 1987, Fang openly supported reforms in the Party. He also encouraged students 
to join the Party in order to reform it from within (Fang, 1989b). The difference between 
Fang and other reformer intellectuals lay only in their approaches and pace to 
transforming the country. In my interview of Fang, I asked him why he encouraged 
students to join the CCP when he was in China. He replied that at that time he believed 
that it was the only way to initiate change within the party because the CCP was still in
the same interview, when I asked Fang whether his reforms implemented in Keda were supported by Hu Qili, he said that he had no 
connection with any leaders. Administrative reforms were initiated in Keda against a relatively relaxed socio-political environment The 
years 1984-1986 were regarded by Fang as the most favourable time for reforms in China. Liu Binyan also expressed a similar idea during 
my interview in Princeton (see Interview 3, Arizona, 1993 and Interview 4, Princeton, 1993).
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power. Since his exile in the United States, Fang recognized that such a view is not 
comprehensive enough. Instead, he asserts that the CCP should allow oppositional forces 
in China (Interview 3, Arizona, 1993). In this. Fang's idea is similar to Yan's as 
documented in chapter 5. It again shows us that Chinese intellectuals are contextually 
bound and constrained by the particular socio-political structure where they live.
Although Fang seems to have maintained his moral integrity, he certainly did not 
think or act independently. Fang himself also implicitly indicated his connection with a 
political patron. In his famous speech to the students of Jiaotong university, he noted that 
the State Education Commission distributed his speeches in 1985 as negative examples 
and stated that nothing had come of it. Nevertheless we observe that with the support of 
his political patrons such views were no longer forbidden in 1986 (Washington Post, 
Nov. 19, 1987). In an interview, he echoed at least three times Hu Yaobang's view to 
persuade intellectuals to conform to the Party line, showing that Fang approved Hu's soft 
line toward the critical intellectuals. In addition, in Hu Qili's discussion with Fang at 
Anhui, he bowed to pressure from the top and, instead of asking Fang to resign from the 
Party, he asked him to be disciplined (The Nineties, Oct. 1988:71). It is also suggested 
that Deng Xiaoping initially encouraged reformist criticism in June 1986, but his change 
in attitude inescapably led to the suppression of it in January 1987 (see Wu An-chia, 
1987). As a result of all this. Fang believes that intellectuals in China should find 
strategic ways to express their views (Interview 3, Arizona, 1993).^  ^ Because Fang was 
one of the intellectuals subject to patronage, the fall of his political patron inevitably 
caused him t rouble .Despi te  the fact that Fang was constrained by the socio-political 
context where he lived, he still could differentiate himself from other natural scientists in 
the field. With direct support from Wan Li, Hu Qili and Hu Yaobang, it is certain that 
Fang had better position and he was fortified from unnecessarily attacks and criticisms. 
Given the same circumstances but without direct and immediate support from the senior 
leaders, I really doubt whether Fang could maintain the same coping strategy. It is at this
^^Such observations may hint why Fang considers intellectuals should adopt strategic ways to express their views as necessary in 
mainland China (Interview 3, Arizona, 1993).
l^For the internal criticisms of Fang's views issued by the Party, see Zeng (1989).
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point we can see Bourdieu's notion of "strategising" is illuminative to our understanding 
of the dynamic between structure and individual choice.
In addition, official tolerance of his vehement criticism may also be intimately 
linked with his role as a scientist. Scholars suggest that professional such as scientists 
and technical intelligentsia have received better treatment than the intellectuals in 
humanities and social science (see, Rai, 1991: 127; White III, 1990). Fang's outstanding 
performance and academic achievement, coupling with his extensive international 
support and his high reputation in science, had fortified him from earlier attack and 
persecution (Williams, 1992). Other than Fang's prominence in the field of natural 
science, it is note-worthy that the reforms in science and technology in the post-Mao era 
has also created the arena for the rise of natural scientists. Saich (1989) observes the 
efforts to reduce the stifling effects of Soviet-style centralized control by devolving 
resources and authority to lower levels. More important, there has been the reemergence 
of universities as centres not only for education but also for research and development 
(Orleans, 1989). Well aware of the deficiency of China's science and technology when 
compared with the outside world, the post-Mao leadership persistently stress the 
importance of science research and technology. Multifaceted reforms — decentralization 
of research, introduction of the market, increased personnel mobility, and greater 
interaction with the international world — have inevitably opened China not only to the 
technological and scientific realms but also to the cultural and ideological realms. 
Exchanges conducted through bilateral agreements signed between China and the 
respective industralizied countries therefore provide China not only a means for 
cooperative research activities and projects; and the reciprocal movement of scientific 
and technological data and literature between China and other countries but also different 
value systems and pluarlity of thought. Most important of all, such changes have also 
engendered a fundamental structural change in the Chinese political system, which 
probably undermines the supreme control of the CCP over scientific and technological 
activities. Once scientists are allowed to have more autonomy in their field, it is difficult
224
to restrict their activities again. It is also against such a more relaxed socio-political 
environment that Fang's critique and dissidence were more readily accepted. It also 
suffices to us that being a natural scientist, Fang is enhanced to develop better coping 
strategies than his counterparts in other fields.
The differences among the post-Mao intellectuals, those in Mao era, and the 
traditional literati rest only with their professional roles. The rise of autonomous 
professions to a considerable extent enhances the relative independence of the 
intellectuals in post-Mao China. It has already been pointed out that Fang received better 
treatment from the state because of his profession; however, it is wrong to overstate the 
independence of the technical intelligentsia. Their intellectual independence is still 
subject to the approval of the Party. This means then that the so-called dissident 
intellectuals, such as Fang, are still establishment intellectuals. Their level of critique and 
dissidence may be more intense, but it is wrong to conclude that they have become 
socially independent. Their professional position has given them relative autonomy, but 
their independence is still fragile and unsteady because of the restrictions from the state. 
Even though their connection with the international world has enhanced their "bargaining 
power" with the state, the scientists are well aware that the threat to the non-scientist 
intellectuals may eventually affect their fate as well. That explains why both scientists 
and non-scientists had allied together as a united front to counteract the repression from 
the state (see Goldman, 1992). It also explains why Cheek urges "Chinese intellectuals ... 
to conceptualize their separation from the state, the end of their mandarin role. They 
must articulate, and then fight to protect, their autonomy from political direction" (Cheek, 
1992: 140).
It is also observed that the ideas of Fang Lizhi have suggested an intellectual 
elitism. He repeatedly maintains the significant role of intellectuals, thinking of them as 
the most productive force in the development of society. He also openly advocates 
ranking intellectuals at the top of the social ladder and he supports the notion that
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knowledge is power (Fang, 1989b: 131-173)/^ When asked about his feeling toward the 
comment that he is too elitist, Fang replied to me,
"I do not know how people define 'elite'... It seems to me that intellectuals are always 
'elitist' since they are the vanguard having the first contact with the outside world and 
introducing new things to their fellow countrymen ... 1 think intellectuals were the first 
group who got to know Western science in modem China. In my opinion, only when 
people are educated do they recognize the advancement of science in the modem world. 
If people regard such a role as 'elitist', 1 think it is quite a normal historical 
development." (Interviews, Arizona, 1993).
With a strong sense of intellectual superiority. Fang urges his fellow colleagues 
and students to strengthen their independent stand as the leading force in society and to 
shoulder the responsibility of developing China by their expertise and knowledge (Fang, 
1989b: 21-28).
"Physicists' methods of pursuing tmth make them extremely sensitive while their 
courage in seeking it enables them to accomplish something ... major social problems 
are often unclear to those without a scientific background ... scientists ... should 
consider themselves responsible to the entire society." {Beijing Review, 29, no 50 Dec. 
15, 1986: 17)
This line of reasoning reveals that Fang has also internalized the mentality of the 
literati, being responsible for initiating changes in society even though he did not have 
traditional literati training (see. Cheek, 1988: 48). Fang also said to me that he may have 
been affected by the literati tradition (Interview 3, Arizona, 1993). Therefore, a strong 
sense of "for the people" underlies his notion of intellectual elitism. It is worth noting 
that his conception of "speaking for the people" is distinguishable from the traditional 
literati because, although he cares about other groups in society, he lets them speak for 
themselves. This kind of paternalistic elitism is new among Chinese intellectuals. Cheek 
also argues that "this is a form of democratization new among Chinese intellectuals who 
have, otherwise, continued the traditional Confucian pretence to minister to and speak for 
the 'people'" (Cheek, 1992: 139).
The examination of Fang's ideas indicates that he has attempted to break the taboo 
in the political realm by discussing the issues from a scientific perspective, in which
is even suggested that Fang's elitism merely a reflection of his personal interest, especially when he upholds intellectuals as the 
vanguard of the proletariat He is thus seen as a spokesman for a group of intellectuals rather than a genuine advocate of democracy, see 
Kraus (1989).
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process he enjoyed a degree of autonomy. His assertion on the leading role of 
intellectuals can be interpreted as his strong belief that intellectuals should first speak out 
since they have occupied a privileged position. This argument is also related to Fang's 
conception of professional knowledge. Fang sees himself as a professional scientist 
rather than a government official or p o l i t i c i an .Hi s  persistent call for the respect of 
human rights is always in his capacity as a citizen rather than a political leader. Thus I 
conclude that the intellectual elitism of Fang Lizhi is intimately linked with his notion of 
the professional role and social responsibility of natural scientists. Again, Fang's 
perceived role of intellectuals reveals what Bourdieu claims that ideas of people are 
affected by the habitus, having the dispositions of some fundamental cultural and social 
values in earlier age. Whether Fang conciously or unconsciously transforms his thinking 
in terms of science and rationality, he is still deeply affected by the habitus 
(Confucianism).
Social and Political Opportunities and Intellectual Radicalism
It is also our contention that the intellectuals have become more radical and 
critical because of their poor treatment and economic insecurity (See chapter 4). The 
political opportunity structure to which the intellectuals have access greatly determines 
their political radicalism (Tarrow, 1989; Brockett, 1991).^  ^ Fang's radical stance is also 
related to his perception of the deprived position of intellectuals and their limited social 
and political opportunities.
In a period of declining respect for intellectuals. Fang has sought greater respect. 
Fang lamented the deprived position of intellectuals as indicated by their declining wages 
and poor living conditions. He also lodged complaints against the state's lack of 
emphasis on education (Fang, 1989b: 66-67; 241-244). He claimed that the 
backwardness of China today is caused by mistrust of intellectuals.(Fang, 1985; see also
^^Fang made this point explicit during his interview with Tiziano Teizani, see Barme & Miniford (1989: 329). In my interview with 
Su Xiaokang (1993), he also indicated that there is a strong relationship between Fang's radicalism and his profession. Being a natural 
scientist. Fang speaks only about things which fall into his jurisdiction. Su commented that Fang had never spoken something in ignorance. 
Fang's consciousness of the role of natural scientists and his profound experience enable him to speak for human rights and democracy in 
terms of the language of science (Interview 2, Princeton, 1993).
^^The elite theories also argue in the same vein that intellectual unrest is closely related to the lack of job opportunity. See Michels 
(1982).
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chapter 4). When asked whether his "life chance" in mainland China had determined the 
level of his critique and dissidence, Fang told me that there was a close relationship 
between intellectuals’ life chance and their intellectual radicalism (Interview 3, Arizona, 
1993). This also sheds light on the protests organized by Chinese intellectuals in Beijing 
for better treatment of intellectuals. Accordingly, we may thus conclude that there is a 
positive relation between their deprived social position and their participation in the June- 
Fourth Incident of 1989 (see, Chong, 1989 and chapter 4).
Thus we see that one additional reason the intellectuals in post-Mao China 
become more radical and critical is that the CCP had failed to provide satisfactory living 
conditions and intellectual environment for them. Besides, the CCP had restricted their 
freedom of speech and expression and also had failed to integrate them politically. 
Therefore, the intellectuals not only speak for the people but also air their own grievance 
as fellow sufferers. These conditions contribute to the growing vehemence of intellectual 
dissidence in post-Mao China. Putting the foregoing observations together. Fang adopted 
critical stand and relatively radical approach in response to the socio-historical situations 
that he confronted in mainland China is closely related with the unique social location 
that he occupied. Coupling with his better position as natural scientist and access to more 
socio-political opportunities. Fang could differentiate himself from his colleagues. It is 
interesting that even though many of natural scientists were living against a similar socio­
political context as Fang did, not many of them adopted the same approach as Fang to 
deal with the state. Putting the foregoing discussion in context, we can argue that Fang’s 
unique social location and political opportunity structure might have made Fang 
distinctive from his colleagues. Added with his popularity among Chinese university 
students and his prominence created by the world media. Fang was enhanced to choose 
strategies which differed from his counterparts in the same field. It is at this point we see 
Mannheim's "social location" and Bourdieu’s "strategy" are insightful to demonstrate why 
individual variations so happen even though people are confronted with similar socio- 
historical circumstances. In addition. Fang's distinctive position is also related to his post
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in the Chinese University of Science and Technology and his educational orientation. 
Educational Orientation. Intellectual Field and Ideological Formation
The above discussion of Fang's ideas has already indicated the close relationship 
between his democratic thought and his training in natural science. Having internalized 
the value of science and rationality, Fang believes that "the tradition of the field of 
physics is to have intervention in society" (Fang, 1989b: 14). In the foreword to his
physics textbook published in 1981, Fang had already developed this view.
"Einstein was a great spokesman for science, reason and democracy. He said 'Only in 
devoting ourselves to the good of society will we find meaning in this fleeting and 
dangerous life.' To him it was an outrage to submit to power or to fail, out of timidity, 
to act like a scientist." (Fang, 1981, quoted fi’om Fang, 1992: 13)
What he tries to describe here is the scientific spirit, the living soul that makes 
science what it is. In order to have a real transformation of China, Fang hopes to 
transplant this spirit into China (Fang, 1981, collected in Fang 1992). He also told Dai 
Qing, a reporter for Guangming ribao, that "being a physicist who should aspire to the 
perfect, harmonious and united natural world requires me to ask how the scientist can 
tolerate and accept the unreasonable and inharmonious situation in society" {Guangming 
ribao, 22 Sep. 1986). Natural science is not only Fang's way of thinking; it is his 
religion. He told Terzani,
"The natural sciences are my rehgion. Einstein once said something of the sort. 
Previously I did not understand him. Now I know: we scientists have a belief and an 
aim, we have an obligation towards society. If we discover a truth and society does not 
accept it, this weighs on us. This is what happened to Galileo. This is when, as 
scientists, we have to intervene. With this mission 1 step into society." (Quoted from 
Barme & Miniford, 1989: 329)'*
Fang first received training in physics at the undergraduate level. Political 
repression during the Cultural Revolution moved Fang from the realm of solid physics to 
cosmology. Fang said "I had one book with me, the Soviet physicist Landau's Theory o f  
Fields. For six months I did nothing but read this book over and over again. It was this 
curious happenstance alone that caused me to switch fields from solid state physics to 
cosmology (Schell, 1988: 124). His research of the "big bang" model of cosmological
 ^^  When asked whether he would convert to Christianity some day. Fang frankly told me that he already had science as his religion, 
considering it abundant to satisfy himself (Interview 3, Arizona, 1993).
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origins gained general acceptance among academics and led Fang to derive universal 
laws in the natural world. Thereafter, Fang, and his colleagues pursued this topic, taboo 
in China. They came to the conclusion that the spirit of science and rationality is the 
guiding principle in the realms of both scientific research and the social world. Not 
surprisingly, such an idea was attacked by the Party and Fang was accused of adhering to 
a naively empiricist and "undialectical" theory of the universe. Of course, his
uncompromising attitude toward science was viewed as a flawed product of "subjective 
idealism", resulting in another political purge (Zha Ruqiang, 1987 and Lin, 1986). He 
was thus condemned for opposing Marxist philosophy by challenging its guiding role 
over natural science (Buckley, 1991: 6). Fang’s faith in science has never been shaken 
even though he was attacked and persecuted several times (Fang, 1992: 289). Fang also 
said that "science is my career or my interest, if you like. Science advocates freedom of 
research and thinking, allowing people to have free circulation of ideas which
characteristics are forbidden in Communism. Thus my professional ethics are in conflict 
with Communism." (Interview 3, Arizona, 1993). This observation indicates how 
rationality and science have influenced Fang. The impact of Fang’s educational 
orientation on his ideological formation is much more than a mode of thinking; it is 
rather a style of life, philosophy of life, and religious faith to him.
The laws of science, to Fang, are universal, and thus there are no "Chinese 
characteristics" when it comes to scientific laws. Such universal laws as Fang envisaged
apply not only to scientific research but also to the social world.
"the basic principles and standards of modernization and democratization are like those 
of science — universally applicable. In this regard there's no Eastern or Western
standard, only the difference between 'backward' and 'advanced', between correct' and
mistaken'". (Fang, 1992: 42)
"the chief obstacle to the modernization and democratizcation of Chinese culture lies in 
the same erroneous idea that kept science out of China for so many years: the theory of 
China's 'unique characteristics', in all its variations." (Ibid)
Buckley (1991) also observes that Fang’s political beliefs have centred on his 
particular understanding of science but maintains that such interaction between the realm 
of natural science and wider social and political realms is not a new agenda in Chinese
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intellectual historyT Based upon the foregoing observations, we confirm our hypothesis 
that Fang's educational orientation must have exerted significant influence on his 
ideological formation.
His adherence to scientific principles makes him believe that the progress of 
science and the general progress of society are inextricably bound together. Imbued with 
such a spirit, Fang has committed himself to truth in all affairs, rejecting any supreme 
principles guiding scientific research including the superior leading role of socialism. His 
faith in science has also shaped his conception of the intellectual role, motivating him to 
support independent thinking not only in scientific matters but also in social and political 
affairs at large.
In addition, Fang's conception of rights has consistently provided him a basis for 
declaring that people should have the right to know what their leaders were doing since 
the socilist system claimed to have made the people the masters of the state. Fang did not 
wait for his ideas to be applied to the society at large but realized them in part in the 
democratic reforms at Keda, where he with the support of his colleagus implemented a 
series of democratic reforms. Fang strongly believes that if  universities are to be centres 
of ideas, students and staff must be provided a free environment to exchange different 
views (Fang, 1989b: 9-51, 175-194). In order to actualize his ideals of democracy in the 
university. Fang proposed the concept of "parliamentary politics", characterized by a free 
atmosphere and accepted procedure for free expression and criticism. Such ideas led 
Fang to allow free speech for the students and faculty, liberating them from any subtle 
and cripping forms of ideological repression. He also said to Schell, "I am determined to 
create intellectual and academic freedom. This will be my top priority" (Schell, 1988: 
130).
As I pointed out in the previous part, even Fang has internalized the value of 
science and rationality, he is not totally immune to the impact of Confucianism. In my 
interview with him, Fang told me that his strong sense of social responsibility of
l^For details of this theme, see D. W.Y. Kwok (1965) and Gu Xin (1990).
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intellectuals was considerably influenced by the ideas of Confucianism (Interview 3, 
Arizonia, 1993). It is thus clear that the habitus (Confucianism) still exerts certain impact 
on Fang’s ideological production. It is wrong to posit that Fang has really undergone a 
total transformation of values or ideas, which has no relation with his deposited cultural 
values as inherited from Confucianism.
In addition to the impact of educational orientation on his ideological formation, 
the unique intellectual field from which he comes also plays a significant role in guiding 
his democratic thought. Being the Vice-President of the University of Science and 
Technology, Fang implemented democratic reforms in the university. With support from 
other professors, all of whom had difficulties during the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Fang 
and his colleague Guan proposed a radical horizontal redistribution of power at the 
university. They decentralized authority to special committees and the departments 
themselves, allowing more autonomy from below to control research funds, degree 
giving, and faculty promotions (Fang, 1988: 151-164). Furthermore, they also 
established the rights of faculty and staff to audit all administrative meetings. Fang 
strongly believed the concept of equal rights in expressing views, and supported freedom 
in speech and thinking (Fang, 1989b: 11).
The democratic reforms implemented at Keda proved successful and received 
encouraging response from the intellectual community. Dai Qing’s interview with Fang, 
published on 22 September 1986, highly praised and recognized Fang’s work. Wu 
Guosheng, a Beijing University philosopher, also sketched a biography of Fang entitled 
"Fang Lizhi: The Republic Needs This Kind of Scholar" with a high appraisal of his life 
and democratic thought (Wu Guosheng, 1986). I have also pointed out in the preceding 
part that the official newspaper Remin ribao also ran a series of five articles in October 
and November of 1986 to report the reforms at Keda in detail. Lu Fang, the reporter for 
Renmin ribao, said he was impressed by what he had seen at Keda, describing Fang and 
Guan in the most adulatory way. Lu Fang, unable to control his enthusiasm, exulted "at 
Keda, everywhere I breathed the air of democracy" (Lu Fang, 1986). In addition. Fang’s
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ideas had an electrifying effect on the university students. The students echoed the 
messages delivered by Fang in their slogans "Respect human Right" and "Return 
Democracy and Freedom to Students" throughout the demonstrations in 1986-87 as well 
as the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989. For this reason the CCP accused Fang as a 
conspirator behind the scene (see, Chong, 1989 and my discussion in chapter 4).
The formulation and implementation of democratic reforms in university can be 
seen as the product of the intellectual force at Keda. The scientists’ and the colleagues’ 
support of Fang’s reformist ideas at Keda created a force for change. Guan Weiyan, the 
President of Keda, had been well-known for his open-minded attitude toward university 
education. He did not intervene and deter Fang from speaking up for democracy even 
though he was pressured to sanction Fang. Guan also believed that "monopolization of 
power invariably leads to corruption. As soon as power comes into the hands of any one 
individual, it signifies a loss of democratic rights for the people" (Schell, 1988: 129).
Wen Yuankai, another reformer intellectual, also supported Fang’s notion that 
freedom of speech and intellectual freedom are prerequisites for scientific research. He 
also approved of the student demonstrations in 1986-87, arguing that communication 
with the students was essential to solve the immediate problems and crisis {Xinbao, 1 Jan.
1987). Wen proposed reforms not only in the economic realm but also in the social, 
political, cultural and ideological realms, closely paralleling Fang’s total reforms in China 
{Shenzhen Qingninbao, 3 June, 1986).
Yang Jike, another colleague of Fang, also supported Fang’s proposed reforms. 
Yang had been famous for his outspokenness in criticizing the malpractice of the cadres 
and the wrong doing of the gang of four (Gin, 1987: 237-242). Seeing freedom of speech 
as a fundamental human right, Yang also stood on Fang’s side.
The cohesiveness of this intellectual field, coupled with wide support for the 
reforms at Keda, had already created a strong force to implement democratic reforms in 
the university. Such an intellectual force likewise suggests that the intellectual 
community should have acted as an agent of change in society. As Bourdieu and Ringer
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have suggested, the intellectual community can be seen as an intellectual force through 
which social changes can be realized. The intellectuals' commitment to the same ideals, 
accompanied by their similar intellectual identity, had further strengthened the force to 
reform (see Mannheim, 1952). The connection between Fang, Guan, Yang and other 
intellectuals again demonstrates the network of relationships among intellectuals in the 
educational institution. This network can have tremendous impact upon the construction 
of ideology. These observations point toward not only the relational and positional 
attributes of ideas but also autonomy of values (field) which has evolved in contrast to 
state dominated values (apparatus).
Apart from that, the intellectual milieu of the Beijing University also significantly 
influenced Fang's ideological formation. During the interview with Fang, he repeatedly 
said that he had already formed his democratic thought in the 50's when he was a student 
in Beijing University. Fang said that the strong May Fourth tradition in Beijing 
University had positive formative influences on his ideology and there had been no 
radical change in his democratic thinking since the 50's (Interview 3, Arizona, 1993). All 
these facts, thus, confirm our hypothesis regarding the formative influences of the 
intellectual field on Fang's ideas. One point which needs to be stressed here is that the 
incidence of such a relaxed intellectual context was not unique to Keda. We are sure that 
the same situation also happened in other higher education and research establishments. 
What made Keda different from its counterparts, in our opinion, should have to do with 
the cohesion and strong bond among the Faculty members. We have pointed it out the 
reform at Keda was not only welcomed by students but also received support from the 
senior management. Receiving direct support from the CCP leaders and its strategic 
position among other universities, coupled with its central location in the Capital and 
prominence in the external academic community, Keda could therefore distinguish itself 
from other universities. Being the vice-president of the University, Fang thus made use 
of his unique position and political opportunity structure to have different strategies to 
assert the autonomy of values in his field in contrast with the dominant values.
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Generational Location and Intellectual Radicalism
In light of the schematic form of generational location set out in chapter one, I 
consider Fang Lizhi as a part of the fourth and fifth generations of modem Chinese 
intellectuals. Fang represents the generation of intellectuals who experienced various 
anti-intellectual campaigns causing their faith and loyalty in socialism to be shaken. 
Their change from loyalty to dissidence toward the Party is highly indicative of the 
understanding of the relationship between the state and intellectuals in contemporary 
China.
The generation is the liberation period of the late 1940’s and early 1950’s (Li & 
Schwarcz, 1983/84). Fang was bom in 1936 into the family of a postal clerk from 
Hangzhou.^® During the years of the anti-Japanese War, Fang was still a very young 
child. Although we may presume that the war years had no great impact on Fang, but the 
year of liberation should have had significant influence upon him because he was mature 
enough to understand what happened around him. In 1952, Fang began his university 
education at Beijing University (Beida) majoring in theoretical and nuclear physics. His 
academic performance was excellent since he eamed straight A's. It was while he studied 
at Beida that he met his future wife, Li Shuxian, a fellow student in the department of 
physics. Upon his graduation. Fang was assigned work at the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences' Institute of Modem Physics Research. In response to Mao Zedong's appeal to 
"let a hundred flowers bloom". Fang submitted a lengthy essay calling for educational 
reform and autonomy in scientific research. As a consequence. Fang was labeled an 
"ultra-rightist". Like many other intellectuals at that time. Fang was purged, criticized 
and finally expelled from the Party. This experience did not make him disillusioned with 
the socialist ideals. He still recalled the incident when he was asked in a 1989 interview 
if he had ever believed in Marxism,
"I certainly have! Immediately after Liberation [1949] and in the 1950's I firmly 
believed in Marxism. In 1955, when I joined the Party, I was convinced that Marxism 
would lead the way in every field and that the Communist Party was thoroughly good." 
(Quoted from Barme & Miniford, 1989; 330)
^^Fang's biological details come from Schell (1988) and Fang (1992).
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Like other intellectuals in this age, Fang trusted Marxism unreservedly at the 
beginning of the liberation and even remained loyal during the 50's. His genuine faith in 
socialism is closely related to his particular generational location. Li and Schwarcz have 
pointed out that the fifth generation of intellectuals sincerely welcomed the liberation to 
actualize the socialist ideals, and they trusted that socialism would save China. But their 
loyalty was to the socialist ideals and not to the entrenched and despotic communist 
rulers. It was that very loyalty which led them to criticize the government during the 
Hundred Flowers Movement of 1959. And it was that openly expressed loyalty which 
brought them to grief. During the Cultural Revolution, Fang was again branded a 
"counter-revolutionary" and a "bourgeois enemy" and subsequently sent to labour reform.
Fang Lizhi, in my view, is one of the typical outspoken intellectuals in his age. 
He remained loyal and faithful to the Party through the 50's; however, the cold reality of 
the Cultural Revolution made Fang depressingly fhistrated. The ten-year catastrophe and 
different tides of anti-intellectual movements inevitably pointed to what Fang believed to 
be the undeniable fact that there must be something wrong with the socialist system. The 
agony and failure in the socialist praxis had created a "broken mirror" to Fang Avowed. 
The tides of political purge finally forced Fang to end his contract with the Party. After 
the 1987 incident, he then openly announced that he no longer wished to be a member of
the Party (Fang, 1989d: 155-165).
"Now the Party has expelled me a second time, but this time I know that I was not in the 
wrong. Therefore I have refused to make a self-criticism." (Quoted from Barme & 
Miniford, 1989: 330)
The experiences of several campaigns against the intellectuals caused Fang and 
other intellectuals to feel "cheated" by the socialist myth. His open declaration of the 
death of socialism and the call for total transformation of the country clearly indicated his 
profound sense of ideological crisis. As I analyze his idea of socialism, I observe a deep 
internal conflict in the mind of Fang. On the one hand, he criticized socialism and even 
renounced its applicability. On the other hand, he approvingly supported the practice of 
socialism in Northern Europe. This cognitive dissonance drove Fang to explain his view
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of the confrontation between the socialist ideal on the one hand and Western democracy 
on the other. We can then conclude that Fang had attempted to grapple with human 
rights and democracy because he lost faith in the orthodox line of ideology. The only 
way out for him was to reconstruct a new faith to resolve the impending cognitive 
dissonance. Through democracy, he hopes to reconstruct a new identity. Fang Lizhi 
typifies many people and intellectuals who originally trusted Communism but now have 
lost faith in it. Thinking through the predicaments in faith, he has strived for democracy 
and human rights to reestablish his own "identity".
It is only in light of Fang’s unique generational location that we can get a better 
understanding of his iconoclastic totalism. Rejecting totally state socialism. Fang thereby 
supported Western ideas and resorted to Western ideologies and methodologies to rescue 
China. His consistent emphasis on rationality and science can be understood as his 
diagnosis of the present impasse. Making science his religion, Fang attempted to fill the 
ideological void and save China from immediate collapse by science and democracy 
(Barme & Miniford, 1989: 329). Notwithstanding that Fang has attempted to internalize 
rationality and science as his new value system, he is not totally free from the impact of 
Confucianism as it is the habitus which still influences his ideological production. The 
discussion of how generational location has affected people’s knowledge production, 
though insightful, still has some limitations. In order to resolve the problems of 
classification of intellectuals into different generations and the reason why individual 
variations occur even they are from the same generation, we must draw light from 
"strategising" and "political opportunity structure" to examine the dynamic and 
interaction between social structure and individual response.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have discussed the democratic thought of Fang Lizhi, the 
outstanding radical reformer in China. His political thought and his particular
relationship with the state is indispensable for our understanding of the relationship 
between the state and intellectuals in post-Mao China.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE MOUTHPIECE OF THE PEOPLE : LIU BINYAN 
AND HIS DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT
Liu Binyan is one of the most prominent intellectuals to expose the problems of 
Chinese bureaucracy. Undoubtedly mainland China's most outstanding exponent of 
reportage literature, Liu Binyan has some keen observations on the labyrinth of social 
and political crises. Through his writings, he has attempted to expose the contradictions 
and conflicts in mainland Chinese society from the vantage point of the crisis inherent in 
state socialism.
By the early 1950's when Liu began his reportage writings, he already understood 
the real threat that bureaucracy, the personality cult, and hidebound thinking posed to the 
socialist cause {Zhengming, March, 1987: 79-81). An examination of the reportage 
writings of Liu Binyan enhances our understanding not only of the social and political 
crises in China but also of the conceptualization of democracy among Chinese 
journalists.
The earlier writings of Liu exposed bureaucratism and malpractice in the Party 
and state without touching on the state structure and system directly, but his later writings 
became a close inspection on the structure itself. In his post-Mao writings, Liu has 
described the root of the problems as socialist commandism.* In the first part of this 
chapter, I am going to examine the difference between Liu's earlier and later works, 
hoping to highlight his ideas of democracy. The remainder of the chapter will analyze 
his ideas in light of the proposed theoretical framework.
'State commandism is characterized by Leain-Stalmism built on traditional feudalism, in which the state is omnipresent, dominating 
every aspect o f the people's life. Su Shaozhi, a reform Marxist scholar describes the political system in mainland China as a united 
"Party-state-military-economic-ideological" cooqilex. In the same vein, Yan Jiaqi also regards the rule of the CCP before the 
Tiananmen massacre as totalism. See also Tang Tsou (1968); Vogel (1969); Xiao and Su (1990) and my discussion in chapter 4.
LIU BINYAN AND fflS REPORTAGE LITERATURE
Early Writings - The Attack on the Communist Bureaucracy
In his early years, Liu wrote journalistic reports to expose unhealthy tendencies 
among Chinese Communist bureaucrats. In 1956, he criticized the CCP for its poor work 
style after the establishment of the regime. In his "On the Bridge Construction Site", Liu 
described the wastefulness and inefficiency he witnessed during the construction of a 
bridge across the Yellow Riyer. The waste, according to Liu's inyestigation, was caused 
mainly by the inefficient administration of the bureaucrats. Argued Liu, less than 60 
percent of the machinery was being used. Each year at least 30 percent of the manpower 
was wasted due to lack of preparation or poor organization of workers (Liu, 1956, 
reprinted in Liu 1988: 442-48). Liu also found that indiyidual initiatiye was completely 
stifled. One of the characters in this reportage, Lo Lizheng, the head of the construction 
brigade, changed from a dynamic youth to a conservatiye leader. Liu describes Lo as 
enthusiastic and idealistic when he was young. Lo could "shoulder a heayy burden of 
luggage as, day and night, he trudged along the Beijing-Hankow railway line" (Ibid, 26). 
Howeyer, when he was promoted, he became excessiyely conservatiye and inflexible, 
failing to recognize precise decisions, instmctions, regulations and systems issued by the 
Bureau. He would not accept others' opinions. Lo began to see himself as standing high 
aboye the masses, diyorcing himself from reality and from the masses. Liu argued that a 
dozen or so years in the Party had turned an idealistic reyolutionary into a passiye, 
unadventurous yes-man. Though Liu did not blame explicitly the Party structure and 
system, his condemnation of the bureaucratic acts of Lo was a veiled criticism of the 
system.
Liu also spent time in recounting the conflict between Lo, the conservative and 
Cheng Gong, the innovative and dynamic worker. According to Liu's description, Cheng 
did everything according to scientific calculations and experience, favoured technical 
innovation and demanded that the construction material quotas be reduced (Ibid, 9). It is 
therefore natural that Cheng and Lo would end in a conflict, especially when Cheng is
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"daring", which to Lo means rash, arrogant and irresponsible. Cheng's reward for risking 
his life to save state property is to be transferred off the site. To Lo, Cheng's penalty is 
justified because of his pride, self-satisfaction, and insubordination to his superiors. Liu 
considered that Lo's victory represents the triumph of conservatism and bureaucratism in 
the Communist Party. It is clear that Liu's hidden message is to expose not only the 
misconduct of individual cadres but also to highlight the fact that the system itself deters 
innovative people from developing good performance while safeguarding the position of 
the conservatives. For Liu, Lo represents the common type of bureaucrats; he is 
conservative, indulging in empty talk, sticking to a rigid way of thinking, being 
hidebound by convention, irresponsible and dilatory, and vindictively attacking others.
"Our Paper's Inside Story" published in Renmin minxue (1956), also gave a 
similar message that bureaucratism and conservative culture in the Party and state 
apparatus have suffocated the creative incentives of dynamic and energetic people. The 
two young reporters in "Our Paper's Inside Story" represent the journalistic ideal of Liu. 
To Liu, news reporters need to have special qualities, the most important of which is a 
strong feeling. Liu said, "when they see the dark side of things, they should feel angry, 
and should brace themselves and speak out. When they come across a good person, they 
should be enthusiastic and praise him to the skies (Yeh & Chou, 1989). Liu upholds the 
idea of "Qin Wen", the undifferentiated masses of the people, for whom and to whom the 
'scout' or patriotic intellectual must speak. To Liu, the news reporters should listen to the 
voice of the people because they act as the social conscience and mouth of the people 
(Wagner, 1987: 197-220). The two young reporters in "Our Paper's Inside Story" 
demonstrated their enthusiastic and energetic working attitude, yet did not rely on these 
qualities alone in their work. They also tried to find out the reasons behind the news 
stories. They represent what is the ideal news reporter for Liu, the journalist whose role 
is that of a social investigator and spokesman for popular grievances. However, in the 
story Liu showed us that the independent journalist's attitude was in conflict with the 
conservative one in the older generation. As expected, the two generations of reporters
240
finally came into sharp conflict. Consequently, a conservative, arbitrary leadership 
dominated a younger generation full of initiative and enthusiasm. This story depicts the 
inevitable and unresolved conflict between these dedicated journalists and the 
conservative bureaucrats of the CCP.
Liu pictures the old generation as too rigid in its thinking and patriarchal in its 
way of dealing with its work. The news reporters should break through such a rigid and 
bureaucratic style of work. According to Liu, the journalist should become independent 
and gain the people as trust through honesty and courage. Moreover, writers should 
assume the role of a moral and socialist scout of the people (Wagner, 1987: 215-17).^
The early writings of Liu directed his sharp criticism to the bureaucratic practice 
of the Party, its subjectivism, factionalism and dogmatism. Though he did not explicitly 
point out that the crisis has its origin in the socialist system, such a message is implicit in 
his reportage literature. Uncovering the dark side of the socialist regime of China 
inevitably led to repression as Liu was accused of 'besmearing the glorious socialism’ and 
labeled an 'anti-party, anti-socialism, bourgeois rightist element’. Consequently, he was 
deprived of the right to write and publish for more than 20 years. Despite this, Liu has 
never abandoned his determination to reveal the social reality.
Later Writings - The Attack on the Socialist Svstem
After his formal rehabilitation following the Cultural Revolution, Liu was 
determined to discover social injustice and speak out for the people in his capacity as a 
reporter for People's Daily. In ’’People or Monsters”, Liu reveals how a single Party- 
branch secretary came to power in Bin County and fashioned an illegal empire through 
influence, bribery, and corruption. The character Wang Shouxin rode roughshod over 
the people. Wang, who had started off as a low-ranking cashier in a fuel company, had 
been promoted during the Cultural Revolution to be the company’s manager. After that, 
Wang became the Party branch secretary and then the deputy chairman of Bin County 
Commercial Revolutionary Committee. From then on, Wang became involved in illegal
^For details o f Liu's view of writers, see Liu (1979a & b); (1985a) & (1988a).
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exchanges of goods and favours with superior officials up to provincial level. To Liu, it 
was one of the most notorious corruption cases of its time, with over 500,000 yuan 
changing hands. In the end, ten people were arrested, all of them members of the 
Communist Party. As Liu wrote in "People or Monsters", "Party cadres themselves 
gradually became transformed into parasites who devoured the people's flesh and blood 
and who blighted the socialist system like an infestation of cankerworms" (quoted from 
Schell, 1988: 150; see also Liu, 1979). This reportage shocked the readers in general, not 
only because of the serious crime of corruption discovered in Bin County, but also 
because of his revelation that such activities were practised for years without anyone in 
the Party paying attention to them. Liu claimed that the Party had regulated and 
intervened in every aspect of life, including military conscription, family planning, 
criminal sentences, and sowing plans, but ignored corruption in its own ranks (Liu, 
1979).
It should be noted that hardly any mention is made of the problems of the Party 
itself. In Liu's words, "the Communist Party regulated everything, but it would not 
regulate the Communist Party" (Schell, 1988: 150). After closing the case of Wang 
Shouxin, Liu wonders how many of the social conditions that gave rise to this case have 
really changed, concluding that the corruption of Wang is not an isolated case. This case 
reveals the fact that the socialist system has its internal weaknesses and flaws, allowing 
for the possibility that many situations similar to that of Wang might exist in China. Liu 
questions why the ideal socialist state has allowed such malpractice to exist for years. 
Critical Lovaltv and Sense of Mission
Having internalized his role as the social conscience, Liu criticizes the rule of 
Communism with his critically loyal attitude. In "A Second Kind of Loyalty" (1985) , 
Liu has suggested three kinds of loyalty. The first kind of loyalty requires that people 
should be diligent and conscientious, work hard without complaint, taking orders 
obediently and never disagreeing with their superiors just like the glorious model set
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forth by the Communist Party in the case of Lei Feng/ The second kind of loyalty is 
typified by Ni Yuxian and Chen Shizhong, who even risked their lives to speak out for 
people, to expose the Party's dark side in an effort to correct the faults of the CCP. Liu 
realized that this second kind of loyalty, critical loyalty, is opposed by the CCP. It is 
nevertheless significant to note that Liu puts emphasis on the second kind of loyalty. The 
third kind of loyalty, argued Liu, requires that people should flatter and heap praises on 
the Party. In the mind of Liu, the CCP only accepts the first and third kinds of loyalty 
but abandons the second kind (Liu, 1988: 113-156).
In "A Second Kind of Loyalty", both Chen and Ni had consistently admonished 
the Party's Central Committee at the risk of their lives for more than 20 years. Chen was 
an ordinary non-Party intellectual.A fter his return to China from studying mechanical 
engineering in the Soviet Union, he became disillusioned with what he encountered in 
his country. Chen wrote to Mao and requested that he quickly rectify his previous 
mistakes. Chen also asked Mao to change domestic and foreign policies.^ By doing so, 
Chen broke the taboo against criticizing the Chinese Communists' foreign policy (Ni 
Yusien, April, 1986: 23; see also Liu, 1988: 113-127). A second letter of this kind 
earned Chen a jail sentence as a counter-revolutionary. Chen deeply believed that his 
move to offer Mao such advice was motivated by his devotion to Chairman Mao and to 
the Party. His deep regard for the Party and his patriotism induced him to give frank 
expression to his political opinions. After his jail term, Chen never changed his attitude, 
continuing to criticize Lei Feng's first kind of loyalty. He called upon Mao to reconsider 
the so-called "anti-Party acts" as the most genuine expressions of love for the Party (Liu, 
1988: 113-127; see also Zhengming, Dec, 1985: 30-31). What appealed to Liu was not 
just Chen's willingness to point up Party errors without regard to personal risks but "his
^Lei Feng was a CCP member regarded as the 'ideal type' that the people should follow. Lei was famous for his spirit of self- 
sacrifice, serving people without any self-interest, and he was loyal & obedient to the Party's rule. After the June Fourth Incident of 
1989, the CCP leaders repeatedly stressed the importance of Party discipline and called again for the learning o f Lei Feng.
‘For the biography of Chen, see Zhengming (Dec. 1985: 24-27; 29-30).
^For details of the letter, see Liu (1988: 120-21).
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concern with the integrity of the Party itself, whose leading role he was criticizing" 
(Schell, 1988: 156). Perhaps Liu saw Chen as a man like himself, having a second kind 
of loyalty.
Another protagonist is Ni Yuxian, a PLA soldier who not only dared to question 
the disastrous leftist agricultural policies of the Party in the 1950's and 1960’s but also 
risked writing to Mao. The more he read selected works of Marx, Lenin, Engels, Stalin 
and Mao, the more he began to realize that the Marxism in the books was not consistent 
with the real practice in mainland China. The natural disasters and economic failure in 
the 50’s and 60's had aroused Ni's concern. He finally concluded that the fault was 
related to the extreme leftist agricultural policies with their high production quotas, 
excessive crop regulations, and over-collectivization which turned a prosperous farming 
area into a wilderness of starvation. As a result, people’s incentive to work was destroyed 
and agricultural and industrial production plummeted (Liu, 1988: 127-137). According 
to the State Statistics Bureau, in the three years of 1958, 1959 and 1960, drought affected 
24%, 31% and 43% respectively of mainland China’s arable land (State Statistics Bureau, 
1981: 18). This brought agriculture to the brink of collapse. In order to conceal the real 
state of affairs from their superiors, rural cadres resorted to reporting inflated production 
figures (Wei Wu, 1984:110). Ni mentioned similar figures in the case of his studies. In 
the Cultural Revolution, the fanatical move of the Gang of Four, a full-scale movement 
to cleanse class ranks, swept through mainland China. To Ni, this kind of movement was 
not compatible with the ideas of Lenin and Marx, with those works was familiar. 
Thereafter, Ni eventually stood on the side of the people who were being persecuted. He 
even wrote a 100,000-word letter to the Party’s Central Committee and Chairman Mao 
urging them to correct their erroneous policies and save the country from danger. 
However, the critical loyalty of Ni did not appeal to the Party (Liu, 1988: 152-156).
In this piece of work, Liu describes more than two young protagonists who 
suffered because of the first kind and third kind of loyalty. To Liu, the loyalty of Lei 
Feng has serious, even fatal defects because he knows only how to follow orders from
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above and he does not know how to make decisions on his own that would enable him to 
resist the mistakes of the authorities (Ibid, 143; 154-56). The second kind of loyalty as 
demonstrated by both Chen and Ni is scientific, correct and critical enough to help the 
leaders to have better administration. The second kind of loyalty, said Liu, is not very 
popular; and you may have to pay for it with your freedom, your happiness, or even your 
life (Liu, 1988: 156)."
On my reading, the scope of Liu's later work, unlike his earlier work, calls 
attention to the fundamental flaws and weaknesses of the socialist system. Thus Liu 
urges a critical loyalty rather than blind obedience to the Party. For Liu, it is a wonderful 
means to help the Party see its mistakes while there is room for improvement. Liu also 
encourages people "to take a look, let everyone get a little nervous, get a little more 
active, and have a little more sense of urgency" (Schell, 1988: 160) to point out the 
impending crisis of the state. The reason behind Liu's move is to correct the stubborn 
tradition of the Communist state which is fearful of admitting difficulties. In Liu's eyes, 
such fears are unhealthy. Through a critical discourse and comments to the state 
administration, Liu hoped to help the Party correct its mistakes. It is in this way that Liu 
has hit officialdom's tenderest nerve. The above examination of his works reveals that 
Liu really touched on the structural crisis in socialist China. Liu had discovered 
unsatisfactory conditions in socialism, causing him to define the root of the problems to 
be the feudal, patriarchal style of leadership, characteristic of the authoritarian rule of 
state commandism in Communist China.
From Lovaltv to Critics
Liu, after the June-Fourth Incident, denounced the leadership of Mao, arguing 
that Mao had deceived the people with a false interpretation of socialism. Right after the 
June Fourth Incident, Liu even openly predicted the collapse of the CCP within two 
years' time. He also anticipated that there would be many more uprisings in China.^
*His woik "The second Kind of Loyalty" aroused huge response from the intellectual community, see, for example, Zhengming 
(Dec. 1985: 21-32); The Nineties (OcL 1985: 92-94).
questioned Liu in person regarding the validity of such a claim. Liu explained to me that he had mistaken the whole situation.
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Having been loyal Party member for 40 years, Liu said that it is now extremely difficult 
for him to continue a good relationship with the Party. After the 1989 incident, most 
intellectuals became conscious of their need for professional autonomy and 
independence, believing that they had been deceived by the Party {Zhengming, Mar. 
1990: 87-88), Liu also explained to me that his notion of "critical loyalty", properly 
stated, was not 'loyalty' at all. Underlying his idea of "critical loyalty" was exactly 
"disloyalty" but Liu himself could not spell it out directly because of political danger. 
Now that he is now living abroad, Liu has become much more bold in his attack on the 
CCP.* He not only pointed out its mistakes but also denounced the regime still controlled 
by the CCP {Minzhu Zhongguo, vol. 3, 1990: 7-11; vol. 7, 1991: 12-15). This move has 
indicated changes not only in his political thought but also in his social location. Thus, 
Liu believes it is necessary to collaborate with the liberal reformers in the Party and 
opposition forces must continue to exert pressure from abroad in order to mobilize 
change in China (Interview 4, Princeton, 1993).
Unlike Yan Jiaqi, the political scientist whose conception of democracy is based 
on Western political theories, Liu's conception of democracy is closely related to his 
perceived role of intellectuals in general and journalists in particular. When asked about 
his definition of democracy, Liu honestly told me that he never detailed researched on 
this subject. Having no detailed understanding of democracy, Liu only singles out some 
general principles associated with democracy such as freedom of speech, freedom of 
expression and right to choice. Thus, I presume that Liu's ideas of democracy merely 
rests only on his concern for the rights of writers and journalists instead of a profound 
analysis of political theories of democracy (Interview 4, Princeton, 1993). It also gives 
us the impression that he has said or written less on Chinese democracy than he was. The
His former prediction rested on the assumption that the reforms in China would become regressive. Without further reforms, the 
CCP would be doomed to a total downfall. However, the CCP continued its reform programme and even openly initiated and 
supported market reforms in China. More importantly, the collapse of the communist bloc in the Eastern European countries and the 
former Soviet Union also imposed pressure on China. Because of these developments that Liu has modified his former view, seeing 
the confirmation o f economic reforms in mainland China as positive (Interview 4, Princeton, 1993).
'Before the June-Fourth Incident of 1989, Liu went to the United States as a visiting scholar. During his stay in the States and his 
visit to Hong Kong, Liu openly denounced the CCP.
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scrutiny of Liu’s speeches and writings, one may discover most of them are reportage 
literature exposing the real life of the people. It might shed light on why Liu is not so 
sophisticated in the conceptualization of democracy.
Having internalized the value of literary intellectuals and journalists, Liu believes 
the principal goals of journalists are to reveal social reality and speak for the people. 
These goals influence why he interprets democracy primarily in terms of people’s rights. 
After the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, Liu reflected upon the relationship 
between the people and the state and upon the role of intellectuals. In an interview, Liu 
even associated the vulnerable position of intellectuals with the Chinese tradition of 
literati and emphasized the need to establish an independent status for Chinese 
intellectuals (Liu, 1993).^
Liu blames the people for causing despotic rule in China. Criticizing the 
’’spiritual crisis” in China similar to that experienced by the people of Eastern Europe, 
Liu asks the Chinese people to be active in creating their own civil society. He cites the 
work of Havel in his call for everyone to have his/her own ideas. The role of 
intellectuals, then, must be critical enough to arouse public attention to what is happening 
and independent enough to point out about the existing predicaments in society {Minzhu 
Zhongguo, Aug. 1990: 7-11). Realizing the importance of an independent civil society, 
Liu urges the people to organize a united social force to assert their autonomy. Though 
Liu realizes that the overthrow of the CCP will not be easy, he believes that the recent 
socio-political changes in China may have contributed to the development of a civil 
society (Liu, 1993). Liu particularly points toward the impact of mass media on the 
public, indicating that more than 103 million Chinese owned TVs in 1987. Having been 
exposed to ’’true” information received from external channels such as Voice of America 
and British Broadcasting Corporation, Chinese people living in the mainland are more 
informed of current developments in the outside world, broadening their perspectives in
’ Liu is among the sixth generation of Chinese intellectuals (red guard intellectuals) who are more critical and independent in 
thinking. For details, see my discussion in chapter 9 and Liu (1993).
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evaluating the existing socialist practices (Liu, 1990a). Based upon these observations, 
Liu proclaims that every Chinese must reflect deeply and examine himself in order to 
transform China and resolve the intense "spiritual crisis" (Liu, 1990: 14-17).*°
TOWARD A CONTEXTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF LIU BINYAN’S SOCIAL- 
POLITICAL IDEAS
Having discussed Liu Binyan's social-political ideas, we are going to analyze 
Liu’s ideas in the light of our proposed analytic framework. It is our contention that 
knowledge can be understood sociologically as partially determined by the social 
configuration in which it develops. Thus, the content and form of knowledge can be 
analyzed in relation to its social context. At the same time, we must also explore how 
different individuals react or respond to their external forces or threats. Their access to 
different socio-economic and socio-political opportunities should have great impact on 
what strategies that they adopt in coping with the "external stimuli" that they are 
confronting.
Our discussion in previous chapters has indicated us that the post-Mao era can be 
characterized by a relaxed socio-political and socio-cultural contexts. It is also observed 
that the CCP's control over the socio-cultural and socio-ideological realms was loosened. 
Against such a background, Chinese intellectuals have attempted to expand their 
influence on public sphere in order that they can assert their intellectual independence 
and eventually redefine a new relationship with the state (for details, see, chapter 4 and 
Bonin and Chevrier, 1991). It is also against such a socio-cultural and socio-political 
contexts that Liu Binyan’s ideas were formed. According to Mannheim, the sociology of 
knowledge is a perspective or style of thought which reflects the various world-views as 
contingent on the experience and interests of particular groups. It is thus intellectually 
stimulating to investigate how Liu’s social location has affected his production of 
knowledge.
'°Such a view is similar to that o f Liu Xiaobo. Liu Binyan told me that his recent reading o f Liu Xiaobo's works revealed that both 
of them had similar ideas though they seemed to be very different in the past Liu added that Xiaobo changed his view toward the 
CCP after his imprisonment toward the importance of cooperation with the liberal wing of the CCP (Interview 4, Princeton, 1993).
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Social Location and the Ideological Formation
It is our hypothesis that the social location of Liu has influenced his ideological 
formation. Like Fang and Yan, Liu Binyan was a member of the CCP and an 
establishment intellectual, working as a reporter in the state-owned news agency since the 
1950s. His role as establishment intellectual considerably constrained his radicalism in 
his earlier works. It is my contention that Liu was subject to political patronage when he 
was in China. His reportage was praised and supported at some times while being 
criticized and attacked at other times, oscillating whenever the political climate changed. 
Such oscillations indicate the limited autonomy and independence of Chinese journalists 
and writers.
Like many other intellectuals in China, Liu had to skillfully and tactically observe 
the "political climate" while his publications depended greatly on the "political capital" of 
his patron.” Under political pressure, Liu had to write something which would please the 
state. He made it explicit that his work on Zhu Boru {Renmin ribao, 28 July, 1983) and 
Zhang Haidi”  published in Liaoning Qingnian (vol.4 1983), praising the good qualities 
of Party members, was a compromise in the midst of a "cold wind" in the literary realm 
(see Liu, 1983, 1984).” Liu also told me that journalists and writers in mainland China 
should be cautious of the changing "political environment" so as to detect the right time 
to speak out. He also admitted that he accepted criticism on some occasions because it 
was necessary if he was to maintain his official capacity. Such responses, according to 
Liu, are strategic and appropriate (Interview 4, Princeton, 1993).”
“ Liu said in an interview that he had to write indirectly to attack state socialism in the early 80s. Like the traditional literati, Liu 
adopted indirect means to criticize the malpractice of rulers instead of direct condemnation. His example highlights the vulnerable 
role of Chinese establishment intellectuals. See The Seventies (Dec. 1982). This observation confirms what Goldman (1981) has 
argued that no matter how critical intellectuals are, they are still restrained by a self-censored approach. See also Cheng (1990: 67- 
96). MacKinnon (1992) argues along the same lines that journalists in mainland China are not immune from the patron-client 
relations. He cites the case o f An Gang who had a direct line to Party Secretary Hu Yaobang. With such a houtai, An Gang could 
have a more &ee hand to express his views. He even headed a team working for the TV series Hexiang. However, An Gang was 
mysteriously attacked in the newspaper Jinji ribao (Economic daily), of which he had been one of the editors-in-chief with the 
downfall of Hu.
'^Zhu and Zhang were regarded by the Party as good and loyal CCP members.
“ in his self-criticism, Liu also defended himself and said that he not only discovered the "dark" side of the CCP but also wrote 
good things of the Party. See Zhengming (OcL 1987: 70-74).
'^In my interview with Liu, he made it plain that the status of writers and journalists is very different from that of natural scientists
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The authoritarian rule of state-commandism scrupulously controls the ideological 
realm and civil society. Within such a political system, mass media has been a means to 
represent the will of the state and the Party rather than of the people. As Gramsci (1971) 
suggested, the hegemonic control of the state is not merely by means of coercion or 
violence but by creating a "total institution"’^  through the imposition of ideological 
hegemony on the civil society. Griffith (1973) also highlights the point that the success 
of state socialism in China rests on a myth of unanimity, which is actualized by 
suppressing dissent and indoctrinating the officially interpreted ideology. Mass media, in 
this way, have been the "ex post facto justification" of the state and the Party (Lee Chin- 
chuan, 1990: 5). Journalists, working in the state-controlled mass media, are trying to 
balance the state authority and the public interest. Conventionally, journalists have been 
part of the state apparatus, serving the Party as "tools" to transmit the will of the Party to 
the people by what Schudson (1989) calls "hegemonic communication" in which the 
rulers address the r u l e d . A t  the same time, they are also supposed to act as the 
"mouthpiece, ears and eyes" of the people, through which "petitionary communication" is 
realized because the people can address the leaders through the media. The particular 
social location of journalists has made them vulnerable because they serve two masters 
with a dual mission, especially when the interests of the two parties are diverse 
(Polumbaum, 1990: 45).’^  Thus, journalists in mainland China are "riding the horse 
between the leaders and the masses, afraid of displeasing both" (Ibid). The extent to 
which they are open in their critique and dissidence greatly depends on support from their
,whose works could be very critical because it had been the CCP's practice to treat natural scientists better simply because the party 
was in great need of them to help modernize China. Writers and journalists had to be indirect in their criticism. Liu also told me that 
one of the reasons for his indirect and moderate approach was to ensure his ofBcial capacity. Liu believed that it was more significant 
for writers and journalists to keep their posts so that they may continue to speak o u t (Interview 4, Princeton, 1993).
adopt this term from Goffinan (1961), which is appropriate to describe political control in the Mao era. The term implies a place 
of residence and work where people are put into a similar situation and cut off from the outside world. With such isolation the 
people's actions and even their thinking can be manipulated.
get the insight from Polumbaum (1990), who has a detailed discussion of the changing role of journalists in the post-Mao era. 
See also Liu's own discussion of the role of journalists in China at 5Aenz/ieng Qingnian boo, 2 Sep. 1986.
'^When he was working as a journalist, Liu also openly proclaimed that he had found two opposing truths, the incongruence 
between the reality and socialist theory. See Schell (1988: 147).
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political patrons. Like other writers, journalists have to get approval from their political 
supporters before publishing their views. This situation confirms Link's observation.
"Typically a high official (someone in a key position — sometimes a publisher or 
editor), a backstage supporter may be interested in serving as houtai because a writer 
can publish a viewpoint that the official approves but would find 'inconvenient' to 
express pubhcly himself." (Link, 1986: 90)
Journalists in mainland China, unlike their counterparts in the former Soviet 
Union who could publish their viewpoints in the underground publications and enjoyed a 
relatively independent position, have to rely on the Party state. Though the state control 
of the mass media has been liberated, allowing more freedom in public discourse since 
1978, journalistic autonomy continues to oscillate between the cycle of shou (restriction) 
and fan  (liberation).'^ Lee Chin-chuan suggests,
"The Party's withdrawal from some aspects of the social arena has permitted the 
emergence of more differentiated and pluralistic semi-autonomous groups that have 
gradually sought to articulate their self-interests within the system. These specialized 
interests and constituencies have been served, within limits, by a proliferated number of 
media outlets and diversified content within given media.” (Lee Chin-chuan, 1990: 5; 
emphasis added)
The diversity and ideological laxity tolerated in the post-Mao era, in this regard, 
cannot be interpreted as a real liberation of the press. Even though the foregoing 
discussion has suggested a changing relationship between establishment intellectuals and 
the state, we must not overstate the independence of intellectuals whatsoever. Even 
though Liu Binyan has striven for his own autonomy and professional independence, 
speaking out for the people and offering critical loyalty instead of blind faith, his fortune 
and work were still restricted by the state. Liu himself also acknowledges that is the cold 
reality confronted by journalists in mainland China. He writes,
"For nearly 30 years, up until the late 1970s, the Communist Party successfully 
exercised absolute control over the Chinese media. What people learned fi’om the 
media were phrases like 'the great achievements of socialism' and the great 
contribution of the Party leadership'... The facts of such a monstrous disaster were 
completely covered up by the Party so successfully that up until now few people in 
China know about it." (Liu, 1990a: 7)*’
adopt this concept from Gold (1990) to portray the general relationship between the intellectuals and the state in China. This 
concept is also appropriate to describe the social position o f journalists in mainland China.
‘’state control o f the media forced most journalists to be observant of the political climate. In discussing his work "The Second 
Kind of Loyalty", Liu told me that he had to find the right time to get it published. O f course, much difficulty would be expected
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In addition, Liu had been under the influence of patronage when he was in 
China/° Though Liu denied the support of Hu Yaobang in 1986, he later admitted that 
Hu had been supporting him. Liu, with a strong sense of gratitude to Hu, states that 
"without his [Hu’s] protection, my pen would have been stopped long ago" (Liu, 1990: 
252). His denial of Hu’s support had to do with the fragile patronage relation. In 1985- 
86, observing the precarious political position of Hu, Liu alluded thus to the rumours
circulating in Beijing.^*
"Some people have said that so-and-so is my protector. But I don't have any protector." 
(Quoted from Schell, 1988: 154)
"I haven't seen Comrade Hu Yaobang for at least eight years. The last time I really saw 
him was in 1958 ... At the final banquet of the Fourth National Congress of Literary and 
Art Workers, we went over and toasted him. I suppose that also counts as seeing him. 
But I've never seen him since then. I believe that my greatest protector, my reliable 
protector, is simply the Chinese people." (Ibid, emphasis added)
When he went to the United States and thus his social location changed, Liu then 
admited his relations with Hu Yaobang, telling his readers that he intentionally avoided 
the association with Hu in public even though he well recognized that Hu had been trying 
to help him.
"The later development in the political situation set the pattern for my relations with 
Hu: I was increasingly resented by people in high places, considered a 'liberalist' 
element, while Hu Yaobang's position also became increasing precarious. I therefore 
avoided all personal contact with him." (Liu, 1990: 242)
Understanding Liu’s delicate but vulnerable relation with Hu, a friend of Liu 
warned him not to say anything which would eventually damage the political career of 
Hu, especially when Hu’s position was unstable at that time. (Ibid)
Liu, in his autobiography, rehearsed Hu’s on-going support to him since the 
1950’s. Once in a regular working meeting of the Propaganda Department, some Party 
members complained that Liu had denounced socialism publicly. Hu showed his
(Interview 4, Princeton, 1993).
^°Liu devotes a chapter in his autobiography to discuss his relation with his political patron Hu Yaobang, see Liu (1990: 237-252).
^'Some tumours suggested that Liu and Wang Ruoshui, the deputy editor-in-chief of People's Daily, had a special permit, i.e. a 
particular reporter ID, which permitted them easily to get information and visit places they wanted.(Lee Yi, 1990: 112-3) Their 
"rumoured" privilege is an indicator o f political support from the senior Party members.
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approving attitude toward Liu's work. In summarizing the meeting, Hu said,
"I know of Liu Binyan. In 1957, when he was labelled a rightist, I had my reservations. 
Last year, I gave my full support to his rehabilitation. Of course he has his faults." (Liu, 
1990: 142)
These words may be interpreted not simply as protection but as condemnation of 
those who attacked Liu.
"I don't see much wrong with Liu. I supported him twenty-two years ago, as I do now. 
If he has his faults, they are certainly no greater than those of you are attacking him. 
This was the first time that Hu Yaobang had spoken more or less openly in support of 
me. Later on, he again mentioned me under different circumstances in more or less the 
same terms, with slight modifications." (Ibid: 143)
Liu repeatedly points toward the critical and radical stance in his reportage which 
was tolerated because of the "favourable political climate in Beijing and Hu Yaobang's 
stable position and positive influence." (Ibid: 155) Making his position clear, Liu states 
that there is a need to observe the "political climate", especially when a country has no 
legal framework and procedural rule to protect freedom of speech (Interview 4, 
Princeton, 1993). Goldman (1994) also reports in the same vein that Hu Yaobang 
protected Liu Binyan who was one of his followers writing for China Youth News. With 
sympathetic attitude towards Chinese intellectuals, Hu was willing to withstand the 
pressure to participate actively in various anti-intellectual campaigns to support 
intellectuals. During the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Hu convened a meeting to assure his 
subordinates in the Youth League when they were condemned as rightists that the League 
would welcome them back from the countryside and factories. In addition, Hu also 
insisted to rehabitate all "victims" of the Cultural Revolution. Differed from those of the 
leadership, Hu's sympathetic attitude towards intellectuals had gained him deep respect 
from the Chinese intellectual c i r c l e s . 2 2  In response to the sudden death of Hu in 1989, 
some articles were published in newspapers such as an article entitled "He Had Deep 
Love for His Comrades — Comrade Yaobang as I Understand Him" in Zhongguo 
qingnianbao. It also explains why many Chinese intellectuals mourned for the death of 
Hu Yaobang.
^^For details of Hu's intellectual network, see, Goldman (1994) .
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The changing political climate in China has had significant impact on Chinese 
literature. The spring of 1984 was relatively "warm" for the writers. At the beginning of
1984, Hu sent down his directive,
"The Party rectification program must settle down to the job in all seriousness. In the 
coming three years of the Party rectification program, the People's Daily should publish 
ten thousand examples fo r  emulation and expose three thousand fo r  criticism"  (Liu, 
1990: 177, emphasis added)
Hu's directive set the "green light" to reporting social evils and criticism, allowing 
more autonomy for intellectuals and encouraging creative writing. Liu also supported 
democratic election in the Writer's Association (Hu & Zhang, 1989: 8). In the same year, 
Hu Qili, the minister who was in charge of ideological work at that time, also supported 
Hu's ideological front (Ibid, 6-8). Having heard these positive words, Liu, like other 
journalists, was greatly encouraged to produce many stories to uncover the social reality 
of the people in 1984-85. Liu told me directly without such support from both of them, 
the publication of his works would have encountered insurmountable difficulties 
(Interview 4, Princeton, 1993).
In addition to the support from Hu Yaobang, I also observe that other senior
leaders openly supported Liu. Liu also frankly acknowledges,
"But it is also largely due to the moral courage of editor-in-chief in Beijing Hu Jiwei 
and his deputy, the philosopher Wang Ruoshui, and their loyal staff." (Liu, 1990: 155)
As Goldman (1994) suggested, Hu Jiwei, the former editor-in-chief of the 
People’s Daily, and Wang Ruoshui, the philosopher and deputy editor of the Theory 
Department of the same paper allied with Hu Yaobang in the past. Because of their 
support, Chinese intellectuals were imbued with courage to speak out.
Wan Li, the reform-minded Vice-Premier, also approved the work of Liu openly. 
Wan had been a supporter of Hu's ideological front and it was he and Hu who effectively 
stalled the campaign against spiritual pollution in 1983 (Ibid, 219). Wan praised the kind 
of loyalty about which Liu wrote in "The second Kind of Loyalty". Speaking at the 
National Symposium of Soft Science Research in the summer 1986, Wan Li said that 
"the reforms currently under way in China require not only the first kind of loyalty
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epitomized by Lei Feng, but also the 'second kind of loyalty’ demonstrated by Chen
Shizhong” (Schell, 1988: 159). At a meeting Wan greeted Liu and said,
"What we need is precisely the second kind of loyalty you wrote of... A party is doomed 
if it doesn't tolerate differing views." (Liu, 1990: 219)
On the same occasion. Wan also encouraged Liu to write something on Wu Han 
and Deng Tuo who were loyal intellectuals denounced by Mao in the midst of a power 
struggle. Uncertain about the political climate, Liu asked Wan directly whether his work 
’’The Second Kind of Loyalty” could be published. Wan told Liu with confidence that 
his work would soon be approved by Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang, the expression of
which made Liu feel safe (Liu, 1990: 220).
"News of Wan Li's talk with me and his words on 'Another Kind of Loyalty' spread far 
and wide. Some local papers printed the news. This, and the appearance of Wan Li's 
speech in the pages of the People's Daily, were taken as sure signs of good weather and 
the intellectuals gained heart." (Ibid, 220)
Securing political approval, Liu became more confident to speak out for the 
people and was particularly productive in 1984-86.^^ This evidence reinforces the idea 
that the outlets of intellectual radicalism and diversified content of journalists in 
mainland China must be within limits and within given media (C.C. Lee, 1990: 5).
Within the patron-client network,^"' the personal fate of Liu went hand in hand 
with Hu, his political patron. When Hu was regarded as ’’the protective screen for all 
liberalist elements'” by the conservatives in the Party, he lost his position eventually
(Liu, 1990: 242). Liu laments the similar fortunes of Hu and himself.
"It is rare for two persons as far apart as Hu Yaobang and I to be joined by the same 
fate, rare indeed." (Liu, 1990: 237)
The personal fate of Liu indicates that people under such a patrimonial rulership 
will ultimately lose their autonomy and independence. Working within such a political 
structure, individual interest, free will and personal choice have to be sacrificed. Hu’s 
downfall clearly demonstrates the vulnerability of insiders. Even though Hu himself did
^^For the details of his works during this period, see the bibliography complied by Hu and 23iang (1989: 232-237).
^^Some scholars also argue that the political system of socialist China is characterized by "patron-client networks", in which party- 
state penetration is realized. See McCormick (1990); Warder (1986).
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not want to restrict intellectual freedom, he had to say something contrary to his will in 
the midst of political crisis. He had to spell out the party line, stating that the Party's 
journalism is the Party's mouthpiece, and naturally it is the mouthpiece of the people's 
government, which is led by the Party, and also the mouthpiece of the people themselves.
Under intense political pressure, Hu was forced to sacrifice his free will. Early in 
1984, he condemned Liu's work on "Right and Wrong in Thirty-three Years", a work 
discussing the fault of the CCP in the past (Liu, 1984). When his position in the Party
was again threatened in 1987, Hu had to criticize Liu's "liberalist elements".
"Liu Binyan had worked at the Youth League Central. He has written several letters to 
me, but I did not see him. He has never moved from his 'rightist' position. I have on 
several occasions suggested to the People's Daily that he is not suitable as a reporter." 
(Liu, 1990: 248)
However, Hu felt that his public denunciation of Liu was the most regrettable 
thing that he had done in his life. For this reason, he asked his relatives to apologize to 
Liu in person; and he also told his friends that he had not willingly condemned Liu in 
such way (Liu, 1990: 248-252).
Realizing the fragile and vulnerable position of establishment intellectuals, some 
intellectuals began to strive for their independence. The fall of Hu Yaobang in the late 
1980's and the anti-bourgeois campaign again uncovered the mask of the CCP's promises 
of better treatment toward intellectuals. Realizing the vulnerable position after the 1989 
movement, Liu began to note that they must be independent from the political structure, 
asserting their professional autonomy and attempting to expand their influence to the 
public sphere {Min zhu Zhongguo^ vol. 3, 1990; vol. 7, 1991). Up to this point, we can 
see how Liu's location as "establishment intellectual" has affected his intellectual 
radicalism. Occupying such a social location, Liu's position was strengthened when his 
patron was in power and vice versa. Most important of all, Liu's unique social location 
also affects his choice of strategies in response to political pressure in particular and 
political climate in general. Assessing his political opportunity structure, Liu therefore 
adopted either more radical or moderate approach to tackle what he encountered. The
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study of Liu's choice of different strategies in reaction to his unique socio-political 
circumstances has indicated Bourdieu's notion of strategy and strategising is enlightening 
in revealing the dynamic nature of knowledge production.
Social & Political Opportunities and Intellectual Radicalism
Liu's intellectual radicalism is also closely linked with his support from the
masses. After the publication of "People or Monsters", Liu received many letters asking
him to continue investigation of maladministration in other regions. Schell reports that,
"sackfuls of letters began to pour into his office at the People's Daily and 
into his home. Most detailed similar cases of corruption elsewhere in 
China that the supplicants desperately hoped Liu, 'the good official',
would help rectify with the power of his pen often they [the letters] are
about the dark side and negative things." (Quoted from Schell, 1988: 151)
One reader wrote to Liu and said,
"I read your 'People or Monsters' to the fourteen workers on our shift with 
feelings of enormous excitement. Among them were women who were 
exhausted and should have been resting. But not one of them got up and 
left during the entire three-hour reading. In fact, they called other people 
to come over and join us. That is how much they wanted to listen." (Ibid, 
152)
This reader not only described the enthusiastic responses from the listeners but
also expressed the hope "that our comrade Liu Binyan will continue to speak the truth on
25our behalf. We do not wish to hear any more lies and deception" (Ibid).
In the same way, after publishing the "Second Kind of Loyalty", Liu received 
further praises and support from the masses. The Guangxi Daily spoke reverently about 
the way Chen's loyalty was "characterized by independent thinking, a sense of social 
responsibility, and a sense of the responsibility of the individual to society and history" 
(Ibid, 159). The article went on, "as we reform our political system, build a democratic 
society, and create a harmonious social atmosphere, we must not ignore or abandon the
^^Liu (1990a) says that the work "People or Monsters" had a circulation of 1.48 million. He claimed that "almost every copy in print 
was read and passed along to others." This work was also reprinted by different newspapers and broadcast by several provincial radio 
stations. Because his work became very popular among the people, Liu was imbued with far more confidence.
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concept of a 'second kind of loyalty'" (Ibid).^^
After receiving warm support and care from the people, Liu replied, "for me the 
message from this experience was that what I was doing was needed by the Party and the 
people" (Ibid, 152 znàMinyi bao, vol. 11, 12, 1979). Imbued with such a 'social force', 
Liu was determined to speak out for the people, to act as the conscience of society, to 
answer the people's questions. Amidst an age of general disillusionment, Liu stressed the 
urgency to supervise the Communist system, saying, "without the supervision of the 
people, a good person will turn bad and an honest official will turn corrupt" (Schell, 
1988: 152; see also Liu, 1988b: 19-48).
So we can see that the genuine support from the masses was the life blood of Liu's 
intellectual radicalism. Encouraged by support from his patrons and the intellectual 
community, Liu became critical and bold enough to speak out.
Educational Orientation. Intellectual Field and Ideological Formation
In addition to the social location, we must also investigate how Liu's educational 
orientation has affected his political ideas. Unlike Fang and Yan, Liu did not receive 
formal education up to university level, but he eagerly learned different foreign 
languages and read Marxist theory and anti-Japanese magazines. His reading of these 
works markedly influenced his political thoughts.
I observe that his "love for the people" is related closely to his journalist 
orientation. Repeatedly, Liu Binyan has stressed that journalists should be responsible 
for discovering social injustice and evils, speaking on behalf of the people rather than 
acting as tools of the state (Lee Yi, 1990: 104-08).^* His perceived role as a journalist
has been clearly revealed in his work "Our Inside Story" published in the early 1950s.
"literature is a mirror. When the mirror shows us things in life that are not very pretty 
or fall short of our ideals, it is wrong to blame the mirror. Instead we should root out
^^Liu also claims that such a work markedly impressed the people in China, suggesting that most people have forgotten most of 
Liu's other works but only remember his "The Second Kind of Loyalty" (Interview 4, Princeton, 1993).
^^Liu acknowledged in an interview that the learning of foreign languages very much affected his future development See Lee Yi 
(1990: 87).
^*For his ideas on journalism, see, for example, the collection ofhis journalist works, Liu (1985b and 1986).
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and destroy those conditions that disappoint us. Mirrors show us the true appearance of 
things, and literary mirrors speed the progress of society. Smashing a mirror is no way 
to make an ugly person beautiful, nor is it a way to make a problem evaporate." (Quoted 
from Schell, 1988: 149)
In the Fourth National Congress of Literary and Art Workers, he made a speech 
entitled "Concerning the Freedom of Creative Writing", distinctly stating his perceived 
role as a writer. He pledged support for making literature and creative writing the 
conscience of society. He also emphasized the importance of the supervision o f  the
government by the people (Liu, 1985).
"There are only two ways in which the feudal, patriarchal style of leadership supports 
and extends itself: one is by coercion and ccanmand; the other is by attack and 
retaliation." (Quoted from Schell, 1988: 152; see also Liu, 1985)
Against the powerful force of despotism, Liu used the only resources at his 
disposal Having exposed the poverty and suffering of the people, Liu was determined to
commit his life as a writer to politics and to the people. He boldly proclaimed,
"We [intellectuals] must answer the people's questions. We have no right to be auditors 
in the courtroom of history. The people are the judges, as well as the plaintiffs. We 
must help supply them with scripts. But before we offer answers, we must first leam." 
(Quoted from Schell, 1989: 151)
He also believes that intellectuals should be critical, willing to participate in social 
affairs, and must consciously expose social injustice and inequalities (Liu, 1985). His
conviction is not merely empty words or slogans. He puts his words into action through
his reportage to reveal the real life of people. When confronted with the competing 
interests of the Party and the people, Liu even takes risks to uphold the people's interests
in the post-Mao era. He always reminds himself not to be divorced from the people.
"Although now my position is good and my life is good, 1 have not been cut off from 
these common peasants, the workers, and the intellectuals." (Quoted from Schell, 1988: 
151)
"Writers should face life squarely and listen carefully to the voice of the people... When 
faced with two kinds of truth ... We writers must maintain strong sense of responsibility 
to the people in reaching our conclusions." (Ibid: 153)
Putting these observations together, we therefore conclude that Liu's boldness and
critical stance are consistent with his perceived mission of the writer and journalist.
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deeply rooted in Chinese literati tradition.^^ His strong conviction inevitably moved him 
to clash with the state.
Further, I also observe that Liu's assertion of professional independence was 
influenced by his exposure to the outside world. His trips to the former Soviet Union, 
West Germany, Japan and the United States made him realize that journalists and writers 
should not act as the tool for propaganda.^® These trips abroad further reinforced his 
notion of journalism's responsibility to report crises and powerful adversaries of the 
country.
"the tradition of our Party, for who knows what reason, is that of being very fearful of 
letting anyone see our difficulties... Our newspapers and news broadcasts put out only 
hypnotic lullabies." (Quoted from Schell, 1988: 160^
Realizing the essence of journalism, Liu no longer accepted news and literature 
only a tool to propagandize for the Party. His reportage published since 1978 has spoken 
of the impasse of the country, pointing toward the problem of state commandism itself. 
Demanding press freedom, respect for the people and a self-regulation for journalists, Liu 
declared that the state's repressive measures had proved counterproductive (Liu, 1990a).
In addition to the impact of his internalized role of writer and journalist, Liu's 
knowledge production is also significantly influenced by the unique social field that he 
belongs. From 1978 onwards journalists have attempted to realize "journalism reform" 
(xinwen gaige) in which they raise significant questions which require answers (Yu Xu 
and Starck, 1988). Their ideas and actions have formulated a strong force for change. 
Like other intellectuals, journalists have organized themselves into a united front to fight 
for freedom of the press and professional autonomy. During the pro-democracy 
movement of 1989, many journalists, including some Party members, even tried to break
’^InteipFeting intellectuals as the spokesmen of the people, Liu therefore persistently maintains his will to be the "social conscience" 
and "mouthpiece" for the people.
^°Liu was also influenced by the spirit of journalism in the East European countries, encouraged to be more critical and politically 
conscious. His speech to Heidai indicated that his ideas on journalism were influenced by the West and East European countries, see 
Lee Yi (1990: 90-91) and Liu (1984a, 1986).
Early in the 1950s, Liu began to think that the CCP was wrong to condemn the critical literary writings such as his reportage and 
the work of Wang Meng "A New Young Comer to the Disciplinary Department".
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their propagandist conventions (Polumbaum, 1990: 37). They voiced their demands and 
asked for passage of a comprehensive press law specifying both the responsibilities and 
rights of the media.^^ Despite the fact that they are closely inspected and censored by the 
state apparatus, the journalists have repeatedly attempted to expand their influence to the 
public sphere in order to report the "truth". Liu regards the state's strict control as an 
indicator of fear of the people. Liu also proclaims that no matter how difficult the 
circumstance, the journalists have never abandoned their hope to speak out. Rather, they 
have become more skillful in reporting, adopting different strategies to spell out the 
"truth". For instance, right after the June Fourth Incident, The People's Daily duly 
reported the visit of Yang Shangkun (one of the leaders who was responsible for the 
Tiananmen massacre) and published his picture. In an ironic and ridiculous move, an 
editor placed the story about some Palestinians killed by Israeli soldiers with a heading 
"Murderers must be punished" under the picture. Such an act, though trivial, reflects the 
anger of the journalists and demonstrates the subtle methods which they have used to 
fight the system.”
In a 1986 national forum of chief editors of provincial newspapers, Teng Teng, 
deputy head of the Propaganda Department, supported greater editorial independence and 
maintained that "newspapers should not carry stories without news value" {People's 
Daily, 20 August, 1986:3) In 1988, Hu Jiwei, the former editor-in-chief of People's 
Daily, argued that journalism was no longer the tool of the Party. He also asserted that 
the press should owe its first loyalty to the people. In addition, Zhao Ziyang, the former 
Party secretary put forth the idea of "supervision by public opinion", highlighting the role 
of the press to report the facts and reflect the debate on important issues in the 13th Party 
Congress. Encouraged by Zhao's words, journalists discussed intensively how to 
actualize such a spirit. In a meeting sponsored by the Propaganda Department, most of
^^For details o f their participation in the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, see Polumbaum (1990) and Editorial Board o f 64 reporters 
(1989:316-339).
^^This insight is drawn from the interview with Liu in July, 1993 at Princeton, see also Liu (1990a).
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the journalists agreed that the responsibility of the media was to expose and criticize 
official malpractice and corruption (Polumbaum, 1990).
Not surprisingly, the relaxed socio-political environment since the 13th Party 
Congress created another 'warm climate' for both journalists and writers in China. One 
survey conducted prior to the pro-democracy movement of 1989 reported that most of the 
journalists were prepared to assert their rights and their professional autonomy. Most of 
them (65%) agreed that journalists should be "people-oriented" {renminxing) (Ibid, 46). 
When facing contradictory interests between the Party and the people, most of them 
indicated that they ought to "lean to the side of the public" (Ibid: 47). They also 
considered the essence of socialist journalism as representing the people's views (see
table 1). One respondent said,
"In a socialist society, the news organs belong to the public. The people are the 
masters. So journalism should express their views." (Ibid)
Chinese journalists regard themselves not only as the mouthpiece of the people 
but also as professionals and experts. They trust that they are able to judge what has
news value. Some respondents added,
"We should use our own judgement, even if we see things one way and officials see 
things another." (Ibid: 48)
The strong urge for professional independence had brought them to the movement 
of 1989, ready to support such slogans as "Break the Party's monopoly", "Allow different 
forms of ownership", and "Allow newspapers representing different interest groups"
(Ibid, 50).
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Total Percentage
Mentions
Autonomy:
Within Framework of Party leadership 3 1%
With legal qualifications 103 26
Unqualified 150 38
Responsiveness to public 144 37
Media criticism and "supervision" 88 22
Training, occupational concerns 78 20
"Truth", accuracy, objectivity 65 17
Diversity of media ownership or content 56 14
Journalist initiative 18 5
Other 99 25
Table 1. Journalists' Priorities for Journalism Reform^^
(Source: Adopted from Polumbaum, 1990: 63)
The foregoing discussion has indicated the emergence of a semi-independent 
press in post-Mao China. The popularity of World Economic Herald in the mid-eighties, 
a newspaper regarded as the battlefield for journalist autonomy, confirms such a 
development (see, Liu, 1990a; Hsiao Ching-chang & Yang Mei-rong, 1990; and Lee 
Chin-chuan, 1990). Even though journalists have not been free from political constraints, 
they have striven for legal guarantees to ensure their professional independence 
(Polumbaum, 1990: 63). This act seems to me a genuine indicator of the awareness of 
independence within a newly arisen autonomous intellectual community in China. In 
Oder to differentiate themselves from apparatus (state-defined ideology), many Chinese 
journalists have painstakingly struggled for the development of their own "field". Being 
not only a journalist but also a writer in the field, Liu has tried to expand the public 
sphere as defined by the Chinese civil society. It inevitably leads him to the direct 
confrontation with the state. Even though Bourdieu's notion of field may not abundantly 
describe the Chinese reality, it makes more sense to us how Liu has attempted to break 
the conventional boundary to report what he believes and sees in mainland China. It is 
also at this point that we appreciate the struggle during the "war of position" as what
According to Polumbaum (1990: 63), ”[t]his table displays responses to the open-ended question "What do you consider the most 
important aspects of journalism reform?" It represents results from 395 respondents who completed this question out o f a total of 505 
who returned questionnaires. Many respondents gave multiple answers (up to four were coded for each), so proportions add up to 
more than 100%."
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Gramsci has suggested. Despite the fact that Gramsci's notion of "war of position" is not 
directly applicable to socialist China, it suffices to us that the strength/force of field that 
intellectuals belong should have acted as their "capitials" or "resources" in control of the 
hegemony. Besides, the fact that such autonomy could exist contributes to our 
understanding of the relationship between the state and intellectuals. We must caution, 
however, that the struggle for professional autonomy among journalists cannot be 
interpreted as the total liberation of the press. Their autonomy and relative independence 
should be understood in light of the relaxed political context where pluralistic thoughts 
and diversity of ideas are relatively tolerated. In fact, Chinese journalists are still far 
from total liberation from state control.
Generational Location and the Intellectual Radicalism
In addition to the influence from his social location and the social force of field, I 
also suggest that Liu’s generational location affected his world view. Unlike Fang and 
Yan, Liu Binyan experienced the most turbulent period in modem China. He was bom in 
the age of war and crisis. Liu directly experienced the invasion of China by Japanese 
troops. Social and political crises seem to have been an integral part of his life. Liu said 
that he recalls being treated as a normal human being only for a very few months of his 
childhood (Liu, 1990: 6). In addition to his earlier war experiences, Liu confronted 
various repressive movements toward intellectuals and countless social and political 
crises.
In light of the schematic form of generational location, I suggest that Liu Binyan 
can be regarded as one of the fourth generation of modem Chinese intellectuals. The 
fourth generation was a turbulent period during the Anti-Japanese War and civil war 
between the Communist Party (CCP) and Kuomintang (KMT) (Li & Schwarcz, 1983-4).
In the midst of national crisis, these intellectuals sought to reconstruct the political 
order. The conflicts among the warlords exposed the undeniable weakness and intense 
crisis in the Republican govemment led by the KMT. Seeing the success of the
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revolution in Russia, the Chinese intellectual community was challenged both 
intellectually and politically. Marxism, to most of them, seemed to be another alternative 
to restoring the political order and integrating society. At this point, many intellectuals 
accepted Marxism instead of Liberalism, joining the Communist Party, and thereby 
deepening and broadening the influence of Marxism.^^ Trusting that Marxism could 
bring new light to modem China, the fourth generation of intellectuals, like the fifth one, 
wholeheartedly welcomed the liberation. Offering themselves devoutly to the socialist 
transformation, they believed that communist ideals would one day be actualized in their 
motherland. Liu Binyan is one of those intellectuals who accepted Marxism when he was 
only a teenager. Like many of his age, Liu's hope was pinned on the Communist Party 
because "the Communists seemed China’s best hope for overcoming Japanese aggression" 
(Liu, 1990: 15). However, unceasing political purges of intellectuals and direct 
confrontation with social injustice eventually forced Liu to think about the fundamental 
causes of the problems. His change from "loyal supporter and faithful believer" of the 
Party to "critic and non-believer" of state-socialism is highly instructive for the 
understanding of the relationship between intellectuals and the state in modem China.^^
Liu was bom in 1925 into a middle-class family in Changchun, Manchuria.^^ Liu 
was still a child when the Japanese invasion of Manchuria was launched in 1931. Liu's 
personal fate went hand in hand with the history of modem China. The socio-political 
context in which he lived had significant impact on his ideological production.
Japanese occupation of Manchuria affected Liu's life. His father was an 
interpreter for the Manchurian Railway which was originally operated by Russia. The 
invasion of Japan brought the end of his job and thus affected Liu's family life, causing
^^For the details o f such change in adopting Marxism and the psychology of intellectuals at this time, see chapter 2 and also Johnson 
(1973).
^*Liu made it clear that he formerly believed the CCP would transform itself from within but such that a vision was broken in 1984. 
Seeing the existing socialist praxis as not genuine Marxism, Liu therefore denounced it with unusual directness (Interview 4, 
Princeton, 1993).
’^The biography of Liu Binyan is based on his own autobiography (1990) and Schell (1988), and his interview with Lee Yi (1990: 
81-116), the editor-in-chief o f Mnehes.
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financial difficulties and interrupting his formal schooling.^* But, the financial hardship 
also had a positive effect on Liu, exposing him to the social reality of the grassroots. 
Becoming aware of the poverty and suffering of the people, Liu's unique kind of social
and political consciousness was induced in the midst of social and political crises.
"The broken-down condition of my country and the penurious state of my family both 
conspired to accelerate my awareness of the acute social contradictions around me ... 
And so, a sense of nationalism developed side by side with a sense of dissatisfaction 
over the inequalities I saw in society." (Quoted from Schell, 1988: 141-2)
In his childhood, Liu's attention was captured by the question of living and dying. 
He wrote in his autobiography that "death then seemed everywhere" (Liu, 1990: 5). The 
endless fighting and military conflict between Chinese and Japanese soldiers made Liu 
realize the intensity of social inequalities and political crisis. This exposure marked his 
style of reportage.
Liu's social conscience and sympathetic mind were also shaped in part by his 
parents.^^ Despite financial difficulties in his family, his parents were willing to share 
with others. Liu recalled that his mother once made dumplings for the family. She was 
eager to give some to their poor neighbours even though she realized that Liu loved 
eating them so much. When Liu and his sister responded like normal children by 
protesting, his mother taught them not to think only of themselves. These words marked 
Liu deeply, making him more sensitive to the poverty and needs of the people (Liu, 
1990: 8).
In addition, Liu was greatly influenced by one ofhis teachers, Mr. Li, a man with 
a strong social conscience. Mr. Li reminded Liu of the national heritage of China and 
urged him to serve the country to the utmost. Even though Liu said that he found his 
middle school lessons boring, he had unintentionally internalized some of the Confucian 
principles (Liu, 1990: 9-10).
^®Liu (1990: 6) cited an example to show his declining family fortunes. He states that he used to travel a loL At first, he rode in a 
weil-fumished second-class sleeping car, then in ordinary third-class cars and later on open cars for transporting cattle and goods. The 
deteriorating modes o f transportation revealed Liu's declining living condition.
^®Liu was greatly influenced by his father, a person with great compassion, who saw poverty and social injustice as evils. See Lee 
Yi (1990: 83).
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His reading of many banned publications such as anti-Japanese books and 
magazines stirred Liu's feeling of nationalism (Lee Yi, 1990: 84). Moreover, his interest 
in reading the literature of the May Fourth Movement and the writings of Pushkin and 
Tolstoy in the original language also provided him clues to the future development of 
China (Schell, 1988: 142; Lee Yi, 1990: 86).
In his childhood, Liu had begun his interest in Marxism. His father, having 
worked in Russia, told him stories about Lenin and the Russian Revolution. Liu's 
admiration of Russia was stirred by his father's own strong affection. To the young mind 
of Liu, Russia was a dream land in which there was neither rich nor poor. The projected 
utopia of Russia directly answered the question growing in Liu's mind regarding injustice 
in life (Liu, 1990: 10) to which he was exposed as a child in Harbin.. The ideas of 
"freedom", "liberalism" and "justice" began to be instilled into Liu from his early 
childhood through the liberalism of the former Soviet Union. He said in an interview 
that Harbin was a place with a liberal atmosphere, and innovative and pioneering spirit, 
where he was progressively influenced by Russian culture and Marxist thought (Lee Yi, 
1990: 84-85). Liu joined a study group, affiliated with the CCP, where he was 
introduced to Marxist theory. And his contact with Guan Muonan, a young writer and 
friend of his, led him to a more intensive study of Marxist thought. On his reading of 
Marxist theory, Liu concluded that he should serve the people wholeheartedly. Like 
other youth in his turbulent time, Liu's commitment to his country was morally boosted 
by the work of Ba Jin's trilogy Family, Spring, and Autumn (Liu, 1990: 12-13)." °^
The internalization of Marxist thought subsequently moved Liu to join the 
liberated area under the Communists in 1943 to fight the Japanese. In the Federation of 
Resistance against Japanese Aggression, Liu was taught to repent of the "original sin" of 
individualism. He was also told to keep his distance from "bourgeois sentiments" (Ibid, 
19). Liu said that even though he did not understand some decisions made by the Party, 
he still trusted that the Party was right.
Jin was a famous writer whose thought and writings had tremendous iir^act on the Chinese revolution in the 1940s.
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"I laid down a rule for myself: save your love and sympathy for the entire working 
class, rather than wasting it on individual suffering; beware of the words of any 
individual, but have absolute faith in the Party." (Liu, 1990: 19)
This iron law had made Liu, a loyal supporter and well-disciplined member in the 
Party. He reminded himself not to be alienated from the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Upon his admission to the Party, Liu was most deeply impressed. in the induction 
ceremony by the words "'Never Betray the Party" (Liu, 1990: 20). Hoping to be a good 
Party member, Liu worked exceedingly hard to spread the idea of revolution. He worked 
hard for the Party in the Northeast Youth League during the civil war. The success of the 
liberation was finally realized in 1949, but Liu was not so exhilarated. He believed that 
the liberation was not yet complete because individual freedom was lacking. Thus, Liu 
could not be overexcited about the emergence of New China {Zhengming, Mar. 1990:
87X
Well before the liberation of China, Liu began to question the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Finland and partition of Poland (Liu, 1990: 10). Under the rule of the CCP, 
Liu discovered that people seemed to have lost their individuality. It seemed to Liu the 
state had scrupulously controlled everything, suffocating any individual freedom and 
a u t o n o m y S e v e r a l  incidents had already made Liu doubtful about the ideal of 
Communism. One of his close associates working in the Federation, Comrade G, was 
asked to leave their ranks when he fell in love with Comrade Jiang. Comrade G was also 
condemned for violation of Party discipline and was accused of having slept with Jiang. 
Liu felt that such a decision was too harsh. According to Liu, even though premarital sex 
was immoral, there was no written rule explicitly forbidding underground members to 
fall in love and marry. Liu’s astonishment became greater when his happiness at seeing 
Comrade G again in the Taihang Mountains cursed by the group leader. This incident 
had caused Liu to wonder why the Party treated a comrade just like an enemy (Liu, 1990: 
18-19).
On another occasion after he was promoted in the Party, Liu also saw the
^'Liu began to discover the internal contradiction of socialist practice of the CCP in the early 1950s. See Lee Yi (1990: 92-94).
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inconsistency between the theory and practice of socialism. When Liu went to see a film 
in Shenyang, he discovered the consciousness of status and rank that pervaded the Party. 
There he saw some VIP enter the cinema with security men guarding the way and trying 
to keep others out. This occasion made Liu uneasy. During the dinner that night, Liu 
further discovered the importance of seniority in the Party for the dining hall was divided 
into three different zones — a small zone for the top cadres, where the food was specially 
prepared, a middle zone and a lower one. Such rankings caused him to become sceptical
of the socialist ideals (Ibid: 26-27).
"Seniority meant too much — and still does to the present day. I felt then that some 
cadres should live better; that this was justified by their ability to work better. But 
should this have implied a difference in human value — if someone was of lower status, 
was he or she somehow not as good a person, or suspect?" (Liu, 1990: 27)
The critical mind and rational thinking of Liu have earned him not only the 
feeling of ambivalence toward the socialist praxis in mainland China but also unceasing 
persecution. His works were criticized by the Party during various anti-intellectual 
campaigns. In the anti-rightist campaign, Liu's works "On the Bridge Construction Site" 
and "The Inside Story" were regarded as "poisonous weeds", with a hideous anti-Party 
message exposing the dark side of socialism."*  ^ As a result he was deprived of the right to 
write or publish for the next 22 years. During the Great Leap Forward, Liu was even 
labelled as a class enemy and sent down to work in remote areas of Shanxi and 
Shandong. His exposure to the real life of the people made Liu realize the myth created 
by the Party, forcing him to rethink his socialist ideals. Such reflection inevitably moved 
Liu to the side of the people. In 1966, Liu was considered by the party to be 
rehabilitated. Unluckily, the "warm wind" was just a short breeze to Liu. Several 
months after his rehabilitation, Liu was again labelled as rightist and counter­
revolutionary in the Cultural Revolution. He was first imprisoned in complete isolation 
for two years, then sent to the May Seventh Cadre School, a rural camp to re-educate the 
intellectuals through manual labour. Life in this camp damaged Liu not only physically
^^For details o f his experience in the anti-rightist campaign, see Liu (1990: 54-91); Lee Yi (1990: 95-100).
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but also emotionally and socially. He was prevented from speaking to his wife even
though they were housed in the same camp.
"When my children came to visit, they were not allowed to speak to me. During the 
day we worked in the fields, and sometimes we worked through the night as well. 
When the weather was bad, when the wind blew and the rain fell, the 'good' people 
[those who were accused of ordinary rather than political crimes] were allowed to do 
political study, but we had to do double work." (Quoted firom Schell, 1988: 148)
This suffocating experience really caused Liu to think of himself as something
less than human, tempting him to commit suicide (Lee Yi, 1990: 100).
"The distinguishing characteristic of this ultra-leftist line was the belittling of human 
beings, the trampling down of human beings, and the humiliation and suspicion of 
human beings." (Quoted from Schell, 1988: 148)
Though Liu was repressed in an extraordinarily inhumane way, he swore that he 
did not regret the stance he had taken in the past. He said with satisfaction that "no 
matter how I now ponder it, I think that the best thing was to have been a rightist" (Ibid). 
This line indicates his consistent belief in marxist ideals but not state socialism. Liu also 
said the label of "rightist" provided him the opportunity to know the life of the grassroots 
and provided the bridge between himself and the people.'*^
Seeing his colleagues being rehabilitated after the Cultural Revolution, Liu was 
frustrated by his particularly long time to be "set free". Though he was allowed to work 
after the revolution, it was not until 1978 that his label of rightist was formally cleared.'*'’ 
After his formal rehabilitation, he was offered a post working as a reporter in Renmin 
ribao. In this capacity, Liu was determined to uncover social injustice and evils through 
his reportage literature. Liu's level of critique and intensity of dissidence became more 
intense as he tried to unravel the problems inherent in state commandism. Inevitably, 
Liu's boldness caused him further political persecution as he was condemned, attacked 
and finally expelled from the Party again under the tide of the anti-bourgeois campaign in
^^Liu also told me that there were diverse interpretations of Marxism. In his opinion, the essence o f Marxism is good, promoting 
real emancipation and freedom. However, the existing "Marxist praxis" is typically a distorted picture of Marxism that Liu rejects 
(Interview 4, Princeton, 1993).
^H e was assigned to work in China Youth News collecting foreign information for the news but his label was not removed. On 
many occasions, Liu found himself very embarrassed in the work place, which was a painful erqrerience to him. See Lee Yi (1990: 
110) and Hu & Zhang (1989).
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1987. Liu's biography indicated that his political thought has been influenced by the 
historical and existential situation that he confronted.'*^ One point which deserves 
attention here is that though the notion of generational location enhances our better 
understanding of how the unique socio-context in which intellectuals live has affected 
their conceptualization of social reality, the concept fails to explain why different 
intellectuals have diverse even conflicting interpretations in relation of their social 
contexts. Moreover, it is again difficult to locate intellectuals into different generations. 
From this point of departure, we must use this analytic tool catiously. To solve this 
problem, we have to come back to Bourdieu's concept of "strategy" and "strategising", 
that is, we have to appreciate the dynamic nature of knowledge production. Living 
against similar socio-political or socio-cultural contexts does not necessarily mean that 
people should have the same interpretation of their external stimuli. Bourdieu is right to 
suggest that the interactive process of habitus and field should not be ignored, stressing 
that people have autonomy to adopt different approaches or strategies in response to the 
their historical situations.
The deep level of Liu's critique of socialist China and Liu's radicalism after the 
Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 is a complicated phenomenon. With his unique 
social location, having the direct support and connection with the senior leaders of the 
CCP, together with the popularity of Liu in the Chinese journalist and literary world, 
have provided Liu with abundant "capitals" to adopt a relatively critical or even radical 
approach to deal with the state. His personal experiences and personality, to a certain 
extent, also contribute to his choice of strategy. Such discussions highlight not only the 
dynamic nature of production of knowledge but also the tension between social structure 
and social agency.
"existential situation" we mean the typical situations of human life everywhere, such as death, suffering, and love. Being 
brought up within a turbulent environment, Liu experienced many "dimensions" in his life and which must have influenced his 
ideological production.
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CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have discussed the democratic thought of Liu Binyan in light 
of the theoretical framework. We reach the conclusion that even though Liu defied state 
commandism, he still genuinely trusted Marxist ideals. Realizing the political reality that 
the goal of democratization could not be achieved overnight, he advocated cooperation 
with the reformers inside the Party to bring about changes in China.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CULTURAL ICONOCLAST: LIU XIAOBO 
AND HIS DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT
"We decide to hunger strike! We have to protest! We have to appeal! We have 
to repent!" These are the slogans of the June 2 Declaration o f  Hunger Strike. Liu 
Xiaobo, a young cultural critic joined the hunger strike and supported the pro-democracy 
movement of 1989. Liu became prominent in the mid-eighties for his exceedingly 
critical stance and vehement attack on Chinese tradition and the socialist regime. 
Because of his critical acts, he was regarded as a cultural nihilist. Compared with the 
previously discussed intellectuals, Liu Xiaobo is unique in his social location because he 
was never an establishment intellectual as Fang Lizhi, Yan Jiaqi and Liu Binyan did.. 
His critique goes beyond attacking the CCP to attacking other intellectuals, officials, the 
general public and even himself. His critical stance made him a solitary figure in 
Chinese intellectual circles. In this chapter, I am going to discuss Liu's political thought, 
especially his idea of democracy, in light of the analytical framework of the present 
research.
CRISIS OF FAITH AND CULTURAL ICONOCLASM
Like the May Fourth scholars, the post-Mao intellectuals have been experiencing 
an intense cultural crisis. By cultural crisis I mean the loss of cultural meaning in terms 
of both values and party ideology as perceived by intellectuals. The disjuncture between 
the promise and the performance of the state begets legitimation difficulties, which have 
turned into a legitimation crisis as well as a crisis of identity for intellectuals.' The deep 
crisis of identity was explained through the works of root-seeking literature {xungen
'For details of socialist China's legitimation crisis, see, for example. White (1993), M ok(I991) and Brugger (1989).
minxué)’^  the popularity of wound-literature in the post-Mao era;^ and the discussion of 
cultural crisis in the post-Mao era/
With a strong sense of desperation, Liu Xiaobo blamed backwardness and poverty 
on traditional culture and sought a total transformation by learning from the West. 
Unlike other cultural critics whose criticisms tended indirectly to attack the present 
system,^ Liu directly pointed out the problems inherent in the socialist system. He 
believed that the CCP had inherited a system based upon outdated Chinese traditions 
(Liu, 1990a SLTidJiefang Yuebo, July, 1989: 64-66), In the past, he trusted the socialist 
ideas and followed Mao's thought closely. The ideal Socialism of Mao guided the 
people's behaviour, regulating social standards and structures; but social adversity during 
the Cultural Revolution exposed the myth of socialism. This demystification, similar to 
that of the May Fourth era, led to the disintegration of both social and political orders. 
Having observed this broken mechanism, Chinese intellectuals began to realize the cold 
reality that it was impossible to save China by relying only on Mao Zedong thought. 
Thus a strong sense of cultural crisis emerged, accompanied with an ideological void and 
identity crisis among intellectuals.
Root of Despotic Politics: Attack on the Political and Cultural Structure
Liu Xiaobo's critique is not confined to attacking Chinese despotic politics, the 
dictators and the corrupt bureaucracy alone; rather, his criticism is extended to the 
authoritarian political-cultural structure which he considers as the fimdamental hurdle to 
democratization. Put precisely, Liu believes that the main cause of China's present 
despotic politics has grown from the feudalistic cultural mentality and stubbornly
^Liu Xiaobo criticized writers like Ah Cheng, Han Shaogong, and Jia Pingwa for their attempt to revive traditional values. For 
details o f root-seeking literature, see Liu (1986) published in Shenzhen qingnianbao (3 Oct. 1986) and Liu (1988) in Baijia (no.l 
1988: 12-26).
^For details of wound-literature, see, for example, Goldman (1987) and Sylvia Chan (1989).
^The heated debate on cultural crisis is clearly shown in the television series Hexiang. See, Bodman and Pin P. Wan (1991). For 
details o f the debate, see, for example, Hua (1989) and Cui (1988).
^The authors of Hexiang criticized the Chinese socialist regime indirectly. It seemed on the surface to attack Chinese tradition. 
Actually, Hexiang intended not only to unfold the intense crises confronting China but also to condemn the existing socialist praxis. 
Su Xiaokang, one of the authors of the series, explained the real objectives o f the series during an interview in Holland 1989 (see Su, 
1989).
274
sustained autocratic political structure traditioned in China (Jiefang Yuebao, Nov. 1988). 
He criticized those people who just attacked corrupt officials and autocratic rulers but 
never found the root in feudalism and authoritarian systems (Liu, 1990a: 1-9 dnd Jiefang 
Yuebao, Nov. 1988). Liu declares that the breeding ground for authoritarianism is elitist 
culture under which the Confucian scholarly class was formed. Confucianism believes 
that the rulership should rest in the hands of men with higher levels of morality. In this 
way, elitist rule is constituted but the spirit of democracy is suffocated (see chapter 2). 
Subsequently, the intimate relationship between Confucian elitism and authoritarian 
political structure has consolidated the autocratic state in China. Urging democratization, 
Liu denounces both authoritarianism and Confucian elitism and pushes for fundamental 
change (Liu, 1989b in Min Bao YueKan, Aug. 1989: 36-7).
Critique of Marxism and Attack on Oriental Despotism
When he was in his childhood, Liu trusted Marxism faithfully, seeing Marxism- 
Leninism and Mao Zedong thought as the ultimate solution for modem China. His direct 
experiences in the Cultural Revolution alerted Liu to the myth of socialist ideals. 
Analyzing the impact of Marxism, Liu frankly admits that no matter how frustrated he 
feels about Marxism, its impact is significant and pervasive. Either in the occidental or 
oriental societies, Marxism has been one of the most popular topics of public discourse. 
Liu makes it plain that Marxism, to many people, is not only an ideology or logic of 
thought but also a faith and even a powerful religious-moral force. Evaluating the impact 
of Marxism on himself, Liu acknowledges the fact that he was deceived by Marxism but 
he now is well aware of the myth of Marxism. He cites Einstein's words, "it is seen to be 
without conscience when people do not trust Marxism when they are young. However, it 
is without wisdom to have faith in Marxism in their middle-age" (Liu, 1989c: 14). Liu 
still believes himself to have been foolish for his choice to believe, and even worship 
Marxism. He even suggests that it is the foolishness, ignorance and mental blindness of 
mankind that made Marxism like a religion. In regard to this, Liu urges people to repent, 
correcting their wrongdoing and equipping themselves with critical minds. According to
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Liu, heightened consciousness is the most fundamental element of rational thinking with 
which people can be more critical of Marxism.
When investigating different "treatments" of Marxism in occidental and oriental 
societies, Liu discovered that people in the occidental world have tried to critically 
evaluate Marxism no matter how much they support Marxism. They tend not to copy 
Marxism directly but abstract what is useful from Marxism to construct their own system. 
In contrast, Liu believes that the people in the oriental world tend to copy Marxism 
directly without further and deeper analysis. Suggesting there is close relationship 
between oriental despotism and Marxism, Liu concludes that Marxism has fitted into the 
autocratic political structure and feudalistic cultural order of those oriental societies.^ 
With such observations, Liu therefore asks his fellow countrymen to make a fundamental 
change in their values. Instead of looking upto enlightened leaders, they must 
institutionalize a democratic system (Liu, 1989c).
Critique of the National Character of Chinese People
Along with his critique of Marxism, Liu has persistently argued throughout his 
works that the Confucian conception of man as good in nature is wrong. According to 
Confucian doctrine, man can realize self-perfection through an inner process of 
rectification and sanctification (xiushen)? Though the CCP attacked Confucianism, it 
reinforced the same logic as Confucianism, trusting and resting hope upon enlightened 
leaders. Internalizing traditional cultural values, Chinese people have looked for 
enlightened leaders as their "universal king" to administer social and political affairs for 
them. They have never independently searched for their own way. It seems clear that 
Liu considers this kind of thought as arrogant and unrealistic because it simply ignores 
the weaknesses and limitations of man. Having been released from prison, Liu evaluated
^Alongside this line of reasoning, some other scholars also suggest that Marxism could easily take root and be more acceptable to 
the Chinese society because the central notion of Marxism was similar to that o f traditional Chinese thought For instance, the utopian 
ideal of Marxism is similar to that of the Confucian state of harmonious relationship and peaceful state of mind. Besides, it is also
observed that the autocratic political structure of Chinese society laid the ground work for the rise o f Marxism. For details, see, for
example, Jin and Liu (1990); Pye (1985) and Li Zehou (1990a).
^For details o f Confucian thought, see, for example, Fung (1948); He Zhaowu (1991) and Watson et al. (1960).
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the pro-democracy movement critically, concluding that most of the student leaders such 
as Kaixi, Chai Ling and other intellectuals were not genuinely democratic. He complains 
that most of them merely spoke of democracy but they had never put the principles of 
democracy into action. He repeatedly points out undemocratic acts of these student 
leaders. He even frankly advised Kaixi to correct his arrogant attitude and abandon the 
autocratic way of doing things. Liu recalls the dialogue with Kaixi several times, 
criticizing Kaixi for regarding himself as the most important person in China and the 
greatest hero throughout the movement. Complaining of the intense power struggle 
among the student leaders, Liu urges the student leaders to adopt democratic procedures 
(Liu, 1992). Having a strong belief that China is no longer in need of so-called 
"enlightened but autocratic leaders", Liu persistently reminds people not to look up to the 
famous, thereby saving themselves the trouble of thinking. This line of reasoning 
explains Liu’s attack on the Chinese intellectual community’s commemoration of Hu 
Yaobang and also his criticisms of the development of a new personality cult around 
student leaders of the movement. His critique, therefore, is not confined merely to 
political leaders and systems, but also extends to the national character of the Chinese 
people (Liu, 1990a: 11-30). He pointed out the inertia of the people in an interview as 
follow:
"The inertia of the old is so great, the roots of the past so deep ... One of the crucial 
aspects of our national inertia is that the Chinese are always wanting people to show 
them a way, to create a new system of values for them. This is an extremely traditional 
way of looking at history and man: the belief that there is a model way along which 
man develops, and that the nature of the relationship between people is unchanging. In 
fact, it's still very hard to say just where we're all going." (Liu, 1986, quoted from 
Barme & Minford, 1989: 397)
These observations led Liu to lay the responsibility for despotic politics in 
Chinese history upon every Chinese. He thus believes the success of Mao’s dictatorial 
rule is the result not only of the unique charismatic leadership inherent in Mao himself 
but also of the socio-cultural context under which stubborn, foolish, vulnerable and 
reliant people and autocratic political structure were formed (Liu, 1988).
After experiencing the Cultural Revolution, Liu argued that the blind faith and
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loyalty of the people in Chairman Mao had made Mao a dictator. Therefore, Liu directs 
his dissidence not only to the system but also to the cultural mentality of the Chinese 
people.
"I'm quite opposed to the belief that China's backwardness is the fault of a few 
egomaniac rulers. It is the doing of every Chinese. That's because the system is the 
product of the people. All of China's tragedies are authored, directed, performed and 
appreciated by the Chinese themselves. There's no need to blame anyone else. Anti­
traditionalism and renewal must be undertaken by every individual, starting with 
themselves ... [ever since] the fall of the Gang of Four, everyone has become a victim, 
or a hero who struggled against the Gang. Bullshit! What were they all doing in the 
Cultural Revolution? Those intellectuals produced the best big-character posters of all. 
Without the right environment, Mao Tse-tung [Mao Zedong] could never have done 
what he did." (Liu, 1986, quoted from Barme & Minford, 1989: 397)
Liu turned to Western philosophical thought and pointed out the lack of self­
reflection and self-examination among Chinese people {Ming Bao Yue Kan, Aug. 1989: 
34-34). Liu has persistently called on the self-consciousness of the people, asking them 
to repent of their little-peasant mentality {xiaonong jingji) (Liu, 1990a). Liu argues that 
the negation of tradition and self-repentance are necessary to give a new birth to Chinese 
people as a whole (Liu, 1988). Liu's understanding of human nature caused him to urge 
his fellow countrymen to critically evaluate themselves and not to look for the solution 
within the authoritarian system. Instead they must institutionalize a democratic system 
(Liu 1989b in Ming Bao Yue Kan, Aug. 1989: 37).
Call for the Institutionalization of Democracv
The intellectual radicalism of Liu Xiaobo has resulted not in empty words but in 
concrete proposals for a democratic political system as the only alternative to replace 
despotic politics. Without the guarantee of democratic system, according to Liu, anyone 
working in the authoritarian system may someday become an autocratic ruler. In his 
mind, authoritarian system is authoritarian no matter how enlightened the leaders are. It 
is impossible that enlightened leaders can turn an authoritarian system into a democratic 
one (Liu, 1988).
With an intense sense of crisis, Liu has sought a wholesale transformation of 
values and spirit to those of Western thinking and technology. Like the May Fourth
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scholars, Liu adheres to the belief that "an intellectual and cultural revolution which 
requires a total rejection of the Chinese past is the fundamental prerequisite for modem 
social and political change" (Lin, 1979: 9). Liu is regarded as the latest in the line of 
"wholesale Westemizers" and cultural iconoclasts for his adherence to the dichotomy 
between traditional and modem; and progressive and backward (Kelly, 1991a). In an 
interview, Liu boldly said that he thought it might be a good thing for China to be 
colonized after seeing the prosperous development in Hong Kong under the British mle. 
Of course, these words were cited as evidence of Liu's betrayal of, and incitement to 
overthrow socialist China. A closer scmtiny of these words reveals that Liu wished for a 
real transformation to a strong and prosperous China (Jin Zhong, 1989).*
Unlike the unclear and fragmentary conception of democracy expounded by the 
students, Liu's notion of democracy tends to be much more thorough and complete.’ The 
spirit of democracy clearly underlies his speeches and works, in which he has set down 
the basic principles of "participatory democracy". When discussing the traditional idea 
of Minben (for the people), he argues that traditional Chinese thought has only the 
concepts of livelihood of the people( minsheng) and people's share (minxiang) but no 
"right of people" {minquan).
In his view, the hope of democratization does not rest in reforming the 
authoritarian system from within or relying on any enlightened leaders alone. On the 
contrary, democracy is to uphold the principles of "equality, human rights, and freedom" 
in order to replace "universal kingship, hierarchy and autocratic system". Liu considers 
constitutional rale based on the legal system as fundamental to democracy, supporting 
also the establishment of private economy and free market to replace centrally-planned 
economy and public ownership. In the ideological and cultural realms, Liu advocates 
plurality of thoughts rather than ideological monopoly (Liu, 1990a: 17 see also Ming Bao
^Liu (1992) understands that his notion of "colonization" was misinterpreted and cited as evidence to accuse him o f invoking anti- 
nationalistic feeling and o f betraying of socialist China. As Liu expected, his statement was used as evidence to denounce him during 
the movement
’Reflecting upon the pro-democracy movement of 1989, Liu holds a very low opinion of the student participants particularly 
feeling dissatisfied with their understanding o f democracy and their acts, see Liu (1992).
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Yue Kan, Aug. 1989: 34-37).'°
Like Western political theorists, Liu also acknowledges human weaknesses and 
limitations (Liu, 1990a: 33). For this reason, the institutionalization of a democratic 
system is necessary. He considers Marx too idealistic, for he saw man as a perfect being. 
Liu's realization that the establishment of a democratic system includes sub-systems for 
checking the wrongdoing of mankind (Liu, 1990: 6) became a life commitment for him. 
Having internalized such a belief, Liu evaluated the pro-democracy movement of 1989 
and pointed out the wrongdoing of both the government and the students (Liu, 1989). 
Even though he supported the pro-democracy movement organized by students, he also 
made incisive criticisms of the weaknesses of the students.
"The students' mistakes are mainly manifested in the internal chaos of their organization 
and the lack of efficient and democratic procedures. Although their goal is democracy, 
their means and procedures for achieving democracy are not democratic. Their theories 
call for democracy, but their handling of specific problems is not democratic." (Liu, 
1989, quoted from Han, 1990: 352)"
Having criticized the students, Liu showed them a personal example by leading a
democratic way of life throughout the movement. He not only taught his students that
the realization of democracy in China should start with themselves but also put these
words into practice by active participation in the movement (Liu, 1989c: 5). Some
scholars also suggest that Liu was one of the only advocates of a practical application of
democratic procedures during the final weeks of the pro-democracy movement (Barme,
1990: 68). His call for a hunger strike clearly demonstrates his conception of democracy.
He openly declared that what China needed today was not a perfect god or any
enlightened leader but a sound democratic system characterized by procedural rules and
"checks and balances". He said in an interview during the 1989 movement that the basic
*°In his woric Sixiangzhimi yu renleizhimeng (The Mystery of Thought and the Dream of Mankind), Liu discusses the importance of 
plurality of thought, arguing that monolithic philosophical thought is a sign o f autocracy. He rejects any ideological monopoly and 
points out the false intention of Xiin'ershangxue (philosophy) to develop a unified thought Liu also criticizes the monolithic ideology 
shaped by Mao to sustain his dictatorial rule. He argues that such a monopoly over the ideological and cultural realm will suffocate 
the creative thinking o f the people. See Liu (1990) and Jiefang Yuebao (July, 1990: 64-66).
"F or details of the student leaders' undemocratic acts and thinking, see Liu's description in his work published in 1992. Some 
commentators believe that Liu's criticisms were intended to attack others in order to lay the ground work for a light penalty for his 
conviction.
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principles of democracy are "checks and balances, rational thought and peaceful action" 
(Liu, 1989).
"We must use a democratic spirit of tolerance and cooperation to begin the construction 
of democracy in China. For democratic politics is a politics without enemies and 
without a mentahty of hatred, a politics of consultation, discussion, and decision by 
vote, based on mutual respect, mutual tolerance, and mutual accommodation." (Liu, 
1989, quoted from Han, 1990: 350)
Even though he condemned the Li Peng government for its autocratic rule, Liu 
still persistently maintained the democratic principles in which he believed. He asked 
Premier Li Peng to resign according to democratic processes and did not regard Li Peng 
as the enemy of the people. He declared that after Li Peng resigned, he could "still enjoy 
the rights that citizens should have, even the right to adhere to his mistaken beliefs" 
(Ibid).
At the beginning of his June Fourth declaration, Liu made his position explicit 
that democracy is based on rationality and peaceful means.
"We advocate the use of peaceful means to further democratization in China and to 
oppose any form of violence. Yet we do not fear brute force; through peaceful means, 
we will demonstrate the resilience of the democratic strength of the people, and smash 
the undemocratic order held together by bayonets and lies ..." (Quoted from Han, 1990: 
350)
Laying down the democratic principles in the struggle for democracy, Liu said,
"Rationality and order, calmness and moderation must be the rulers of our struggle for 
democracy; hatred must be avoided at all costs. Popular resentment towards 
authoritarianism in China can never lead us to wisdom, only to an identical form of 
blind ignorance, for hatred corrupts wisdom." (Liu, 1989a, quoted from Barme, 1990: 
62)
Liu stressed that only the power of the people could make use of the peaceful and 
rational ways of democracy. He considers as fundamental to democracy the notion that 
state power originates from the people (Jin Zhong, 1989: 316-323). He criticizes those 
rulers who are concerned only with getting political power but have no respect for the
'^Liu (1992) reports that he actively engaged himself in persuading people to forsake the use of arms to fight against the PLA. He 
recalls one incident in which he even knelt down to beg the people not to use force or coercion to gain democracy. Liu told them that 
the student movement's rational and peaceful spirit would be spoiled if coercion was used. Those people listened to Liu and finally 
agreed to stop arming themselves. After that, they cried together. This act was also cited by the CCP as Liu's "positive contribution" 
to the movement. With such a "contribution", he received a lighter penalty and was eventually released.
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right and freedom of the people/^ He also identifies the central problem of despotism as 
the lack of proper procedures to facilitate social development (Liu, 1990a: 14), creating a 
power vacuum which can be filled only by the people’s power in the civil society. He 
says,
"(1) all [sectors of] society should establish lawful, autonomous citizens' organizations, 
and gradually develop these organizations into citizens' organizations, that will act to 
check government policy making, for the quintessence of democracy is the curbing and 
balancing of power. We would rather have ten monsters that are mutually restrained 
than one angel of absolute power; (2) by impeaching leaders who have committed 
serious errors, [we should] gradually establish a sound system for the impeachment of 
officials. Whoever rises and whoever falls is not important; what is important es how 
one ascends to, or appointment and dismissal can only result in dictatorship^ (Quoted 
from Han, 1990: 351, emphasis added).
In addition, Liu also suggests that the Chinese people’s struggle for democracy 
has mainly remained at the level of popularizing ideas and slogans. They have indulged 
in mere talk of goals but lacked operational means, procedures and processes. He makes 
it clear that, though he supports the spirit of the movement, he still criticizes the 
immaturity of student participants in terms of their acts and ideas (Liu, 1992).''* Liu 
(1992: 163-4) even reveals the fact that some student participants were as autocratic as 
the CCP. Having adapted to the ’’socialist” way of doing things, their slogans, tactics, 
and even names of organizations were typically shadowed by the CCP culture.'^ 
Therefore, Liu has tried to awaken the people to change from the enlightenment of 
democratic consciousness to the construction of operational procedures (Liu, 1989).
Taking his position a step further, Liu emphasizes the notion that Chinese people 
should bear social responsibility and involve themselves into a deeper level of self- 
examination and repentance. As Barme (1990: 70) suggested, ’’concepts of freedom.
" I t  is note-worthy that after deeper reflection on the spirit of democracy, Liu admits that he was wrong in attempting to dominate 
public discourse by means of interruption in a "loud" voice. Seeing "mutual respect" as essential to democratic life, Liu has become 
conscious o f paying attention and respect to others during discussion.
"Liu recalls many incidents to illustrate the student participants' immature concept o f democracy . He remembered that some 
female students had asked him to give them money to buy some contraceptives. He viewed some students' use o f this serious 
movement as an opportunity for self-gratification as ridiculous. Liu also reportedly stated that the student leaders were arrogant, 
driving for self-interest and fame instead of fighting for public interest or higher goals (See example, Liu, 1992: 141-44; 156, 160-63).
"Liu cites many cases to show that Chinese people have indulged in telling lies. As Barme (1990) suggested, China is typically an 
autocratic and monolithic system except for its pluralistic nature of telling lies. Liu (1992: 76) also admits that he himself was not 
immune to such a "political culture" when he was in China.
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responsibility, and repentance form a major element of Liu Xiaobo's writings". On Liu's 
declaration of a hunger strike, he frankly told his fellow countrymen that because running 
a democratic country was new to every Chinese, it was urgent for them to act as 
beginners, trying hard to adopt an open attitude toward mistakes, maintaining that people 
should see mistakes positively, and urged them to admit, correct and learn from them 
(Liu, 1989). He also called for the birth of a new political culture and pleaded for a 
public consciousness of political responsibility,
"We appeal to all Chinese, from those in the government down to every ordinary 
citizen, to give up the old political culture and begin a new one ... We appeal to all 
[members] of [Chinese] society gradually to drop the attitude of being onlookers and 
simply expressing sympathy. We appeal to you to acquire a sense of citizen 
consciousness." (Quoted from Han, 1990: 350-351)
Instead of making democracy an abstract concept, Liu pins it down to the daily 
life of the people. He suggests,
"At the same time as staging mass political demonstrations within the wider political 
sphere, people have to engage in detailed, down-to-earth and constructive actions in the 
immediate environment. For example, democratization can start within a student group, 
an independent student organization, a non-official publication, or even the family. We 
can also carry out studies of the non-democratic way we live in China, or consciously 
attempt to put democratic ideals into practice in our own personal relationships 
(between teachers and students, fathers and sons, husbands and wives, and between 
friends)." (Quoted from Barme, 1990: 76)
Issuing a position paper on 7th May 1989, Liu stated his notion of democracy 
clearly. In the first part of the paper, Liu analyzed the causes for undemocratic practices 
in China and suggested that there had been a lack of procedural rules in China's political 
system. Without a sophisticated system of rules, people have tended to rely on 
relationships, doing things by means of the "back-door" policy. Liu also added that 
Chinese people were not realistic enough, always setting idealistic and unattainable goals 
which only discouraged people to continue the fight for democracy. More 
fundamentally, Liu suggested that the root of the problems is in the petty peasant 
mentality, of contradiction and hatred in human relationships. Such a mentality had 
created an impossible hurdle for institutionalizing a system of procedural rule which 
requires mutual trust (Liu, 1992: 94-6). Liu therefore initiated attempts to create an open 
and democratic atmosphere in academic discourse, mobilizing changes in university
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administration and even calling for more student participation in dialogue and daily 
administration (Liu, 1992: 97). Adhering to the principle of democracy, Liu repeatedly 
emphasizes that the praxis of democracy is to create the ground for dialogue and 
communication, striving for compromise and conflict resolution instead of violence and 
hatred (Liu, 1992: 111-2).
With regard to his conception of democracy, we can see that Liu puts forward 
both responsibility and rights. He not only asserts human rights but also urges people to 
be conscious of social and political responsibility. He sees tolerance as fundamental to 
Western democracy.
Independent Role of Intellectuals
Liu's self-examination led to felt need for repentance which shaped his conclusion 
that Chinese intellectuals must acquire independence which is based not on political 
power but on the accumulation of knowledge. Criticizing the traditional literati notion 
which sees the ultimate goal of intellectuals as royal advisors and remonstrators within 
the bureaucracy, Liu urges Chinese intellectuals to have a fundamental change in value. 
Liu suggests that the weakness and vulnerability of intellectuals in their traditional role is 
the result of "bureaucratization of intellectuals", which inevitably causes them to become 
the "tool" or "instrument" of the state apparatus. With such a social location, they could 
hardly escape from being dependent upon the establishment. Thus, it is not surprising 
that they have become the spokesmen of the state (Liu, 1990a: 5). Besides, Liu 
condemns intellectuals for perceiving themselves as national saviours and arrogantly 
over-rating their positions.
In his essay "On Solitude" published in 1988, Liu also emphasized that Chinese 
intellectuals needed to 'negate' themselves, for only in such a negation' would they find 
the key to the negation of traditional culture (Liu, 1988). This message is repeatedly 
stressed in his November, 1988, interview with Jin Zhong, the editor of Jiefang Yuebao 
{Jiefang Yuebao, July, 1989). It is also observed that Liu and Zhu Dake, a good friend of 
Liu and controversial Shanghai critic, suggested that the lack of God as the source of
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ultimate values is the most tragic aspect of Chinese tradition {Mingbao Yuekan, Aug. 
1989: 34-37).
In addition to "bureaucratization of intellectuals", Liu suggests that "politicization 
of intellectuals" and "politicization of knowledge" are marked characteristics of the 
Chinese intellectual establishment.
"Intellectuals with politicized personality have never valued knowledge creation, 
transmission of knowledge and achievement in scholarly research as their ultimate goal 
in life. Rather, they have made use of knowledge to get political power, seeing it as 
means rather than ends". (Liu, 1990a: 3, my translation)
Having such observations, Liu points toward the problem of devaluating the 
essence of knowledge which confronts the Chinese intellectual circles (Liu, 1990a: 2-3).
"If only intellectuals lose their social conscience [a strong sense of critique], it may 
probably lead to the greatest catastrophe to society — politicized and authorized 
knowledge." (Ibid: 4, my translation)
Such a politicized knowledge worries Liu very much and he therefore considers 
critical thinking as essential and fundamental to intellectuals. With a strong conviction 
that intellectuals should uphold the mission of knowledge transmission, Liu calls 
intellectuals to be critical and conscious about social issues, to be aware of their detached 
relationship with the political power, and to form an independent intellectual group 
(Ibid).
Adhering to Western conceptions of intellectuals, Liu therefore suggests that 
"knowledge is power" and that "intellectuals should possess knowledge as cultural capital 
to form a new class" .However ,  most Chinese intellectuals' practice of reliance on the 
political establishment and devaluation of knowledge inevitably creates an 
insurmountable hurdle to the development of Chinese intellectuals into a "new class" 
with a "collective consciousness" (Liu, 1990a: 2).
In addition, Liu also criticizes the intellectuals' "blind faith" and "loyalty" to 
rulers or political authority. Such allegiance and loyalty, according to Liu, is not only 
unnecessary but foolish, contributing to the dependent role of intellectuals. Thus, Liu
**For details of the new class formulated by intellectuals, see, for example, Gouldner (1979) and Konrad & Szelenyi (1979 and 
1991); see also my discussion in the next chapter.
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criticizes Liu Binyan's notion of "loyalty" and condemns also the idea of Neo- 
Authoritarianism.^^ Liu explains clearly his view,
"After the Cultural Revolution, many intellectuals have not examined their relationship 
with the state even being purged and executed in the Revolution. Many of them have 
still had hope in the existing system. They may well recognize the problems existing in 
the present system, feeling disappointed in the leaders and social reality but they have 
not lost hope totally in the present system (The Four Cardinal Principles). The 
advocacy of "Neo-Authoritarianism" is the consequence of their frustration with present 
leaders. Therefore, the critique and criticisms from the people unnecessarily mean that 
anew system is undertaking." (Liu, 1990a: 36, my translation)
Going a step further, Liu maintains that it is the complicated psychology of many 
Chinese intellectuals that causes their vulnerable position. Many intellectuals had hoped 
that the Party would one day recognize their loyalty and genuine faith. Liu cites the case 
of Liu Binyan, who had been purged and expelled from the Party twice. Feeling 
fhistrated, Liu Binyan still hoped his position might be recognized again by the Party. 
Liu Xiaobo rejects such a "critical loyalty", suggesting that intellectuals should be loyal 
to the state constitution, laying the foundation of faith on knowledge rather than on any 
political patrons (Liu, 1990a: 23-4; 32-4; 36-8).
To expound his ideas, Liu says that the obstacle to the development of collective 
consciousness and of an independent intellectual community is resistance not only from 
the autocratic ruling class and the stubborn and foolish public but also from the 
intellectuals themselves. This observation leads Liu to call the intellectuals to self­
repentance, rethinking their role and striving for independence which will enable them 
really to emancipate themselves. In order to realize the goal of intellectual autonomy, 
Liu suggests some sort of division of labour among Chinese intellectuals. First, some 
intellectuals must concentrate on developing theories and on actively participating in the 
movement of anti-authoritarianism. Second, some members of the intellectual 
community have to improve the economic position of intellectuals and make them 
economically independent. Third, the most significant of all is that intellectuals have to
‘^Neo-Authoritarianism stresses the need to have an enlightened leader to strengthen one's country. Such believers also believe that 
economic reforms should be prior to political ones, suggesting social stability is the pre-condition for economic development. For this 
reason, they support an enlightened leader in consultation with a strong think tank, to initiate changes in the economic realm in the 
first place, followed by political reform after the success o f economic reform. For details, see, for example, Deng Ziqiang (1989); Wu 
Jiaxiang (1989) and Zhou Wenzhang (1989).
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accumulate, develop and consolidate knowledge. He warns that those playing this third 
role must bear loneliness, isolation and relative deprivation; but such work is 
fundamental and necessary. Without knowledge as capital, Liu argues that Chinese 
intellectuals can never free themselves from the "iron-cage" of patron-client networks 
(Ibid, 8).
In short, he criticizes intellectuals for being silent for years toward the despotic 
rule, and he therefore urges them to confess their mistakes (1989). Liu believes that 
Chinese intellectuals have failed to make self-examination, paying little attention to 
individuality, rights and freedom of mankind. They have been concerned only with 
"national revival" to the exclusion of the "emancipation of man" (Liu, 1990a: 12; see also 
Liu, 1986). Having such a conviction, Liu has urged redemption through independence 
leading to a new relationship with the state (Liu 1989).
His reflection on the role of intellectuals has made Liu conscious of his own 
position in the Chinese intellectual community. Seeing the importance of independence 
in social location, Liu has consciously distanced himself from other intellectuals. During 
the pro-democracy movement of 1989, Liu criticized those so-called "elite" intellectuals 
for their reluctance in joining the movement. He not only condemned those intellectuals 
whose role as honourary advisors to students. Locating themselves in a privileged 
position, these intellectuals had fallen into empty words without actual participation. Liu 
openly denounced the acts of Yan Jiaqi and other leading intellectuals for their short­
sighted vision. Disagreeing with the stand held by most intellectuals that students should 
offer their support to Zhao Ziyang's liberal wing, Liu therefore organized his own hunger 
strike to ally himself with students (Liu, 1992: 155).'* Recalling his discussion with 
Barme, Liu criticizes Chinese intellectuals for pretending to be the greatest national 
heros, the saviours of the people while failing to commit themselves to carry out the 
mission. Without courage and the sense of self-sacrifice, most intellectuals have never
‘^Liu (1992) also recalls a dialogue with Wang Juntao, in which he disagreed with Wang. The fundamental difference between 
them is their attitude toward westernization. Liu Xiaobo advocates total westernization while Wang maintains that China has its own 
characteristics. For this reason, Wang believes what is really needed in China is to establish a system with Chinese characteristics. 
Unlike Liu, Wang adopts a more pragmatic approach to work with the liberal wing o f the CCP in order that reforms can be deepened.
287
shouldered the "penalty of the cross" as Jesus did. Their half-hearted efforts pay only lip- 
service to the pro-democracy movement (Liu, 1992: 54).
Self-Repentance: A Higher Kind of Intellectual Consciousness
After examining Liu's ideas, I observe that even though Liu had sought to reveal 
all the tradition as the cause of backwardness and weakness; he did not himself abandon 
traditional beliefs altogether. Despite the fact that Liu condemned most Chinese people 
for ethnocentricism, he also admitted that he himself is not immune to the feeling of 
"Chineseness".^^ After his trip to the United States, Liu realized his isolation from the 
outside world and acknowledged his narrow mind. He said that his anti-traditionalism 
had not reflected any concern for humanity as a whole nor transcendental concern for the 
self-fulfilment of individuals. He said that "there may be some merit in my anti­
traditionalism, but only if it is considered within the context of China or with a view 
toward transforming China" (Liu, 1990b: 13, quoted from Barme, 1991: 115). Before his 
trip to the United States, Liu thought that his anti-traditionalism was up to international 
standards, but the stay in the West unsettled Liu deeply. He found himself deluded by 
arrogance and realized that his theories were completely meaningless when viewed from 
the fate of mankind (Liu, 1990b: 21). The failings of his theories are "narrow 
nationalism and a blind fawning before the West" (Barme, 1991: 115). Liu rejected the 
accusation that he is an advocate of "total Westernization" and a "cultural nihilist" since 
he intended to strengthen and transform China by means of his critique. He also 
regretted that his critical re-evaluation was not based on a commitment to "knowledge for 
its own sake". Liu found that he himself failed to meet the minimum requirement of 
"Westernization" since real westernization criticizes not only Chinese culture but also 
Western culture, concerning the fate of the whole of mankind and the needs of the 
unfulfilled individuals (Liu, 1990b). He criticized himself for neglecting the interest of 
humanity and knowledge accumulation, regarding himself too utilitarian, too practical;
^®His participation in the pro-democracy movement of 1989 revealed his strong nationalistic feeling as he sought to save his mother 
country from bankruptcy and he also saw himself as a great national hero. He also said that he thought he should enjoy a prestige that 
of other great heros in Chinese history. He even equated himself with Chen Tianhua, a great hero who drowned himself to awaken 
other people for saving the mother country. It is thus evident that Liu is not immune to ethnocentricism. For details, see (Liu, 1992).
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being caught up in the vulgar concerns of the problems of Chinese reality (Barme, 1991).
Like Lu Xun in his later years, Liu found himself unable to free himself from the 
old problem of Chinese intellectuals. The strong traditional utilitarianism of Chinese
literati seems pervasive in his thought.
"Chinese intellectuals lack the motivation to transcend themselves as well as the spirit 
that motivates individuals to pit themselves against society as a whole; they lack the 
internal fortitude required to cope with solitude and the courage and curiosity to face an 
unfamiliar and unknown world. Chinese intellectuals can only survive in their own, 
familiar surroundings, bathed in the limelight and applause provided by the ignorant 
masses... This 'China-fixation' is virtually inescapable; its most outstanding feature is 
the absence of real individuality". (Liu, 1990b, quoted from Barme, 1991: 116)
His visit to the Metropolitan Museum and the Museum of Modem Art in New 
York woke Liu up suddenly and thoroughly. The exposure to the Western world further 
vanquished him. Liu frankly admitted that he had overlooked, and purposefully 
attempted to avoid mentioning the weaknesses of Western culture, merely hoping to 
transform China in terms of Western standards. Liu found that he himself was strongly 
affected by traditional utilitarianism since he was solely concerned with China's future 
instead of future of the whole mankind. Having pervasive influence of utilitarian 
individualism, Liu found in himself failed to address the issues from an international 
standard, nor could he dialogue with the upper strata of the international intellectual 
community. As he criticized those who ingratiated themselves with political power, Liu 
found all he could do was to "ingratiate him self with Western culture, seeing Western 
culture as the messiah of China. Liu thereafter stated that he thus acknowledged the 
limitations of China when it was compared with the West. Following the same logic, 
when he compared Western culture with the whole of mankind, the West thus became 
very small; when comparing mankind with the universe, he inevitably found the 
limitations of mankind. Taking these observations together, Liu concluded that mankind 
is very limited in its attempt to solve the intense crises confronting the modem world 
today.
"The gradual disappearance of [the sense of] original sin has set man loose from his 
moorings; today's decadence represents a second fall from grace." (Liu, 1990 quoted 
from Barme, 1991: 118)
289
The only way to save mankind from such a fall is a genuine redemption and the 
acknowledgement of personal guilt. Therefore, Liu openly confessed his arrogance and 
foolishness. It was this spirit which motivated him to join the pro-democracy movement. 
Instead of joining the intellectual community in praising the petitions demanding the 
release of Wei Jingsheng and other political prisoners, Liu urged them not to indulge in 
slogans but to act independently (Liu, 1990a). Liu told his friend Chen Jun before he 
went back to China to join the movement that "either you go back and take part in the 
student movement or you should stop talking about it" (Chen Jun, 1989: 63). The 
consistency between his acts and his thought is thus clearly shown throughout his 
participation in the pro-democracy movement. After his visits to the outside world, Liu 
(1992) admitted his past wrongdoing, his arrogance, his ignorance, his attempts to show 
himself off by means of excessive critique and his efforts to dominate the intellectual 
discourse by his "loud" voice. Without giving respect to others, he provoked waves of 
debate and irritated others in public discourse. Nowadays, Liu considers such acts as 
unacceptable behaviour which contradicts the rules of democracy. Only after such self- 
reflection did Liu advise Kaizi to correct his arrogant attitude and leam to be humble, 
paying respect to others.^®
The foregoing discussion of Liu’s self-examination has demonstrated two 
significant points in understanding the evolution of his political thoughts. First, I observe 
that Liu had fallen into a logical-emotional difficulty which is similar to that of the May 
Fourth scholars, who advocated westernization and heaped scorn on Chinese traditional 
culture. It is my contention that Liu Xiaobo's adherence to occidental ideals was only an 
"instrumental" one, for he hoped the borrowing of Western ideas and technology would 
strengthen China immediately.^' The unmitigated scorn for Chinese culture and
“^During a dialogue with Wang Juntao, Liu discovered that Wang was too dominating in the whole discourse, repeatedly interrupted 
when other people were speaking. Liu also found Kaizi to be too autocratic and arrogant. Having seen that, Liu realized that Wang 
was only a mirror image o f what he himself had been (Liu, 1992).
Other studies confirm the conclusion that the May Fourth scholars adopted instrumental view of democracy and science, wishing 
to make use o f them to save the country. See Zhou Y.S. (1989: 445-457) and Lin (1989: 215-240).
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unthinking enthusiasm for all aspects of Western civilization reflect his feelings of 
national inferiority and idolatry for a foreign culture. His vehement attack on traditional 
culture seems to be the result of his frustration and desperation. As Liu confronted the 
"broken mirror"^^, his rejection of traditional ideas is immediate and self-explanatory.^^ 
Like the May Fourth scholars, Liu did not forsake his emotion for his mother-land. Tu 
Weiming argues that the May Fourth scholars could not really abandon their traditional 
values.
"the deliberate effort to forget and abandon the Chinese tradition was never fully 
realized, conscious rejection and unconscious identification with traditional symbols 
and values were pervasive among the most influential figures in Chinese intellectual 
life." (Tu, 1987: 79)
In summary, Liu was emotionally attached to China's past and intellectually 
committed to Western values. His complicated psychology is similar to that of the May 
Fourth scholars. No matter how critical his view on Chinese tradition, his nationalistic 
feeling was clearly demonstrated in his speeches and acts during the pro-democracy 
movement of 1989.^ *^ Unlike the May Fourth scholars whose organismic objection to 
tradition not only failed to save the country but also created crises of meaning and 
consciousness for the scholars themselves, Liu adopted both Western technology and 
ideologies to transform China. He suggested that China should transform not only 
economically but also socially, politically and culturally with reference to the West. 
Unlike the May Fourth scholars, Liu has resolved the internal conflict between practice 
and theory, setting his goals not only on national survival but also on the welfare of the 
whole of mankind. Most important of all, Liu practiced what he preached while the May 
Fourth scholars didn't. It is in this light that Liu really made some advancement in both
^^"Broken mirror" refers to the myth portraying a holistic view of social transformation, coupled with ultimate national unification 
and harmony as promised by the socialist ideals. The post-Mao intellectuals felt "cheated", and a strong sense of despair developed 
among them.
“ Like the post-Mao intellectuals, one of the most prominent intellectuals o f the May Fourth era, Chen Duxiu who openly declared 
that "Chinese thought is a thousand years behind Western thought" and advocated a total rejection o f the past and faith in progress, 
democracy and sciences, confidence in the limitless potential of human reason, etc. — in short, reflecting the optimistic expectations 
o f eighteenth and nineteenth-century Europe. See Chow (1960) and Lin (1979).
“ In his reflection on the pro-democracy movement o f 1989, we observe that Liu had a strong moralistic and nationalistic feeling. 
Like some of the student participants, Liu was not immune to the particular atmosphere of the movement
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theory and practice of Chinese democracy movement.
The second element necessary for understanding the evolution of Liu's political 
thoughts is his distinctiveness from the May Fourth scholars as well as other 
contemporary intellectuals, which rests in his deep sense of repentance. This view has 
moved Liu to establish a new relationship with the state. Many intellectuals of the 
generation of Red Guards have also followed Liu's path apparently leading to the 
emergence of a real awakening among the younger generation of intellectuals.
Before going into the contextual analysis of Liu's social-political ideas, one point 
which deserves attention is that no matter how radical Liu seemed to be, his ideas of 
democracy which detailed in his hunger-strike statement and his work published in 1992 
have not shown more radical substantially than Y an Jiaqi's or Liu Binyan's and even Fang 
Lizhi's advocacy of a culture of democracy. Compared Liu Xiaobo's democratic ideas 
with Yan's, we discover that both of them adhere to a similar notion of democracy, 
stressing rationality and peaceful means as fundamental elements. What makes Liu 
Xiaobo distinguished from other scholars is the approach or strategy that he adopted in 
response to the external crisis or threat. In addition, Liu also contrasted himself with 
other three intellectuals by direct participation in the pro-democracy movement. Unlike 
other intellectuals, Liu practised what he preached.
TOWARD A CONTEXTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF LIU XIAOBO'S SOCIAL- 
POLITICAL IDEAS
Compared Liu Xiaobo with other selected case studies in this research we may 
find that Liu is very different from the other three scholars in terms of his social location, 
generational location and political opportunity structure to which he has access. Being 
the youngest generation among the foregoing discussed intellectuals, Liu has unique 
personal experiences. Without any offrcal position either in the party or in the state 
apparatus, Liu distinquishes himself from his fellow colleagues in the Chinese intellectual
want to give thanks to Dr. Stephen Feuchtwang, Reader of Sociology, City University, London, for this idea was drawn from his 
critical comments.
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circles. The following part will analyze how Liu’s social location and political 
opportunity structure has affected his choice of strategies in response to the socio- 
historical context where he lives.
Social Location. Economic-Political Opportunities and Intellectual Radicalism
Unlike other intellectuals, Liu Xiaobo has been a solitary figure in the Chinese 
circles for he has never been accepted and welcomed in the Chinese intellectual 
establishment even though he received wide support from the university students when he 
was lecturing in China. Having had no direct connection with any political patron, Liu 
could retain a certain amount of autonomy to criticize the state policies and political 
structure; but such autonomy was fragile especially when Liu was under attack by both 
officials and other intellectuals. Liu was thus at a disadvantage without houtai. 
Inevitably, his works were denounced by the state and also rejected by the intellectual 
circles.
Liu first came to national prominence in May 1986 when attending an 
international conference on Chinese literature in Shanghai. He lashed out boldly at 
current Chinese writing as backward, unimaginative, being controlled by the Party. After 
this occasion, he began to attract huge audiences. Criticizing the whole intellectual 
community of the post-Mao era for being satisfied with their works, Liu directly and 
forthrightly pointed out the problems in contemporary Chinese literary works.
"from the nostalgia for the 1950s and affirmation of the early years of Liberation, back 
further to a longing for the period of the Democratic Revolution (1930s and 1940s), 
moving gradually from that onwards a renewed affirmation of the educated youth in the 
countryside and those undergoing labour reform. Finally, one arrives at the celebration 
of traditional classical culture and a return to it" (Liu, 1986, quoted from Barme, 1990;
55)
Liu pointed out the activistic roots of contemporary literature confronting the 
intellectual community which Liu identified not only as reactionary, retreating into 
traditionalism, but also suffocating to the creative spirit in literature. Liu emphasizes that 
the life blood of writers is the ability to produce creative writing.
"the wisdom of the age, the soul of a nation, the fortune-tellers of the human race. 
Their most important, indeed their sole destiny ... is to enunciate thoughts that are ahead
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of their times. The vision of the intellectual must stretch beyond the range of accepted 
ideas and concepts of order; he must be adventurous, a lonely forerunner; only after he 
has moved on far ahead do others discover his worth ... he can discern the portents of 
disaster at a time of approaching obliteration". (Liu, 1988, quoted from Barme, 1990:
56)
With this conception of intellectual creativity, Liu openly criticized many 
intellectuals regardless of their seniority and prominence. In his work "Crisis of 
Literature", he directly pointed toward the problems of root-seeking literature and 
wound-literature (Liu, 1986). Besides, he also attacked Heshang for the reason that 
Heshang presents a message proclaiming China the strongest nation in the world. In 
Liu's eyes, this idea is typically arrogant, the expression of which reveals the Chinese 
people's under-estimation of its own weaknesses (Liu, 1990a: 55-56). To distinguish his 
position from other intellectuals, Liu comments,
"I can sum up what's wrong with Chinese writers in one sentence: They can't create 
themselves, they simply don't have the ability, because their very lives don't belong to 
them". (Quoted from Barme, 1990: 397)
The critical stance of Liu angered many intellectuals. He openly denounced the 
view of Liu Zaifu, the new godfather of literary theory, who in 1986 had praised the 
literary works of the post-Mao era. Liu also wrote a book debating with Li Zehou, a 
prominent Chinese philosopher. In this work, Liu pointed out problems in Li's proposal 
for the revival of tradition in order to save the country. To Liu, Li's ideas are a 
reactionary and dangerous retreat into tradition. Disagreeing with the view of Li Zehou 
that Chinese people cannot negate their own tradition without negating themselves, Liu 
emphasized self-examination and self-negation as a means for creating a new mind and 
independent thinking in the people. In contrast to Li Zehou's ideas, Liu Xiaobo 
conceived of a future China which rests upon a total transformation and opening to the 
outside world (Liu, 1988a).^^
In addition to his critique of the Chinese literary realm, Liu also extends his 
criticisms to individual intellectuals. Liu attacked not only Liu Binyan personally for his
^^Liu stresses from time to time the impoitance of intellectual autonomy and professional independence which he considers as 
fundamental to intellectuals. Thus he rejected cooperation with other intellectuals in China and disassociated himself from the party 
leaders.
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notion of "critical loyalty" but also criticized Fang Lizhi's reluctance to join the June 
Fourth Demonstrations. He also rejected openly what the so-called "elite" intellectuals 
had proposed during the pro-democracy movement of 1989 (see, Liu, 1992: 155). 
Dissatisfied with intellectuals' impotence and unwillingness to confront the autocratic 
rulers directly, Liu then took part in a hunger strike to emphasize his message that 
intellectuals should not rest on empty critique but should actively participate in social 
movements (Liu, 1992: 199-200). His concern for modernity and progress has directed 
Liu's thoughts to Western democracy. Having a strong conviction that theory and action 
must be an integral whole, Liu went back to China from the United States to participate 
in the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989. He was not only an active participant but also 
one of the "engineers" of the movement.^^
Furthermore, he also condemned the response of the intellectual community to the 
death of Hu Yaobang. Defying other intellectuals' mourning of the dead "enlightened 
leaders" such as Hu and Zhou Enlai, the prime minister in Mao's era, Liu argued that it is 
not necessary to mourn those leaders since their destiny was determined by their passivity 
and reluctance to oppose repressive rulers. Liu maintained that if these "enlightened 
leaders" were independent, they could have stood to counteract those autocratic rulers. 
Arguing against the common view of Zhou Enlai as a good leader, Liu questioned the 
integrity of Zhou. Liu believed that if Zhou had been willing to restrict Mao, the 
dictatorial rule of Mao could have been curbed. Liu added that many of the so-called 
enlightened leaders of China were only playing roles as royal remonstrators, who had 
contributed to despotic politics in Chinese history (Liu, 1990a).
"do the Chinese constantly repeat the same tragedy (one starting with Qu Yuan's 
drowning in the Miluo River)? Why do the Chinese mourn people like Zhou Enlai, 
Peng Dehuai, and Hu Yaobang as tragic heros, while they forgetting such tragic figures 
as Wei Jingsheng?" (Liu, 1989)
Liu also condemned the egregious "cronyism" of the literati with his usual
is suggested that the democratic thought and political ideas of Liu had significant impact on the student leaders during the 
movement See Barme (1990) and Chong (1990) and my discussion on chapter 4. Liu (1992) also states clearly his personal contacts 
with the student leaders as their advisor.
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directness.
"The famous in China are much taken with acting as benefactors of others who care for 
and suckle the unknown. They use a type of tenderness which is almost feminine to 
possess, co-opt, and finally asphyxiate you. This is one of the peculiarities of Chinese 
culture ... Some people have the talent to excel, but shying from the dangers of doing it 
alone, they instead seek out a cover {Be Le). They look for support, for security, so they 
can sleep easy; lunging into the bosom of some grand authority or other, and doze off in 
their warm embrace". (Liu, 1988, quoted from Barme, 1990: 81)
His intellectual radicalism and vehement critique of both the literary realm and 
individual intellectuals inevitably led to Liu’s rejection by the Chinese intellectual 
establishment. Without any support from political patrons and without acceptance from 
the intellectual community, Liu became vulnerable and lonely and found himself rejected 
by the literary field. Wang Meng, the Party novelist and the Minister of Culture once 
commented on Liu (though he did not name Liu directly) that "[Liu] would lose his 
popularity as quickly as he gained it" (Zhongguo wenhuabao, 26 Nov, 1989). Liu Zaifu 
and Li Zehou, when discussing Liu Xiaobo’s criticisms of his own ideas, made his 
rejection of Liu very clear even though Li did not state it openly.^* In addition, Liu was 
condemned for his "extreme individualism" and criticized for his rude attitudes toward 
other intellectuals. Liu was attacked by the other intellectuals for his lack of regard for 
seniority general lack of respect for other intellectuals. They regarded Liu’s open 
challenge to the leading intellectuals as a way to make himself more popular, a "dirty 
trick" perpetrated by an arrogant young man. I was also told by Su Xiaokang and Liu 
Binyan that the extremely critical outlook of Liu Xiaobo reflects the mentality of the 
younger generation of Chinese intellectuals. To a certain extent, Liu’s popularity among 
university students also points out the fact that the Chinese youth nowadays no longer 
easily submit themselves to any authorities. Instead, they subject everything to questions, 
and are more concerned about their own interests rather than those of the collective 
whole. This line of reasoning is also consistent with the findings of Rosen’s (1989, 1992)
Liu Xiaobo was criticized by different intellectuals in China after his critique of the root-seeking literature and some prominent 
Chinese intellectuals like Liu Binyan and Liu Zehou was published. Even though the above-mentioned scholars did not name Liu 
Xiaobo directly, their criticisms clearly pointed to Liu. For details, see Li Zehou's interview in Lin (1989: 259-262).
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study of the recent value change of Chinese youth (see also chapter 4)/^
By far the most harsh criticisms of Liu Xiaobo, have been from the cultural 
critics. Liu was condemned as a "cultural nihilist". He Xin, a 'cultural conservative’ 
attacked Liu:
"I would like to remind my compatriots that behind the crises of radical anti­
traditionalists and iconoclasts so popular today there is a hidden agenda which calls for 
another Cultural Revolution ... Amidst the miasma of cultural nihilism, radical-anti- 
traditionalism, as well as among the wrapped attitudes and extremism of some young 
intellectuals, if we sit back and consider things calmly and rationally we can discern in 
their proclamations many familiar shadows of the past. The difference is that the anti­
traditionalism and cultural nihilism of those years marched under the banner of Marx 
and Mao Tse-tung [Zedong]; today it is hidden under the cloak of Freud and Nietzsche. 
The thing [the two currents of thought] have in common is their zealotry, their absurd 
theoretical framework, and their wrong-headed and distorted analysis of Eastern and 
Western culture. (It is here in particular that I suggest people examine and re-evaluate 
Liu Xiaobo's theories.)" (He Xin, 1988: 12, quoted from Barme, 1990: 83)
In the 1989 pro-democracy movement, Liu was further denounced by the state as
the chief instigator of unorthodox thinking and the leader behind the scenes of the student
demonstrations. His critical speeches and unique ideas earned him condemnation and
imprisonment.^® Even though Liu was well-received by university students, he was
restricted by having no "background". Even earlier Liu had given open lectures at
Beijing University on the eve of the student demonstrations in 1986-87 attended by large
numbers of students. However, Liu got into trouble with the authorities because of the
lectures and he had to stay out of the public scene for the next several months. This
incident indicates to us that Liu was constrained by his "anti-establishment" position.
Equally important, we also observe that Liu was conscious of his disadvantaged position
in China. In his work (1992), Liu said that he thought for a about his personal security
before he went back to China because he had published some articles critical of the
’^Su Xiaokang told me in an interview that he regarded Liu Xiaobo's anti-traditionalism as a challenge to the existing 
establishment He also sees Liu's extreme position as typical o f the utUitaiian-individualism which has become popular among the 
Chinese youth though Liu definitely has more knowledge and a higher level of education than most other youths. Analyzing Liu's 
ideas, Su suggests that Liu's extreme political stand is the "product" o f the cultural crisis in mainland China. The direct confrontation 
o f ideological crisis, compounded by a deep-seated identity crisis, the Chinese people have therefore turned to the quest for individual 
interests. According to Su, the Liu Xiaobo phenomenon reflects the deep-down spiritual crisis or crisis of morality that is challenging 
China today (Interview 1, Princeton, 1993).
^°For details of the condemnation of Liu Xiaobo from the CCP, see Jiefang Yuebao, (July, 1989: 67-68).
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Chinese leaders and of the system/^ Liu publicly admitted that he was frightened by the 
repressive rule of the CCP. Having been involved in the student protests of 1986-87, Liu 
was well-informed about his dangerous position. Condemned as the instigator of the 
anti-revolutionary movement, Liu felt insecure and considered leaving China in the midst 
of the crisis. He later expressed regret for not having done so (1992: 252). Arrested and 
convicted of anti-revolutionary acts, Liu was imprisoned by the CCP. During his 
imprisonment, Liu felt excessive pressure from his family and from society. During a 
visit in prison, Liu's father cried and begged him not to be stubborn, asking him to admit 
that he had done wrong in order to be released from prison. When he considered his wife 
and his small child, Liu concluded that he was acting irresponsibly, so he finally gave in 
and agreed to write a statement of repentancedeclaring that he had witnessed no massacre 
on the Tiananmen Square on June Fourth 1989. As one might anticipate, Liu's statement 
was criticized and he was condemned as a "big liar", "polluting" the noble nature of the 
movement; and he was labelled a traitor of democracy (Liu, 1992). Under strong social 
pressure, meant Liu had to rationalize what he had done in order to restore his public 
image.^^ Thus, it is clear that Liu is not really free from the particular context in which he 
lives. No matter how popular he was among university students partly because of his 
connections with an underground literary 'salon', Liu was eventually subject to external 
constraints. In spite of Liu's previous critical outlook and outspokenness, he has had to 
pay a heavy "cost" to remain as critical and even radical against the state. Having lost 
support, Liu therefore wrote to explain the impasse that he was confronting. He 
rationalized what he did, saying that what he has reported is genuine. He openly 
denounced the undemocratic acts of students, condemning also other intellectuals. He 
further subjected himself to scrutiny, admitting that he was in fear of repression and 
death.
^'For details o f these articles, see the collected essays o f Liu published in Liu, (1989c: 3-84).
^^For details o f his rationalization, see Liu (1992: 26-27). Such ideas can be easily found within the lines o f his self-explanation in 
this work. Liu also plainly states his ambivalent feeling and his fears of losing public support and disgracing his public image for 
having written the statement of conviction. Because his conviction was under public scrutiny, he was condemned for telling lies. 
Under such circumstance, Liu therefore wrote to explain his position.
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Liu's reflection (1992) reveals the difficult choice of Chinese intellectuals. On the 
one hand, he criticizes himself vehemently for his impotence and insufficient persistence 
to stand firm for what he really believes, feeling extremely guilty when he compares 
himself with Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming who are still imprisoned. On the other hand, 
he justifies his action by asserting that the protection of one's freedom has utmost 
importance. Feeling that his public image was being destroyed because of his statement 
of conviction, Liu uses the appeal that he was under the threat of death if he failed to 
cooperate with the CCP (Liu, 1992).”  At this point, we can see that without any direct 
connections to political patrons and losing support from the Chinese academic 
establishment, Liu was isolated and found himself vulnerable. Despite his strategy in 
making himself popular and famous in the Chinese intellectual community, especially his 
strong appeal to the university students by means of attacking other scholars, Liu only 
found himself aliented from other intellectuals without any recognition from them. 
Adopting a relatively radical approach could suddenly render Liu with fame but he also 
paid the cost for being isolated from the establishment. This case study again suggests 
our hypothesis that Chinese intellectuals have not been free from the constraints imposed 
by their particular socio-political environment and their social locations. Alongside this, 
the hypothesis that intellectuals' access to socio-economic and political resources have, to 
some extent, shaped their intellectual radicalism is validated.
Educational Orientation. Intellectual Field and Intellectual Radicalism
The intellectual critique of Liu Xiaobo has been strongly influenced by his unique 
educational orientation. His exposure to works of major Western philosophers such as 
Rosseau, Nietzsche and St. Augustine shaped his world view. In his work Sixiang zhimi 
yu renleizhimeng, (The Mystery of Thought and the Dream of Mankind), he revises and 
evaluated the works of different philosophers, pointing out the limitations of mankind
Xiaokang commented that Liu Xiaobo was extremely individualistic. In order to justify himself, Liu has attempted in his 1992 
book to cast aspersions on others as undemocratic (interview 1, Princeton, 1993).
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and asking for repentance (Liu, 1990b: 43, 46-7). The main thrust of this work stresses 
the individuality and creativity of mankind. In addition, Liu also highlighted the fact that 
death makes people more realistic in viewing themselves. He cited the works of St. 
Augustine and Rousseau with particular emphasis on their repentance (Liu, 1990b: 1-58; 
121-134; and 231-40), praising Augustine's deeper level of repentance. The Confessions 
are written in the form of a prayer in which Augustine perpetually gives praise and 
thanks to God. Recognizing his limitations and origin of sins inherent in mankind, 
Augustine offers his thanks and gratitude to the Almighty God. In The City o f  God, 
Augustine identifies the sins of mankind, arguing that the only hope of mankind rests in 
offering a faithful heart to God. It is, therefore, necessary, that men confess their sins 
and repent. '^  ^ After reading Augustine's works, Liu stressed the importance of 
repentance.
"The tragedy of man rests neither in fate nor society or other external factors. The 
tragedy of man rests solely in man himself. We must admit the original sins in our life; 
original sin is disaster; whilst our life is the process of disaster." (Liu, 1990b: 128, my 
translation)
Liu admiringly echoed the ideas of Augustine that self-doubt is necessary. He 
approvingly adopted the stance of Augustine's genuine, honest attitude and his spirit of 
self-criticism.
In addition, Liu is very much influenced by Nietzsche, particularly his view of 
tragedy and solitude. Liu admires the uncompromising attitudes and boldness of the 
German philosopher. The influence of Nietzsche's thought upon Chinese intellectuals is 
not new but dates back to the May Fourth era as indicated in chapter two. In the late 
1980s, there was a great intellectual debate over culture, the wenhuare (cultural fever) in 
mainland China. In this debate, significant prominence was given to Nietzsche 
scholarship. The Academy of Chinese Culture, the first non-official institution, was 
established in 1986 and published a paper discussing the affinities of Zhuang Zi and 
Nietzsche by the Taiwanese philosopher Chen Guying (Chen Guying, 1986). In addition.
■^*For details o f the works of Augustine, see, for example, Liu (1990: 121-133).
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Zhang Rulun from the Chinese Academy of Social Science and An Yanming of Fudan 
University also criticized China's contemporary moral crisis in light of Nietsche's ideas 
(Zhang Rulun, 1985 & An Yanming, 1987) As Bloom, Stauth, Turner, and others note, 
the impact of Nietsche on Western Marxists, particularly "critical theorists" such as 
Marcuse and Adorno has been pervasive. The people living in mainland China also have 
been exposed to Western or neo-Marxist thought, including Nietzsche (see. An Yanming, 
1985) I have also pointed out in the preceding discussion (chapters 3 and 4), that since 
1978 Chinese students and intellectuals have been exposed to different Western thinkers 
like Karl Popper, Rousseau, Freud and Nietzsche, especially their ideas on nihilism and 
individualism (see, Kelly, 1991a; Chong, 1990; Rosen, 1990). Such exposure has 
influenced the whole intellectual community. Even Liaowang, the official weekly 
admitted the pervasive influence of the West on the Chinese intellectual community. 
One article, which divided the reform program in the post-Mao era into four stages, 
highlights the stage of the "Will to Power" under which students felt disillusioned with 
the reforms especially when confronting "unhealthy trends" within the CCP.
"In their pondering, some students turned negative ... Even more pondered on a number 
of irrational phenomena and attributed them all to a single notion, expressed in the word 
'power'. Power was the one thing necessary, the one thing you could not do without, if 
you wanted to realize the value of human life. For this reason Nietsche's theory of the 
'Will to Power' rapidly gained popularity among the students. A 'Nietzsche' fever 
developed. The works of Nietzsche became best sellers. Such sayings as 'become 
yourself, 'don't follow me', 'the réévaluation of all values', 'the superman' became 
favourite slogans often heard on their lips." (Liaowang Zhoukan, May 1989: 18-20, 
trans. in Inside China Mainland, July 1989: 23-25)
The official acknowledgement of the impact of Nietzsche indicates that the 
situation had become so acute that the official press could no longer ignore it. A Marxist 
critic also observed that many young people had been keen on western philosophy and 
referred to themselves as "Freud fans", "Schopenhauer fans" and "Nietzsche fans" 
(Banyuetan, 12 Dec. 1987, trans in Inside China Mainland, Nov. 1987: 6-7).
Liu Xiaobo's democratic thought was formulated in this socio-cultural 
environment. Liu, modelling after Nietzsche, internalized the notion of "individualism as 
moral revolt" (Kelly, 1991a), deepening his critique and dissidence. Like Lu Xun, Liu
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very much admired the thought of Nietzsche, and was particularly captured by his notion 
of "superior individualism"; Liu praises Lu’s critical attitude toward the feudalistic and
autocratic rule in traditional society. Liu consciously attacks this tradition,
"... we can then see why Lu Xun so glorified Nietzsche, the theory of evolution, and 
Symbols of Suffering. Nietzsche was the smasher of idols, the symbol of individual 
freedom; the theory of evolution is the replacement of the old by the new, the symbol of 
free competition; and Symbols of Suffering is sensual life, the symbol of subconscious 
distress and the tragedy of existence...In contemporary China Lun Xun-style extremism 
and ruthlessness is especially needed, especially in dialogue with traditional culture ..." 
(Quoted from Kelly, 1991a: 19)^ ^
Seeing the different nature of anti-traditionalism between the post-Mao 
intellectuals and the May Fourth scholars, Liu praises the spirit of critique throughout the
May Fourth era.^  ^ He also sees the need to revive such a spirit.
"Summing up the experience of the May Fourth Movement, the result reached should 
not be an attitude of compromise with the traditional culture, but the start of a long
term, thorough-going anti-feudal enlightenment movement ... The anti-tradition
stemming fi"om Lu Xun must be able profoundly and broadly to transcend the "May 
Fourth" New Culture movement by Lu Xun." (Quoted from Kelly, 1991a: 19)
This invocation of Lu Xun imbued Liu with courage to criticize the Chinese 
people in general and the intellectuals in particular. His internalized belief in Lu and 
Nietzsche had also forced Liu to condemn the Chinese traditional values, especially 
attacking anti-democratic populism (minbenzhuyi), the Confucian personality {Kong-Yan 
renge), and the harmony of Heaven and Man {tianrenheyi) which is embedded in
Confucianism (Liu, 1990a; see also Kelly, 1991a).
Unlike the other three scholars, Liu was isolated from the intellectual circles. 
Without support from other intellectuals, Liu could not benefit from any "social force" or 
"intellectual force" created within the intellectual field except his appeal to the university 
students. It suffices to us that social location and field that intellectuals occupy or belong 
should have significant impact on their coping strategies.
^^For details of Lu Xun's anti-traditionalism, see, for example, Goldman (1977) and Lin (1979).
^^Liu argues that the post-Mao intellectuals have not really abandoned out-dated Chinese tradition. In his eyes, the post-Mao 
intellectuals have tried to establish another autocratic regime in terms of traditional political thought See Liu (1990a; 1-54) and see 
also Liu (1986).
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Generational Location and Intellectual Radicalism
In addition to his social location, the iconoclastic to tali sm of Liu Xiaobo has been 
greatly influenced by his particular generational location. Compared with Yan Jiaqi, 
Fang Lizhi and Liu Binyan, Liu is the youngest scholar, having been bom in 1955 in 
northeast China.^^ His youth was spent mainly in Changchun with a three-year stint from 
1970-73 in Inner Mongolia, during two years of which he was an "educated youth" 
because of his having completed middle school. In 1976-77, Liu was employed by the 
Changchun Construction Company. In light of the generational location scheme, Liu 
belongs to the sixth generation, the Cultural Revolution generation. During that 
Revolution, Liu was an energetic and active participant who upheld Mao Zedong 
Thought. Being one of the generation of Red Guards, Liu was involved in the movement 
attacking intellectuals, the "class enemy" and the so-called "counter-revolutionary". Liu 
personally experienced the prolonged stmggle in the oppressive atmosphere during the 
Cultural Revolution.
"In the high tide of the Cultural Revolution, I was only eleven years of age. Aside from 
those revolutions that I was too small to attend, I was eager to participate in whatever 
kinds of activities. Up to now, I still deeply remember the rhythm, melody and dancing 
steps of 'Loyalty Dance' (Zhongzimu). Not only can I frequently speak of the poetry 
and speeches of Chairman Mao but also remember clearly almost all of the slogans of 
the revolution. My brother was a red guard, involved in a series of struggles and fights; 
my parents also joined the Revolution and they represented two opposing groups. I still 
remember they always debated at home. Some children, similar to my age, and I 
attacked the rich, the rightists and the bourgeois element. Once, I made an old guard of 
the former Kuomintang (KMT) kneel down before me, begging for my forgiveness, and 
crying for learning from the young red guards' and salute to the young red guards'". 
(Liu, 1990a: 60, my translation)
Speaking of the nature of the Revolution, Liu highlights,
"The Cultural Revolution was full of class struggle. The intellectuals were not only
attacked and purged by the workers, peasants and army but also attacked by other
intellectuals". (Ibid)
Within such a socio-political context Liu’s youth was devoted to tides of class 
struggle. Like other youth of his age, Liu believed that China’s future rested in the
realization of what Chairman Mao had said. Liu makes it abundantly clear that the
base the biography of Liu on the material from the work of Barme, (1990).
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experiences in childhood had tremendous impact on his development. He said that the 
"big blow" in childhood had made a physical and emotional impression on him. His 
pessimistic world view is probably the result of this "big blow" (Liu, 1990b: 4).
In the midst of the Revolution, Liu was very glad because it gave him freedom to 
do whatever he pleased. He said in an interview that he felt really emancipated during 
the Revolution since he was free from the formal educational process. Besides, he was 
extremely grateful to the Revolution because it exposed him not only to Marx's work but 
also to the works of the major Western philosophers.^* Liu's direct confrontation with an 
intense ideological crisis had made his psychology exceedingly complicated, involving a 
mixed feeling having been "cheated" coupled with an intense feeling of guilt. As Li and 
Schwarcz (1983-4) suggested, the sixth generation of Chinese intellectuals was suddenly 
and thoroughly awakened after having weathered interruptions in their lives and having 
experienced every conceivable kind of hardship. Accordingly, Liu is definitely one of 
them.
"Politically outraged, emotionally wounded, intellectually doubt-ridden, they are 
reflective, full of feeling in their approach to the contemporary situation. They may be 
pessimistic, hesitant about the future, unable to grasp any prospect with certainty". (Li 
& Schwarcz, 1983-4: 52)
Despite the dreadful experiences in the Cultural Revolution, Liu found some 
positive impact on him; that is, the Revolution had forced him to search for a way out. 
Thereafter, Liu subjected everything to doubt, leading him to have a deep self-reflection 
and self-consciousness.
"The quest for democracy in the post-Mao era is the direct consequence of the Cultural 
Revolution. Because the Cultural Revolution has unmasked the myth of personal 
dictatorship and personality cult, it has shaken the fundamental hope for a national 
saviour. Without the extremely autocratic politics in the Revolution, there would not be 
the consciousness of democracy of today; without the absolute and monolithic 
ideological control during the Revolution, there would not be the quest for 
emancipation of thought of today; without the blind faith, there would not be today's 
general doubt and scepticism. The Cultural Revolution speeds the demolition of the 
feudalistic cultural tradition and facilitates the self-consciousness of today". (Liu, 
1990b: 52-3, my translation)
^®For details of how Liu described the evolution of his thought, see his interview with Jin Zhong in Emancipation Monthly (Dec. 
1988: 59, 60, 64) and Liu's work in Press Freedom Herald (no. 11, 30 Sep. 1989).
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Concerning the implications of the Revolution, Liu asks people to be alert to the 
revival of feudalism and to take individual responsibility for the dehumanized life of the 
past (Ibid, 53).
When describing his philosophy of life, Liu adopts a positive view toward a 
pessimistic life {Jiefang Yuebao, July, 1989: 62). Liu frankly said in an interview that "I 
am pessimistic toward the whole of mankind, but I do not intend to escape from this 
reality. Even though I am confronted by series of tragedies, I remain to struggle, to 
counteract" (Ibid, 61). Realizing his youth had been lost, Liu studied hard to compensate 
for his "deficiency". He enroled in the Chinese Department of Jilin University and 
graduated in 1982. Upon his graduation, he was admitted to the Beijing Normal 
University where he taught and undertook his postgraduate studies. In 1988, Liu 
completed his studies and was awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. During the 
post-Mao years, Liu learned major works of Western Philosophers, adopting different 
intellectual ideas from the outside world. Liu also adopted Western standards to attack 
Chinese tradition. Like many intellectuals of his generation, Liu is not only particularly 
critical of the cultural system but also extremely radical against the existing social and 
political structure.
According to Li and Schwarcz (1983-4), the sixth generation of intellectuals in 
modem China regains the courage and independence the former generation lost. They 
are more critical, vehemently attacking the feudalistic state-socialism. Like the second 
generation, the sixth generation of intellectuals subjects every thing to doubt, trying to 
reevaluate rather than accept matters unquestioningly. Their works demonstrate strong 
concern for human values and stress the importance of individuality. They adhere to 
liberalism and have tried to set the course for the development of China. They are 
exploring new patterns, trying to be the model-builders, and welcoming ideas from the 
outside world. Being one of these intellectuals, Liu has attempted to experiment with 
tmth after commemorating the sorrows of his lost youth. He has tried to develop himself 
as an independent intellectual. Chen Jun, one of Liu’s good fnends, argues that Liu and
305
the Red Guard intellectuals are different from the former generations because they have 
become really independent and free from the influence of the CCP (Chen Jun, 1989: 63). 
Liu Binyan, in spite of some disagreement with Liu Xiaobo, also pins his hope on these 
sixth-generation intellectuals, considering them as distinguished from the former 
generations. Having experienced the prolonged dark age, these intellectuals are more 
knowledgable about social reality in China (Liu Binyan, 1990a). Having the 
characteristics of the Red Guard generation, Liu's intellectual radicalism and political 
thought is closely associated with his particular generational location.
Again, we have to point out that even though most of the sixth generation of 
Chinese intellectuals were brought up against a similar socio-historical context, they may 
have adopted different strategies or approaches to cope with their environments. As the 
coming chapter is going to discuss how the sixth generation Chinese intellectuals react 
differently to their socio-political circumstances, individual variations and interpretations 
can be analyzed in the light of Bourdieu's notion of strategy. Unlike Chen Ziming and 
Wang Juntao, two prominent Sixth Generation intellectuals, who adopted moderate 
approach to expand their influence over the public sphere by estanblishing indepedent 
social research institutes to influence the state policy on the one hand; and gained 
cooperation from the reformers in the Party without making themsleves totally detached 
from the establishment on the other (for details, see. Black & Munro, 1993), Liu Xiaobo 
chose a different path by means of radical strategy to make himself well-known in China. 
Having fame and "name" in the Chinese intellectual circles Liu hoped to develop his own 
field in constrast with the dominant values. Seen from this light, the complicated nature 
of sociology of knowledge is demonstrated, revealing the dynamic between social 
structure and social agency. In conclusion, even though people are structurally and 
institutionally bound, they still retian certain level of autonomy to choose what kinds of 
strategies or approaches in response to the external stimuli or threats. Without 
appreciating such an interactive and dynamic process, we cannot develop a fuller picture 
of what sociology of knowledge is about.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND 
THE INTELLECTUALS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
Currently, it has been suggested that intellectuals have played the most 
fundamental role in the transformation of state socialist societies;such as Hungary in 
1989-1990, the former USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (see, Konrad & Szelenyi, 
1991). With the erosion of bureaucratic domination and the decline of the old elite, 
scholars have decided that intellectuals are the only viable candidates for the new ruling 
class. The emergence of intellectuals as a "New Class" has been a controversial issue in 
the sociology of intellectuals.' Even though it is not the focus of this research to examine 
whether the post-Mao intellectuals have emerged as a new class, some of the central 
issues raised in the New Class debate are relevant here^ insofar as they involve the 
structural position of intellectuals in social reproduction and how they emerge as a New 
Class dominating politics and society. Szelenyi (1979) proposed his idea of New Class in 
the late 70’s to depict the rise of the intelligentsia in the Eastern European socialist 
countries. He argued that a new dominant class of intelligentsia was in the process of 
formation. In state socialist societies, according to Szelenyi, redistribution is the main
'Discussions on new class date back to the 1870. Michail Bakunin coined the term "New Class" around 1870 in his book The 
Knoto-Germanic Empire and the Social Revolution. When discussing the scenario o f Marxist socialism, he pointed out the reign of 
scientific intelligence and Bakunin's ideas of "New Class" was reprinted in Krimerman & Perry (1966). The Russian-Polish radical 
Jan Makhaisky also propounded the concept that a new class, represented by a group of "white hands" with their "intellectual capital", 
had arisen to exploit manual labour through socialism. M. Djilas (1957), a former close lieutenant o f Marshall Tito, recognized in a 
similar vein the rise of a ruling class which was dominated by the bureaucrats. Gouldner (1979) distinguished by the "critical" 
educated strata in scientific, cultural and social employment fix>m the old-style managers. Szelenyi (1979) believed that a new class 
was based on teleological knowledge known as "redistributor" had arisen. The redistributor o f state socialism claims to operate within 
the framework of "substantive rationality", the new society is one in which teleos dominates techne, where an "intelligentsia" occupies 
a dominant position in the social structure. There have been diverse interpretations of the new class. For details, see, for example, 
Podhoretz (1972); Bruce-Briggs (1979); Szelenyi (1979; 1991); Held (1986); Bell (1979) and Frentzel-Zagorska & K. Zagorski 
(1989).
^Szelenyi (1988/89) suggests that there are three waves of New Class theories. (I) The first wave o f theorizing fundamentally 
touched on the question of agency, asking who acted to form the New Class (see, Krimerman & Perry, 1966). (II) The second 
generation of New Class theories concentrated attention on the question o f structural position, for exan^le what positions New Class 
agents occupy in the system of social reproduction so as to qualify as a new dominant class (see, Szelenyi, 1980; Djilas, 1957 and 
Cliff, 1979). (Ill) The third wave mainly investigated the changing nature o f knowledge, arguing that a new type o f  knowledge has 
emerged to influence politics and society in general. It can be regarded as a "teleocratic project" since the "knowledge dimension" is 
stressed (see, Gouldner, 1979; Bell, 1979).
mechanism which guarantees expropriation. When people control the mechanism of 
redistribution, they thus become a dominant class. New Class is emerging because those 
who are producers have little control of the products while the redistributors control the 
redistribution of the products. Thus, an antagonistic relationship is provoked when the 
position of intellectuals is on the rise, especially in state socialism which is characterized 
by rational redistribution. In Szelenyi's view, the more rational the redistribution 
becomes, the more significant the intelligentsia will be because more professional, 
technical and teleological knowledge is required (Szelenyi, 1979). In his later writings, 
Szelenyi pointed out forthrightly some mistakes that he made in his early New Class 
theory. The socio-structural changes in the East European countries did not fulfil 
Szelenyi's early anticipation. Neither his predicted scenario that the intelligentsia would 
unite with the bureaucrats to form a new ruling class nor the united front between the 
intelligentsia and the public had formed. Therefore, he had to modify his thesis, 
admitting that he failed to paint an all-encompassing picture and decided to narrow the 
focus to a critical (or reflexive) sociology of intellectuals (Szelenyi, 1991).
Such a change has led Szelenyi to ask (1) Do intellectuals have power aspirations? 
If yes, in what ways can they use knowledge to attain power of their own? and (2) To 
what extent do self-interests and, specifically, power aspirations of intellectuals affect — 
if they affect at all — the nature of knowledge that is being produced, processed,, and 
disseminated by intellectuals?^ Szelenyi's later assertion is similar to that of Gouldner 
(1979), pointing out the interaction between the manipulation of cultural capital and 
domination. His main hypothesis is that "knowledge class theories or other radically self­
reflexive theories of knowledge-power were theoretical reflections of such 'projects' of 
intellectuals to promote their power aspirations; these theories were falsified by history 
because these projects were defeated in the West and in Eastern Europe" (quoted from 
Szelenyi, 1991: 363). However, the recent development in the post-communist countries 
such as the disintegration of the political order, the decline of the state's economic
^These questions are cited in Szelenyi (1991: 362).
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monopoly and the rise of a bourgeoisie proper have inevitably caused radical change in 
both political and social structure (for details, see, Szelenyi, 1991). Because Szelenyi 
believes that intellectuals will play a crucial role in the era of post-communism, he has 
turned his attention to the exploration of the relationship between knowledge and power 
or knowledge and interest in order to derive a clearer picture of intelligentsia in post­
communist transformation.'*
Using the foregoing assumptions as analytic tools, this chapter is going to 
examine the changing relationship between the state and the post-Mao intellectuals. In 
particular, special attention is concentrated on investigating whether the socio-structural 
transformation in post-Mao society has facilitated these intellectuals' rise to power. We 
will examine the three major dimensions in class formation. First, one needs "agents" 
who are able and willing to occupy a new class position. Second, new socio-economic 
positions must be possessed by these agents. Third, a new kind of consciousness must be 
developed in order to consolidate the new class position.^ We are going to examine 
whether the post-Mao intellectuals have fulfilled these criteria to expand their control on 
the public sphere and to assert their intellectual autonomy in light of these dimensions.
A NEW CONSCIOUSNESS
The growth of intellectual dissidence has indicated a new kind of consciousness 
shared by the post-Mao intellectuals marked by a growing awareness of the importance of 
enlightenment, intellectual autonomy and professional status. There has been a revival of 
the May Fourth ideal of "qimeng" (enlightenment) in the post-Mao era (Cheng, 1990; 
Goldman, 1987).^ Fang Lizhi, Yan Jiaqi and Liu Binyan continue to question the 
prejudices and superstitions of their bureaucratic superiors. Though they have been 
condemned as "unpatriotic" by the Communist state, their own notion of criticism can be 
designated as critical patriotism or critical loyalty. Nowadays, they try to employ both
^Habermas (1971) argues in the same vein that there is a strong relationship between knowledge and interest 
get this insight from Szelenyi (1988/89).
*For a fuller discussion o f the May Fourth Movement as a Chinese Enlightenment, see Schwarcz (1986).
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Chinese values and non-Chinese methods to highlight China’s backwardness in the 
modem world and to point out the Party's share of responsibility for its predicament. 
They drew from the experiences of the Northern European countries (Fang), Eastern 
European countries (Liu) and Western countries (Yan) to condemn the authoritarian 
regime of Communist China. More importantly, they have no longer confined their 
attention and activities to their campuses but directed their attention to national affairs. 
These critical patriots refuse to see their homeland as unique in the world. Rather, they 
realize that the advancement of the Western world and Japan can bring them some 
experience and teach them good lessons applicable to their own modernization. As 
Schwarcz suggested,
"[the contemporary intellectuals] believe that the gain of technological modernization 
will not be secured unless and until the enlightenment movement is allowed finally to 
challenge the tenacity of feudal habits of mind" (Schwarcz, 1986a:253).
The critique and dissidence of these intellectuals has been significant to 
contemporary Chinese politics and society. Their independent thinking is revealed 
through their intellectual radicalism. Unlike their predecessors, they not only criticize 
policies of their country but also denounce official ideology. In the Mao era, they 
identified with the Marxist ideals; but nowadays, they talk only of the myth of a 
Communist utopia. They have begun to look for a new identity. Moreover, Fang Lizhi, 
Liu Binyan, and Yan Jiaqi point out different types of crisis in post-Mao China and 
advocate autonomy for intellectuals and freedom for the people. With an intense sense of 
ideological crisis, these intellectuals have turned to the outside world looking for an 
alternate path for China (see foregoing chapters; see also Rubin, 1987; Wager, 1987; T. 
Gold, 1990; Calhoun, 1991; Tang Tsou, 1991; and Cheek, 1992).
These post-Mao intellectuals revive questions of national identity and national 
survival which go back to the Westernization Movement and the Reforms of the late 19th 
century. Their questions no longer deal with how to transform China technologically; but 
more significantly, they raise the fundamental question of how to modernize people’s 
minds. 1 also find that the critique and dissidence of the contemporary Chinese
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intellectuals differ from those of the traditional literati. The traditional literati rarely 
attacked the administrative apparatus and political structure (Chang Hao, 1989: chapter 1- 
3) while the post-Mao critical intellectuals have broken with the old tradition by going 
beyond the permitted boundary. They have touched on the taboo area by attacking 
socialist ideals and system.
Su Shaozhi, a former Director of the Marxism-Leninism Institute at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science, denounced the orthodox interpretation of Marxism and 
claimed that Marxism should be interpreted with special reference to the particular socio- 
historical context of China. He also asked for a more scientific and flexible interpretation 
of Marxism (Brugger & Kelly, 1990).^
Wang Ruowang (one of the intellectuals denounced during the anti-spiritual 
pollution campaign)® publicly exposed the fact that socialist alienation existed in 
Communist China and exhorted people to study the capitalist system (Rubin, 1987). 
Wang Ruoshui, a leading reformist theoretician, confronted the 'abyss' of the regime's 
moral bankruptcy and sought gradually to redevelop the Marxist edifice (Brugger & 
Kelly, 1990). As Liu Binyan began to see the myth of the socialist ideals, he turned to 
condemn the Chinese Communist Party {The Nineties, July, 1991: 66-70; Zhengming, 
March, 1990: 87-88; June, 1991:64-66). The above-mentioned intellectuals have 
maintained a marxist position to criticize state socialism practised in mainland China, 
pointing out the discrepancy between socialist ideals and the existing "model" 
implemented in mainland China. They have never taken off their marxist glasses in their 
conceptualization of social reality.
In contrast, the younger generation of Chinese intellectuals (such as the red Guard 
intellectuals) have adopted a non-marxist approach in seeing things. Having experienced
’Su's open support of the student demonstrations in 1989 inevitably made him one o f the targets attacked by the CCP. Now in the 
United States, he continues to reevaluate Marxism and to press for democratization in China. For details of Su's ideas, see. Su (1988; 
1992).
^Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign is one of the anti-intellectual campaigns in the post-Mao era in which intellectuals like Bai Hua, 
Wang Ruoshui and Wang Ruowang were attacked because o f their open proclamation o f alienation in socialist China. Their 
expression of genuine feeling and critical evaluation of the Cultural Revolution made them the victims o f the campaign. For details, 
see, for example, Goldman (1987).
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dreadful Cultural Revolution with all its hardships, these intellectuals are consumed by a 
search for a new vision of the world and of the self. According to Li & Schwarcz 
(1983/84), this generation of intellectuals not only commemorates the sorrows of their 
lost youth but also quest for freedom to experiment with truth. The distinctiveness of 
these intellectuals lies with their deeper sense of reflection on their social role. Not 
limiting their horizon to their mother country, these intellectuals show their concern for 
the outside world, seeking a higher kind of knowledge and aspiring to higher goals for 
mankind.
Wu Jian, an intellectual who is living in mainland China, published an article 
overseas arguing that Chinese intellectuals should assert their rights to express their ideas 
since the nobility of intellectuals is to act as social conscience. Unlike the literati, Wu 
interprets the foundation of such a conscience as based on individuality and rationality of 
intellectuals. Rejecting the role as remonstrators, Wu conceives the role of intellectuals 
as distinct from others because intellectuals are independent and critical, not relating 
themselves to any political party. Unlike politicians, the fate of intellectuals should not 
be linked with success or failure of political struggle. Preserving their social conscience, 
Wu believes that Chinese intellectuals can be free from the dilemma: whether to support 
or reject the political authority (Wu Jian, 1993: 72-74). To make his ideas more explicit, 
Wu Jian has also supported an internal transformation of Chinese intellectuals, converting 
from the literati tradition to the formation of independent personality through which they 
can really retain their autonomy. In the same vein, Ruan Ming (the former secretary of 
Hu Yaobang and one of the intellectuals who has been in exile since the 1989 Incident) 
suggests that intellectuals who are willing to sacrifice their souls can get political life; if 
they are unwilling to surrender their souls, they must be prepared to sacrifice their 
political interests and even their life (Ruan Ming, 1992, cited in Su Wei, 1993: 34). 
Although the younger generation of Chinese intellectuals believe they must be critical 
and independent, they have become more cautious of intellectual autonomy. Liu Binyan 
told me that he believes the dependent and reliant role of intellectuals is a function of
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their lack of economic independence. Unlike the younger generation, Liu and the older 
intellectuals were more careful to observe the political climate for appropriate times to 
speak their minds (Interview 4, Princeton, 1994). In addition to their concern for the 
relationship between the state and intellectuals, these intellectuals have also aspired to a 
higher level of goals concerning the whole of mankind.
READY AND WILLING AGENTS
Sixth Generation of Chinese intellectuals possess the qualities necessary to 
become the agents for development of the "New Class". Highly intelligent and well 
educated, they have been exposed to social, cultural, and political philosophies and 
theories from all parts of the world. They are willing to evaluate the Chinese culture and 
political system in light of more than the restricted perspective of officially sanctioned 
ideas. They possess the boldness necessary to criticize the political establishment. Most 
importantly, they are willing to fill the role of "New Class" leadership both in intellectual 
production and in the assumption of administrative duties. Some of these Sixth 
Generation intellectuals have been discussed in earlier chapters. Others will be discussed 
here.
Wang Juntao
Wang Juntao, the editor of Beijing Spring during the Democracy Wall Movement 
and one of the supporters of the pro-democracy movement of 1989, was accused of 
instigating the 1989 student demonstrations and sentenced to imprisonment. Evaluating 
the social position of Chinese intellectuals, particularly the relationship with the state, 
Wang strongly stresses the importance of intellectual independence. Even though Wang 
had access to better social and economic opportunities because his father was in the 
Party, he turned away from such a patron-client network and decided to work 
independently. His wife, Hua Xiaotin, said that Wang preferred a life of poverty to rely 
on Guanxi (network) and Houtai (patron) (Hua, 1992) because of his perception of the 
social role of intellectuals. Right after the Cultural Revolution, Wang began to conceive 
that Chinese intellectuals should not only be independent of any political patron in order
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to be intellectually autonomous. To achieve this goal intellectuals must live by their own 
means. Wang, with his close friend Chen Zhiming (also accused of inciting the students 
during the June Fourth Incident), supports the view that Chinese intellectuals should 
strive to have economic independence in order to maintain their intellectual autonomy 
and professional independence.
Wang has paid more than lip-service to his convictions. From 1984 onwards, he, 
Jiang Hong, Li Shengping and Chen Zhiming established the first independent social 
science research organization in China. The ultimate goal of this a storehouse of thought 
was to produce real thinkers, not merely designers {Asia Watch, June 10, 1992). With the 
formation of their research group, Wang and Chen successfully organized nation-wide 
opinion polls and other research on Chinese people’s social and political values.^ Well 
before the June-Fourth Incident, Chen and Wang finished conducting research on the 
views of the Beijing people toward the student demonstrations of 1989 and of the present 
regime (see, chapter 4 and Contemporary, 30 Dec, 1989). Moreover, Wang and Chen 
also involved themselves in the publication of Storehouse o f  Twentieth-Century Writing 
and Translations o f  the Works o f Famous Foreign Thinkers^^ through which they 
introduced plurality of ideas. Believing that genuine intellectuals should develop a solid 
knowledge base and uphold their conscience for serving the people, Chen and Wang thus 
put their belief into practice.'*
Since the late 70's, Wang has consistently supported democracy and protection of 
human rights. In the 1980 election of the People’s Congress in Beijing’s Raiding district.
’The proper name of Wang's research group is the Beijing Social and Economic Sciences Research Institute. Their research projects 
include "Investigation into Chinese political culture and political psychology"; nationwide samplings for the Economic Daily, and 
creation o f the human resources evaluation and testing centre, developing a system to improve civil service in China, organizing 
academic conferences, and conducting other independent research activities in mainland China. The work o f this Institute received 
critical praise ftom scholars both inside China and abroad. For details, see, for example, Asia Watch (June 10, 1992).
'"These publications had tremendous influence on the intellectual community in mainland China, especially the discussion of 
"cultural crisis", by providing intellectuals with new insights in seeing things.
"A ll Sixth Generation intellectuals believe, to some extent, that it is necessary to assert an independent position by means of 
developing their "cultural capital" is important. Chen Zhiming and Wang Juntao recognized the importance o f professional autonomy 
in the early eighties when they engaged in the publication of Beijing Spring. Chen stated "since we considered that our most important 
contributions to the future were in research, planning and construction; that we needed to continue to enrich our scholarship" (Asia 
Watch, June 10, 1992).
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Wang expressed aspirations for political freedom, a better political system and 
democratic rights. In a speech he pointed out the importance of restructuring the 
relationship between the Party and the state, emphasized that people's voices should be 
heard and insisted that proper measures should be established to protect people's civic 
rights. The basic political attitude of Wang can be exemplified by his slogans: "The past 
decade is the decade to be criticized, while the decade to come will be a time of 
construction" {Asia Watch, June 10, 1992: 5).’^  In particular, Wang believes that China's 
political reforms should include universal suffrage, checks and balances, public 
participation and consolidation of the legal system; but he also belies that the overturn of 
the CCP would do more harm than good to China. Even though Wang and Chen 
criticized dictatorial rule and bureaucratic practice in the Mao era, they still supported the 
reform programme initiated by Deng Xiaoping. In order to create a favourable 
environment for deepening reforms in China, they consider stability as the pre-requisite.^^ 
Their willingness to cooperate with the state does not imply that they fall into the same 
trap again that their forerunners did. Because they see the monolithic rule of the CCP as 
the only existing socio-political reality in China, they regard the most appropriate way to 
initiate immediate change in China is to work within the present system. Setting 
themselves apart from other "established intellectuals", Wang and Chen have persistently 
asserted the significance of intellectual independence. Chen Zhiming makes his position 
crystal clear:
"I believe that the relationship between the government and the stratum of intellectuals 
needs to be radically changed. The two must develop independently, recognize the 
common areas in their goals, each shoulder their particular responsibilities, each accord 
the other sufficient respect, contend but not clash and cooperate but remain independent 
of each other." (Quoted from Asia Watch, June 10, 1992: 7)
^^Wang's close collaborator, Chen, suggested that Wang had put forward several dozen constructive ideas for political and economic 
reform in the early eighties. Since then, 70-80% of Wang's ideas were adopted or were in the process o f implementation while the 
remaining 20-30% would certainly be put into practice during the nineties {Asia Watch, June 10, 1992: 5). If  we scrutinize Zhao 
Zhiyang's proposal for reforms addressed in the 13th National Congress o f the CCP, we can observe that many ideas of Zhao are 
similar to those of Wang. See Zhao Zhiyang (1987).
'^Early in the eighties, Chen Zhiming held the belief that what China needed was deepening reform. Offering his support to reforms 
in China, Chen hoped that, reform programmes could consolidate the centre's reformist direction and could train a generation of new 
political talent. He also believed that reforms could help liberate people's thinking and it could strengthen the National People's 
Congress system.
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From 1987 onwards, Wang and Chen encouraged other intellectuals to work 
within the existing system.^"
However, their adherence to a more pragmatic approach, especially stressing that 
"intellectuals should combine passion for reform with steady progress, adopting a 
rational, well-intentioned, cautious and responsible attitude", was criticized by other 
intellectuals as "neo-conservative" or "fundamental conservatism".
With a conciliatory attitude toward the CCP, the response of Chen and Wang to 
the student demonstrations of 1989 is note-worthy. Wang and Chen asked the students to 
make national stability their highest priority, and they prevented the people working with 
them from getting directly involved in the movement. They believed that there was an 
acute need for the intellectuals to stand forward and speak in a rational voice in order that 
stability could be maintained, and they encountered the students to get compromise with 
the state instead of engaging in direct confrontation through hunger strike (For details, 
see, Chen Zhiming, 1992: 361-442).
Peng Rongchong
Peng Rongchong, one of the intellectuals was exiled after the June-Fourth 
Incident of 1989, suggests that Chinese intellectuals should establish a close link with the 
people in the civil society in order to realize the goal of intellectual autonomy. 
Comparing the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 with some of the pro-democracy 
movements in Eastern European, Peng observes that Chinese intellectuals have had little 
practical experience in organizing and mobilizing the masses. He also points out that the 
fundamental problem facing the Chinese intellectual community today is their naively 
keeping the literati traditional role of royal remonstrators rather than to adopt critical and 
independent role like that assumed by their counterparts in the West or in Eastern Europe. 
They should take the initiative to establish an independent organization to mobilize 
various social forces in order to gain a better bargaining position in negotiating with the
'^Chen Zhiming, in his statement of defense, stated cleariy that "making full use o f the existing political system, employing, 
digesting and perfecting i t  We opposed the blind pursuit of a new system and the creation o f a completely new structure" and he also 
considered "political order and stability" as significant to the further development of China (Asia Watch, June 10, 1992 : 9).
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State (Peng, 1990: 42-43)/^
Su Wei
The same kind of self-awareness is also revealed from writings of Su Wei, one of 
the intellectuals who signed the petition for the release of Wei Jingsheng and who 
supported the pro-democracy movement in 1989. Su suggests that the fundamental cause 
for the vulnerable position of Chinese intellectuals is their subordination to the state. Su 
points out that Chinese intellectuals must transform themselves in terms of their social 
position and their role perception. Su criticizes those intellectuals who are living in 
mainland China for their greed for political power and reliance on political patrons and 
he condemns their support of Deng Xiaoping’s advocacy for further economic reform 
before the 14th Communist Party Congress, considering such allegiance as blind loyalty. 
Questioning such "loyalty". Su points out the fact that Deng Xiaoping broke party 
regulations*^ and his own promises of "rule by law", "doing things according to 
democratic procedures" and "clearing the way for the younger generation" (Su Wei, 
1993: 32). In response to Deng’s move. Su denounces the saying that "the words of Deng 
Xiaoping are right" supported by mainland Chinese intellectuals and declares that those 
intellectuals have trapped themselves into the same tragic cycle as their predecessors 
during the Mao era. Though Su acknowledges that these intellectuals are constrained by 
their social location under the rule of the CCP, he still regards such submissive acts as 
unnecessarily foolish. He expresses the hope that these intellectuals can find sufficient 
resources to avoid making themselves "tools" of the political establishment. Su adds,
"After the June-Fourth Incident of 1989, there was a period of deeper reflection in the 
Chinese intellectual community: we [the intellectuals in mainland China] began to 
realize that we had made Mao a god' during the Cultural Revolution. Such myth­
making finally caused intense national crises. Despite this experience, we failed to
'^Peng Rongchong (1990) also discusses other blind spots of Chinese intellectuals in conceptualizing democratization in mainland 
China. Peng's reasoning is similar to that of Chen Zhiming and Wang Juntao in the view that intellectuals should strive to maintain 
economic independence in order to retain their intellectual autonomy and to find appropriate points for social intervention. After 
seeing the successful case o f Chen Zhiming and Wang Juntao, this scholar supports the notion that Chinese intellectuals should pay 
more attention to the life o f the civil society and strengthen their professional knowledge to do some more concrete woric for the 
people.
'*Deng is only an ordinary member, supposedly, who has no formal position in the party. However, his words become party policy, 
overriding formal party procedures.
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learn the lesson. We again made Deng a 'god' during the past reform era, which 
inevitably led to the tragedy of the June-Fourth Incident. We are responsible for such 
tragedies." (Su, 1993: 33, my translation)
Anticipating a gloomy future for Chinese intellectuals, Su asks them not to 
sacrifice their dignity and right of life in exchange for a brief period of peace (Su, Ibid). 
He calls on those intellectuals who are in exile to work hard to make far-reaching 
contributions to Chinese culture. Having been influenced by the tradition of the 
dissidents of Eastern Europe whose critical and creative works have great formative 
influences on their mother countries. Su suggests that Chinese "dissidents" who are now 
living abroad should endeavour to expand their knowledge domain, accumulating more 
"cultural capital" to add significant content to Chinese culture.
After important influence on Su was Havel's conception of "good taste" in 
politics,^* Su Wei suggests that Chinese intellectuals aspire to higher goals, which serve 
the whole mankind. Havel's "living for the truth" and "politics of anti-politics" led Su to 
suggest that Chinese intellectuals consider "aesthetics" [good taste] in politics by 
implementing two concepts; first, aesthetics is independent of pragmatism, as truth and 
knowledge are free from pragmatism (Su, 1993a: 2); and second, aesthetics represents 
freedom, because it sustains an internal harmony and order. From this vantage point, 
"good taste" or "aesthetics" and politics are integral. Formulating political ideals 
different from both Oriental despotism and Western utilitarianism, Havel has charted a 
new course for politics which upholds the fundamental goals of mankind and returns 
politics to the most primitive but purest form. Su thinks that only this kind of politics can 
protect the conscientious, honest and humble nature of human beings (Su, 1993a: 3). He 
says real emancipation has to do with the protection of human dignity and individual
‘^Su considers most so-called Chinese dissidents not to be dissident enough. He criticizes Fang Lizhi for regarding his dissidence as 
an individual force while Dai Qing eagerly isolated herself from other dissidents. Su considers such a phenomenon unhealthy, urging 
the whole intellectual community to work together as a unified force to control the hegemony of China. In this context that Su calls 
for rethinking the role of overseas Chinese intellectuals. See Su (1993).
'*Havel is now the ex-president of Czechoslovakia whose political ideology is distinctly different from other Western political 
philosophy. Having been ruled by the former Communist regime, Havel realizes the socialist myth and suggests "good taste" in 
politics by which he means one has to aspire to honesty, humility, wisdom, and responsibility as higher goals in political life. Even 
though Havel's assertion is regarded by some as too idealistic and unrealistic, he persistently maintains his position, striving to put 
these principles into practice. For details, see, for example, Minzhu Zhongguo, (Oct, 1993: 57-58) and Havel's article on "The Power 
of the Powerless" in Keane (1985).
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independence and autonomyT This new concern for the welfare of mankind indicates 
that some of the post-Mao intellectuals have new and different level of critical 
consciousness.
In addition, Su denounces the reliance on support of political patrons and asks 
them to change from "utilitarianism" to "democracy", calling on them to evaluate their 
role and relationship with the state. Having reviewed the role of Chinese intellectuals in 
the twentieth century. Su stresses the need for Chinese intellectuals to be free from any 
group or party interests.^® He anticipates that, if they fail to make themselves 
independent of political conflicts, they will be doomed to endless political purges and 
persecution. Su suggests, "the loss of independent personality of intellectuals, coupled 
with their surrendering of professional knowledge, and rationality and becoming political 
instruments, are contradictory to the logic of modem civilization" (Su, 1993: 34). He 
says that the so-called reformers' adoption of the same strategy as the leftist intellectuals 
in their fight for hegemonic control is undemocratic and foolish (Su, 1993: 35).
Wei Jingsheng
Wei Jingsheng, after fourteen and a half years of imprisonment, was released in 
1993. During an interview, Wei said that he did not regret what he had done during the 
Democracy Wall Movement, proclaiming that he would continue to express his critical 
unchanged political views. He stated openly that he was prepared to be imprisoned 
again, fighting for democracy and human rights in the future. Wei realizes that the 
liberation from what he considers a despotic political system should be a gradual process. 
Wei said,
"democracy should be implemented step by step, the success of democratization merely 
lies with people's consciousness and continuous struggle.... The power of the 
government should be decentralized and returned to the people." (Wei, 1993: 25, my 
translation)
After imprisonment, Wei seems to be more realistic in acknowledging the
'®As we have discussed in chapter 8, Liu Xiaobo is also concerned with such higher goals o f the mankind. 
^°This line of thought is similar to Liu Xiaobo, see (chapter 8).
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difficulties of the on-going struggle to democratize China. He believes that rationality 
and peaceful demonstration are essential to democracy. When asked to comment on 
Deng Xiaoping, Wei says,
"I would support him [Deng] if he does some good and right things even though we 
have some disagreement with each other. If someone does something wrong, I would 
disagree with him even though he is my friend." (Wei, 1993: 27, my translation)
He also asserts that those who fight for democratization of China should adopt 
non-violent means to achieve their ends. Tolerance and cooperation are essential 
elements in resolving conflicts according to Wei. He also claims that when people are 
too suspicious and sceptical about each other, they hinder the development of China 
(Wei, 1993: 27). Wei’s tolerance for the views of others while consistently fighting for 
democracy is indicative of the growing stature of critical intellectuals in the post-Mao 
era.
Heightened Self-Consciousness: Strong Sense of Repentance
It is worth noting that the Sixth Generation of Chinese intellectuals have also 
developed a strong sense of repentance. By repentance we mean that Chinese 
intellectuals have a deeper level of self-evaluation of their role of intellectuals and 
reexamine their relationship with the state. Going beyond such a reflection, some of 
these Sixth Generation even convert themselves into Christianity, believing that the 
fundamental problems of China today have to do with the nature of man.
Many Chinese intellectuals believe that their dependence on political power and 
their insufficient attention to the consolidation of the knowledge base were wrong. The 
case of Liu Xiaobo illustrates the emergence of a deeper level of reflection in relation to 
the role of intellectuals. Liu admitted openly that Chinese intellectuals were responsible 
for causing the Cultural Revolution since they had supported Mao. Unlike the traditional 
literati or the intellectuals during the Mao era, who perceived their role as remonstrators, 
Liu declared that not only intellectuals but also every Chinese person should repent and 
evaluate their role as "royal" supporters. Having grown disillusioned toward the 
authoritarian regime because of the Cultural Revolution, Liu declared that such a despotic
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rule was the result of the people's reliance upon strong leaders instead of asserting their 
independence. His critique is no longer limited to the autocratic system but levelled 
against the national character of the Chinese people. He, therefore, called for the use of 
Western and humanitarian standards to evaluate Chinese culture and politics.
Another Sixth Generation intellectual who calls for national and individual 
repentance is Su Xiaokang, one of the chief authors of Heshang. When he was living in 
China, he felt dissatisfied with the existing out-dated system,and said that it should be 
totally discarded. The purpose of Heshang, accord ing  to Su, was to deal with the strong 
feeling of anxiety which has permeated Chinese society in post-Mao China, especially the 
mentality of crisis which has emerged from the stagnation of the reforms (Chong, 1989- 
90: 52). A closer scrutiny of Heshang reveals that, beyond its treatment of the cultural 
crisis as such, it subtly proclaims the message that the people living in Communist China 
are still ruled by a feudal system shadowed by its "cultural legacy". So, the central theme 
of Heshang is really an attack upon the rule of the Communist Party by using the 
'parable' of cultural crisis. In an open lecture in Leiden, Su Xiaokang explained why 
Heshang did not attempt to examine the political problems, which in fact most of the 
intellectuals had already identified as the most fundamental problem or the root of 
China's existing predicaments. They focused on cultural problems for the fear of the 
CCP.^^ Having fled China after the June Fourth Incident, Su explicitly said that "the 
origin of the stagnation of the reforms is not Chinese culture, but the CCP's one-party 
dictatorship and the socialist system of state-ownership (Chong, 1989-90: 44). Having 
resided overseas for several years. Su has begun to realize that both the critics of Chinese 
tradition and calls for learning from the West were not comprehensive enough. Su 
indulged in self-criticism by admitting that he had failed to grasp a holistic view of the 
West, without which he thus misinterpreted reality and made wrong proposals for
Heshang was a television series, discussing the cultural crisis of China. The authors o f the series criticized not only out-dated 
Chinese tradition but also condemned the existing political system. Denouncing autocratic and feudalistic political-cultural order, the 
authors therefore called on people to open their eyes and to I earn from the West. For details, see, Wan and Bodman (1991).
^^For details of the debate on Heshang, see, for example, Heshang (1989); Wan (1991); see also my unpublished Master’s thesis 
submitted to the Chinese University of Hong Kong (1991), particularly the chapter on cultural crisis.
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modernizing China (Interview 1, Princeton, 1993). Recognizing the fact that there are 
many social problems in the so-called democratic societies in the West, Su admits that his 
former analysis was one-sided. He told me during an interview that:
"I merely believed that to learn from the Western model would be a breakthrough for 
China when I was in mainland China. Over-romanticizing the West inevitably led me 
to a misconception. For this reason, I had wrongly analyzed the Chinese reality, over­
generalizing the goodness of West and therefore made wrong suggestions. Having 
direct and personal experiences living in the United states, I begin to realize that my 
criticism of Chinese tradition was not totally right." (Interview 1, Princeton, 1993).
To put his position a step further, Su states clearly that the Sixth Generation of 
Chinese intellectuals are different from the earlier generations in terms of their analytic 
framework. Su suggests that most of the older generations of intellectuals such as Liu 
Binyan still maintain a marxist position whereas the sixth generation of intellectuals have 
abandoned Marxism in favour of a widened social reality (Interview 1, Princeton, 
1993).^  ^ Criticizing those intellectuals who have been eagerly playing the integral roles 
as remonstrators for the state. Su also condemns those intellectuals who have tried to 
attach themselves to the masses. Su points out sharply that without a distinguished social 
location of Chinese intellectuals, the intellectual autonomy and professional 
independence will certainly be limited. He plainly states that intellectuals cannot 
represent other people but only themselves. Therefore, Su urges Chinese intellectuals to 
develop themselves as a distinct social stratum by means of accumulation of knowledge. 
He also believes that only when intellectuals respect knowledge do they begin to 
consolidate their base of autonomy. Most important of all. Su suggests a fundamental 
change in intellectuals' mode of thinking, calling them to develop new perspectives in 
order that they no longer fall into the orthodox marxist approach. He cites Fang Lizhi as 
an example of intellectual independence because Fang's professional knowledge protects 
his intellectual autonomy to a certain extent. In view of this. Su willingly commits 
himself to research and academic work and aspires to a higher level of intellectual 
autonomy. He does not believe, however, that intellectuals should involve themselves
“ This line o f thought is also supported by Liu Binyan as he himself pins hope on the sixth generation of Chinese intellectuals (Liu, 
1990a).
322
either in the struggle for political power or aspire to political office. Considering the 
Chinese intellectual tradition already outdated, Su asks intellectuals to forsake the role as 
mouthpiece and social conscience of the people. Like Liu Xiaobo, Su believes that 
intellectuals should speak for what they really know, the specialized knowledge that they 
possess (Interview 1, Princeton, 1993).
Having a guilt-feeling for their wrongdoing in the past, some of the Sixth 
Generation of Chinese intellectuals believe openly that the fundamental problem which 
the Chinese intellectuals face is the very nature of man that it is man's sinful nature which 
contributes to the past and existing problems of China. Some of them have come to the 
conclusion that that there is a strong relationship between democracy and faith in 
Christianity. Yuan Zhiming, one of the authors of the TV series Heshang, criticized 
Chinese authoritarian politics and spoke of intense cultural crisis. Now that he has lived 
in the United States and has been exposed to the reality of the West, Yuan admits that 
Heshang is only a broken dream. His romanticized notions of the West have been 
shattered by his exposure in the United States to such problems as crime, suicide, 
alienation and immorality, causing him not only to think about the crisis of this world but 
also to ponder the actual meaning of life. Once he got to know a group of Christians in 
Princeton, Yuan was very impressed by their genuine and enthusiastic attitude toward 
life. Thereafter he began to read the Bible and finally converted to Christianity.
Yuan once attended the President's morning prayer in the United States and 
observed different members of two parties joined together in prayer for their country. 
Deeply moved by this occasion. Yuan was amazed that these people with divergent 
political stands could join in praying and worshipping God together. Yuan reiterated the
words of the Vice-President, saying:
"Authoritarianism and disorder of this world have their roots in the corruption of our 
spiritual hfe; that is, people are unwilling to admit their limitations and their sins. We 
can easily find that authoritarian regimes are founded on the trust of any political leader, 
ideology or party." (Yuan, 1992: 41, my translation)
Having heard this speech. Yuan began to correlate the fundamental problem of
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despotic rule with the arrogant nature of man. Thereafter, Yuan turned limited in 
wisdom, life expectancy and morality toward Christianity. Yuan says,
"the root of authoritarianism which has to do with the ignorance and the sinful nature of 
mankind, lies in the spiritual dimension; admission of the sinful nature and limitation of 
man is the origin of democracy." (Ibid)
Having such an experience. Yuan reflected deeply the case of China and declared,
"It is my first time to see clearly that the essence of democracy closely related to 
repentance toward God." (Ibid)
Yuan realized that there is a question that we must deal with; "where is the 
ultimate source of authority?" In that connection Yuan recalled a chat with a pastor who 
serves in the Congress of the United States. The pastor told Yuan that when he had 
visited China in the 40's, he met a girl on a boat who asked him to sing her a song. In
response to her request, this pastor sang her a hymn praising the Lord. Thereafter, the
pastor asked the girl to sing him a song in return; however, the girl, nodded her head and 
said that she had no song to sing at all. This incident had marked him deeply. This 
pastor told Yuan that,
"The freedom enjoyed by the citizens of the United States is derived from God. God's
presence in the hearts of the people safeguards their freedom." (Yuan, 1992: 41)
This pastor continued to say that,
"Our 'Declaration of Independence' and the 'Constitution' guarantee the human rights of 
the people including the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness because we 
believe that all these rights are derived from God. The rights of people are not given by 
the government. Therefore, the government has no authority to intrude upon people's 
rights. If our rights are infringed, we can rise up to fight against it and even change the 
government." (Yuan, 1992: 41-42)
The chat with this pastor made Yuan further recognize the essence of democracy. 
Christian faith has laid the foundation for democracy, human rights and equality in this 
world. Yuan thus realizes two sides of human nature. On the one hand, the essence of 
human nature is good since he is created according to the image of God; on the other 
hand, man is sinful because man is not immune from the origin of sin (Yuan, Ibid). Such 
a reflection corresponds to what Chang Hao's (1989) suggestion, that the sinful nature of 
man has made the institutionalization of democracy necessary. Yuan also compares
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Chinese culture with Christian thought, suggesting that equality and genuine love are 
stressed in Christian belief whereas the traditional Chinese thought has emphasized 
hierarchial love and ranks. According to Yuan, it is such a traditional cultural mentality 
which makes China a despotic state. Yuan maintained,
"If there is no faith in Christianity as the foundation of Chinese democracy, the leader of 
the pro-democracy movement may one day become a dictator." (Yuan, 1992: 43)
The genuine belief in Christianity and a real reconciliation of the relationship with
the eternal God, according to Yuan, is fundamental to guarantee the implementation of
democracy. He criticizes people for their selfishness despite their noble and righteous
slogans. The fundamental problem of this, as Yuan suggested, is that these people have
not reflected upon themselves, especially their relationship with God. Yuan also believes
democracy is not merely a system nor an ideology but a deep structure of faith (for
details, see. Yuan, 1993). Yuan concluded his speech in the President's morning prayer
by saying "the distance which Chinese people are away from God is the distance which
democratization must travel to be actualized in China" (Yuan, 1992: 43).^ *^
Like Yuan Zhiming, Yan Jiaqi also maintained that people should answer the call
of conscience, which is a response to the call of God. Even though Yan said that he had
no religion, he believed there must be a God external to this world. Adopting "this
world" view, Yan chose to work according to the call from his conscience (Yan, 1990).^^
It is my opinion that the idea of "conscience" is similar to the interpretation of "spirit" in
Christian thought. Though not all Chinese intellectuals openly declare that they have
converted to Christianity as Yuan Zhiming did, these intellectuals have somehow trusted
^^When discussing the relationship between Christianity and democracy, Su Xiaokang told me that many Chinese intellectuals who 
are now in exile in the United States have converted to Christianity. He also commented on Yuan Zhiming's ideas about the tie 
between democracy and Christian thought, seeing Yuan's conversion to Christianity merely as a function of his immediate need for a 
god to fill his ideological void. Su added that Yuan's switch from supporting democracy to neo-authoritarianism and later to Christian 
faith indicated his deeper psychological need for one who is superior to him who is able to maintain the social and political order. Su 
also said to me that Yuan's original family in mainland China had had some contact with Christianity which made it was easier for him 
to adopt Christian thought For details, see (Interview 1, 1993, New York; Yuan, 1992).
^^Yan's attitude is similar to the attitude of Confucius who also believed there is a God around. However, Confucius concentrated 
the need on solving the immediate problems in this world rather than dealing with the spiritual matters in the other world. For details, 
see, for example, Fung (1948); Schurmann and Schell (1967).
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that there is a God external to them/^ And the sins of which they must repent are against 
this God as much as they are against people.
Zhou Dauo (1993), in his article "In Defence of Religion", suggests that many 
Chinese intellectuals have rejected religion without serious thinking or analysis. Having 
been exposed to the Christian faith, Zhou began to appreciate the essence of Christianity 
because of its emphasis on genuine love toward one another. Zhou points out the fact 
that many Chinese intellectuals have become devout Christians while studying abroad.^^ 
However, these believers are attacked and criticized by other Chinese intellectuals who 
are non-believers. Seeing this, Zhou attempted to write a defense of religion because he 
thinks that those non-believers may have misconceptions of religion.^* According to 
Zhou, Chinese people have confused religious faith with superstition. In order to 
differentiate them clearly, Zhou suggests that people should look for the substantive part 
of religion rather than the rituals which are practised. Zhou admits that he had rejected 
religion when he was in China, seeing it as the opium of the people. Having got the 
chance to attend a Christmas service in the United States, Zhou was greatly impressed by 
the spiritual atmosphere under which all people bowed down before God. After the 
service, one question crowded his mind. "Why are the general public and even the top 
class intellectuals in the West still devout believers of Christianity?"^^ This experience 
forced Zhou to look carefully at religion.
Zhou thereafter looks into the theology of Christianity and supports the view that 
sin is inherent in human nature. He points out that the predicaments which people are 
confronting today are related to their arrogance and disobedience. Zhou cites David
^*In my interview with Liu Binyan, Fang Lizhi and Su Wei, they also support the essence of Christianity, see it as good for human 
nature. However, when asked whether they would convert to Christianity, they said they respected such a religion but did not practice 
i t  In their minds, Christianity is good, especially to help correct the notion of extreme individualism.
^ I^n interviewing Su Xiaokang, he told me that an American missionary reported that the estimated number o f  Christians in mainland 
China was about 70 million in 1993 (Interview 1, Princeton, 1993).
^^When Zhou calls religion here, he refers to Christianity only since he just discusses the Christian faith in his article.
^^This question is similar to that of Yuan Zhiming. Fang Lizhi, too, had a similar question when he attended a Christian service 
abroad and saw many well-educated people, even scientists, worshipping God together. After this occasion, he wrote an article titled 
"After praising the Lord" to express his feeling, see Fang (1988).
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Ehrenfeld's work "The Arrogance of Humanism" in describing human beings' attempts to 
assert independence from God, believing themselves to be as powerful as God. After 
reading this book, Zhou repented and began to feel guilty for what he had done in the 
past. Having been influenced by Christian thought, Zhou reevaluated Karl Marx's ideas 
and suggested that Marx was arrogant since he made himself a god. He also contends 
that the central problem of Marx is the assertion of the unlimited strength of man and the 
condemnation of God. Denouncing Marxism, Zhou points out that it is anti-democratic 
and anti-humanistic, claiming what Marx created was a bad religion. Zhou suggests that 
the "party culture" shaped by Marxism has caused the people to disregard regulation, 
become dishonest and irresponsible. He also says that Chinese people have little sense of 
aesthetics, being uneducated and uncivilized (Xinwenziyou Daobao, 22 Jan, 1993). 
Having been influenced by such a "party culture", the Chinese people have become 
nihilist in terms of having no baseline for morality, no regulation in playing political 
games, and no distinction of right or wrong (Ibid).
Because Zhou believes that a plurality of ideas must be allowed in modem 
society, he condemns Marxism for obstructing freedom of thought. Zhou says that he 
accepts religion on the condition that it does not contradict the principles of democracy, 
freedom and humanistic goals. He is looking forward to a better world in which the 
ultimate value of mankind can be realized. Zhou is greatly impressed by the Christian 
faith since its particular doctrine is to love one another by contrast with Marxism which 
rests on hatred. Without love but hatred, dictatorship is inevitable. In order to actualize 
the essence of democracy, Zhou asks people to repent and think deeply about the essence 
of religion. Along with his support of the doctrine of love in Christianity, Zhou also 
suggests that church as a social organization through which intimate relationships can be 
developed is what China needs because such a force not only unites people together but 
also strengthens the civil society. Zhou also compares Confucian thought with Christian 
thought, arguing that the limitation of Confucianism is its emphasis on reciprocity in 
human relationship and hierarchical love. Adhering to Christianity's love regardless of
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people's background and status, Zhou supports the view that,
"The essence of Christianity is the will to love which is derived from God. Christianity 
stresses a self-sacrificing love. If love is self-centred, it is not a real love since one can 
choose whether to love or not. A God-centred love is the most absolute and purest kind 
of love". (Wang, cited in Zhou, 1993: 49, my translation)
The Sixth Generation intellectuals discussed above believe that there is a close 
relationship between Western liberalism and the Christian civilization. But China must 
not adopt an instrumental view, treating religious faith only as an immediate solution to 
their deep-seated emotional crisis while ignoring the cultural foundation of religious 
practice. Su Xiaokang maintains that China has to leam the cultural foundation of 
Christianity (Interview 1, Princeton, 1993). Moreover, the uniqueness of these Sixth 
Generation intellectuals, as compared with the traditional literati and intellectuals in the 
Mao era, lies in their awareness of the need for repentance and their assertion of human 
r i g h t s . T h e y  realize that human dignity, autonomy and nobility should not be restricted 
by political power but are in-bom. In spite of their deeper level of reflection and strong 
sense of repentance, we must not over-generalize that all the Six Generation of Chinese 
intellectuals have converted to Christianity. The previous discussion indicates that only 
some of these intellectuals have become Christians but many others have not committed 
themselves into such a religion. Although some of them like Su Xiaokang and Fang 
Lizhi who support the belief of Christianity, they declare that they are not the believers 
(Interview 1, Princeton, 1993 and Interview 3, Arizona, 1993). Again, the differences 
among these intellectuals reveal the fact that even though they share similar features and 
live against a similar socio-political context, individual intellectuals still have autonomy 
to choose different approaches or strategies in response to their "historical situations". It 
is at this point we can see the tension between individual strategizing and external 
constraints. Acknowledging that ideological formation is structurally and historically
^°Even though most Chinese intellectuals have a general agreement that Christianity has laid a good foundation for Western 
democracy, not all of them have converted themselves to Christianity. In my interviews with these intellectuals, many o f them said 
that they respected the faith of Christianity but neither did they believe nor convict to Christianity. Thus we cannot simply posit that 
many Chinese intellectuals have become Christians. Rather, some of them have been aware o f different cultural foundation which has 
significant formative influence on democratization.
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bound, we must also realize the fact that people can react differently to their 
environments.
Despite the fact that the Sixth Generation intellectuals have developed a new 
consciousness which is prerequisite to the development of the New Class, there remain 
some important questions. (1) Have the intellectuals retained the unique ruling position 
formerly enjoyed by their forerunners, the literati? (2) Is the growth in critique and 
dissidence sufficient to argue that the post-Mao intellectuals have emerged as another 
type of intellectuals? (3) Have they diverged from the traditional mantle of moralist- 
bearers? (4) Do these intellectuals have aspirations to seize political power? (5) Have 
they possessed a new socio-economic position to dominate politics?
SOCIO-ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE SIXTH GENERATION
Also like the literati, the Sixth Generation lack economic independence makes and 
must continue to rely on political patrons. Chen Yizhi explained to me that Chinese 
intellectuals are not independent enough, and they have never been a distinctly 
autonomous social class but have always functioned as appendages to the ruling class. 
Being part of the state apparatus, their fate is therefore determined by whoever is in 
power (Interview 2, Princeton, 1993).
Different from the mentality of both the independent intellectuals and those who 
follow the literati tradition, a new intellectual mentality has emerged in the post-Mao era, 
typified by a New Docility Dissecting, w h i c h  characterized the intellectuals as so 
frightened by the repression and oppression of the government that they have lost their 
courage to criticize maladministration or point out social injustice. They prefer to lead a 
silent life, with abundant subsistence and peaceful environment, by avoiding what many 
believe to be the essence of intellectual critique. Instead of serving either in the 
traditional role of royal remonstrator, or the critical role of the New Class, these
‘^This idea is adapted from a common saying about those Chinese people who sacrificed their dignity and autonomy by serving the 
Japanese in order to lead a better life under the repressive rule of Japan during its invasion in the Second World War. For details, see 
Minzhu Zhongguo (Feb. 1992).
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intellectuals are satisfied with gaining political benefits through patron-client networks 
(see Su Wei, 1993 & 1993a and Wu Jian, 1993). Such 'instrumentalism’ characterizes 
those intellectuals who have forsaken noble deeds and critical outlook to protect their 
own interests while these characteristics are not true of all intellectuals, they do depict a 
recent development in the habitat of the mainland Chinese intellectuals, a conclusion 
verified by some intellectuals’ continual support of Deng’s reforms. These servile 
intellectuals who ride over the "wind” attacking the opposing group of intellectuals have 
demonstrated clearly the "unchanged" mentality of class contradiction deeply-seated in 
them (see. The Nineties, Sep. & Oct., 1992; Minzhu Zhongguo, Fed. & April., 1993). 
Wang Runsheng and Zhang Lun (two young intellectuals and active participants of the 
1989 pro-democracy movement who are in exile in Paris) criticize those post-Mao 
intellectuals who have lost courage and boldness, having neither a critical stand nor 
altruistic mentality as inherited from the traditional literati (Zhengming, May, 1990). 
Such observations have revealed again the influence of inhabitus on intellectuals’ 
conceptualization of the social world. Though they are conscious of developing new 
ideas, they are not totally immune to the impact of their cultural tradition. Cheek (1992) 
suggested that some of the intellectuals, even after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, still 
hoped to renew their social contract with the state. Through their faithful service to the 
state these intellectuals who are neither dissidents nor literati hope to improve their 
livelihoods or get the chance to study abroad.
UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS OF CHINESE INTELLIGENTSIA
(1) Sixth Generation Intellectuals and the Literati
We believe the relaxed socio-political and socio-cultural contexts in China since 
the late 1970s have created a pre-condition for liberating intellectuals from repression, 
but it does not necessarily mean that they are free from all kinds of constraints. On the 
contrary, those intellectuals who are more critical constitute a small segment of the whole 
intelligentsia in China. The foregoing discussion has indicated that intellectual radicalism
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is greatly constrained by the intellectuals' social location, and their access to different 
social-economic-political opportunities.
The present study has concentrated on the analysis of these intellectuals who have 
been the activists in the pro-democracy movement and whose critique and dissidence 
have received much attention because of their prominence. The media's focus on their 
dissident nature seems to project the emergence of a new class of Chinese intellectuals. 
However, upon closer scrutiny of their particular socio-political context, we may discover 
that intellectuals are not really socially independent because of their restrictive social and 
economic conditions. Nowadays, most of the intellectuals discussed above are in exile 
either in the United States or in Paris where they have freedom of speech and freedom of 
expression. As important as freedom from constraints and restrictions is freedom from 
deprivation; and the intellectuals in exile are supported by good jobs or by donations 
from overseas Chinese and American people. Fang Lizhi is employed by the University 
of Arizona. Su Xiaokang, Su Wei and Liu Binyan are current members of the China 
Institute attached to the University of Princeton. Chen Yizhi, the president of the Centre 
for Modem China, is also supported financially by funds raised in the United States. Yan 
Jiaqi is now residing in Paris and also receiving financial support from the French 
government in the form of a scholarship. Thus it appears that only those intellectuals 
who have acquired the "liberation" of exile have become free enough and bold enough to 
be really critical.^^
In contrast, those intellectuals who remain in mainland China are confronted with 
a moral dilemma associated with supporting the party line because they have to weigh 
professional autonomy against life security in every decision. One may ask why Chinese 
intellectuals still engage in "a dangerous game of cooperation".^^ The answer to this 
question may be found not only in examining their unique social locations but also in
^^This line of reasoning supports Fang Lizhi's contention that the critical dissidence of intellectuals in mainland China are 
determined by their particular social locations. It also explains the pragmatic approach adopted by Wang Juntao and Chen Zhiming in 
dealing with the state.
^^This question was raised by Ma (1993) in his recent article.
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realizing the traditional sense of mission in most Chinese intellectuals who continue to 
assume roles as standard-bearers of morality, critics of the authorities, and spokesmen 
and protectors of the public (see chapter 4). Our fore-going case studies again confirm 
that these post-Mao intellectuals have inherited the tradition of the literati, perceiving 
themselves as the mouthpieces of the people. Israel (1986) makes it succinctly clear,
"the Party recruits intellectuals, seeking to control them, broaden its own base, and 
restore weakened legitimacy. Intellectuals play a still risky game by entering the Party, 
hoping to advance their own interests and to transform the establishment from within." 
(Israel, 1986: xii)
Chen Yizhi, one of the former members of Zhao Zhiyang's think tank, comments
that:
"Chinese intellectuals have a strong sense of mission, assuming that they have to take 
care of other walks of life. Having such internalized value, intellectuals have tended to 
seek immediate solutions for the problems which they are confronting." (Interview 2, 
1993, New York)
No matter how critical Chen Zhiming and Wang Juntao are, they still maintain 
that intellectuals have the responsibility to serve the public '^* and to transform the state. 
Thus Chinese intellectuals have engaged themselves in cooperation with the state 
regardless the danger associated with such a game.
(2) Diversification and New Class Development
One hurdle for uniting Chinese intellectuals as a New Class is the diversification 
among them. They are a heterogeneous group with different generations, different 
educational backgrounds, different personalities, and different political orientations. 
Compounding the situation, the CCP's has practised a 'divide-and-rule' policy of 
deferential treatment towards the intellectuals of the natural sciences and technical fields. 
As Rai points out, "the Chinese state in its turn, while willing to give enough space to the 
technical intelligentsia, denied the same right to the critical social science intellectuals" 
(Rai, 1991:127).^^ In chapter 4 ,1 pointed out the fact the CCP has regarded intellectuals
^^Chen Zhiming states succinctly in his statement of defense that "the intellectuals should not be envious of their superiors and 
should not flatter the masses, but should woik hard to make themselves into the bridge between the government and the people" (Asia 
Watch, June 10, 1992: 9).
^^For other related discussion, see White III with C. Li (1990) and Zhou Fangniang (1989).
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as appendages to the working class rather than as a well-defined class. The Party intends 
only to make use of the intellectuals in support of their modernization programme in an 
effort to consolidate its legitimacy. Pye has observed that the ruling class of socialist 
China has denied "government and influence to members of the educated classes" as a 
common feature of their "aggressive treatment of intellectuals" (1968). Deng's 
pragmatism made it possible for him to exploit the skills of educated people while and at 
the same time excluding their values. According to Kenneth Jowitt's notion of 
development/^ China has entered the inclusion phase "marked by the methodical 
consideration and management of tasks" instead of "controlled or elite-directed 
disruption", requiring the involvement of intellectuals to help with modernization. 
However, the success of such inclusion depends greatly on whether the ruling elite is 
willing "to expand membership in the regime in a way that allows politically co-opted 
social elites or activists to maintain their social-occupational identity" (Jowitt, 1975: 69). 
The Communist government of China has found a way to use intellectuals as tools 
without giving them corresponding status in society by keeping them divided against each 
other. It seems evident, then, that we must answer the second question by saying that the 
growth in dissidence has not been sufficient to warrant the conclusion that a New Class of 
intellectuals has emerged.
The Party's cadre system places further constraints on intellectuals as they are 
working within the establishment. There are basically two kinds of cadre: Party and non- 
Party. In Communist China, most cadres are constrained by the Party organization 
regardless of whether they are Party or non-Party members. As Pye suggested, "under no 
condition would a cadre question policies or discount the goals of the revolution" (Pye, 
1984: 184). In fact, he is expected to work with endless vigour and complete self- 
sacrifice for the goals of the revolution. Pye says that a cadre is supposedly a 
professional revolutionary working "for promotion and is aware that he is part of a
According to Jowitt (1975), there are three stages of development in Leninist regimes, namely, transformation o f the old society, 
consolidation o f the revolutionary regime, and inclusion.
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system that recognizes seniority and provides a career ladder" (Pye, 1984: 185). In this 
sense, cadres are perfect "organization men". Because most of the intellectuals are party 
members, they are therefore restricted by the party. The dependent nature of the 
intellectuals is similar to what Szelenyi describes in the case of East European 
intellectuals, "not every member belongs to the ruling elite; not even every intellectual 
who belongs to the party can belong to the state. But it is clear that no one can be a 
member of the elite who is not both a party member and an intellectual" (Szelenyi, 1979: 
191).
Recent research has shown that, even though the more Chinese intellectuals 
occupy, higher posts and are more influential, they are not free from control by the state 
(Huang Ping, 1991). In their eyes, the total rejection of the socialist system may result in 
a total disintegration of socio-cultural and socio-political order. Most of the intellectuals 
therefore still adhere to the Marxist path, hoping to transform the socialist system from 
within. Such a belief may have contributed to the intellectuals' support of Deng 
Xiaoping's reform during the 14th CCP Congress. In Cheek's words, "one goal these 
different groups of intellectuals shared: to revise the deal between intellectuals and the 
state, not to reject it" (Cheek, 1992: 129).
The concurrent development of an independent research institute "outside state 
control" (Goldman, 1991: 16) by Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming is insufficient evidence 
to assert that a "popular consciousness" is widely shared by the intellectual community. 
Chamberlain (1993) notes that,
"intellectuals' vision of civil society, in other words, is not so much 'counterstructure' as 
it is alternate structure' - a way of organizing and staffing the state apparatus 
differently, rather than challenging it altogether." (Chamberlain, 1993: 203)
(3) Sixth Generation Intellectuals and Moralist Bearing
The Twentieth Century Chinese intellectuals have been compared with the 
traditional literati in many other parts of this study. Such a comparison is made in this 
chapter under the section entitled Sixth Generation Intellectuals and the Literati. Further 
comparisons of the roles of modem intellectuals and the literati can be formed in the
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section entitled Sixth Generation Intellectuals and Political Aspirations in this chapter. It 
is clear that those who are truly dissident have been forced into exile, but some remain to 
work as insiders to transform the political system. However, it appears that the vast 
majority of Sixth Generation intellectuals have forsaken both the literati and the dissident 
roles to pursue their self-interest in relative safety and comfort. Thus the answer to the 
third question appears to be yes, the modem intellectuals have diverged from the 
traditional expectations for intellectuals.
(4) Sixth Generation Intellectuals and Political Aspirations
In this research, I have observed that the "dissident" tradition of Chinese 
intellectuals is unlike that of their Russian and Eastern European counterparts. The 
mental framework of the Russian intelligentsia has been shaped since Peter the Great by 
official encouragement to leam from Westem Europe. Peter the Great introduced secular 
education into Russia, sending young men abroad to leam military, naval and industrial 
skills. Under Elizabeth and Catherine II, Westem teaming was supported, and French 
social graces became popular at the Russian court. With the growing popularity of 
Westem teaming in St. Peterburg and Moscow, there was also a spread of Westem 
radicalism among Russian pupils by the end of the 18th Century (Seton-Watson, 1960).
The Russian intellectuals soon became aware that higher education would not 
necessarily improve their social position particularly when the political opportunity 
structure remained unchanged. The "free professions" which grew as a result of more 
opportunities for education found themselves isolated not only from the mling class but 
also from the masses. And "if he [the intellectual] was himself of plebeian origin, he was 
more painfully aware of the contrast than if he was a son of the nobility" (Seton-Watson, 
1960: 43). Accordingly, the Russian intelligentsia, oppositional by its nature, has 
developed a critical and dissident tradition which distinguishes them from other classes.^^ 
Aware of their limitations and potential, the Russian intellectuals determined to assert
^^For details of Russian intelligentsia, see, for example, Seton-Watson (I960); Shatz (1980); Cohen (1982); Pipes (1961, 1982); 
Lip set & Dobson (1973).
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themselves through dissidence and through revolutionary activity.
Unlike the Russian intelligentsia, Chinese intellectuals have not been encouraged 
from the "top" to transform themselves into a critical class. In all of Chinese history, 
intellectuals have always functioned under political constraints. The literati class formed 
over a long period of time growing out of a general education for laymen. It was not a 
hereditary or exclusive group, for entry to it was by public competitive examination 
(Weber, 1951). Lin Tongji, a sinologist in Taiwan, points out the fact that the literati 
(Shi) originally was a group of people of noble rank who possessed special skills and 
techniques in fighting and held high military rank {Wushi). With the collapse of the 
ancient feudal system and national unification in the Qin dynasty, the Shi lost their 
privileged position and became either appendages to the ruling class or scholars engaged 
in teaching students (Lin, 1987). Thus the literati have long been a dependent group.^®
Under the reign of the CCP, the intellectuals have been treated as "tools". Being 
seen as appendages to the working class, the social position of intellectuals was further 
lowered. Without any initiative to improve intellectuals’ social position from the top, it 
has been difficult for Chinese intellectuals to reform themselves especially when they are 
reliant on the party establishment. In addition, unlike the Russian intelligentsia, Chinese 
intellectuals have never been familiar with Christian theology emphasizing human dignity 
and freedom. As I presented in the preceding part, some of the Sixth Generation 
intellectuals have called for repentance because of their guilt feelings for what they did 
during the Cultural Revolution. This phenomenon is similar to that of the former Soviet 
intelligentsia during the period of de-Stalinization in the reign of Khrushchev (Shatz, 
1982). The recent reflection among Chinese intellectuals hints that a small segment of 
Chinese intelligentsia has become really critical and dissident. It is a sign of a small but 
growing group of critical intelligentsia in the post-Mao era. There is still a long way to
^^The literati did have tremendous power under the emperors who delegated the implementation of policies to these bureaucrats. In 
addition, the emperors normally maintained a good relationship with the literati for the reason that the literati had been their close 
advisors and even teachers when they were young. With the exception of the Yuan and Ming dynasties, such a relationship between 
the state and the literati was maintained (Tu, 1991). In Yuan and Ming dynasties, the ruling strata were suspicious o f the literati. 
Therefore, the literati were purged and harshly treated. For details, see Tu (1991); Yu (1987) and Wang (1966).
336
go for the real transformation of Chinese intelligentsia.
Unlike their former Soviet and Eastern European counterparts, the Chinese 
"dissident" intellectuals were driven from their homeland. The "exile" has freed them 
from the constraints imposed by the Communist state and therefore they become much 
more critical outside China.^’ This observation echoes the view that intellectual 
radicalism is greatly influenced by the context where intellectuals live. As Swingewood 
(1987) suggested, the root of the conservative English culture and the lack of an 
autonomous intelligentsia in Britain lies in the particular historical and social context to 
which English intellectuals belong. Historically, the English intelligentsia formed a 
small, compact group which had close ties of occupation, education, and family. The 
peculiarities of English society and culture have constrained the emergence of a classic 
intelligentsia. In addition, professional associations, together with the market, condition 
not only intellectual occupations but also the supply of intellectuals.'*® Without 
independent socio-economic position, it thus constraints their rise to a ruling class.'** The 
constraints that they are facing not only limit their socio-economic base but also 
discourage their aspirations to seize political power.
(5) Sixth Generation's Economic Dependence
This topic has been discussed extensively in other parts of this study, including 
the section on Socio-Economic Position of the Sixth Generation in this chapter. It is
Hirschtnan (1970) suggested, people will adopt different strategies according to changing social and political contexts. Once 
when the constraints were lessened, people might prefer to "exit" and thus they would withdraw their "loyalty" and became more 
critical and bold enough to "voice" out their grievances. Ma Shu-yun (1993) and Lee Wei-chin (1992) also adopt Hirschman's 
framework to discuss the exiled Chinese intellectuals which deserves attention.
‘*®Wilford (1993) also argues along the same lines that the New York intellectuals in the late 1940's were not immune from the 
constraints of their particular context. The social location, economic and political opportunities to which they had access also 
restricted their intellectual activities. The economic conditions of the 1930's, combined with the contagion of professionalization, and 
the assimilationist pressure exerted by the dominant ethnic culture on an ethnic minority, greatly restricted the autonomous activities 
o f these New York intellectuals. It is against such background that the New York intellectuals were institutionalized.
^‘Some Chinese intellectuals maintain that even though Chinese intellectuals have succeeded in improving their economic position 
by means of doing business (Jumping to the sea), they are still far from being socially independent Su Xiaokang believes that 
whenever intellectuals engage in doing business, they are no longer intellectuals as such but become businessmen. One scholarly of 
Beijing University has a similar opinion that intellectuals should be conscious of their role especially when they are engaging in doing 
business. He points out the fact that it is a danger for intellectuals to surrender their ideals and creation to make their work more 
popular and acceptable to the people. Such a commercialization of intellectual work undermines not only intellectuals' autonomy but 
also devalues the work o f intellectuals. In this light, intellectuals in mainland China are really in the cross-road, choosing between 
economic betterment or retaining professional autonomy. For details, see, (Interview 1, 1993, Princeton; Chinese Social Sciences 
Quarterly, Feb 15, 1993).
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sufficient here to say that the fifth question must be answered in the negative; the 
intellectuals do not possess the socio-economic resources to dominate the Chinese 
political system.
CONCLUSION
The fore-going discussion provides more light on the formation of discursive 
practices among Chinese intellectuals as they are influenced by political and social 
constraints. Some scholarly works suggest the Chinese intellectuals have established 
three distinctly different kinds of relationships with the state. First, there are the 
"establishment intellectuals" who are still working within the establishment as part of the 
state apparatus. Second, some intellectuals have become "non-establishemnt 
intellectuals" who try to develop an independent force in the civil society not only to 
enhance their social status but also to become a strong force for social change. Although 
these intellectuals have no intention of overthrowing the present regime, they are eager to 
change the practices of the present state. The third group of Chinese intellectuals are 
"anti-establishment" intellectuals. It is note-worthy that some of these intellectuals like 
Liu Binyan, Fang Lizhi and Yan Jiaqi were originally establishment intellectuals who 
tried to transform the state from within, they shifted their role from establishment 
intellectuals to anti-establishment intellectuals when these efforts failed."*^  
Notwithstanding some insights can be drawn from such a classification, these categories 
are far from satisfactory. When classifying Chinese intellectuals in terms of these 
categories, one probably encounters the difficulty in locating Chinese intellectuals 
especially they are so diverse as a group. From this point of departure, we must be 
cautious in employing such categories in locating Chinese intellectuals. Our previous 
discussion has further indicated that even though intellectuals are of the Sixth Generation, 
they adopt diverse strategies or approaches in response to their socio-historical situations. 
With different interpretations of the social reality, together with varied socio-political
^^For details o f such a classification of Chinese intellectuals, see, for example. Cheek (1986) and Huang Ping (1993).
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opportunities, these intellectuals behave and react differently. Thus, we conclude that, 
though intellectuals are greatly influenced by their unique social location and the political 
opportunity structure that they face, their individual response to these forces belies the 
assertion that the forces are omnipotent or inexorable. Social and political influences are 
extremely important in determining the thought processes of intellectuals, but they are 
not all-important. Such findings indicate that ideological production of intellectuals is a 
complicated process which is determined in part by socio-cultural and socio-political 
influences.
This chapter set out to examine the Sixth Generation intellectuals of China in light 
of Szelenyi's three major dimensions of class formation. The evidence indicates, first, 
that although some such intellectuals are able and willing to occupy the New Class, the 
majority certainly do not meet this criteria. Second, while those intellectuals who are in 
exile may possess the economic resources to become independent, they do not have the 
socio-political influence to effect social change; and those who remain in China have no 
financial resources whether or not they have any socio-political opportunities. Third, we 
discovered that three distinctly different ways of viewing reality have emerged, 
influenced largely by social location and political opportunity structure. So it is safe to 
conclude that Chinese intellectuals have failed to fulfil all Szelenyi's dimensions for 
forming a New Class.
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CONCLUSION
The first task of the conclusion will be to remind the reader of the limitations of this 
study. Second, we shall discuss both the extent to which these research hypotheses may be 
validated and the answer to some questions posed at the beginning of this study. Finally, I shall 
suggest some areas for further study arising from or depending upon the current study. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Because of the vast number of intellectuals living and working in China, this study was 
consciously and purposefully limited to a select few dissident intellectuals. It was precisely 
because these intellectuals were outspoken and had gained some notoriety that they were chosen. 
For this same reason, we may presume that they are not representative of the whole. They stand 
out from among their compatriots. At the same time, it may be argued that these selected 
individuals might represent far more of the intellectuals than one might expect. Given the same 
set of environmental factors, including especially social and political opportunity, other 
intellectuals might have acted in the same way as those who were selected for this study.
This study has suggested that Chinese intellectuals have become more critical and more 
sensitive to the need for developing a new relationship with the state to provide greater autonomy 
for intellectuals. It is clear that this observation cannot be generalized to include all Chinese 
intellectuals. Nor can we conclude that the intellectuals have developed into a newly emerged 
autonomous and unified group or a New Class because they remain a widely diverse group. But 
our discussion has pointed out clearly that socio-political context in general and social location in 
particular have affected the ideological formation of certain intellectuals. While the selected case 
studies cannot represent all Chinese intellectuals, they do demonstrate how these intellectuals have 
reacted to their unique environments.
Furthermore, this present study is not a history of ideas. Instead we have attempted to 
analyze certain intellectuals' ideological formation from a sociological perspective. Limited both 
in scope and purpose, this research cannot offer a coherent and comprehensive framework for
examining the evolution of Chinese ideas of democracy.
HYPOTHESES AND QUESTIONS
The first hypothesis stated that there is a strong relationship between intellectual 
radicalism and the socioeconomic and political opportunity to which the intellectuals have access.
Among the selected individuals chosen for this study, most have become more critical, 
more radical in pursuing what they believe. They have expressed the need for intellectual 
autonomy and professional independence. Our examination has indicated that several factors have 
led to this conclusion. First, all of those who have been more dissident have had the kind of social 
location and/or educational orientation that have fostered their development. Second, as a group 
they have had the kind of access to socioeconomic and socio-political opportunities which 
empowered their dissidence. Third, the particular political, historical and intellectual contexts 
have exerted great influence in their ideological formation. We have observed that not only the 
social movements themselves but also the assertions made during the democracy movements have 
been socially and culturally bound. Finally, we have also observed that the intellectuals’ 
secondary socialization such as their educational orientations and occupational and political ties 
also have influenced their ideological production.
Based upon the observations above, we can conclude with Gramsei, Bourdieu and 
Mannheim that ideological formation is closely related to the social location of intellectuals. We 
further conclude that the extent and level of intellectuals’ dissidence and critique are closely 
related to their unique socio-political circumstances and opportunities. We thus conditionally 
confirm the first hypothesis. The limitations of the study stated above prevent an unconditional 
confirmation; but we can with reasonableconfidence suggest that other intellectuals exposed to 
similar influences and given the same opportunities would very likely respond in similar ways.
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Influence of the Intellectuals
The second hypothesis was that post-Mao intellectuals deepened consciousness has 
exerted significant impact both on the general public and on the hegemony o f  mainland China.
The Chinese intellectuals selected for this study were leaders in widespread attempts to 
restructure their relationship with the state in the post-Mao era. In spite of continued suppression, 
the critical intellectuals have shown more courage in lodging their complaints and raising their 
questions against the policies of the present regime, even to the extent of denouncing the socialist 
system itself. Their intellectual radicalism has pointed to the breakdown of the Chinese tradition 
of intellectuals as 'obedient and loyal remonstrators'. Our study discovered numerous illustrations 
of the growing independence from the influence of the state, including open letters to plead for the 
rights of the demonstrating students (Chong, 1989; Tang Tsou, 1991), the development of 
democracy salons and open seminars (Strand, 1990; Unger, 1991; Saich; 1990), and even the 
establishment of an independent body for research and advocacy.
Younger generations of Chinese intellectuals, especially the sixth generation, have become 
more critical of the existing socio-political structure. With a new kind of autonomy they have 
tried to redefine the state/public/private relations. Unlike their previous generations, the younger 
intellectuals have somehow distanced themselves from the establishment either by establishing 
their own businesses or research institutes to avoid becoming appendages of the state. Such 
efforts require financial independence as well as independence in thinking.^
Although the degree to which they have influenced the public cannot be assessed with 
certainty and the changes in the actual hegemony of China are all but invisible, still the findings of 
the present research again point to a qualified confirmation of the second hypothesis.
 ^See Chapter 9. Among the young intellectuals wiio have launched business in order to gain financial independence fi-om the state is Wang Xizhe, one 
of those who fought for democracy in the Democracy Wall Movement in the late 70s. When asked by a reporter in Guangzhou whether he had 
abandoned his idealistic goals for the establishment of democracy in China, Wang replied, "it doesn't mean I have given up, I feel it is only right that I 
follow for so many years. I have lost touch with the people ... Since everyone is now in business, I feel it is only right that I follow the trend of the society 
and join the business world." Accumulating more money, Wang hopes to open a book store and plans to write a book on the democracy movement in 
Guangzhou (South China Morning Post, Feb. 3, 1994; 8).
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Generational Location and Ideological Formation
One of the questions posed in this study involved the influence of generational location on 
ideological formation. This present study has traced the development of the concept of "human 
rights" among the various generations of Chinese intellectuals from the 1919 May Fourth 
Movement through the June Fourth Movement in 1989 as one means of approaching an answer to 
that question. Traditional Chinese wisdom has always placed the collective good above any 
consideration of individual rights. But the concept of "human rights" has evolved from the 
interpretation of "liberation from autocratic rule" among the May Fourth intellectuals to "respect 
human beings" and "freedom of individual choice" in the post-Mao era. The sixth generation of 
Chinese intellectuals have moved cautiously in their assertion of human rights, tempering their 
ideas with thoughts of duty and responsibility. But the seventh generation, possessing an unclear 
concept of "human rights", have gone so far as to speak only of rights to the neglect of duty, an 
approach which we have labeled "utilitarian individualism". It seems perfectly clear, then, that 
the generational locations of different intellectuals have played great roles in shaping their world 
views in general and their ideological concepts in particular.
Chinese Concepts of Democracv
A second question of interest concerns the development of the concept of democracy 
among Chinese intellectuals. It is clear that the concept of democracy has not been a consistent 
one through the history of this century. Among the May Fourth scholars, democracy was thought 
to be a quick and simple solution to the socio-politico-economic problems which they faced. The 
more recent intellectuals realize that democracy is about political institutions and even a way of 
life.
Although the post-Mao intellectuals have a much clearer idea of democracy and its 
implications for social and political institutions, the findings of this study indicate that even the 
June Fourth activists had not developed a clear concept of democracy. More importantly, their 
behaviour did not confirm to any normal understanding of democracy. They have certainly more
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aware of the importance of freedom, speaking of emancipation in terms of liberation from 
unlimited and authoritarian state control. They view such control as an excessive interference in 
their private sphere.
The findings of this research suggest that Chinese intellectuals have grasped the general 
principles of democracy, stressing "people's power", "checks and balances", and "procedural rule" 
as fundamental to democracy. Although the intellectuals have presented no concrete proposals for 
development of democracy in China, the present study indicates that their understanding of 
democracy has advanced.
FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
Our observation of the relatively independent and critical stand of the post-Mao 
intellectuals indicates an expansion of intellectuals' influence upon the public sphere. Scholars of 
China are in general agreement regarding the success of the socialist state in its control of every 
aspect of the people's lives through influence exerted vertically and horizontally by means of party 
and non-party organizations (see, for example, Schurmann, 1968; Vogel, 1969; Soloman, 1971 
and Townsend, 1969). After Mao's death, both the socio-political order and the moral-cultural 
order started to disintegrate (White, 1993). In response to this legitimation crisis, the post-Mao 
leaders have placed modernization and economic reforms at the top of their political agenda in 
order to restore the credibility of the CCP. Further study is indicated of (1) the relationship 
between the legitimation crisis and the methods and means of implementation of modernization 
and (2) the effectiveness of economic reform in achieving the CCP's goal of restoring confidence 
in the socialist leadership.
Economic Reform and Social Reform
During the post-Mao era, economic development and economic reforms have led to the 
growth of a market economy. Millions of Chinese have started their own business (see Rosen, 
1987/88) and the southeastern coast and most Chinese cities have been opened up to foreign
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investment and trade. The urban private sector has mushroomed from a base of 140,000 
registered enterprises in 1978 to more than 3,000,000 units by the late 80's (Gold, 1991). 
University students, intellectuals, reformers and ordinary workers have also engaged in legal but 
unregistered & untaxed economic activity (Shehui, 1 1, 1988). Thus the people of China now say 
that "the whole country is doing business".
In order to promote technological advance, initiative and entrepreneurship, the reformers 
have acknowledged the need for a more liberal intellectual atmosphere, greater physical and social 
mobility, individual initiative and stronger horizontal links between enterprises, occupational 
groups and individuals. This has inevitably softened the boundaries between state and society and 
has encouraged a more fluid, dynamic and entrepreneurial society for the promotion of a market 
economy. At the same time, these socioeconomic changes have rendered the old social 
organizations of control inappropriate. For example, increased mobility has given rise to a 
floating population of at least 16 million who lie outside the scope of neighbourhood committees 
and work units and who therefore effectively lie outside state control (Solinger, 1991). It seems 
clear then that the development of a market economy to some extent has liberated China not only 
in the economic realm but also in the social and political realms.
The questions which remain open for further study are (1) does the economic reform so 
urgently desired by the CCP dictate new social organizations as well as new laws and regulations;
(2) can economic reforms continue if social and political reforms are withheld; and (3) are the 
economic reforms advocated by the CCP and the already evident social changes in China 
precursors of sweeping changes in the social and political structure, perhaps the total demise of 
the socialist state?
Protest and Social Reform
Some have argued that new social organizations have emerged in China since the late 70's. 
Walder (1992b) observes some grass-roots organizations sprang up spontaneously and flourished 
during the June Fourth Movement of 1989. He identified four specific types of organizations, the
345
most striking feature of which was the participation of all sections of the urban population. Some 
scholars similarly argue that a new civil society has been emerging especially since the Tiananmen 
Massacre (Tang Tsou, 1991; Calhoun, 1991; Saich, 1990; Sullivan, 1990; Strand, 1990; Unger, 
1991; Gold, 1990; Nathan, 1990; and Wasserstrom, 1992; White 1993, 1994 and Whyte, 1992). 
Unger declares that "what the urban populace of China was demanding, in short, was no less and 
no more than 'civil society... (Unger, 1991). Barme (1991) also finds the appearance of the 
concept of shimin, cityfolk, taking on the meaning of 'civilian' among the populace's own way of 
describing themselves. China scholars have generally agreed that there has been the emergence of 
some social forces within Chinese society which indicate some sort of restructuring of power 
relations between the state and the society (see, for example. White, 1992; McCormick et al.,
1992 and Sun, 1993). Waves of debate (see, for example, Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly, 
Feb. 15, 1993) and numerous academic studies on the development of civil society with the 
Chinese intellectual community have been provoked (see, for example. Modern China, April,
1993 and Liu and Wang, 1993). Economic, social, and political forces have formed inside and 
outside China, so that Wang Ruowang anticipates great changes after the death of Deng Xiaoping 
(Zhengming, Feb, 1991: 62-3). Liu Binyan describes Chinese society as an eggshell within which 
a chicken growing (Liu, 1990: 17); and Nathan says that although "the apparatus of totalistic 
political control still exists, but inwardly an independent society is developing" (Nathan, 
1990:120).
Consistent with the raging debates and studies already being conducted, this writer 
suggests that the emerging society presents a huge area for continuing study.
Chinese and Western Culture
Notwithstanding the general agreement of the emergence of civil society/public sphere in 
the post-Mao era, we must be cautious about the applicability of such concepts in the study of 
China. Against the popular tide of employing concepts from the Western social sciences to 
discuss the recent development of China, historians of China study have suggested that the
346
dichotomy between public and private as commonly used in the West may not be adequate to 
describe the Chinese reality. Rankin (I 986) proposed that there is one intermediate level 
(communal level) between the state and the private sphere. Other scholars also suggest that we 
can conceptualize the societal development of Chinese society in light of "state (guan), collective 
(gong) and private (si). And King (1994) suggests that the Chinese concept of "private" (si) and 
"public" (gong) are different from their Western counterparts, hinting that we have to analyze the 
ideas of private/public in context. Some historical works also report that Chinese society has 
retained a communal level as a buffer between the state and society since the late Qing period 
(see, for example, Rowe, 1989; Strand, 1989; Schoppa, 1989 and Kuhn, 1976). More recently 
Huang (1993) identifies a "third realm" between state and society in addition to the "public 
sphere" or "civil society" identified by Western scholars.
What remains for scholarly inquiry is the development of a uniquely Chinese system for 
describing and exploring societal development within China, which we may call a contextualized 
sociology.
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